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Abstract 
This thesis argues that negotiated peace agreements to regulate ethnic conflicts need to be 
understood as a process of within-bloc as well as between-bloc elite bargaining. The 
proposition advanced here is that the nature of the agreement depends upon the dynamics 
within each respective ethnic bloc. The theoretical framework of the thesis entails a shift 
in the conceptual paradigm for viewing ethnic blocs as unitary actors. Rather than 
viewing ethnic blocs as unitary actors (like nation-states), it argues that in the fluid 
dynamics of divided societies ethnic blocs consist of an area in which there is a 
constellation of factions that seek to exercise a monopoly of legitimate power and 
compete for control over the bloc's population. The nature of within-bloc competition 
shapes elite incentives and preferences in negotiating an inter-ethnic bargain. The nature 
of the bargain, whether a comprehensive maximal peace agreement or a limited minimal 
pact, is influenced by three important variables concerning the nature of ethnic blocs: (1) 
the configuration of within-bloc competition; (2) the tradition of elite accommodation; 
and (3) exogenous influence or dependence. 
Efforts towards the regulation of ethnic conflicts by negotiation between the 
respective conflict blocs are inclined to focus on minimal bargains to resolve threats to 
the leadership of the negotiating elites from within their ethnic bloc rather than 
comprehensive conflict regulation. The fractious nature of ethnic blocs dominates elite 
incentives to achieve inter-ethnic peace. The typology of three organisational dimensions 
which influence elite bargaining outcomes advanced in the thesis - ethnic-bloc 
configuration, elite accommodation, and external resource dependence - is established to 
highlight the effect of institutional, structural, and procedural ethnic-bloc dynamics on 
the respective elites negotiating positions and on the nature of the agreement reached. 
The typology is applied to four negotiated peace agreements reached in the 
Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland cases. Subsequent chapters provide an analysis 
of the internal ethnic bloc determinants and factional competition on inter-ethnic elite 
bargaining. By considering the factors that led to minimal and maximal agreements, the 
study illustrates the transformative potential of inter-ethnic elite negotiation and the 
influence of institutional innovation on the nature of the agreement reached. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The argument 
Donald Horowitz asserts in Ethnic Groups in Conflict. - 
In short, a principal limitation on interethnic cooperation is the configuration of 
intraethnic competition, both present and anticipated. Theories of accommodation that 
rest on elite initiative must include variables related to group structure and competition, 
for these constrain the opportunities for interethnic relations. (Horowitz 2000: 574) 
Following Horowitz, this thesis begins with the notion that `a principal limitation on 
inter-ethnic co-operation is the configuration of intra-ethnic competition'. It considers 
the nature of inter-ethnic co-operation and whether incumbent ethnic-bloc elites coalesce 
over limited and exclusive minimal security bargains or comprehensive inclusive 
agreements. The study attempts to contribute to the understanding of the configuration of 
intra-ethnic competition and the incentives for elite co-operation between conflicting 
ethnic groups. 
The propositions advanced give rise to the following hypothesis, which will be 
examined within the subsequent case studies: 
" Contrary to the literature on negotiated settlements, ' inter-ethnic Agreements are 
determined by the influence of intra-ethnic factional competition on ethnic-bloc 
elite incentives. The nature of the agreement reached, whether it is exclusive and 
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limited or inclusive and comprehensive, is dependent upon the influence of within- 
bloc factional competition on the incentives of the incumbent ethnic-bloc elites. 
Based on the assumption that ethnic-blocs are not unitary, but rather a constellation of 
factions engaged in an effort to gain authority over the bloc, the incentives for incumbent 
ethnic bloc elites to negotiate inter-ethnic agreement are subject to a degree of 
competition which is affected by the degree of leadership autonomy they possess. 
Assessing the dynamics of factional elite competition within blocs provides greater 
insights into the origins of incumbent elite incentives and the influence of within-bloc 
factional constraints on leadership autonomy. Moreover, the rationale behind the nature 
of the agreement or inter-ethnic bargain reached is illuminated by the incumbent ethnic- 
bloc elite incentives. Whether agreements take the form of inclusive, comprehensive 
peace settlements or exclusive security driven pacts is determined by within-bloc 
competition, otherwise described as factionalism. Within-bloc competition is illustrated 
by three dynamics: the configuration of the ethnic bloc, the nature of elite 
accommodation, and external resource dependence. These three dynamics influence 
incumbent bloc elite preferences and ultimately shape the comprehensiveness of the 
Agreement reached. The exclusive or inclusive nature of the agreement reached is a 
condition of the influence of within-bloc competition on ethnic bloc elite preferences. 
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1.2 Case selection 
The thesis examines four cases of negotiated peace agreements between ethnic conflict 
groups, which illustrate the impacts of intra-ethnic bloc elite competition. Two cases are 
taken from two different periods in the conflict in Northern Ireland between nationalists 
and unionists and their (externally recognised) respective ethnic-bloc elite 
representatives: the British and Irish governments in the first case, and the various 
factional elite leaders and guarantors in the second case. Similarly, two cases are taken 
from two different periods in the conflict in Israel/Palestine, between Israelis and 
Palestinians and their (externally recognised) respective ethnic-bloc elite representatives, 
the Israeli and Egyptian governments in the first instance, and the Israeli government and 
the PLO leadership in the second case. 
The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 in the Northern Ireland case is an example 
of a maximal comprehensive agreement, in which core conflict concerns are addressed in 
sum or in part, whereas the other three agreements, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, 
the Camp David Accords of 1978, and the Oslo Accords of 1993, are exclusive minimal 
bargains, in which the signatories prioritise arrangements of co-operative containment 
(O'Duffy 1996: 285) that minimise shared threats or exclude a `common foe' (see Diehl 
and Goretz 2000: 247, Rabushka and Shepsle 1972: 80-92). The assessment of four 
cases over time controls specific time-sensitive influences and the comparative nature of 
the cases counters concerns about geographic specificity. The minimal nature of the Oslo 
Accord in the Israeli-Palestinian case discounts the idea that exclusive minimal bargains 
are always incremental arrangements that create by virtue of their existence the means for 
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negotiating an inclusive comprehensive agreement. While the existence of a limited 
exclusive bargain can often create subsequent inter-ethnic co-operation, and increase the 
probability of inter-ethnic blocs coalescing over time, the failure of the Oslo negotiations 
to create a maximal comprehensive agreement, advancing from the Camp David 
Agreements, suggests that minimal bargains need not necessarily evolve into maximal or 
comprehensive bargains. In short, comprehensive, inclusive maximal agreements do not 
necessarily follow from limited or exclusive minimal bargains. 
Complementary circumstances and intervening factors impact the nature of 
subsequent agreements. It is the case that negotiating bloc elites `bargain in the shadow 
of the future'2 and negotiated agreements are bargaining outcomes which affect the 
history, institutions, and resources of the respective blocs. However, it is also the case 
that bargaining occurs in the shadow of bloc members' opinions and under the constant 
threat posed by insurgent factional elites seeking to replace the negotiators (Lupia and 
Strom 2003: 4). Agreements are not solely a series of incremental minimal bargains 
towards the achievement of a comprehensive settlement. Despite the best efforts of elites 
to maintain their leadership positions, within-bloc elite competition alters the identity of 
the incumbent elite by open competition, electing new leaders or assassinating or 
deposing existing leaders. 
The examination of the negotiated agreement cases addressed here indicates that 
subsequent negotiations and bargains borrow heavily from previously negotiated 
elements and features, and often include the `scratched out clauses'3 of former bargains 
creating palimpsest like agreements. The exact nature of the deal reached depends upon 
deliberate decisions made by the negotiating bloc elites in the particular political context. 
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A series of minimal bargains may serve as confidence-building measures, and elicit a 
degree of familiarity and trust between ethnic-bloc elites, enabling greater inter-ethnic co- 
operation and co-ordination over time by establishing stable rivalries (Diehl and Goertz 
2000: 110, Maoz and Mor 2002: 51). But these factors are not sufficient to explain why 
the minimal bargains are agreed. The scope of policy learning, established rivalries, and 
path dependence between incumbent ethnic bloc elites, while influential, are not the 
determining factors for the emergence of a subsequent comprehensive maximal bargain 
that addresses more than peripheral concerns. The nature of the agreement reached is 
mitigated not only by the intensity of inter-ethnic co-operation or conflict but also by 
intra-ethnic determinants, namely the configuration of the respective ethnic blocs, 
traditional elite accommodation, and the external resource dependence of the respective 
bloc elites. 
1.3 Methodology 
The original basis of this comparative research emanates from extensive Public Records 
Office research on the nature of the foundational agreements negotiated in each of the 
chosen conflict cases (Ragin 1987). The documented archival sources on Anglo-Irish 
Treaty negotiations from 1920 illustrated historical precedents for the subtleties of inter- 
ethnic elite bargaining and intra-ethnic bloc determinants on the respective British and 
Irish elite negotiators. The nature of the negotiations over Palestine in 1921 and later the 
demise of British-mandated Palestine and the emergence of the UN Partition Plan of 
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1947 accentuated the influence of Israeli (Jewish) and Palestinian (Arab) factions on 
British elite decision-making and exposed the comparative importance of the nuances of 
factions within groups and factors otherwise obscured by the interests of Empire and 
international dynamics. 
The focus on factions borrows from political anthropology, while the 
consideration of within-bloc competition is framed by the comparative politics literature, 
in particular the work on political parties, coalition building, consociational theory and 
questions of power sharing in the regulation of ethnic conflicts. Studies on the nature of 
ethnic cleavage, divided societies as well as territories, enduring rivalries, negotiated 
settlements, and third-party intervention drawn from security studies and international 
relations complemented the core literature on ethnic conflict. 
The case oriented qualitative approach adopted here, faces the `many variables, 
small N' problem, and the difficult task of isolating and systematically vary a single 
variable with a limited set of evidence, while addressing any number of explanatory 
variables (Lijphart 1971: 685). The remedy to this methodological difficulty is 
theoretical reductionism, minimising the number of variables under scrutiny by applying 
a fixed and limited analyitical approach. 
The methodological foundation of this study on how within-bloc or intra-ethnic 
competition configures between-bloc or inter-ethnic elite bargaining and the nature of the 
bargain reached is the first-hand investigation of the formal and informal positions, 
power and motivations of the elite involved by way of systematic, detailed personal 
interviews (Putnam 1976). This investigation incorporates eighty independent interviews 
at first hand (second and third interviews of the same subjects are not double-counted) 
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with politicians, negotiators, government officials, decision-makers, factional and ethnic- 
bloc leaders, civil servants, agreement drafters, NGO leaders, journalists, and experts in 
each of the cases studied and from an array of intra-ethnic groupings. These interviews 
were conducted in London, Dublin, Leitrim, Belfast, Berlin, Wilton Park, Jerusalem, Tel 
Aviv, Haifa, Gaza City, Ramallah, Jenin, Alfula, Durah, Boston, Hanover NH, and Halki. 
The first round of initial interviews was in-depth and semi-structured in form, and the 
interviewees often made themselves available for a second and third less formal, more 
open interview. The majority of the interviews were recorded. Because of the sensitive 
nature of the information or the position of the interviewees, certain interviews were 
either not recorded or are recorded but are unattributable. In cases where the identity of a 
particular interviewee was not or could not be provided for reasons of security and the 
nature of his or her position, dialogue with two or more interviewees provided 
triangulation. In order to increase the reliability of the information gathered and mitigate 
the influence of retrospective assessment and defective and partial memories, it was 
verified by one other independent source and, when possible, confirmed by elites from 
members of the opposing negotiating bloc. Interview material was corroborated, where 
possible by primary documents of public record and, on occasion, by drafts of particular 
ethnic-bloc negotiating positions and drafts of agreements in the possession of the 
interviewee and revealed to the interviewer. 
The information obtained from these interviews represents an important and 
original contribution to the understanding of the configuration of intra-ethnic competition 
and how it shapes the negotiation of inter-ethnic agreements. The interviews often 
provide a first-hand account of the motivations of the negotiators and ethnic-bloc leaders 
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as well as the interests of the hidden hand of the faction leaders. The material obtained 
and the analysis that follows provide insight into the mechanisms that contribute to inter- 
ethnic elite bargaining as well as the internal ethnic-bloc determinants. It is clear from 
this research that between-bloc bargaining is influenced by within-bloc competition. This 
research and analysis provide persuasive support for the central conclusion of this thesis: 
" that the configuration of intra-ethnic bloc competition, elite accommodation, and 
dependence on external resources influence factional imperatives, shape elite 
incentives in negotiating inter-ethnic bargains, and determine the nature of the 
agreement reached, whether limited and exclusive or maximal and comprehensive. 
1.4 Colluding to exclude: the nature of inter-ethnic agreements 
Negotiating peace agreements involves `cumbersome, tedious and sometimes devious 
rituals of compromise' (Bailey 1969: xiii). This thesis argues that negotiated peace 
agreements to regulate ethnic conflicts need to be understood as a process of intra-ethnic 
as well as inter-ethnic elite bargaining. Long described as insoluble due to the 
irreconcilable ethno-national4 principles that pervade in each case, the Israeli-Palestinian 
and Northern Irish conflicts can be viewed as enduring rivalries (Diehl and Goertz 2000: 
15) with established institutionalised parameters of conflict and segmented political 
competition (Lustick 1993: 43). These protracted ethnic conflicts (Azar 1990) have 
often, as a result of enduring rivalries, been perceived as a conflict of `solidary [sic] 
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groups' or unitary actors (Barry 1975b: 502, Lijphart 1977: 31). 5 When ethnic blocs are 
considered to be homogenous and insular, they are perceived to behave as unitary actors. 
In keeping with the unitary actor assumption in much of political science relating to 
nation-states and political parties, ethnic blocs are often treated as unified bargaining 
actors. Ethnic-conflict literature argues that in deeply divided societies and territories, 6 
conflicts are most successfully regulated by agreement between the conflicting ethnic 
groups or blocs as opposed to imposed external third-party agreements (Kreisberg 1997, 
Lake and Rothchild 1995: 21). As a result explanations for reaching agreement have 
generally been attributed to macro-conflict considerations, such as changing global 
dynamics, the end of the Cold War (Jacoby and Salsby 2002), the New World Order 
(Philips 2001, Stern and Druckman 2000). Settlements are successfully reached because 
of internecine stalemates and ripeness (Zartman 2001: 10,2000a: 225), balance of power 
dynamics, the divisibility of stakes (Pillar 1983: 24), and mediation (Walter 1997: 348, 
2002: 15). 
When such thinking is applied to ethnic conflict regulation, if negotiations are 
successful, the peace agreements negotiated by the incumbent leaders of each group are 
seen to be reached between ethnic blocs, implicitly equating the motivations presumed to 
be held by the bloc with those of the negotiating elite or leadership. The dominant 
assumption that ethnic blocs are cohesive unitary actors means that leadership 
motivations which reflect those of the entire bloc are inferred when inter-ethnic co- 
operation leads to an agreement. In sum, the decisive capacity of the negotiating elites is 
ascribed to the unity or cohesion of the bloc and limited competition within it. The 
fractious nature of the blocs is concealed by the achievement of reaching agreement. 
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The characteristics of that agreement, whether minimal and security-oriented, 
based on co-operative containment, the regulation of a common foe and shared threat, or 
maximal and comprehensive, based on the regulation of the conflict, are therefore rarely 
linked to the nature of the negotiating actors and bargain signatories. Instead, variations 
in the nature of peace agreements, ranging from minimal security bargains defined here 
as pacts limited to mutual security agreements (Sisk 1996: 81) to comprehensive conflict 
settlements addressing core conflict concerns, are attributed to macro-conflict 
considerations, such as changing global dynamics, the end of the Cold War, the New 
World Order (Philips 2001, Stern and Druckman 2000), `ripeness' and mutually 
detrimental impasse or `hurting stalemate' (Zartmann 2000a, 2000b, 2001). 
The creation of a mutually hurting stalement is said to provide a `window of 
opportunity' for negotiation and third party intervention. Conflict `ripeness' heralds an 
optimal time for mediators to engage parties to the conflict in dialogue and negotiation. 
Zartman asserts that conflicts cannot be mediated `any old time', and ripeness is a 
necessary (but insufficient) condition for initiating negotiations (Zartman 2000b: 8). 
When parties to the conflict perceive themselves to be in a `no win' situation and the 
costs of conflict are mutually unstainable the hurting stalement is reached and the 
partiesto the conflict ripe for negotiation and mediation with the assistance of a third 
party. 
The theory of ripeness provides a frame of reference for assessing negotiations 
(Kleiboer 1994: 109). It does not, however, address two important elements required to 
apply the notion of ripeness to negotiation initiatives. Ripeness theory omits a suitable 
measure for assessing stalemate thresholds above which parties are more likely to 
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negotiate. It also fails to account for `greenhouse effects', the influence of mechanisms 
or environments conducive to generating the prerequisite `hurting stalement' and 
eventual `ripeness'. While Zartman observes that in protracted ethnic conflicts the 
mutually hurting stalemate can signal a (perseverance) `win' for the non-state challenger, 
it does little to identify the prerequisites for ripeness and impedes Zartman's larger 
scheme (Zartman 2000b: 9). Acknowledging the importance of agency in negotiating 
conflict, Zartman alludes to the significance of factions and within-group splits but 
explains that factional activity is either provoked and perturbed by the `timing' of talks 
and stages of negotation. 
In Committing to Peace Walter argues that the two most important factors in 
convincing combatants to sign and critically implement peace bargains are third party 
security guarantees and power-sharing pacts (Walter 1997: 348,2002: 15). The omission 
of credible commitments or guarantees constitutes a disincentive for negotiating elites 
and limits the scope of agreement as elites bargain in the shadow of the future. 
Walter observes: 
Contrary to common expectations, combatants do not have the greatest difficulty 
resolving underlying conflicts of interest and reaching bargains. They have the greatest 
difficulty implementing the resulting terms. In short, the conditions that encourage 
groups to initiate negotiations and sign settlements do not appear sufficient to bring peace 
(Walter 2002: 5). 
However, it is also the case that bargaining occurs in the shadow of ethnic bloc members' 
opinions and under the constant threat posed by insurgent factional elites seeking to 
replace the negotiators. The existence of limited minimal agreements, however, suggests 
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that the preferences of elites are shaped by the dynamics within ethnic blocs as well as 
inter-ethnic conflicts (Kalyvas 2001: 103, O'Duffy 1996, Wilkinson 2000: 10). Within- 
bloc dynamics impact upon the nature of the agreement reached, suggesting that it is 
factional elites rather than ethnic `groups' that initiate negotiations. Where public 
support is the linchpin of leadership power (Lupia and Strom 2003: 8), incumbent elites 
share the desire to maintain and gain legitimacy for their position (Barker 2001: 4, 
Silverson 1998: 3). Equally, ethnic bloc elite leaders have incentives to limit the number 
of issues that might threaten their position, often resulting in a minimal and limited 
security bargain motivated by the exclusion of the common foe (Diehl and Goetz 2000: 
285). Minimal security pacts describe inter-ethnic bloc elite bargains agreed between 
ethnic bloc incumbent elites who collude to exclude a shared threat or common foe. 
Defined as any factional group treated as an enemy, both incumbent bloc elites seek to 
contain and/or exclude from the established `enduring rivalry' (Diehl and Goertz 2000: 
247). 
The new institutional arrangements created in a minimal security bargain are less 
a means of resolving inter-ethnic conflict than mechanisms to elicit the continued support 
of the bloc while simultaneously signalling strategic considerations to exogenous 
custodians or third parties by the signatories of the bargain or executive agreement 
(Martin 2003: 2). Minimal security bargains are not solely or primarily conflict 
regulation mechanisms but rather tactical arrangements among ethnic bloc leaders linking 
a shared security concern be it military or political, to create a durable non-permanent 
security regime (Buzan and Waever 2003: 491). The aim of the minimal security bargain 
often involves `papering over, rather than settling core disputes' (Higley and Burton 
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1998: 101). The shared threat of a common foe can often, though not always, entice 
ethnic bloc leaders to coalesce and reach an accommodation or mutually beneficial 
bargain with the incumbent leadership of the opposing ethnic bloc. Shared threats create 
the common interest to bargain, without which there is nothing to bargain for and without 
conflict, nothing to bargain about (Ikle 1987: 2). A minimal bargain constitutes a limited 
and exclusive security pact. It is often driven by a shared threat from a common foe, 
which is of mutual concern to the negotiating elites. An inclusive, maximal bargain 
represents a comprehensive peace pact addressing in sum or in part core conflict 
concerns. An exclusive minimal bargain, for example, may involve a co-ordination pact 
between ethnic-bloc elites allying against a common threat or foe emanating from within 
either ethnic-bloc (Fearon 1998: 269). When ethnic blocs are viewed as oligopolies and 
inter-ethnic bloc agreements as elite bargains or security pacts, the Camp David 
Agreement of 1977, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and the Oslo Accords of 1993 
can in turn be viewed as concordats reached by ethnic bloc incumbent elites, binding on 
their bloc at the expense of their within-bloc factional competitors (Lijphart 1985: 90). 
Conversely, comprehensive inter-ethnic bargains tend to be inclusive pacts, with 
factional representatives usually in the guise of political parties, willing to participate in 
bargaining (if not always to commit to the bargain). Comprehensive security bargains 
tend to incorporate incumbent as well as insurgent intra-bloc factional elites and tend to 
address core conflict concerns. Furthermore, inclusive comprehensive agreements 
contain elements of an agreed inter-ethnic arrangement, externally endorsed and 
constituting a distinct political accommodation viewed from the longue duree or long 
term. The Camp David Accords, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and the Oslo Accords are 
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defined here as limited or minimal exclusive security bargains, forged to address a 
common foe. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998, however, is described as an 
inclusive, comprehensive maximal bargain. 
In distinguishing between minimal or limited security pacts and comprehensive 
bargains, the study attempts to address why it is that `the conditions that encourage 
groups to initiate negotiations and sign settlements do not appear sufficient to bring 
peace' (Walter 2002: 5,1997: 336). Walter and others examine the constraints restricting 
bargain implementation rather than consider the nature of the bargain created and 
associated incentives and constraints. The capacity of incumbent leaders to represent 
their ethnic blocs in negotiations is taken for granted (Lijphart 1977: 25,31, Nordlinger 
1972: 118). The proposition advanced here is that the nature of the agreement reached 
needs to be understood as a process of intra-ethnic as well as inter-ethnic elite bargaining 
and depends upon the dynamic within each ethnic bloc. The decision to negotiate, the 
incentive to reach agreement and the type of agreement reached depend on the nature of 
the within-bloc political constraints placed on ethnic bloc factional leaders. 
The consideration of intra-bloc competition between competing elites integrates 
the literature on consociational theory and research on consociational parties? as well as 
the study of coalition bargaining, 8 the role of factions9 and that of elites, 10 incorporating 
studies on enduring rivalries, security and peacemaking. " 
In applying these literatures to the material on ethnic conflict regulation and 
negotiated settlements, ' 2 the study addresses the way in which an inter-ethnic 
accommodation or bargain is configured by existing and anticipated intra-ethnic 
competition (Horowitz 2000: 574). 
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Accounts of the agreements reached in negotiations in the Israeli-Palestinian and 
Northern Ireland conflicts have yet to be explained in these terms. The Agreements in 
the Northern Ireland case, namely the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and the Good 
Friday Agreement of 1998, are linked indirectly to a process of peace. The Camp David 
Accords of 1978 and the Oslo Accords of 1993 in the Israeli-Palestinian case are also 
causally linked to a process of peace. Previous accounts omit the influence of elite 
incentives on the agreements reached, the exclusive or inclusive nature of the bargain, 
and whether the bargain reached attempts to address the core conflict concerns or seeks 
only to collude in order to exclude and secure a moderate, limited pact. 
1.5 The puzzles 
Approaching inter-ethnic peace agreements without consideration of elite incentives and 
the way they are shaped leads to a series of interesting puzzles. In the Northern Irish 
case, for example, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was a security-driven bargain 
limited and exclusive in nature. Numerous questions arise as a result of this pact 
(Horowitz 1990: 452). What led the British and Irish governments, as the dominant 
factional elites representing British Unionism and Irish Nationalism, to converge on the 
final bargain when this outcome deviated substantially from the options considered at the 
outset of the negotiations? Why was the Irish government, as the representative of the 
Nationalist bloc, agreeable to committing itself to greater responsibility for Northern 
Ireland without a concomitant increase in power? In the later 1998 Good Friday 
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Agreement, the paradox was that an inclusive comprehensive agreement was reached 
despite the contradictory end goals of the negotiating ethnic-bloc elites. Why would 
competing factional elites with divergent ambitions agree to an inclusive and 
comprehensive bargain? 
In the Israeli and Palestinian case, the two substantive peace agreements suggest 
further puzzles. The Camp David Agreement of 1978 was an exclusive limited bargain 
between Israel representing the Israeli ethnic bloc and Egypt, in this instance, 
representing the Palestinians and therefore the Arab bloc. The Agreement alluded to the 
prospects of a more comprehensive agreement addressing the Palestinian question and for 
peace in the Middle East. The difficulty lies in the willingness of the leadership of the 
Israeli bloc, committed to a greater Israel and territorial Israeli expansion, to relinquish 
land to Egypt. Why did the ethnic-bloc elites agree to a partial pact that failed to accede 
to the articulated goals of either bloc? In the later Oslo Accords of 1993, between the 
PLO leadership and the Israeli government, what accounts for the willingness of the 
leaders of the respective ethnic blocs to agree to a partial, limited security pact in secret 
negotiations in the midst of a comprehensive initiative with international sponsors to 
address the core conflict concerns? 
The puzzles arise from a prior consideration of the nature of the agreements 
reached without explicit attention to the motivations of the leadership of the respective 
ethnic blocs and their desire for agreement. This thesis argues that the degree of ethnic 
bloc cohesion and uniformity, as well as the influence of within-bloc dynamics (Mitchell 
1995), shapes the preferences of the elites and crucially the nature of the agreement 
made. Exclusive security pacts described as essential, minimal, and limited bargains can 
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be negotiated by incumbent elites representing blocs that contain intense internal 
factional competition. This type of exclusive bargain limited to security may be agreed 
upon in order to contain an intra-ethnic leadership challenge from a factional elite within 
a bloc that seeks to escalate inter-ethnic conflict. The threat of an insurgent or challenger 
to the equilibrium of the existing conflict regime or `status quo' impacts upon the 
traditional rivalries (Maoz and Mor 2002: 71) between the incumbent elites of both ethnic 
blocs and creates a shared incentive for the leaders to negotiate an exclusive inter-ethnic 
minimal bargain in order to secure their respective positions in light of the mutual threat. 
The existence of limited minimal agreements, however, suggests that the preferences of 
elites are shaped by intra-ethnic as well as inter-ethnic conflicts. 
Bloc elites have incentives to agree to a minimal bargain that controls intra- 
ethnic insurgents who constitute a common foe. The ability and incentives of bloc elites 
to reach exclusive and limited rather than comprehensive agreements compel 
investigation into the features that shape inter-elite bargaining. When negotiated inter- 
ethnic agreements are viewed as the product of bargaining between leaders of fractious 
rather than unitary ethnic blocs, it is possible to clarify the fundamental aspects of 
factional within-bloc influences on inter-ethnic bargaining. 
Distinguishing between the incumbent elite or leadership and the insurgent 
factional elites of the ethnic bloc reveals the complexity obscured by the misleading 
perception of the bloc as a unitary actor. The thesis advanced here is that ethnic blocs are 
not unitary actors but a constellation of factions. An ethnic bloc includes: the incumbent 
factional elite leadership, elite factional challengers, and the demotic, united in the bloc 
by virtue of any number of shared racial, ethnic, historical, linguistic, religious, cultural, 
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national or territorial ties (Connor 1994, Smith 1983). Ethnic-bloc categories are 
described as `social phenomena, which exist only where there is a convergence of views 
and understandings among "the X" of what is and what is not a reasonable claim to "x- 
ness"' (Ruane and Todd 2003: 6). The bloc is created by the members' tacit agreement 
to pursue a common articulated goal. The nature of the declared goal of the ethnic bloc 
may be liberation, unity, reunification, self-determination, or a similar aim to which the 
majority aspire (Kelly 1968: 62). Ethnic blocs share an alleged ascriptive identity or 
concord on par with Renan's description of the nation as `a daily plebiscite'. Ethnic 
blocs as such are fractious and subject to episodic change. 
It is a group's mutual antagonism to an opposing ethnic bloc that is perceived as 
threatening the realisation of its particular bloc goal and which forms the important 
feature of inter-ethnic animosity. The `other' bloc is equally shaped by an array of 
associations as well as a broadly agreed goal that challenges and conflicts with the 
aspirations of the first bloc. The existence of a dominant ethnic cleavage broadly defined 
(Connor 1994: 73-6,207, Brubaker 2002: 169), and conflicting aspirations that threaten 
the ability of each bloc to fulfil its respective goals, unifies each bloc against the other. 
Within-bloc cohesion and between-bloc opposition are perceived as resistant to change 
and able to survive quite radical social and political change (Ruane and Todd 2003: 17). 
The apparent cohesion within ethnic blocs in times of conflict is often mistaken for 
political homogeneity (see Lijphart 1977: 25, Nordlinger 1972: 118). The inter-ethnic 
conflict can obscure the degree of division within blocs and the existence of divergent 
preferences around which factional elites evolve and form the basis of challenges to the 
incumbent bloc leaders (Enloe 1977: 150). Factional elites share the broad aspirations of 
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the bloc and tend to co-operate with the incumbent bloc leaders under certain conflict 
conditions usually in order to compete more effectively with the opposing ethnic group 
(Cook 2002: xi). 
1.6 Pernicious factions: the role of within-bloc dynamics 
A faction refers to any group within the ethnic bloc that seeks to exert authority over it 
(Rose 1964: 36). Blocs may contain factions that reflect ideological, religious or political 
movements, or parties that preserve separate identities within the bloc community. The 
political effectiveness of a faction within the bloc is a function of the ruling factions 
potential for control and for unity (Dahl 1958: 465). The term faction, while broad, 
focuses attention on the inner dynamics of ethnic blocs, providing a unit of analysis that 
allows for functional equivalence as factions form an appropriate application in the 
analysis of within-bloc dynamics (Sartori 1970: 1034). 
Factions provide the opportunity to study the interaction and competition within 
and among political parties, segments, cliques, networks, patron-client dyads, and 
paramilitary organisations, as well as the consideration of strategic decision-making by 
self-promoting leaders in stages of conflict and transition (Brumfiel and Fox 1994: 6). 
Addressing the role of factions provides for greater understanding of how within-bloc 
dynamics shape leaders' perceptions and decision-making (Kelman 1970). While 
incumbent elite motivation is a necessary condition for initiating and engaging in inter- 
ethnic bargaining (Nordlinger 1972: 118), leadership or incumbent elite intentions are 
19 
variables rather than constants (Horowitz 2000). Factional competition is also an 
important force for social transformation (Brumfiel and Fox 1994: 3) all the more 
significant when ethnic blocs are perceived as social phenomena (Ruane and Todd 2003: 
7) in the ever-changeable dynamics of divided societies and territories. In ethnic blocs in 
which there is a constellation of factions that seek to exercise a monopoly of legitimate 
power and compete for control over the bloc's population, the nature of intra-bloc 
competition shapes leadership incentives and preferences in negotiating an inter-ethnic 
bargain. 
The purpose of this study is to consider the constraints on what Horowitz 
describes as the `latitude of leadership', or elite autonomy, namely the influence of 
institutional and structural mechanisms on the exercise of leadership autonomy. It 
considers how and in what way intra-bloc dynamics influence incumbent factional 
preferences and shape subsequent inter-ethnic bargains as exclusive or inclusive. 
Borrowing from Lupia and Strom, bargaining is defined as: 
a process by which actors engage in communication for the purpose of finding a mutually 
beneficial agreement. Bargaining is required to reach such agreement, if there exist 
individual benefits that can only be achieved through collective action, if there are 
multiple ways of distributing the benefits associated with such actions and no actor can 
simply impose a collective arrangement upon another. (Lupia and Strom 2003: 5) 
Individual benefits mean parties to the bargain can accomplish more working together 
than they would otherwise. It follows that bargainers have incentives to adapt their 
behaviour because of transaction costs by structuring agreements in particular ways: 
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`When uncertainty and the threat of opportunism generate large transaction costs, 
[bargaining elites] have an incentive to seek restrictive arrangements' (Lupia and Strom 
2003: 13). Some bargains or settlements therefore seek at best to `tame' and contain 
rather than resolve conflict. Minimal or limited inter-ethnic bargains tend not to be 
"principle driven" making ethnic bloc leaders vulnerable to the charge of striking `heretic 
bargains' (Higley and Burton 1998: 99). Such bargains can result in the apparent or 
actual abandonment of core ethnic bloc commitments (communalities) and co-operation 
and generate a challenge to the dominant elite within the bloc, arising from a shift in the 
leadership's policy over the bloc's shared aspiration or goal, for example. Inter-ethnic 
bargains can exacerbate both `schismatic factionalism' which refers to divisions between 
well-defined and cohesive elements within the ethnic bloc such as political parties, and 
`pervasive factionalism', which involves a partial failure of otherwise cohesive elements 
within the incumbent elite (Siegel and Beals 1960a: 109). 
In ethnic blocs power and authority is confined to a small group, a controlling or 
elite faction which arrogates power to itself (Lenczoski 1975: 1). If all incumbents have 
rivals, ethnic blocs are a configuation of factions defined as any group within the bloc 
that seeks to exert authority over it (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003: 16, Rose 1964: 36), 
with a ruling elite who `to some degree exercise power and influence over other 
[factional] actors' (Dahl 1958: 465). Factional dominance is not permanently fixed; 
leaders can continue to lead only so long as they have followers (Barry 1975a: 396). 
Disaffection within the established elites can result in the emergence of an insurgent 
counter elite faction challenging the incumbent leadership (Enloe 1977: 152). Within- 
bloc competition for dominance of a particular ethnic group can alter the traditional 
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between-bloc rivalry. On occasion, the emergence of a `common foe' (the PLO, Sinn 
Fein or Hamas), constituting a political threat to the leadership of its own bloc and a 
military and therefore political threat to the leadership of the opposing ethnic bloc, 
creates a common concern and shared security threat `between otherwise rivals' (Diehl 
and Goertz 2000: 247). 
1.6.1 Within-bloc dynamics 
To reiterate, the nature of within-bloc factionalism or competition influences inter-bloc 
bargaining. In intra-ethnic competition the three crucial dynamics mentioned above, 
become transparent. These are: the configuration of the ethnic bloc (Horowitz 2000: 
574), the tradition of elite accommodation (Nordlinger 1972: 60) and external resource 
dependence (Burton 1990, Carment 1993, Herman 1996, Rubin 1981). Factional 
dynamics are analysed using the variables that relate to the nature of ethnic bloc structure 
and competition. The value of the variables is their illustration of the institutional and 
procedural ways in which within-bloc competition influences the decision-making and 
bargaining positions of the incumbent bloc elite. While one or more of the variables may 
dominate the factional nature of competition within a bloc at any given time their 
influence translates into motives for explaining incumbent elites' decision-making 
(Nordlinger 1972: 54) and why it is they decide to `do things differently'. 
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1.6.2 The configuration of the ethnic bloc 
First, the configuration of the ethnic bloc, the constellation of factional actors within the 
bloc, considers the institutional procedural nature of the ethnic bloc. The configuration 
of the bloc refers to the internal, structural nature of the ethnic group insofar as it has an 
incumbent elite or `leadership' involved in negotiations. Whether the bloc is made up of 
a series of political parties, paramilitary or quasi-political organisations, or whether it is 
embodied in the guise of a charismatic leader or `warrior gangs' (Enzensberger 1994: 22) 
shapes the configuration of the ethnic bloc. Any within-bloc elite challenge of the 
incumbent faction elite manifests itself differently, depending on the procedural 
institutional structure of the bloc and the mode of competition within the bloc. If the 
ethnic bloc is broadly defined, the parameters for within-bloc competition are numerous. 
For example, the emergence of pan Arab nationalism or pan-Arab movement led to the 
creation of a pan-Arab bloc advocating the political union of Arab states in the 1950s and 
led by the leaders of the Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi regimes. The bloc was short-lived, 
the parameters of the bloc were multifarious and numerous with little tangible consensus. 
Made up of factional elites of state regimes, these leaders vied for supremacy as the 
representative leader of pan-Arabism, but they failed to speak with one voice. Unable to 
seize the monopoly of power in the bloc for any substantial amount of time, pan-Arabism 
dissolved long before the competing regime leaders relinquished their claims over its 
authority (Mufti 1996). Pan-Arabism was a tool of legitimacy used by competing regime 
elites in the Middle East. The Egyptian leadership, for example, asserted its position to 
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speak for the Palestinians during the Camp David negotiations on the basis of its pan- 
Arab credentials. 
If the ethnic bloc consists of factional units of political parties, the nature of 
competition will differ from an ethnic bloc composed of political and paramilitary 
elements. If, for example, the ethnic bloc elite represents a democratic state government, 
the bloc instituted will be different from one in which the ethnic bloc elite represents a 
body of disenfranchised armed men without a recognised territory. In divided societies, 
blocs tend to contain a number of functionally distinct elite factional actors. The 
propensity for inter-ethnic violence often endemic in unresolved ethnic conflicts signals 
the existence of paramilitary factional elites often in tandem with political elites. The 
nature of intra-bloc competition is sometimes shaped by the existence of factional elites 
with force of arms. In these situations, relationships between factional elites tend to be 
instituted differently as incumbent elites engage in ongoing competition over the 
monopoly of force. 
The configuration of the ethnic bloc influences the autonomy of the bloc 
leadership. The institutional structure of the bloc shapes the internal power structure, `the 
mode of interaction', or the way in which incumbent elites accommodate intra-bloc 
threats and challenges (Scharpf 1997: 43). The configuration of the ethnic bloc is 
influenced by the nature of its composite elements whether political parties, revolutionary 
movements or otherwise. The composition of the bloc influences the centralised or 
decentralised nature of the bloc and the structure of elite dominance (Nordlinger 1972: 
73). Whether or not the bloc comprises political parties, paramilitary groups or 
revolutionary movements, in turn, influences the nature of elite accommodation and 
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whether it is centralised [resulting in pervasive factionalism] within the incumbent 
leadership, or decentralised resulting in open competition between schismatic factions 
within the bloc. 
1.6.3 Elite accommodation 
The `tradition of elite accommodation' referred to in the consociational literature here 
addresses the pattern of institutional competition within the ethnic bloc. It considers the 
way in which incumbent ethnic bloc leaders contain factional challengers and orient their 
position to maintain dominance over shared preferences or `values' that elicit consensus 
among the ethnic group members (Nordlinger 1972: 60, Scharpf 1997: 43). Elite 
accommodation signifies the potential shift in the support of the people in the bloc for the 
leadership. If the bloc is traditionally decentralised with schismatic factionalism, for 
example, where the incumbent bloc elite forms the leadership of a single-party majority 
government and is challenged by a faction (in party politics this faction would be 
described as an opposition party) conventionally opposed to the governing elite's 
preferences, this challenge is less likely to undermine the leadership of the bloc than if 
the challenge were to emerge newly from within the governing political party itself. 
Equally, if the incumbent ethnic-bloc elite leads a revolutionary political movement and 
operates a `catch-all' policy of accommodating dissent within a broad coalition, and finds 
it cannot include the current factional insurgents within the consensus, then the threat to 
the autonomy of the leadership increases. The failure of the incumbent elite to co-opt the 
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emerging dissenters suggests that a shift in the internal power structure has occurred 
within the bloc and the tradition of elite accommodation (Nordlinger 1972: 60). Any 
change in the mechanisms of elite accommodation alters the path dependence of ethnic 
bloc competition and the way in which the bloc is oriented (Higley and Burton 1998: 114, 
Ruane and Todd 2003). 
Any fissure in the support of the bloc factions for the incumbent elite can threaten 
the leadership position and increase the salience of the threat of both schismatic factional 
(or opposition party) challenges from rival elites within the bloc and pervasive factional 
challenges from within the incumbent elite (or governing party). The consequences of 
the change in the traditional nature of elite accommodation, altering the operational code 
of do ut des or `give that you may be given', can affect the incumbent elite's monopoly 
over shared bloc values and allow room for insurgent factions to compete over core 
principles, the consensus generating values and guiding or binding principles of the 
ethnic bloc (Mansfield 1964: 934). For example, if the bloc's common articulated 
aspiration refers to reunification of the national territory as a secular nation-state, and if 
the orientation of factional bloc elites has shifted from secular to religious, the failure of 
the incumbent secular elite to incorporate and reflect this change would threaten its 
monopoly over ethnic bloc representation in inter-ethnic bargaining. The monopoly over 
the consensus values of the bloc forms an important part of the latitude of the incumbent 
elite leadership. 
The ideological proximity or distance of the schismatic faction is significant in 
anticipating what if any accommodation can be found between the incumbent elite and 
the insurgent faction. Whether the faction adheres to the Weltanschauung model of 
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politics in which the group seeks to `make the world conform to their basic philosophy or 
world-view' (Lipset 1959: 93) alters the ethnic bloc regime dynamic. Factional adherents 
of the Weltanschauung model are not likely to be integrated into the bloc leadership. 
Where factionalism is ideologically driven within bloc, the challenge of the insurgents is 
less perceived as a competition for resources but rather an ideological belief in the truth 
of the world view of the faction and the inherent error in the preferences of the incumbent 
elite (Lipset 1959: 94). 
The threat to the incumbent elite monopoly has consequences for the negotiating 
behaviour of the ethnic-bloc leadership. Negotiation with the opposing ethnic bloc can 
increase the vulnerability of the bloc leadership, as co-operation with `the enemy' can 
invite one's own destruction (Putnam 1993: 26). The incumbent elite's autonomy, its 
flexibility to act without fear of strong within-bloc censure is influenced by the traditional 
nature of within-bloc elite accommodation of the bloc. If the orientation of the bloc's 
preferences has shifted and public support for the incumbent elite has weakened then its 
leadership position may be threatened. The threat may become explicit if the bloc's 
tradition of elite accommodation falters. For example, if the tradition of elite 
accommodation within the bloc is one of co-option (internalising elite challengers within 
the institutional structures of the leadership elite) and it is found that this mechanism is 
no longer effective, thereby making schismatic factions pervasive then the possibilities of 
elite accommodation have been fundamentally altered. When the incumbent elite can no 
longer accommodate the factional challengers internally, then the emergence of open 
competition within the bloc emerges, creates schismatic factions and constrains the 
previously dominant elite's autonomy. To minimise this threat, the incumbent elite's 
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position shifts to address the changing preferences exhibited by the challenging factional 
challengers or `ethnic entrepreneurs' (Kasfir 1979: 372) within the bloc. The nature of 
these preferences is often expressed by a countervailing and often centrifugal tendency in 
the bloc. 
In both instances, the incumbent ethnic-bloc elites' negotiating position is shaped 
by the change in support or position of the bloc it represents and the orientation of the 
bloc in terms of the leadership and its autonomy and monopoly over bloc power, voice 
and control. To a large degree, the vulnerability of the leadership to these intense 
factional challenges and shifting internal dynamics is influenced by its dependence on 
external resources, the third factor central to this analysis. 
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1.6.4 External resource dependence 
Today, I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter's gun. Do not let the 
olive branch fall from my hand. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. Do not 
let the olive branch fall from my hand. 
Yasser Arafat, PLO Chairman, UN General Assembly Address, 
13 November 1974 (Journal of Palestine Studies 1975: 192) 
Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone 
here object if, with a ballot paper in one hand and the Armalite in the other, we take 
power in Ireland? 
Danny Morrison executive member address, 77th Sinn Fein 
ArdFheis, 31 October 1981 (NIPC P940)13 
The third factor is the incumbent elite's dependence on external resources for leadership 
monopoly and autonomy within the bloc. External resources can be material, financial or 
status-oriented. The role of third parties or actors can be coercive or non-coercive, 
exogenous actors can become guarantors for negotiated inter-ethnic bargains and can be 
experienced positively or negatively. The role of exogenous third parties varies 
(Bercovitch 1984,1986: 155). In some inter-ethnic bargains, third parties exercise 
authoritative decision-making whereas in others influence can be mild (Burton 1990: 188, 
Osler Hampson 2001: 387). The role of third parties or external actors can be decisive 
for the incumbent ethnic bloc elites and for other third-party protagonists (Mandel and 
Tomlin 1991: 43, Wagner 2000: 482). Inter-ethnic elite bargains may form part of a 
nested game between competing parties exogenous to the conflict with a vested interest 
in particular conflict outcomes or bargains (Tsebelis 1990a: 164). 
The 1974 and 1981 speeches cited above, advocating a tactical change in strategy 
by both the PLO and Sinn Fein in their respective conflicts suggest otherwise. Perceived 
as political spoilers, Sinn Fein and the PLO were politico-paramilitary anti-regime 
organisations seeking to rupture the existing political parameters of their conflicts. The 
publicised policy shift of these particular political entrepreneurs towards partial political 
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engagement in tandem with paramilitary activity illustrated a desire by the PLO and Sinn 
Fein to engage the existing inter-ethnic conflict regime both by foul and fair means. The 
policy shift advocating the use of negotiation and a degree of political participation, 
threatened the monopoly held by other ethnic bloc actors over `fair means'. The appeals 
made by Yasser Arafat to the United Nations General Assembly and Danny Morrison to 
the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis represented tactical shifts, advocating a dual strategy for both the 
PLO and Sinn Fein in their respective conflicts. 
The appeals addressed distinct audiences. The PLO leadership's dual strategy 
was directed towards the international community at the UN, while Sinn Fein appealed to 
its organisation members. Both audiences were selected as the custodians of the 
respective leaderships' positions. The PLO leadership's legitimacy emanated as much 
from states sympathetic to the Palestinian situation as it did from displaced and dispersed 
Palestinians often described as refugees first and Palestinians second. Support from a 
majority of Irish Republicans for the dual political and paramilitary strategy was equally 
indispensable to the Sinn Fein leadership. 
Ethnic-bloc elites may be externally constrained from achieving or supporting a 
particular bargain, or conversely, within-bloc factional elites may be encouraged by way 
of legitimacy, a great power `arming a favoured faction', or by financial incentives to 
agree to a particular bargain (Osler Hampson 2001: 389). When ethnic bloc leaders are 
dependent upon one or more exogenous actors for support, the probability of an imposed 
bargain increases (Burton 1990: 196). Recognition and sustained support from external 
actors may maintain the position of the bloc leadership. Recognition of insurgent 
factional elites, by exogenous sponsors or actors, however, can also escalate the threat of 
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the challenge to the incumbent elite and constrain its autonomy. Conceptions of 
leadership status can be decisive in factional challenges because recognition of a degree 
of status parity is required prior to inter-ethnic bargaining (O'Duffy and Githens-Mazer 
2002: 120). If the incumbent elite is recognised as the legitimate representative of the 
bloc, then the leadership is predisposed to negotiate for and on behalf of the bloc, 
reasserting its inter- and intra-ethnic monopoly position. 
Ethnic-bloc dependence on external resources can mitigate within-bloc conflict; 
if, for example, an external resource is only made available or indeed made conditional 
upon a bloc consensus. Such resources can entice intra-ethnic consolidation and 
cohesion. Equally, exogenous actors can represent a shared threat to the bargaining 
intentions of the incumbent bloc elites, and encourage the negotiation of an exclusive 
bargain without the imposition of the influential third party, rather than an inclusive 
bargain to which the third party would be privy. 
The Oslo Accord of 1993 exemplifies this situation where external or third parties 
represented a shared threat to the bargaining intentions of the incumbent elite blocs in 
numerous ways. First, the declining support of the leadership of the Arab regimes for the 
PLO leadership and their increasing sponsorship of the insurgent Hamas faction 
threatened the incumbent position of the PLO. Secondly, the Israeli and Palestinian 
negotiators agreed to a minimal bargain under the auspices of exogenous actors acting as 
neutral facilitators, specifically the Norwegian non-governmental organisation FAFO, 
with the assistance of the Norwegian and Swedish governments. Rather than arrive at an 
inclusive, comprehensive bargain under the auspices of the United States government 
acting as facilitator for negotiations in Washington taking place concurrently, the Oslo 
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signatories exploited the existence of numerous exogenous actors. The twin-track 
diplomacy dynamic was conducive for the leaders of the blocs to prioritise their factional 
elite preferences of a minimal exclusive bargain over a comprehensive agreement 
addressing core conflict concerns. 
Combined, these three fundamental within-bloc dynamics affect the respective 
incumbent elites' bargaining positions, preferences, incentives and leadership autonomy, 
influencing the `collude to exclude' or `core conflict concerns' nature of the agreement 
negotiated. 
1.7 Colluding to exclude or considering core conflict concerns? 
The nature of the agreements reached between ethnic bloc leaders can be defined as 
limited exclusive pacts where leaders collude to exclude a shared threat or common foe, 
or comprehensive inclusive agreements that address core conflict concerns. The conflict 
regulating agreement reached is dependent upon the autonomy of the incumbent bloc 
elite. This thesis provides an account in factional terms of the negotiated agreements 
reached in the Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland conflicts. The Agreements in the 
Northern Ireland case, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, and the Good Friday 
Agreement of 1998, are linked to a process of peace. The Camp David Accords of 1978 
and the Oslo Accords of 1993 in the Israeli-Palestinian case are also understood as 
features of a negotiated process of peace. The nature of the agreements reached whether 
exclusive and limited security pacts or comprehensive attempts to address the core 
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elements of conflict are dependent upon the influence of within-bloc dynamics on the 
incentives of the incumbent elite. 
In the Northern Irish case, for example, the security-driven Anglo-Irish 
Agreement of 1985 was an exclusive, limited bargain. Numerous questions arise as a 
result of this pact. What, for example, led the British and Irish governments14 to 
converge on the final minimal security bargain and deviate from the more substantive 
political options considered at the outset of the negotiations? An elite incentive and 
factional dynamic explanation argues that the elite accommodation within the Irish 
ethnic-bloc had altered. The escalating electoral support of Sinn Fein within Northern 
Ireland and the Irish Republic challenged the existing mechanisms of elite 
accommodation within the Irish ethnic bloc while exacerbating the military and political 
challenge of Sinn Fein to the British ethnic-bloc elite's dominance. Sinn Fein became a 
stalking horse politically for both the British and Irish ethnic-bloc elites and an escalating 
security threat for the incumbent British elite (government). The creation of a common 
foe provided the impetus for negotiation. By the time the negotiations were concluded, 
electoral support for Sinn Fein, no longer an imminent political threat, eased the incentive 
for a more substantive arrangement and the bargain reached attempted to limit the 
military security threat posed by Sinn Fein. 
Why was the Irish Government (the incumbent ethnic-bloc elite) content to adopt 
greater responsibility for Northern Ireland without the correlative power? The electoral 
success of Sinn Fein altered the configuration of the Irish ethnic bloc, previously an anti- 
system faction. The adoption of electoral mechanisms and partial participation 
threatened the factional dominance of the moderate SDLP in the Northern Ireland 
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political arena as well as altering the nature of elite accommodation in the Republic. The 
Irish government, in agreeing to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, gained greater security 
responsibilities without proportional rights in Northern Ireland15 in a bid to limit the 
permanent reconfiguration of the Irish ethnic bloc. 
The paradox of the later 1998 Good Friday Agreement was the nature of the 
comprehensive, inclusive peace agreement, notwithstanding the competing end goals of 
the ethnic-bloc elites. Why would competing ethnic-bloc factions, incumbents and 
(some) insurgents, agree to an inclusive maximal bargain when they have divergent 
ambitions? An elite incentive and factional dynamic explanation argues that the nature of 
the Good Friday Agreement as a comprehensive, inclusive, maximal bargain maintained 
the consensus values of each respective bloc. The consensus value of each bloc refers to 
the nature of the ethnic-bloc's collective aspiration: a united Ireland for (Irish) 
Nationalists and remaining within the United Kingdom for (British) Unionists. The 
Agreement recognised both conflicting aspirations while addressing the pressing 
concerns of the respective Nationalist, Republican, Unionist and Loyalist factional elites. 
The consociational power-sharing nature of the comprehensive bargain allowed the 
factional elites within Northern Ireland to access power while maintaining their 
respective factional positions. 
The comprehensive nature of the Good Friday Agreement was facilitated by the 
consensus and convergence between the British and Irish governments as the incumbent 
ethnic-bloc elites. Their willingness to act as Agreement guarantors to facilitate the 
institutional and structural features of a framework for accommodating the various 
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factional elites within Northern Ireland to negotiate a power-sharing consociational 
arrangement was imperative to the comprehensive nature of the agreement. 
In the Israeli and Palestinian case, the two substantive and partial agreements 
raise additional questions. The Camp David Accords of 1978 constituted two bargains. 
Both were exclusive and limited. The expressed aim of the Accords set out the 
parameters for peace in the Middle East. The Accords were two-part bargains. Only the 
initial bargain addressing the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt was fulfilled. The 
bargain alluding to the prospects of a more comprehensive agreement was never 
implemented. 
The paradox lies in the willingness of an Israeli ethnic-bloc elite committed to 
Israeli expansion to relinquish land. Why did the ethnic-bloc elites agree to a two-part 
partial pact that failed to accede to the goals of either bloc? An elite incentive explanation 
argues that the configuration of the Israeli bloc altered and the incumbent governing elite 
of the Likud (Unity) party emerged amid an ideological cleavage within the Israeli 
ethnic-bloc regarding land and the aspiration for Eretz Y'Israel or the greater Israel 
(Lustick 1993). Dependent on the US government for external resources, however, the 
incumbent elite complied with external pressure to negotiate a partial bargain, 
relinquishing the non-sacred land of Sinai while maintaining control over the Gaza Strip 
for security reasons and the sacred land of the West Bank (Judea and Samaria). 
The Camp David Accords were an exclusive partial agreement. Israeli 
recognition of the incumbent Egyptian government as the representative leadership of the 
Arab ethnic bloc provided the Israeli incumbent elite with the opportunity to diminish the 
sense of threat perceived by the Israeli bloc while establishing a negotiating precedent 
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and securing recognition from an Arab state (Lieberfeld 1999: 73). The Accords 
simultaneously endorsed the legitimacy of the Egyptian government to the exclusion of 
competing factional elites, such as the PLO, which threatened the traditional elite 
accommodation of the pan-Arab ethnic bloc. The high external resource dependence of 
the respective incumbent ethnic elites on the US government assisted in the exclusion of 
the Soviet Union from negotiations. 
In the later Oslo Accord of 1993, what accounts for the willingness of the 
incumbent ethnic-bloc elites to agree to a partial pact reached in secret negotiations 
despite the initial comprehensive initiative to address the core conflict concerns? An elite 
incentive and factional dynamic explanation argues that the configuration of the 
Palestinian bloc, previously a schismatic faction of the Arab bloc, had altered due to the 
emergence of Hamas. The mechanisms of elite accommodation within the Palestinian 
bloc, unable to adapt to the religious orientation of the bloc's followers and the 
schismatic challenge of Hamas, threatened the monopoly of the secular PLO leadership 
elite. The elite's dependence on material external resources, financial support from third- 
party sponsors and exogenous legitimacy created the incentive for the PLO leadership to 
reach a minimal limited pact with the incumbent Israeli elite. 
The bargain was based on the Israeli (governing) elite's recognition of the PLO as 
the representative of the Palestinian people, achieving the desired PLO legitimacy. The 
Israeli leadership's incentives for reaching a partial pact arose from the common inter- 
elite threat posed by Hamas. Intra-ethnic motivations include the changing nature of the 
Israeli ethnic-bloc's configuration with the arrival of the Soviet Jewish Aliyah, creating 
new factional elites and a shift in the traditional consociational accommodation 
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mechanisms of the Israeli bloc with the elemental radicalisation in response to the 
Intifada. The external resource dependence of Israel on the international community and 
on the USA, in particular, was influential. The escalation of inter-ethnic violence and the 
Israeli leadership's security response to the Intifada were criticised internationally. The 
exclusive, partial pact at Oslo provided an alternative to the comprehensive multilateral 
peace negotiations in Washington. The limited Oslo bargain also addressed the important 
concerns of the incumbent Israeli elite without the necessary compromise of a 
comprehensive settlement of core conflict concerns. 
In divided societies, the initiative to engage with if not within the political 
parameters of the disputes altered the configuration of these two conflicts and the 
positioning of all the conflict protagonists. The partial encroachment of the PLO and 
Sinn Fein into the political sphere of conflict influenced the ideological distance between 
the other conflict protagonists or actors (Sartori 1976: 121) and in so doing shifted pre- 
existing conflict rivalries. In adapting their strategies, the PLO and Sinn Fein provide the 
conflicts' protagonists with an incentive to negotiate what often became cumbersome, 
ever tedious and occasionally devious bargains of compromise. While prepared to 
`employ all means' to achieve the PLO's objective `to liberate all Palestinian territory', 
Arafat also wanted to participate in the proposed negotiations towards an agreed Middle 
East. 16 Similarly, in the speech to its Republican membership, the Sinn Fein leadership 
was ready to forgo its traditional policy of abstentionism, advocating instead a dual- 
policy of electoralism with militarism to achieve its objectives (Feeney 2002: 303). 
Within-bloc factional changes altered existing between-bloc rivalries and with them 
incumbent bloc elites incentives. 
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Chapter 2 will consider the nature of ethnic blocs, arguing that retaining the unitary 
actor assumption impedes the ability of conflict analysts to consider the significance of 
within-bloc determinants on conflict regulating accommodations. Furthermore, it 
assesses the characteristics of ethnic blocs, whether they predominantly consist of elites 
from political parties, paramilitaries, revolutionary or other segmental groups. The nature 
of incumbent and insurgent elites is considered in order to chart the impact of ethnic-bloc 
elite incentives and the role of factions within and beyond the bloc. Three influential 
dynamics of within-bloc competition, namely (1) the configuration of the ethnic bloc; (2) 
elite accommodation, the way in which competition is managed within the group; and (3) 
external resource dependence or the influence of third party on intra-ethnic bloc 
dynamics are considered. 
Chapter 3 considers the Camp David Accords of 1978 as an exclusive limited 
inter-ethnic elite bargain, masquerading as a comprehensive peace agreement 
accommodating peace in the Middle East. In this case the Egyptian and Israeli 
governments secured their immediate national security objectives, culminating in the 
return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, the Israeli government securing a negotiating 
precedent and a diminished sense of threat. Both negotiating elites extracted desired 
outcomes to endorse their domestic bloc positions by coalescing to the detriment of a 
common foe, in this case the PLO. For the Egyptian elite, as self-proclaimed leader of 
the pan-Arab bloc, the PLO constituted a schismatic faction, threatening the Egyptian 
governing elite's domestic Egyptian and broader regional interests and autonomy. For 
the Israeli incumbent elite, the inclusion of the Egyptian government as the recognised 
co-signatories of an adequate and limited `cold peace', at the expense of the PLO, 
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excluded a common foe. The incumbent Israeli leadership accommodated potential elite 
insurgents in an eclectic coalition government mitigating schematic factional challenges. 
Finally, the case illustrates the nested nature of ethnic conflict settlements. The influence 
of leadership dependence on external resources in examining the role of the United States 
as sole sponsor of the Camp David Accords rather than act as co-sponsor with the Soviet 
Union as initially proposed. 
Chapter 4 examines the Oslo Accords of 1993 as an inter-ethnic elite minimal 
bargain to exclude the common threat from Hamas. The case illustrates the security 
features of an exclusive bargain between incumbent ethnic bloc elites seeking to 
neutralise the challenge from a common threat or common foe for both the PLO and 
Israeli government. The Oslo Accords illuminate the shift in the configuration of the 
Israeli ethnic bloc towards increasingly schismatic factional challenges and open 
competition in the midst of increasing inter-ethnic violence. Similarly, the configuration 
of the Palestinian ethnic bloc had shifted. Where once factional challenges were 
accommodated internally the emergence of the insurgent elite Hamas provoked a shift 
towards schismatic factionalism and threatened the autonomy of the PLO leadership. 
Furthermore, the Oslo case study considers the influence of external resource legitimacy 
and the role of multiple third parties. 
Chapter 5 analyses the Anglo Irish Agreement of 1985 as an exclusive inter- 
ethnic elite minimal bargain. The insurgent threat of Sinn Fein to the structural 
predominance of Nationalists as opposed to Republicans within the Irish ethnic bloc 
altered the mode of elite accommodation from solely schismatic open competition 
towards a pervasive factionalism of the Irish bloc. The creation of the New Ireland 
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Forum incorporated all Irish political parties with the exclusion of Sinn Fein and 
attempted to limit the changes to the configuration of the ethnic bloc provoked by its 
challenge. The British and Irish governments inter-ethnic bargaining attempted to 
undermine the shared electoral threat posed by Sinn Fein and the combined electoral and 
military threat posed by Republicanism. The chapter illustrates the position adopted by 
the representative governing elites of the ethnic blocs and illuminates the factional 
constraints that shaped the incentives of the elites and the nature of the final bargain. 
Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 as an inter- 
ethnic elite comprehensive bargain notwithstanding the competing end goals of the 
incumbent ethnic-bloc elites. The chapter illustrates that in negotiating the nature of the 
Good Friday Agreement the ethnic bloc factional elites (both incumbent and insurgent) 
bargained while adhering to the consensus values of each respective bloc. The chapter 
examines how the inclusive nature of the Good Friday Agreement was facilitated by the 
consensus and convergence between the British and Irish governments as the 
representative incumbent ethnic-bloc elites. The willingness of the governments to act as 
Agreement guarantors to facilitate the institutional and structural features of a framework 
for accommodating the various factional elites within Northern Ireland to negotiate a 
power sharing consociational arrangement was imperative to the comprehensive nature of 
the agreement. 
Chapter 7 concludes the study with a consideration of the nature of the ethnic bloc 
and the significance of factionalism on within-bloc conflicts and inter-ethnic elite 
preferences. It addresses the prescriptive considerations of viewing ethnic blocs as a 
constellation of factional elites and negotiated inter-ethnic peace agreements as inclusive 
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and exclusive bargains. Adapting the lens that comparativists use to study political 
parties, intra-party dynamics and coalition building to assist conflict regulation theorists 
and practitioners illuminates the nature of ethnic blocs as institutions. To examine the 
nature of ethnic blocs, students of conflict regulation are required to trespass across 
disciplines and use all necessary conceptual tools to explain and illuminate, in the best 
possible manner, the way in which within-bloc factional dynamics impact upon 
incumbent elite incentives and explain how and why they commit to a particular peace 
preference. 
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2 Elite incentives and the role of factions 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the configuration of within-bloc competition and the influence of 
factions on ethnic-bloc elite preferences. The importance of factions and factional 
behaviour arises from the advocacy of elite-based formulas for regulating ethnic conflict 
by negotiated inter-ethnic elite settlement (Lijphart 1977,1985). Elite-driven conflict 
regulation perspectives tend to adhere to three suppositions: a prerequisite ethnic-bloc 
leadership exercising a high degree of leadership latitude or `autonomy' in decision- 
making (Lijphart 1965,1977; see Horowitz 1985,2000: 574), the assumption of a stable, 
fixed and constant leadership, and the functioning of an ethnic bloc as a unitary actor. 
This study argues that ethnic blocs are configured differently and function as oligopolies 
with a controlling or elite faction which arrogates power to itself (Leczoeski 1975: 1). 
The incumbent oligarchs vie with challengers to maintain their position. Viewed in this 
way, ethnic blocs are a constellation of factions described as groups within the bloc that 
seek to exert authority over it (Rose 1964: 36), with a ruling elite who `to some degree 
exercise power and influence over other [factional] actors' (Dahl 1958: 465). Measuring 
the degree of latitude exercised by incumbent ethnic-bloc elites is made possible only by 
considering the nature of constraints imposed by within-bloc challenges. 
The fractiousness of an ethnic bloc illustrates the parameters of the particular 
bloc. Far from distinct unitary actors with fixed surrounds, ethnic blocs are built on 
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institutionalised relationships and based on a shared consensus over the recognition of an 
`in group' (Brubaker 2002: 167, Ruane and Todd 2003: 7) subject to episodic shifts. In 
divided societies, the `other' bloc is equally shaped by association and a broadly agreed 
goal that challenges and conflicts with the aspirations of the `out' group. `The self-and- 
other aggregative definitional dimension of "us" versus "them" and with "them" versus 
"them" is close enough in awareness and contractive experience to be called a 
consciousness' (Grove 2001: 358, Spira 2004: 255). While it is agreed that ethnic blocs 
broadly conform to an amalgamation of ethnic and national sentiment, the debate over the 
notion of the institutional manifestations of the ethnie and the nation has generated as 
many descriptive terms for ethnic groups as there are ethnonational or ethnopolitical 
groups (Brass 1991). 
The nature of the definitive ethnic bloc is contested. What or who constitutes the 
people (Jennings 1956: 56) is complicated by the `imagined' (Anderson 1991) or the self- 
differentiating nature of the nation (Connor 1994: 42). Similarly, ethnicity may be 
perpetuated by intervening factors with little to do with its emergence (Comaroff 1998), 
postulating continuity between the ethnic and national dimension (Conversi 2004: 3). As 
Spira asserts: 
Ethnic identity and modern nationalism have tended to arise out of specific types of 
frequently negative interactions between the leadership of centralizing states and elites 
from non-dominant ethnic groups, especially but not exclusively on the peripheries of 
their resident states (Spira 2004: 249). 
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Throughout this work the term ethnic bloc is synonymous with ethnonational or 
ethnopolitical. Definitional ambiguities result from the often dynamic nature of ethnic 
blocs. The institutional nature of the bloc privileges certain behaviours and can shape the 
expectations and preferences of political actors (Luebbert 1986: 29-44). The apparent 
cohesion of blocs created by the dominant ethnic cleavage tends to be perceived as 
political homogeneity (Lijphart 1977: 25, Nordlinger 1972: 118), obscuring, in turn, the 
divergent within-bloc preferences around which insurgent factions form. This thesis 
argues that within-bloc competition or factionalism has an inherent dynamism grounded 
in the malleability of ethnic blocs' and the nature of competitive strategising. 
Acknowledging the fractious and dynamic nature of ethnic blocs, the power 
afforded to political entrepreneurs vying to represent ethnic blocs in divided societies as 
well as divided territories is often elusive. 2 The way in which ethnic blocs are instituted 
can hinder examination of the locus of power which resides within patterns of factional 
accommodation concealing (often) diverse elite preferences. The ability of elites to exert 
power within the often-ambiguous parameters of an ethnic bloc is influenced by three 
factors. The way in which the bloc is configured impacts upon the autonomy of the 
incumbent elite. Whether factional actors are more likely to be political parties, 
revolutionaries or paramilitaries acting within a democratic state or a national movement 
influences the autonomy of the bloc leadership. Moreover, the way factional elites are 
accommodated is influential. If factional competition within the bloc is untempered (Cox 
and Rosenbluth 1996: 260), and competition within the bloc is open, with schismatic 
factional elites challenging the incumbent recognised bloc leadership by election, then 
within-bloc dynamics are transparent. If competition is closed, with challenges 
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accommodated internally, leading to the creation of coalitions, dynamics tend to be 
concealed. The nature of accommodation, whether broadly open or broadly closed, 
influences the monopoly of power wielded by the incumbent ethnic bloc elite (Siegel and 
Beals 1960). Finally, the dependence of the incumbent and insurgent elites on exogenous 
or external resources influences the strategies (Bloomfield 1997) available to the 
factional elites and the competitive dynamic of the bloc. 
The nature of ethnic-bloc (1) configuration and (2) accommodation as well as (3) 
the dependence of rival within-bloc factional elites (incumbent and insurgent) on external 
resources influences the bloc leadership's incentives in negotiating inter-ethnic 
agreements. Elite incentives, shaped by the need to maintain a monopoly over the bloc 
consensus or ideology to sustain the legitimacy of the leadership and its capacity to 
mobilise the bloc, are considered in the light of factional impediments and 
accommodating leadership strategies. These three dynamics are considered in order to 
illustrate the way in which within-bloc competition configures inter-ethnic elite 
bargaining and the nature of agreements reached. Combined and considered, these three 
dynamics - the configuration of the ethnic bloc, the pattern of elite accommodation 
within the bloc, whether it is schismatic and open or pervasive and the dependence of the 
bloc elites on external resources - prompt the need for appropriate elite incentives as a 
necessary condition for initiating and engaging in inter-ethnic bargaining. 
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2.2 Elites 
A ruling elite is a controlling group less than a majority in size that is not a pure artifact of 
democratic rules. It is a minority of individuals whose preferences regularly prevail in 
cases of differences in preference on key political issues. (Dahl 1958: 465) 
Insurgent and challenging factional elites are political entrepreneurs. By virtue of their 
authoritative position, elites are able to affect political outcomes regularly and 
substantially by advocating `ideas with hegemonic potential' in the political arena of the 
ethnic bloc and in so doing `shape the cognitions and values of the incumbent elites and 
masses' (Lustick 1993: 123). Their aim is to (re)define, for their own purposes, the 
allowable boundaries and the appropriate stakes of political competition. The capacity 
for insurgent elites in divided societies to reorient the already flexible boundaries of an 
ethnic bloc is greater than would be the case in societies free of violent inter-ethnic 
conflict with strong unmalleable institutions establishing the parameters of political 
competition as givens, permitting decision-making, bargaining and other forms of 
political activity to proceed `normally' (Lustick 1993: 43). 
Defined as those `who get most of what there is to get' (Lasswell 1958: 13). The 
role of elites in democratic transitions is well documented (Higley and Burton 1998). As 
are efforts to examine the influence of mass action on elite and regime types and 
transitions (Perthes 2004: 3). Sisk, reviewing the empirical evidence from South Africa 
and Northern Ireland asserts that `the elite-mass dichotomy is too simplified and that 
pivotal players are mobilized mid-level elites' (Sisk 1996: 84). Perthes refers to these 
elites as `the political relevant elite' to describe a powerful stratum that can influence the 
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decision making of incumbent elites (Perthes 2004: 3). The notion of the politically 
relevant elite (PRE) is helpful in distinguishing between temporary elites, namely those 
who gain a position of political relevance but do not necessarily maintain elite status and 
more politically influential functional segments such as elements of government, 
administration or the military. In keeping with Sartori's observation pertaining to the 
significance of political parties and party systems, not all elites are `relevant' (1970). 
In divided societies, the parameters of political competition are influenced by the 
dynamic nature of the PRE defined here as factions and subject to episodic change. The 
ability of incumbent bloc elites to withstand challenges is influenced by the configuration 
of the bloc. The structure of the bloc is only partially considered in conflict regulation 
literature that emphasises the role of incumbent bloc elites and autonomous leaderships in 
negotiating conflict regulating agreements (Lijphart 1999 et al. ). The nature of the ethnic 
bloc regime is, however, instrumental in determining the autonomy and authority 
afforded to the bloc leadership. 
A structurally centralised bloc is one in which the bloc leadership dominates or 
monopolises the bloc institutionally. The configuration of an ethnic bloc, for example, is 
structurally predisposed to centralisation and a distinct elite monopoly if modelled on the 
Westminster system with a plurality electoral system. Conversely, a multi-party ethnic 
bloc with proportional representation allows a structurally less centralised system. An 
institutionally decentralised bloc tends to have numerous sources of legitimacy 
manifested in groups and actors or factions. The `leadership latitude' (Horowitz 2000: 
57), or monopoly of authority attributed to the incumbent elite, can become more difficult 
to discern in an institutionally decentralised bloc. The pattern of elite accommodation 
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within an ethnic bloc is determined by whether the bloc can be described as structurally 
centralised or decentralised. 
The traditional pattern of accommodation used to co-opt or accommodate 
factional challengers to the incumbent elite's authority is influenced by the existing 
configuration of the bloc. If the bloc is described as centralised then accommodating 
challengers by way of coalition or co-option enables the leadership to absorb (Tsebelis 
2002: 12) the factional challengers, so that factional competition is pervasive rather than 
schismatic. Successful absorption or co-option of a factional challenge can result in the 
independent or distinct openly competitive faction reverting to the position of a 
tendency. 3 A newly modified or `tamed' tendency may maintain a niche monopoly 
although it no longer poses a threat or a challenge to the leadership. Centralisation of this 
kind is common in ethnic blocs with longstanding dominant incumbent elites and is often 
found in liberation movements (Irvin 1999: 20). The bloc elite might be instituted as a 
liberation movement, for example, and operate a `catch-all' policy of accommodating 
dissent within a broad coalition. But where it finds it cannot include a present or current 
factional challenge within the bloc consensus, it must either change its pattern of 
accommodation or anticipate a weakening of its authority. If the ethnic bloc is a hybrid 
of political actors with militaristic affiliates, as is often the case in ethnic conflict blocs, 
the elite and the challenging factions may be inclined to suffer from both schismatic and 
pervasive factionalism and employ various means of both open competition and internal 
accommodation mechanisms in tandem. 4 
The monopoly of leadership authority is revealed by the mechanisms used within 
the bloc whether structurally centralised or decentralised. Two means of maintaining the 
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leadership are available to the incumbents. The first one is open competition, 
characterised by the absence of attempts to centralise and co-ordinate or co-opt factions. 
When a bloc adopts open competition mechanisms, the challengers or factions to the 
incumbent elite compete for votes (in the case of electoral politics) or members and 
affiliates (in the case of liberation movements). The mechanism of internal 
accommodation is characterised by the existence of patterns of co-ordination of the elites 
across different factions. There is usually an absence of (imminent) electoral competition 
and attempts to `poach' members. These two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, 
suggesting a degree of ambiguity. Should an elite choose to engage in internal 
accommodation when it conventionally adheres to open competition to allay a factional 
threat, the change in mechanism informs the nature of the threat and the extent of the 
factional challenge. Within-bloc competition is usually assessed by way of elections. 
The incumbent elite will have the monopoly of leadership authority if there are limited 
challenges to its authority. In ethnic-blocs in which the leadership is elected, a vote of no 
confidence would constitute a threat to the monopoly of the incumbent elite's authority. 
In short, the factional challenge manifests itself differently, depending on whether 
the bloc is structurally centralised or decentralised and shapes the pattern of 
accommodation or `the mode of interaction' (Scharpf 1997: 43), namely the way 
preferences are formulated within the bloc. If the bloc leadership, for example, is a single 
party majority government and is challenged by an opposition faction traditionally 
opposed to its preferences, this challenge is less likely to undermine the bloc leadership 
than if the challenge came from within the governing elite (or party) itself. 
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A centralised structure may refer to the nature of the political institutions, 
whereby the system and its electoral mechanisms centralise the bloc. In cases of ethnic 
conflict where within-bloc competition openly manifests itself in electoral party 
competition, factional (party) challenges lend themselves more readily to examination 
(Mitchell 1995: 773). Within-bloc open party competition is further influenced by the 
hierarchy of intra-bloc cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 6). The `hierarchy of 
cleavages' may alter from region to region and and may be socio-economic, class or 
ideologically oriented. 5 Moreover, the influence of bloc configuration on inter-ethnic 
conflict has been addressed in relation to policy concerns and the way in which within- 
bloc elites engineer frictions and tensions in the wider conflict environment (Fearon and 
Laitin 1996: 730). The ramifications of these findings, while important for examining the 
influence of intra-ethnic party divisions over policy preferences, go further, and highlight 
the importance of within-bloc constraints on incumbent elites' decision-making and 
illustrate the significance of the configuration of the ethnic bloc on elite decision-making. 
Similar conflicts over policy preferences in ethnic blocs configured by non-party political 
factions would not be so readily visible, but would nevertheless play an important if 
undisclosed role in the decision-making of the bloc leadership. The importance of 
factional concerns has been addressed in the literature on party politics and coalition 
building. 6 Where elections determine the identity of the governing elite, electoral 
competition becomes the focus of elites (Mayhew 1974: 20, Mitchell 2001: 2) albeit to 
ridicule or delegitimise the elections as a mechanism of appeasement. Usually, the 
transparency provided by the (often) open schismatic factional competition between 
distinct political parties creates patterns of elite accommodation within the party system 
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as they would within an ethnic bloc. Within-bloc factional coalitions form in a similar 
manner to those formulated in factional or consociational parties common in some party 
systems. In the case of Japan defined as a factionalised predominant party system, the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominates Japanese politics (Lieserson 1968: 70). In 
this case, political party factions are described as imprimatur having the sanction of the 
party and therefore mainstream or non-mainstream without party sanction (Cox and 
Rosenbluth 1996: 268). 
The transformation of a standard form of consociationalism between segmental 
parties to consociationalism within a single (consociational) party assists in assessing 
within-bloc dynamics. Power sharing within a party, as compared to power-sharing 
between parties, can be analysed with the help of the concept of the consociational party 
(Bogaards 2002: 10). A consociational party is described as one made up of separate 
organisational entities that function as a unity (usually) in the context of multi-party 
elections. The alliance party describes a consociational party made up of separate 
organisational entities that function as a unity in the context of comparative multi-party 
elections and skilled at vote-pooling (Horowitz 1991). Conversly, the `congress model' 
party consisting of factions and/or subnational party organisations representing 
ethnoplural constituencies and operates within a multi-party system, the congress party 
model is more a system than a party (Kothari 1964, Lijphart 1996) modelled on the 
Indian Congress Party and characterised by a system of consensus that has assumed 
dominance. The congress party model illustrates schismatic factionalism, whereas the 
alliance party model suggests more pervasive factionalism. There is a plurality in the 
form of factions, internal competition is sustained and factions from outside the 
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consensus are absorbed making it a `continuing accommodation of interests' performed 
by way of `conciliation machinery' (Kothari 1964: 1168, Bogaards 2002: 8). The study 
of consociational intra-party dynamics illustrates the significance of within-bloc factional 
dynamics and provides a model to adapt to ethnic bloc factional segments. 
The Israeli case proves valuable as the ethnic bloc (broadly) corresponds with the 
political party system. Israel's low electoral threshold of 1.5 per cent allows for the 
inclusion of an array of perspectives, voice is given to single issue preferences and there 
are often one-man list parties (Hirschman 1970). 8 Israel is described as having a 
consociational party system (Lijphart 1985: 61, Lijphart 1999, Arian 1999, Hazan 
1999b). In considering the effective number of parties (to influence the creation of a 
cabinet (Taagepera 2002)) within the Israeli system, the nature of factional 
accommodation among party elites is important for assessing the flexible legitimacy of 
the bloc leadership. As a result factionalised and coalition parties tend to be counted as 
`one and half parties in terms of effectiveness'; the same description is provided for 
closely aligned parties (Lijphart et al. 1999: 33). The nature of elite accommodation and 
the degree of party factionalisation is addressed when considering the effective numbers 
of parties in a party system. As Lijphart argues: 
a three party system in which all three parties are completely independent entities is more 
fragmented than a three party system (with the same party sizes) in which one of the 
parties is highly factionalised. Conversely, a three-party system in which all three parties 
are completely independent entities is more fragmented than when two of the parties are 
closely and perpetually allied with each other. (Lijphart et al. 1999: 33) 
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In the same manner, changes in the instituted pattern of factional accommodation 
(whether broadly schismatic or pervasive) within the ethnic bloc reflect the degree of 
leadership latitude or autonomy. In the case of Israeli political parties, the description of 
party effectiveness is reflected in the ideological placement or positioning of the parties. 
A shift in the traditional nature and direction of elite accommodation in ethnic blocs, 
whether from schismatic to pervasive or pervasive to schismatic, charts the ideological 
diversity (distance or proximity) of insurgent factional elites to the incumbent leadership. 
Insurgent challenges to the leadership become more explicit when ideological 
diversity within the bloc is great (Sartori 1999: 14). Assessing the ideological proximity 
of the ethnic bloc to the incumbent elite provides a gauge as to whether the tendency 
within the bloc membership is centrifugal or centripetal. For example, the emergence of 
the Hamas faction within the Palestinian bloc threatened the traditional pattern of 
pervasive factional competition within the bloc. Unable to co-opt the religious and 
ideologically distinct Hamas elite into the secular and ideologically proximate factions 
within the `catch-all' PLO, the pattern of factional competition within the Palestinian 
bloc became more schismatic. Open competition between the PLO leadership and 
Hamas created a new pattern of factional competition based on divergent ideological 
preferences. The monopoly of ideology held by the PLO leadership was challenged and 
traditional modes of accommodating such challenges were ineffectual. Open competition 
between schismatic factions within the Palestinian bloc threatened the incumbent regime. 
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2.3 Ideology 
Elite assertions to the monopoly of legitimacy and authority within a bloc include claims 
on the monopoly of ideology. Defining the ethnic bloc as a coalition of groups united in 
minimal consensus regarding a shared ethnic goal or aspiration highlights the importance 
of within-bloc dynamics. Ethnic preferences are deemed to be intense and non- 
negotiable (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972: 66). Party leaders are vulnerable to outflanking 
by rival ethnic parties claiming to be the `authentic voice' of the bloc (Wilkinson 2000 
3). It requires that the incumbent elite can guarantee its autonomy when challenges to 
existing orthodoxy in bloc ideology or identity occur. The ability of the leadership to 
maintain and secure an ideological or value consensus is vital in order to counter any 
schismatic factional challenge to its elite autonomy (Putnam 1993). 
Ethnic bloc ideology forms the basis for bloc consensus. Competing over bloc 
ideology threatens the cohesion of the bloc's core resource. Maintaining the monopoly 
over ideology constrains the ability of the bloc leadership to negotiate comprehensive 
agreements with the opposing bloc's leadership. In comprehensive peace settlements, 
bloc incumbents effectively adopt the policy that `their competitions will no longer be 
driven by principles' (Higley and Burton 1998: 100). 
A high degree of leadership autonomy is required in order to reach inter-ethnic 
bloc agreements as the features of the bargain may constitute a shift that challenges bloc 
ideology and threatens the minimal consensus aspiration that forms the basis of bloc 
cohesion. Maintaining the monopoly of ideology is important for ensuring the continued 
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existence of elite authority as ethnic-bloc actors `attribute far deeper meaning to the 
historical battles that define collective identities than to the transient conflicts of daily 
politics' (Katzenstein 1996: 8). Comprehensive settlements can be more readily achieved 
when elites are `relatively free to strike heretical bargains ... and avoid 
backlashes' 
(Grzymala-Busse 2001: 88, Higley and Burton 1998: 100). Any challenge to the 
leadership's advocacy of the legitimate ethnic bloc ideology threatens the authority of the 
incumbent elite and heightens within-bloc conflict (Lindholm-Schulz 1999: 73). The 
failure of the leadership to co-opt ideological dissenters (usually schismatic factions 
(parties) as opposed to pervasive factions) suggests a shift has occurred in the pattern of 
accommodation within the bloc. 
The ideological proximity or distance of the schismatic faction is significant in 
anticipating what if any accommodation can be found between the incumbent elite and 
the insurgent faction. Whether the faction adheres to the Weltanschauung model of 
politics, in which the group seeks to `make the world conform to their basic philosophy 
or world-view' (Lipset 1959: 92-4) alters the ethnic bloc regime dynamic. Factional 
adherents of the Weltanschauung model are not likely to be integrated into the bloc 
leadership. Within-bloc competition is not perceived as a competition for resources but 
rather an ideological belief in the truth of the preferences of the faction and the inherent 
error in the world view of the incumbent elite (Lipset 1959: 93). In the Palestinian bloc, 
the emergence of Hamas is a case in point. In this instance patterns of elite 
accommodation or integration fail to transcend the ideological cleavage. 
The autonomy or `leadership latitiude' of the incumbent ethnic bloc leadership, 
(Horowitz, 2000: 574) is related to the degree of freedom it has from the constraints 
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imposed by the institutional and structural features of the bloc and from associated 
within-bloc factional conflict. Moreover, this thesis argues inter-ethnic bargaining is 
driven towards enhancing the internal bloc status of the bloc elite. Intra-ethnic factional 
imperatives influence (Wolfers 1962: 103) and drive inter-ethnic bargaining, shape the 
conduct of the ethnic-bloc elites, and the nature of the elite bargain. 
The existence of intra-ethnic competitive conflict is perceived to have an 
ambivalent effect on the overall regulation of the ethnic conflict. The literature reveals 
that violent conflict within ethnic blocs reduces inter-ethnic conflict (Horowitz 2000: 
598). Ethnic conflict actors are perceived to have only a determined amount of resources 
and violent conflict within the bloc reduces the capability for inter-ethnic violence (Coser 
1956). This affords greater significance to the nature of intra-ethnic conflict. 
If conflict within the bloc is violent, it deflects the attention and resources of the 
bloc from engaging in violent conflict with the opposing ethnic bloc. If, however, 
conflict within the bloc is a consequence of schismatic factionalism that is open 
factionalism between ethnic bloc elites, usually over dominance of the bloc and with 
political power imperatives, it can exacerbate ideological distance between the elites, 
within the bloc and result in a bloc wide directional shift towards centrifugal competition 
(Sartori 1977: 121, Lijphart 1977: 165). As a result, violence threatens the bloc 
leadership's authority, alters the leadership's transaction costs (those of making, 
monitoring and enforcing agreement between leaders), and changes inter-bloc incentives, 
often exacerbating existing inter-ethnic tensions. The relationship between inter-ethnic 
and intra-ethnic conflicts is complicated as noted in the following excerpt: 
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[I]nter-ethnic conflict may be reduced by arrangements that emphasise intra-ethnic 
conflict instead. Intra-ethnic conflict is usually (though not always) less dangerous 
and violent than inter-ethnic conflict. If intra-ethnic conflict becomes more salient, 
this may reduce the energy available for conflict with other groups ... 
Some sub- 
ethnic conflict, however, is conducive to a species of intra-ethnic party competition 
that tends to exacerbate inter-ethnic conflict. (Horowitz 2000: 598) 
The susceptibility of ethnic elites to within-bloc conflict, however, runs contrary to the 
assumption that ethnic-blocs are unitary actors. Ethnic groupings have been described as 
coalitions based on sub-ethnic ties often with niche monopolies (Olzak 2002). The 
proposition advanced here is that ethnic-blocs are a configuration of factions rather than 
unitary actors and are only occasionally coalitions. 9 The incentives for bloc leaderships to 
negotiate inter-ethnic agreements are subject to the degree and direction of competition 
within the bloc, whether or not elite competition adheres to traditional pervasive 
factionalism among imprimatur factional elites or whether open competition between 
schismatic non-mainstream factions influences the `leadership latitude' or autonomy they 
possess. 
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2.4 Legitimacy 
The preferences of leadership elites, when attempting to regulate ethno-national conflict, 
are weighed by their motivation for asserting or securing their authority within their 
respective ethnic-blocs. 10 The focus on leadership autonomy in the literature highlights 
the importance of - usually self-designated - bloc leaders who are able to represent and 
negotiate for the bloc while having the power to implement any decision made. The 
leadership is deemed to have the de facto monopoly of `legitimate concern' or power 
within a bloc. Autonomy does not characterise ethnic-bloc leaderships. It is the pursuit 
of leadership autonomy through legitimacy, the desire for greater leadership latitude 
affording power and prestige and the impact of certain institutional factors in this pursuit 
that characterises ethnic-bloc leaderships. 
The claim for legitimacy usually `involves the capacity of a political system to 
engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are most appropriate' 
(Lipset 1959: 86). The claim for legitimacy among leaderships refers to the activity of 
gaining authority and greater autonomy. The greater the degree of legitimacy or support 
achieved, the greater the leadership autonomy. Contemporary considerations of `new 
civil wars' (Kalyvas 2001: 101) attribute the declining importance of ideology in 
legitimating the position of protagonists and competing factions arguing instead that there 
is no longer any need to legitimise actions of factions viewed as `warrior gangs' 
(Enzensberger 1994: 22-30). Protracted ethnic conflict and attempts to regulate it, 
however, can lead to challenges to the autonomy of an incumbent leadership if it is 
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perceived as unable to defend or protect the bloc it represents or if a challenging faction 
has a greater capacity. 
Conversely, negotiated inter-ethnic bargains can sometimes increase and endorse 
the legitimacy of the elite if it is apparent the leadership is able to defend, protect and 
advance the position of the bloc. The nature of the bargain or agreement reached is 
influenced by the desire to create input-oriented and/or output-oriented legitimacy 
arguments. Whether the elite is primarily concerned with generating the means of 
executing good government and instituting the necessary structures and procedures or 
whether the elites is preoccupied with securing its legitimacy by creating elite power 
enabling and action enabling features of government (Scharpf 2003: 3). 
Legitimising actions often have unintended consequences and in inter-ethnic bloc 
agreements are no exception. Consensual inter-bloc elite agreements which alter the 
parameters of the existing conflict dynamic can, however, also result in factional shifts. 
Resulting changes in inter-bloc conflict dynamics can threaten incumbent elite autonomy, 
making it vulnerable to new factional challenges emerging from the new conflict 
dispensation. In short, the incentives for the incumbent elites centre on maintaining the 
leadership authority position while minimising and marginalising the constraints on 
leadership autonomy most commonly manifest as factional threats. 
The traditional patterns of elite accommodation in the bloc influence the degree to 
which the incumbent bloc elite or leadership can make decisions and gain the acceptance 
and compliance of its support base. Within-bloc support can depend upon the leaders' 
strategies and policies. The ability of the incumbent elite to gain or maintain support for 
a policy or agreement is based on the ability of disaffected bloc members to shift their 
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support from the leadership to that of a challenging faction. A fixed support base refers 
to the inability of dissenters to alter their affiliation or support. ' 1 
The configuration of the bloc, the extent to which a consensus exists over shared 
preferences or `values' among the ethnic group members (Scharpf 1997: 43) is important 
because it signifies a potential shift in the support of the masses or people (demotic) in 
the bloc. Any change in bloc support for the leadership threatens its position and 
escalates the threat of a factional challenge. Divisions or splits within the bloc may occur 
less because of leadership loss of previously maintained unity and more because of 
prevailing factions and pre-existing divisions become schismatic and open competition 
within the bloc ensues (Rose 1964: 45). An example of this is illustrated in the Irish case 
where the existing configuration of the predominantly nationalist Irish bloc was altered 
by encroaching Irish Republicanism in the guise of the Sinn Fein party. The incumbent 
Irish government and leadership of the bloc feared that the `underbidding' or moderation 
of Republicans made manifest in the changing policies of Sinn Fein combined with the 
increasing radicalisation of the Nationalist electorate provoked by continuing alienation 
of Catholics in Northern Ireland was encroaching on the support of the Northern Ireland 
nationalist party the SDLP. As Garret FitzGerald observes: 
The hunger strikes tempted Sinn Fein into the political field with the success of the H 
block candidates and they thought they could in fact win a majority of the nationalist 
community vote in N1, while continuing the campaign of violence and thereby gain a new 
credibility that might force the British hand, perhaps even to raising things to civil war 
level in NI with a mandate from the majority of nationalists. That was our fear, the whole 
forum and Anglo Irish negotiation was designed to block that and focus nationalist 
loyalty sufficient to pull opinion back, that worked. '2 
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The fear of a centrifugal shift to republicanism mobilised the Irish government to work 
with SDLP. Ideologically, the SDLP was closer to the existing parties within the Irish 
political system advocating a United Ireland by consensual means. 
This approach was closely paralleled by that of the moderately nationalist Fine 
Gael party in governing coalition with the Labour party of Ireland. In a bid to address the 
open challenge posed by Sinn Fein, the broadly nationalist parties agreed to convene a 
New Ireland Forum. The objective of this forum being: `to reverse a trend within the 
nationalist community towards SF dominance' 13 and `to establish a working consensus 
over the parameters of a New Ireland and the negotiating terms acceptable to the 
majority' 14 of the party elites. Consensus was delayed, hedged and modified by the most 
ideologically Republican of the entire Forum's parties, Fianna Fail. The Fianna Fail 
party attempted to maximise the benefits of the Forum by challenging the positions of the 
moderately nationalist parties while simultaneously securing its position as a moderate 
choice for Republican bloc members otherwise predisposed to support Sinn Fein. The 
two-level game played by Fianna Fail, the main opposition challenger to the incumbent 
government - affiliating with the moderately nationalist parties while simultaneously 
reasserting its Republican credentials - resulted in schismatic division as a pervasive and 
prevailing faction within the party, the conservative and moderately nationalist faction of 
Fianna Fail, seized the opportunity to challenge the Fianna Fail leadership openly and 
create a new political party known as the Progressive Democrats . 
15 
The potential for ethnic bloc members to shift support from the incumbent elite's 
`constituency' to that of a challenging faction, and the ability of the leadership to appeal 
to their supporters, are a measure of the maintenance of the leadership's bloc authority. 
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Popular support for the incumbent elite is associated with two interrelated factors: intra- 
ethnic outbidding, and bloc mobilisation. Intra-ethnic outbidding refers to the nature of 
intra-ethnic factional competition and the ability of factional elites to `outbid' one another 
in order to exploit shifting bloc membership values and constituencies (Mitchell 1995). 
Intra-ethnic outbidding occurs explicitly in schismatic factional competition when two or 
more factional elites (often political parties) compete for bloc support. When outbidding 
occurs, each factional elite promotes increasingly extreme positions, which in turn alter 
the leadership's incentives towards inter-ethnic bargaining and negotiation (Kaufman 
1996: 109). 'Outbidding' prevails when leaderships and elites have political (and 
ideological) space to shift within the ethno-national bloc (Horowitz 2000: 359). 
The power to outbid within-bloc rivals relies on an elastic bloc, where bloc 
loyalties are liable to shift, usually in response to mobilisation. Mobilising the bloc can 
alter its configuration and alter the fixed nature of bloc support. In response, the 
incumbent bloc elite threatened by changes in the tendency of the bloc to alter the shared 
consensus can attempt to outbid its immediate within-bloc rivals in order to restrict 
challenges to the existing bloc order (Gagnon 1996). In this study, bidding is used to 
assist in qualifying the centrifugal nature of competition among factions within blocs and 
the effect of underbidding or centripetal competition in arriving at inter-ethnic 
agreements. 
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2.5 Mobilisation 
The second feature of elite accommodation is mobilisation (Grove 2001: 361). Elements 
of schismatic factionalism, centrifugal competition and outbidding arise during a period 
of ethnic mobilisation within a protracted conflict. Two types of mobilisation can arise 
and are not mutually exclusive, and they may be exhibited at different phases within the 
same conflict. The `classical model' develops when the position of the incumbent elite is 
more extreme than that of the average ethnic-bloc member, creating incentives for the 
elites to modify and moderate positions. 
The second model develops when the position of the individual is more extreme 
than the position of the incumbent ethnic-bloc elite (Meadwell 1993: 241). In the second 
case, leadership moderation increases disaffection among factional challengers, creates 
elasticity, and weakens the autonomy of the incumbent elite, reorienting the monopoly of 
within-bloc power. The threat to the leadership may result in an attempt to accommodate 
the disaffected members and cadres who may be inclined to support factional challengers. 
The mobilisation crisis may prompt an initiative to accommodate pervasive factional elite 
challengers in a forum where grievances can be aired internally, thereby modifying 
dissent and censoring open competition. 
The process of mobilisation illustrates the leadership constraints shared by actors 
in each ethnic bloc that are built into a system of ethnic conflict regulation. When 
support for the leadership is relatively fixed, less incentive exists to engage in within-bloc 
accommodation when factional challenges are made. The capacity for both mobilisation 
models to exist within the ethnic-bloc dynamic at different times constrains leadership 
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autonomy and creates a `follow me, I'm right behind you' dynamic between elites and 
the members of the bloc. 16 
A change in the orientation of the bloc influences the incumbent elite's monopoly 
power and allows factional elites to compete for authority over the bloc. The 
mechanisms of electoral outbidding and bloc mobilisation constrain the status of the 
incumbent elite and impact their autonomy. The impact of shifting bloc support on the 
bloc leaders' negotiating preferences reveals the ethnic-bloc as diverse and segmented. 
The vulnerability of the leadership to these dynamics is influenced by its capacity to 
mobilise external resources, the ability of external actors or resources to mobilise the bloc 
and the dependence of the bloc elites on external actors. The third influential factor on 
elite bargaining incentives deals with elite dependence on external resources. Prevalent 
in maintaining the autonomy and authority of the leadership is the ability to regulate the 
impact of fluctuating legitimacy. The legitimacy afforded to incumbents by external and 
international actors is subject to the interests of the external actors and the effects on elite 
incentives. 
External recognition can guarantee the incumbent elite authority and status when 
it is the sole financial benefactor of the relationship of external sponsor within the bloc 
(Bercovitch 1986, Pechota 1971). This third influential factor of external resource 
dependence can be decisive when intra-factional elites compete for recognition and 
external actors seek to influence the dynamics of the bloc by favouring elite challengers 
(formally, financially or otherwise) over the incumbent. The utility of external actor 
recognition can be variable and often unpredictable. The incentives of external actors are 
often unclear. They may ascribe legitimacy to elite challengers to promote regime 
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change within the ethnic bloc, usurp the influence of the bloc leadership or acquiesce to 
the demands of its own domestic constituency and factional challenges. This can create 
vicious circles of political distrust and coercion (Putnam 1993). External recognition for 
pervasive factional challengers can exacerbate divisions, altering the pattern of elite 
accommodation - from pervasive to schismatic - within the bloc and create schismatic or 
open competition when insurgents have access to resources prejudicing their abilities to 
challenge the existing regime and to constrain its autonomy (Byman et al. 2001). 
When ethnic bloc leaders rely on one or more external actors the likelihood of an 
imposed inter-ethnic bargain is said to increase, particularly when one or more external 
actors are prepared to act as co-sponsors and guarantors for the bargain reached (Walter 
2002: 26). External co-sponsors can therefore influence elite incentives to reach 
agreement and shape the nature of the agreement reached. Conflict regulation efforts 
have, however, increasingly emphasised the role of the bloc elite or autonomous leaders 
in negotiating agreements for the regulation of ethnic conflict, advocating 
consociationalism as a device both in terms of process and institutional structure for 
regulating inter-ethnic conflict. 
Consociationalism and power sharing inter-bloc accommodations can provide for 
a consensus agreement between the incumbent elites of the respective ethnic blocs while 
including the insurgent elites within the divided ethnic blocs. Inter-ethnic grand 
coalitions have been addressed in the consociational literature (Lijphart 1968,1977, 
1997). Inter-ethnic-bloc patterns of accommodation that appeal to the demands made at 
the ethnic-bloc or group level, such as consociationalism or power sharing, often require 
the need for external actors as guarantors or co-sponsors. The consociational literature 
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addresses the instruments and mechanisms of power sharing between conflict groups. 
Consociational bargains or power-sharing arrangements provide for a consensus 
agreement between the incumbent elites of the divided ethnic blocs as well as a device in 
terms of process and institutional structure for regulating inter-ethnic conflict. 
Nevertheless, in the negotiation of inter-ethnic agreements, as well as in consociational 
arrangements, the freedom of incumbent bloc leaders to negotiate and enter into 
agreements is taken for granted, assuming the following contingencies: 
that political elites enjoy a high degree of freedom of choice, and that they may resort to 
consociational methods of decision-making as a result of the rational recognition of the 
centrifugal tendencies inherent in plural societies and a deliberate effort to counter act 
these dangers. (Lijphart 1977: 165) 
Defined as an association of communities, consociation is the outcome of a bargain or 
pact between representative political leaders of ethnic or religious groups in deeply 
divided societies (Lustick 1979: 328, O'Leary 1998: 2). Based on four criteria, 
consociationalism requires cross community representation in the executive by way of 
grand coalition, concurrent representation across blocs and pluralitarian levels of support. 
Conventionally outlined, consociationalism requires: (1) the participation of 
representatives of all significant groups; (2) the proportionality principle to serve as the 
basic standard of political representation; (3) a high degree of community autonomy or 
self-government; and (4) minority veto rights to protect their interests (Lijphart 1997: 
495). The central factor for successful power sharing requires co-operation among elites 
capable of accommodating divergent interests and factional demands with the ability to 
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transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival ethno-national 
blocs. The capacity of the incumbent bloc leadership, in turn, depends on its 
commitment to the maintenance of the regime and to the maintenance of existing modes 
of accommodation while recognising the `perils of political fragmentation' (Lijphart 
1969: 216). Within consociationalism, a critical role is attributed to incumbent ethnic 
bloc leaders. The final feature of conventional consociationalism is the representation of 
community autonomy and minority veto rights. 
The pattern of inter-ethnic accommodation is matched in the quasi-consociational 
features adopted within ethnic blocs in order to alleviate factionalism. Evidence of this 
may be found in Israel, '? where the Israeli political system and its party system have been 
described as functioning on quasi-consociational grounds. Based on four criteria, this 
form of quasi-consociational arrangement (within rather than between groups) regulates 
open competition and creates pervasive factions as it requires the participation of all 
significant subgroup representatives within the bloc elite or leadership to enable power 
sharing between aspiring elites, becoming an elite coalition of the respective subgroup 
leaders within the bloc (Lijphart 1997: 495). The proportionality principle of 
consociationalism serves as the basic standard of political representation between groups 
and is adapted in internal or in-group consociational attempts to the representation of 
factions within the institutions and structures of the ethnic bloc. The `umbrella' 
institutions of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation function on this basis. 
Within ethnic blocs, the autonomy of subgroups exists in their niche (religious, 
ideological, cultural) or geographical monopolies; the difficulties with autonomy and 
factionalism arise when the groups attempt to challenge the elite and dominate the ethnic 
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bloc. Successful power-sharing within blocs necessitates the capacity of the incumbent 
bloc elite to accommodate divergent interests and factional challenges (Lijphart 1969: 
216). Similarly, the internal organisational aspects influencing conflict regulation have 
been addressed in the study of corporatism (Lehmbruch 1993). It has been argued that 
corporatist arrangements in Western Europe were less successful in states that lacked 
monopolistic trade unions (Scharpf 1997: 235). 
In negotiated conflict regulation, ethnic bloc leaders initiate the bargain or 
arrangement reached, suggesting that `it is within the confines of the political elites that 
many of [the] explanatory variables are presumably to be found' (Nordlinger 1972: 40). 
The ethnic-bloc leadership, however, often `has limited freedom to choose its own path' 
(Horowitz 2000: 574). Analysing within-bloc relations identifies the mechanisms that 
mitigate elite autonomy and create intra-ethnic conflict. The dynamics that influence and 
mobilise ethnic bloc challenges to the incumbent elite induce intra-ethnic factionalism 
(Gagnon 1996). The incentives for incumbent bloc leaderships to negotiate inter-ethnic 
agreements are subject to the degree of within-bloc competition conditioning the degree 
of leadership autonomy they possess. Assessing the dynamics of factions within blocs 
provides greater insights into the nature of elite or leadership autonomy. The 
examination of factions is motivated by this literature on consociationalism, coalition 
formation and party competition. 
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2.6 Factions 
If leaders are the central actors and decision-makers in negotiated bargains then it follows 
that any influence on their performance from factionalism is in turn likely to influence the 
nature of the agreement or bargain reached. Factionalism refers to conflict within a bloc 
which `leads to the increasing abandonment of co-operative activities' (Siegel and Beals 
1960a: 399). Ethnic blocs hinge on co-operative activities and broad consensus. Any 
deviation in the tentative concordat that constitutes the bloc alters the nature of the bloc 
regime. Within-bloc conflicts escalate when factional elites crave a particular seat of 
power or compete to be the provider of benefits for the bloc membership. If all 
incumbents have rivals, ethnic blocs are a constellation of factions defined as any group 
within the bloc that seeks to exert authority over it (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003: 16, 
Rose 1964: 36), with a ruling elite who `to some degree exercise power and influence 
over other [factional] actors' (Dahl 1958: 465). Factional dominance is not permanently 
fixed; leaders can continue to lead only so long as they have followers (Barry 1975: 396). 
Disaffection within the established elites can result in the emergence of an insurgent 
schismatic counter elite faction openly challenging the incumbent leadership (Enloe 
1977: 152). The ramifications of intra competition for dominance of a particular ethnic 
group can alter the traditional inter-bloc rivalry and the nature of the inter-ethnic conflict. 
The way in which ethnic blocs cultivate their common interests and manage 
internal conflicts influences the effectiveness of the bloc leaders' ability to lead. As is the 
case with the formation of coalition governments, internal bloc competition and conflict 
constrains the degree of elite autonomy in negotiating inter-ethnic conflict-regulating 
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frameworks as the leaders bargaining inter-ethnic agreements have incentives to adapt 
transaction costs (Scharpf 1997: 117) by structuring the agreements in particular ways: 
`When uncertainty and the threat of [within bloc elite] opportunism generate large 
transaction costs' leaders have an incentive to seek restrictive agreements or limited 
bargains (Lupia and Strom 2003: 13, Maor 1998: 11). 18 Therefore, the nature of the 
ethnic-bloc dynamic in divided societies means that any inter-bloc bargaining presents 
controversy. 
The focus on factions is based not only on the coalition structure of ethnic blocs 
but also on the characteristics of ethnic-bloc actors. These within-bloc actors, while 
distinct, tend to share the same objective of within-bloc power. Although tactics may 
differ, the goal of the faction and the object of a factional challenge involves gaining or 
regaining leadership and predominance within the bloc. As parties constitute an essential 
part of the institutional machinery and policy-making process in a state, so within-bloc 
factions seek to control bloc organisation and to shape and dictate the policy of the ethnic 
bloc (Zariski 1960: 38). 
In the party literature in which a political party may be defined as `a large-scale 
organisation whose purpose is to control the personnel and policies of the government', 
factions have been defined as `an element inside a party whose purpose is to control the 
personnel and policies of the party' (Ranney and Kendall 1956). In cases of inter-ethnic 
conflict, bloc participants can be both factions and parties, in ethnic bloc regime 
dynamics, political parties tend to represent elite accommodation where open competition 
is prevalent and factional autonomy is greatest. Open competition suggests a 
decentralised ethnic bloc where schismatic factionalism between distinct groups exists as 
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the means of factional competition within the bloc. In blocs where elite accommodation 
is instigated openly, there tends to be a substantial degree of distance between the 
ideology and preferences of the incumbent elite and those of its challengers. Blocs 
centrally organised with peak association and rigid hierarchy tend to exhibit more 
pervasive factionalism, and institute internal accommodatory mechanisms sanctioning 
`imprimatur' factions. In blocs with internal accommodatory mechanisms there tends to 
be greater ideological proximity between factions and a traditional pattern of internal elite 
accommodation. To accommodate these characteristics, ethnic bloc actors' factions are 
broadly described as any organisational unit of political competition that seeks to gain 
authority over the bloc (Rose 1964: 37, Lawson, 1979: 1170) and more specifically 
referred to as schismatic or pervasive. 
These distinctions allow for the inclusion of political parties while providing a 
scope in which to reveal the significance of intra-party cleavages and cadres. Similarly, 
the non-'governing' or insurgent, as opposed to incumbent, factional actors within 
national liberation movements (some with quasi-political or militaristic features) are 
included. The use of a factional analysis allows comparison between the often diverse 
configurations of actors in the respective ethnic blocs, allowing for the inclusion of 
political parties, liberation movements and other organisations, equating factional elites 
with one another. 
In inter-ethnic bloc negotiation, the incumbent representative bloc elite initiatives 
may differ in their bargaining preferences; nevertheless the between-bloc leaders are 
driven by a shared desire to maintain and enhance the primacy of their leadership 
positions within their respective ethnic-blocs. This requires an examination of the 
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features and characteristics of within-bloc dynamics and the role of factions, namely, a 
self-conscious organisation whose membership or affiliation maintains a measure of 
discipline, operating socially with a degree of persistence over time. The features 
outlined distinguish factions from loosely connected tendencies and provide an analysis 
of the determinants of ethnic bloc structure and the social, religious, or ideological 
composition of the faction (Zaiski 1960: 43). The social or membership composition of 
the faction refers to the perception of factions as niche monopolies based on geographical 
or sub-ethnic ties combined with peak associational, institutional, and organisational 
arrangements with a large degree of autonomy (Hobsbawm 1990: 12). 19 Factions operate 
within the associational, institutional and organisational features of the ethnic blocs. The 
three dynamics of bloc configuration, traditions of elite accommodation and the role of 
external resource dependence exercise influence over ethnic bloc elite incentives in inter- 
ethnic bargaining. 
Just as the unitary actor theory has long been upheld in coalition theory, although 
in the reality of a coalition it is not realistic (Timmermans 2003: 11), the notion of ethnic 
blocs as unitary actors constrains the ability of students of ethnic conflict to consider the 
dynamics that shape and influence the incentives of ethnic bloc leaders to bargain for 
minimal and limited or maximal and comprehensive bargains. Nordlinger's study of the 
structural predominance of elites and Horowitz's assertion that the consideration of elite 
mechanisms requires an assessment of the variables related to group structure and 
competition (as well as Zartman's `theory of timing'20 and associated features of 
mutually hurting stalement and ripeness described above), as incentives for elite co- 
operation (Horowitz 2000: 574). This study advocates the analysis of factional dynamics 
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as a means of considering the imperative for examining elite incentives to reach minimal 
and limited or maximal and comprehensive bargains in the regulation of ethnic conflict. 
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3 Colluding to exclude the PLO: the 1978 Camp David 
Accords 
3.1 Introduction 
The Camp David Accords of 1978 between Egypt and Israel (and facilitated by the 
United States) exemplify an inter-ethnic elite bargain. The Accords consist of two 
distinct and independent documents agreed in tandem and paradoxically nested one 
within the other (Tsebelis 1990a, 1990b). For political reasons, the two agreements could 
not have been agreed independently although they have no bearing on each other in terms 
of implementation. The first document charts a Framework for Peace in the Middle East 
and invites other parties to the Middle East conflict to `adhere to it'. ' The second 
document is a concise and exacting Framework for a Peace Treaty between Egypt and 
Israel and functions as a bilateral security pact. The Camp David Accords were less of an 
Agreement to initiate peace (Princen 1991: 57) than an accommodation defined as `some 
form of agreement reached with terms, but does not entail that they take a particular 
form' (Barry 1975a: 396). 
The readily agreed document that provoked the Accords was the Framework for 
Peace between Egypt and Israel. Israel's agreement to withdraw from the Egyptian Sinai 
Peninsula acquired after the 1967 war was rewarded with the promise of complete 
Egyptian recognition of Israel and the establishment of full diplomatic relations. Egypt 
agreed to recognise Israel and, as the first Arab State to do so, created a precedent for 
other states to follow suit; in return, Egypt's territorial integrity was restored with the 
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return of Sinai. The agreement or rather this part of what became known as the Camp 
David Accords has been maintained for 25 years. Agreed within six years of the last of 
three wars fought between Egypt and Israel, the bilateral pact between Egypt and Israel 
provided Egypt with increased economic and military aid from the United States, 
allowing the return of Sinai from Israel. The agreement provided recognition for Israel, 
creating a negotiation precedent, the maintenance of the West Bank and a diminished 
sense of threat. The difficulties arose concerning the second document, the Framework 
for Peace in the Middle East. 
The Framework for Peace in the Middle East was a residual document, a 
compromise and face-saving arrangement, agreed after failed attempts to renew the 
inconclusive multilateral Geneva Conference of 1973 (Aruri 2003: 55). The Agreement 
was necessary to deflect criticism from Egypt for agreeing to what was in essence a 
bilateral agreement with Israel. The Agreement also allowed an American unilateral 
peacemaking and regional advantage over its rival superpower, the Soviet Union. 
Signing two agreements allowed Egypt to assert its role as Arab world leader and to 
encourage other Arab states to participate in the framework for a comprehensive peace 
agreement. The criticism unleashed on Egypt after the Accords were signed in 
September 1978 would undoubtedly have been greater internationally had the Agreement 
only been a single minimal, bilateral security pact with Israel, the signing of the bilateral 
agreement was delayed until March 1979. 
The Framework for a Middle East peace was meant to address core conflict 
concerns, in particular the problem of Palestine, and provided legitimacy to the Egyptian 
initiative. The Framework for Middle East peace also appeased heightened American 
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concerns over its regional influence in light of escalating instability in both Iran and 
Afghanistan and allowed Israel to begin a process of normalisation in the Middle East. 
The aspirational framework for a comprehensive peace provided a pragmatic exclusive 
and partial Egyptian-Israeli security proposal. 
The Accords were signed on the same day 17 September 1978, under the auspices 
of the United States government and reflect the outcome of 13 days spent at the 
presidential Camp David retreat by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat to redress 30 years of hostility. The negotiations were 
unprecedented and the first of this kind of the era and the personalities of the participants 
later dominated accounts of the negotiations and were perceived to dominate outcomes. 2 
The Camp David environment created a negotiating precedent; the respective 
negotiators were secluded from external distractions; meetings were held late at night and 
while the Egyptians and Israelis met formally twice during their time at Camp David, the 
role of the American facilitators was to shuttle between the two groups drafting and 
amending proposals. The negotiations were held in a news blackout and the impetus to 
reach agreement was reinforced by American President Jimmy Carter. 
Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizmann, Israel's foreign and defence ministers 
respectively, were instrumental in persuading Prime Minister Begin to agree (provisional 
on the endorsement of the Israeli Knesset) to the removal of the Israeli Yamit settlement 
at Rafah in Sinai (Maoz and Maor 2002: 158) as part of a complete Israeli withdrawal 
from the peninsula and to recognise the `legitimate rights of the Palestinian people' 
without reference to the word `national' (Dayan 1981, Sayigh 1979). The Egyptian elite, 
however, functioned differently. The resignation of Ismail Fahmy, the Egyptian deputy 
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Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, in 1977 is attributed to the decision by President 
Sadat to make an unprecedented visit to Jerusalem and the Israeli Knesset in order to 
initiate a public dialogue with Israel which was previously unthinkable to the Arab States 
(Volkan 1997: 30). 3 The subsequent resignation of the Egyptian Foreign Minister, 
Muhammad Kamel, and the Egyptian delegation's principal legal advisor, Nabil al-Arabi, 
on the day the Camp David Accords were signed, was attributed to both men being 
unable to bear responsibility for President Sadat's concessions to Israel (Kamel 1986: 
363). The diversity between the modes of interaction within each negotiating team is 
illustrative of the distinct dynamics within each grouping the Egyptian (as the incumbent 
bloc elite for Pan Arabism and the Palestinians in particular) and Israeli (Dayan 1981, 
Fahmy 1983). The Accords were received in equal measure as a negotiating failure and 
4 success. 
The Egyptian resignations arose from the Framework for Peace for the Middle 
East Agreement and the willingness of Egyptian President Sadat to withdraw from Arab 
consensus and negotiate with Israel. President Sadat's strategy was rewarded with 
Israel's recognition of the Egyptian government as the representative leadership of the 
Arab ethno-national bloc and endorsing the legitimacy of the Egyptian government to the 
exclusion of competing factional elites, such as the PLO. Egypt's increasing alignment 
with American policy and access to American resources endorsed the legitimacy of Sadat 
as leader, and Egypt as acceptable representative of the Arab world, in the eyes of the rest 
of the world. 
The decision of the Israeli, Likud-led government to relinquish land won in battle 
conflicts with party ideology and its aspirations for Eretz Yisrael and threatened to 
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jeopardise the party's recent success. The 1967 war had reactivated the temporal concept 
of Zionism and with it the pre-Independence debate on the `desirable boundaries' of the 
Jewish state (Lustick 1993: 26, Seliktar 1988: 31). The astute choice of Israeli Prime 
Minister Begin to recruit Moshe Dayan (the general responsible for winning Sinai and 
ideologically affiliated with the Labour opposition party) to act as Foreign Minister 
attempted to fix Israeli support for relinquishing Sinai in favour of securing Israel's 
position concerning the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas by virtue of the second 
Framework for Middle East peace proposals. Equally influenced by dependence on 
external resources, Israel hoped that by complying with the negotiations, it would ensure 
American security guarantees to diminish its strategic vulnerability after the territorial 
loss of Sinai. 
The Accords are best understood as a means for managing a mutual threat posed 
by the PLO as well as territorial and regional security concerns. The mutual recognition 
advanced in exchange for additional security guarantees provided and endorsed by the 
United States increased the negotiating elites' preferences for the bargain (Maoz and Mor 
2002: 217). The influence of factions and the three operative variables on the 
motivations of the negotiating elites will be considered in this chapter. An examination 
of the constraints within which these motivations are manifest and the substantive 
dependence on external resources asserts that the Camp David Accords were driven by 
elite priorities. 
The chapter will first consider the architecture of the Agreement. The 
institutional and functional ramifications will be compared along with the bargaining 
positions of the negotiating elites. Secondly, the nature of the Camp David bargain will 
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be assessed with particular reference to the nested nature of the Agreement and the 
exclusion and influence of the PLO. Finally, the composition of the ethnic bloc, the 
tradition of elite accommodation and resource dependence of the respective bloc elites 
will be considered and the influence of these factions on the nature of the Camp David 
Accords assessed. 
3.2 The architecture of the Agreement 
It's been more than 2,000 years since there was peace between Egypt and a free Jewish 
nation. If our present expectations are realized, this year we shall see such peace again 
President Jimmy Carter address to Congress September 18`h 19785 
The Camp David Agreement was a partial pact. The Agreement formed the basis of a 
separate, bilateral peace treaty between Egypt and Israel within a framework for a 
comprehensive settlement of the `Arab-Israeli' conflict in all its aspects, including its 
root cause, the problem of Palestine (Sayigh 1979: 3). Of the two agreements, `the 
Framework for Peace in the Middle East' alludes to a comprehensive pact; it is not a 
peace agreement per se. The framework formed only the procedural basis for peace, 
establishing principles that would serve as the foundation for negotiations to be 
conducted later to conclude a peace treaty with Egypt and autonomy for Palestinians. 
The Agreement was made conditional on the approval of Israel's Knesset and upon the 
ratification of Egypt's parliament. Peace negotiations with Egypt would be conducted 
and finalised prior to discussions on the Palestinian issue. 
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The Agreement involved a total Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in 
recognition of Egyptian sovereignty over this territory. In turn, Sinai would be 
demilitarised under the supervision of United Nations forces, also responsible for 
ensuring the free passage of shipping through the Gulf of Eilat. 6 The Israeli objective 
centred on proceeding towards a normalisation of relations with Egypt. This `Framework 
for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel'' was the most substantive 
agreement. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 was accepted and applied to 
the resolution of dispute between Israel and Egypt. A timescale for implementation of 
the Agreement was established. Interim withdrawal of Israeli forces would begin 
between three and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty; Israeli forces would 
withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El Arish8 to an agreed point. A 
deadline of two to three years was agreed in order to allow the withdrawal of Israel's 
armed forces from Sinai, an exercise of Egyptian sovereignty to the internationally 
recognised border between Egypt and mandated Palestine. Sinai would be demilitarised 
with only the United Nations forces stationed in part of the area in Sinai to ensure 
freedom of passage for shipping through the Strait of Tiran. Access required by Israel 
was provided by Egypt. The Yamit Israeli settlement in Sinai (a sticking point in the 
negotiation) would be vacated and both States would recognise their shared border and 
demilitarised zone. The bilateral feature of the Camp David Accords was transparent and 
specific. 
The Camp David Accord was a two-part minimal bargain. The second part of the 
Accord consisted of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David. 
The broader Middle East framework established Israeli-Egyptian and American-agreed 
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guidelines for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours on 
the basis of UN Resolution 242. The appropriate framework for achieving `a just, 
comprehensive and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict' required the 
involvement of `all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict'. The 
framework proposes a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between 
Israel and each of its other neighbours prepared to negotiate with Israel on this basis. 
This framework included the possibility that the representatives of the Palestinian people 
along with Egypt, Israel and Jordan `participat[ing] in negotiations on the resolution of 
the Palestinian problem in all its aspects'. 
The Framework for Middle East Agreed Peace reached between Egypt and Israel 
proposed establishing a `self-governing' authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to 
replace the existing Israeli military government regime. Authority or self-rule for the 
Palestinians in these areas would be determined by Egypt, Israel, Jordan and 
representatives of the Palestinian people (the term Palestinian people was explained in a 
side letter from President Carter to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin as being 
understood by Israel to mean Palestinian Arabs). The self-governing authority in the 
Palestinian areas would exercise the powers conferred upon it for a five-year transition 
period after which time the final status of the West Bank and Gaza would be determined 
in relation to `its neighbours'. The powers of the self-governing authority however were 
not detailed. The responsibilities and powers of Palestinian self-rule would be decided 
during anticipated negotiations among the parties by consensus. Each interested party 
(Egypt, Israel and Jordan) had the right of veto on the powers of the proposed self- 
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governing authority with the exclusion of Palestinian representatives should they 
participate. 
The participation of Palestinian representatives was not mandatory, nor did Egypt 
or Jordan have to agree to host Palestinians in their delegation. Moreover, the 
Framework Agreement was drafted without Jordanian consultation and while Jordan's 
role was anticipated by the other parties (Egypt, Israel and the USA), it had not been 
confirmed; Jordan's inclusion without consent antagonised King Hussein of Jordan and 
created greater Jordanian antipathy towards Egypt. While the Jordanians were included 
without consent, the Palestinians likewise could be excluded without consent. Any 
proposals made by Palestinian members of a delegation (Egyptian, Jordanian) would 
have to be sanctioned first by its host delegation. Representatives of the Palestinian 
people would, by virtue of their association with one or more of the states, be required to 
make proposals through the state with which they were affiliated. Independent 
Palestinian participation of the people or the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza 
would be forthcoming in the negotiations for Palestinian `self-government'. The 
participation of the Palestinians attending any negotiations would be by proxy (Sayigh 
1979: 8). Should the Palestinians refuse to be represented in this way and as a means of 
ensuring the implementation of the provisions relating to the West Bank and Gaza `in 
order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people', Egypt was prepared to 
assume the Arab role emanating from the provisions, following consultation with Jordan 
and the representatives of the Palestinian people. 9 
The proposal by President Sadat to represent the Palestinian people contradicted 
the agreed position of the PLO and the leaders within the West Bank and Gaza to the 
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Camp David proposals. Egypt's attempt to vouch for the Palestinians flouted the agreed 
position of the Arab states reached in 1973 at the Arab Summit Conference in Algiers 
where (with the exception of Jordan), all of the Arab states committed themselves `to 
restor[ing] the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine as will be decided by the 
PLO'. The subsequent Rabat Arab League Summit in 1974, on this occasion with 
Jordanian support, confirmed the commitment to restore the national rights of the 
Palestinian people `in accordance with the resolutions that will be accepted by the 
PLO'. 1° Egypt's Camp David position to serve as the representative for Palestinian 
concerns constituted a challenge to the PLO and an attempt to alter the configuration of 
the Arab, and specifically the Palestinian, bloc. Furthermore, Egypt's willingness to 
advocate initiatives for and on behalf of the Palestinians increased polarisation within the 
Arab bloc. 
The Camp David framework proposals for the West Bank and Gaza, while 
appearing to postpone all decisions until negotiations occurred, nevertheless secured 
important Israeli concerns. The Israeli military presence in the West Bank and Gaza 
would persist, although the army would withdraw from the large Palestinian population 
centres and redeploy elsewhere in the territories in order to maintain Israel's security 
interests. Both the anticipated five-year interim self-rule schedule as well as the plan for 
determining the future of the Palestinian areas in relation to their neighbours established 
certain precedents. It allowed a previously condemned Israeli presence in the West Bank 
and Gaza for five years. 
Described as a peace agreement the Accord framework however, omitted core 
conflict concerns. A series of contentious issues excluded from the framework document 
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were addressed in a series of letters, stating the position of each negotiating party. The 
issue of Jerusalem featured not in the framework for peace but rather in the series of 
position letters between Egypt's President Sadat, Israel's Prime Minister Begin and US 
President Carter. Notwithstanding pressure from Begin to amend the American position 
on Jerusalem, President Carter reaffirmed the United States' position on the status of 
Jerusalem with reference to US policy statements made in 1967 and 1969. In President 
Carter's letter, the statements were alluded to rather than repeated. President Sadat's 
letter referred to the position of Arab Jerusalem as an integral part of the West Bank and 
suggested the essential functions of the city should be undivided. " The negotiating 
parties were unable to reach explicit agreement and the issue was consigned to a series of 
letters; as such, the question of Jerusalem does not form part of the proposed negotiations 
regarding self-government in the West Bank and Gaza. 
The issue of Israeli settlements was one of the most explicitly divisive features of 
the negotiations at Camp David and subsequently for the Israeli elite (Weizmann 1981: 
369). An Israeli assurance was given that `during the agreed period of negotiations for 
the conclusion of the peace treaty, no new settlements [would] be established by the 
Government of Israel in Sinai, in the Gaza District, and in the area of Judea and Samaria' 
[the West Bank]. 12 The ambiguity arose concerning the statement `during the agreed 
period of the negotiations'. It was not clear whether Begin referred to the three-month 
period prior to the negotiations on which a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was 
scheduled as was his intention or whether President Carter's interpretation of a halt in 
settlement activity applied to the duration of the negotiations for the period of the planned 
self-governing authority in the territories (Sharon 1989: 406). 
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Advocates of the Accords heralded the merits of the framework (Eban 1978: 346). 
The priority placed on the foundation of all negotiations on the basis of UN Resolution 
242 was an important feature of the Accords. Were negotiations to occur the negotiators 
would recognise the 'legitimate rights' of the Palestinian people and efforts would be 
made to resolve the Palestinian problem. 
The reference to Resolution 242, however, is selective; the Camp David Accord 
fails to incorporate the complete context of the Resolution, excluding the reference to the 
'inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war' while emphasising that 'every State 
in the area can live in security'. The selective application of Resolution 242 is 
problematic and not unexpected. When the Resolution was first drafted, the definite 
article 'the' existed in the French but not in the English translation of the phrase 
'withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict' in the 
sub-paragraph of the operative paragraph one of the resolution (Sayigh R. 1979: 25). 
The reference to the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people caused 
controversy, because the tautological nature of the phrase 'legitimate rights' was 
ambiguous (Sayegh F. 1979: 28). The Resolution failed to refer to national rights and 
only to the more opaque terrn 'rights'. Prime Minister Begin referred to the repetition of 
the words 'legitimate rights' as benign. ' 3 
The Accord also refers to the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its 
aspects and adopts a three-stage incremental approach in the Framework for Peace 
Accord. The use of the phrase 'in all its aspects' allowed the negotiators the leeway to 
advocate the final goal most desired by their constituents. The self-rule and self- 
government references were used by Egyptian President Sadat as synonyms for 
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Palestinian self-determination whereas for Prime Minister Begin self-rule referred to the 
administration of local government and the politics of the Palestinian inhabitants of the 
territories of the West Bank only. 
Excluding procedural concerns, the Accord deferred agreement on the issues 
relating to the Framework for Peace in the Middle East. Important areas of concern were 
conspicuously absent from the Accord, namely, the final status of Jerusalem, the issue of 
settlements, the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and sovereignty over the West Bank and 
Gaza. The nature of the Camp David bargain provided for the maintenance of that status 
quo. The proposed withdrawal of Israeli forces made provision for Israeli military and 
territorial security arrangements as well as its societal security (Buzan 1991) needs. The 
ideological associations with 'Judea and Samaria' constitute a societal security issue for 
Israel (Lustick 1993: 26). The willingness of Israel to allow a UN force in Sinai while 
prohibiting the introduction of foreign forces in the West Bank reveals the distinction 
between the territories and their resonance for Israel. The Sinai Peninsula, defined as a 
territory acquired under the auspices of war victory, was perceived as a peripheral rather 
than integral part of Israeli territory. Conversely, the West Bank (referred to as Judea and 
Samaria) is perceived as being held at the 'metropolitan centre' of Israel's territorial 
perceptions of the territorial boundaries of the state for adherents to the theory of a 
Greater Israel (Lustick 1993, O'Leary et al. 2001: 65). The Gaza Strip on the other hand 
has an anomalous position, under Egyptian control until an Israeli raid in 1955, the Gaza 
Strip inhabited by Palestinian refugee camps, with limited resources 14 was not perceived 
by Egypt or Israel as part of the territorial heart of either state and the outcome of the 
Camp David Accords illustrates this ambiguity (Roy 1995: 103). 
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As a result of the ideological ambiguities, the location of boundaries proposed in 
the Frameworks for Peace Accord is associated with the question of settlements in the 
West Bank and is deferred, to be addressed after the interim period. The question of the 
sovereignty of the West Bank and Gaza was postponed as was the final status of the West 
Bank. These core Israeli concerns were noted as Israeli Prime Minister Begin's 'three 
noes': no to a Palestinian state, no to a plebiscite on the West Bank and Gaza and no 
negotiations with the PLO (Schindler 1995). The three outlined noes had parallels in the 
Arab bloc. At the Khartoum Conference in 1967, the Arab States addressed three noes to 
Israel: no to the recognition of Israel, no to negotiations with Israel, and no to peace with 
Israel. 
Egypt was the first Arab state to break with the Arab consensus against 
recognising Israel. The Israel i-Egyptian dialogue meant that Egypt had broken with 
Arab League Policy prohibiting bilateral negotiations with Israel and culminating in 
Sadat's visit to Jerusalem; the Israeli Knesset outlined the need for the Framework for a 
Middle East peace: 
Any separate peace between Egypt or Israel, or between any Arab confrontation 
state and Israel, will not bring permanent peace built on justice in the entire region. 
Rather, even if peace between all the confrontation states and Israel were achieved, 
in the absence of a just solution to the Palestinian problem, never will there be a 
durable and just peace upon which the entire world insists today'5 
Sadat's appeal to the Israeli parliament the Knesset, and to the rest of the Arab world for 
a multilateral and comprehensive peace encapsulated the core elements of the Carter 
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Administration's proposals to renew the Geneva Conference first convened to implement 
the ceasefire after the 1973 war. The results of the 1973 war had created a new impetus 
for peace. In the aftermath of the war, President Sadat had attempted to renew previous 
ties with Syria to include Syrian President Hafez al Assad in a coalition for peace. 
Sadat's efforts failed and the Egyptian embassy in Damascus was bombed in protest at 
this proposed initiative. 
In 1974 at the Palestinian Liberation Organisation National Council (PNC) 
meeting, the PLO adopted a new political programme. At the twelfth session of the 
meeting in Cairo, the PNC departed from its previous statements stating it would 'employ 
all means, and first and foremost an-ned struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to 
establish the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of 
Palestine that is liberated'. 16 The statement no longer called for the immediate 
elimination of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state over all of Palestine. 
The change in the PLO's position signalled the desire of the PLO leadership to participate 
in any negotiation pertaining to peace in the Middle East and the position of the 
Palestinians in particular. 17 However, contrary to Sadat's Knesset speech and the Geneva 
Conference proposals, the subsequent Camp David Accords excluded the PLO. The next 
section considers the exclusive nature of the Accords. 
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3.3 The nested nature of the Agreement and the exclusion of the PLO 
The Framework for Middle East peace was inclusive in design only. The Accord 
excluded the PLO in spite of preliminary American discussions with the PLO's Fateh 
leadership regarding participation and a dialogue regarding the necessary concessions 
required from the PLO to facilitate its involvement. Instead, the proposed multilateral 
comprehensive Geneva Conference framework was altered and supplemented with the 
Camp David Accord. The change in the nature of the proposed bargain can be examined 
as a consequence of the constraints imposed from within-bloc dynamics as well as the 
nested nature of the bargain. The terrn 'nested' is borrowed from the literature on nested 
games and is used here to describe the multi-layered features of constraints involved in 
the Camp David Accord. The configuration of the ethnic blocs - the Israeli bloc, the 
Arab bloc (within which the Palestinian bloc was nested) - in this bargain is numerous 
and their external resource dependence plays an instrumental role in the Accord, framing 
the nature of the bargain reached. The Cold War dynamic and the role of the USA as 
facilitator to the Accords altered the parameters of the bargain. 
The Geneva Peace Conference of 1973, initially convened to ensure a ceasefire 
and disengagement after the 1973 war, was heralded as an attempt to secure Arab 
agreement to dialogue with Israel (Eban 1978: 346). The negotiations initially 
orchestrated by the USA to facilitate two troop disengagements between Egypt and Israel 
were successful. The official objective of the Geneva Conference was for a multinational 
conference including Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinians, the USA, the 
Soviet Union, and the United Nations Proposals for a Geneva Peace Conference based on 
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UN resolution 338 that called for the immediate opening of negotiations between Israel 
and the Arab States. The proposed structure of the Geneva Conference involved 
delegating the USA and the USSR as joint chairs of the talks (Aruri 2003: 55). The joint 
US-Soviet statement on the Middle East stated that the: 
fundamental solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem in its entirety is 
negotiations within the framework of the Geneva peace conference specifically 
convened for those purposes, with participation in its work of the representatives of all 
the parties involved in the conflict including those of the Palestinian people. 18 
The reference to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and the suggestion of 
renewed Soviet involvement was opposed by the Israeli and Egyptian governments 
respectively (Aruri 2003: 456, Katamidze 1989: 10). Within days, a paper forinulated by 
Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and known as the 'Dayan-Carter working paper' 
made clear that acceptance of the joint statement was not a prerequisite for the 
reconvening of the conference. 
Egypt's President Sadat and King Hussein of Jordan had initially proposed an all- 
party Geneva Conference with a role for the PLO while rejecting formal peace with Israel 
as long as it retained occupied land. The joint Egyptian-Jordanian statement reaffirmed 
recognition of the PLO as the sole Palestinian representative and insisted that it should 
participate in the talks as an independent interlocutor on par with the other delegations, 
adding that the process should lead to the creation of an 'independent Palestinian entity' 
(Sayigh 1999: 414). Privately, President Sadat increasingly perceived an all-party 
Geneva Conference as an intolerably protracted if not dead-end road to peace. ' 9 
90 
Israeli Prime Minister Begin met with President Carter in Washington in July of 
1977 and established the Israeli proposals for participation. The 26 points outlined 
Israel's position and preferences . 
20 The Geneva Conference would be held in accordance 
with Resolutions 338 and 242, with accredited representatives of Israel, Egypt, Syria and 
Jordan. Israel proposed a series of bilateral committee meetings within the framework of 
multilateral Geneva talks. The issue of Israeli borders and the question of the West Bank 
were addressed to President Carter in private. Begin asserted that Israel was determined 
to maintain the West Bank and Gaza but was prepared to 'make significant withdrawal 
from Sinai' (Dayan 1981: 20). 
The US administration's memorandum proposals for the Geneva talks referred to 
Israel's withdrawal from all fronts and the creation of a Palestinian entity to allow the 
future realisation of Palestinian self-determination. The Israelis rejected this article of the 
American memorandum outright; the threat of a Palestinian 'entity' to Israeli security 
was considered too great when considered with the territorial features of the refugee 
problem if the Palestinian refugees from 1948 onwards were to have territory that would 
be under their exclusive control. The proposal that Israel withdraw 'from all fronts' was 
rejected and Israeli withdrawal was understood to refer to the meaning given in UN 
Resolution 242, that is 'to mutually agreed, secure and recognised borders'. 
The Israeli government prepared working papers and agreed to dialogue with the 
Palestinians. For the first time, Israel provisionally agreed to discuss issues with 
Palestinians independently rather than as part of a Jordanian or other delegation. In the 
interests of the multilateral negotiations in Geneva, Begin initially proposed to President 
Carter that Israel would not investigate the credentials of the Palestinians who would be 
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attached to the Jordanian delegation. In agreeing to consider the Geneva negotiations, 
Israel hoped to gain an American commitment to a long-term defence treaty in exchange 
for territorial concessions. Israel desired a defence treaty on par with the concrete 
proposal the American government had provided to NATO, as a security guarantee. 21 
The US impetus for peace encouraged the PLO to initiate communication with 
'dovish' Israelis interested in opening a dialogue. King Hussein of Jordan renewed the 
idea of a Palestinian-Jordanian federation and met with the speaker of the Palestinian 
National Council (PNC) to consider joint concerns. The King was conscious of dialogue 
between the US administration and the PLO and asked for assurances that any proposed 
Palestinian entity not include part of Jordan's East Bank. 
PLO leader Yasser Arafat consulted with UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim 
and the PLO opened offices in European capitals in preparation for participation in the 
Geneva Conference. The basis of the Geneva dialogue was UN resolution 242 and the 
readiness of the PLO to participate would mean that the PLO would be prepared to 
acquiesce and co-exist with Israel. The failure of the PLO Charter to recognise Israel or 
to accept UN Resolution 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiation prohibited the PLO 
leadership's participation in Geneva. The PLO leadership had taken the initiative to 
change the PLO Charter and even held discussions in Egypt over possible amendments to 
the PLO Charter. The Sadat government, while being seen to acquiesce to the Palestinian 
leadership's desire for involvement in the Geneva Conference, was simultaneously 
thwarting efforts for a united Arab delegation to Geneva. 
Egypt was the exception among the Arab states as it was opposed to a united Arab 
delegation proposed by Syria and was prepared to start negotiations before the convening 
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of the Geneva Conference. Prior to the proposal of Palestinian PLO representation, 
President Assad of Syria had suggested that the Palestinians be represented at Geneva by 
the League of Arab States. 22 The Geneva Conference was thwarted by the concerted 
efforts of the Israeli and Egyptian governments; the lack of Palestinian representation, 
Israel's refusal to withdraw from the West Bank, and a united Arab delegation. 
The Geneva initiative was usurped by a unilateral Egyptian action. President 
Sadat's decision to address the Knesset in Jerusalem altered the pan-Arab consensus over 
Israel. The decision to visit Jerusalem constituted a tacit recognition of Israel by Egypt. 
The decision alienated Egypt from the rest of the Arab bloc of States and increased 
President Sadat's leverage in bargaining for Egypt with Israel and the United States. 
Sadat's Jerusalem initiative further undermined the prospects for a comprehensive 
settlement and the United States was eager to be the unilateral powerbroker. Rather than 
collaborate with the Soviet Union, the USA drove a sole initiative that would alienate the 
Soviet Union from the Middle East, enabling the USA to acquire dominance in this 
particular sphere of Cold War influence. The Soviet Union sponsored the Syrian and 
Iraqi regimes as well as the PLO. It had lost the 'prize' Egyptian satellite during Sadat's 
Presidency. The Egyptian flirtation with Soviet support was a consequence of Israel's 
1955 raid on Gaza. Gaza had been under Egyptian control and the Gaza raid had a 
substantial impact on Egyptian foreign policy (Roy 1995: 95). 23 Not only did the raid 
highlight Egypt's military weaknesses to Israel, it also constituted a major domestic 
threat to the incumbent Egyptian regime leading Sadat to illicit military support from the 
Soviets. 
93 
Egypt was now trying to align itself with the United States and disassociate itself 
from the Soviet Union after twenty years of Soviet support. 24 The repercussions were felt 
in the failure of the Geneva Conference and the makings of a comprehensive settlement. 
The origins of the comprehensive settlement required much greater co-operation between 
the respective actors than the subsequent Camp David Accord. The exclusion of the PLO 
from the Camp David Accords allowed a bilateral bargain between Egypt and Israel to be 
negotiated, while setting the procedures for future negotiations concerning the question of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, without the same degree of constraints on the bargaining 
elites as would have been the case with the inclusion of the PLO. The influence of the 
PLO in Lebanon, the question of Palestinian refugees, the issue of Jerusalem, the problem 
of the Israeli settlements and sovereignty of the Palestinian state were not core bargain 
concems with Egypt, regardless of Sadat's rhetoric. 
Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin secretly hoped for 'Sadat to blink', 
while Sadat unflinching arrived in Jerusalem to address the Knesset without having read 
the working paper proposals for the Geneva Conference. 25 The visit to Jerusalem was 
paramount (Dayan 1981: 85) for the bilateral bargain and for the initiative to be one 
dominated by Egypt as the representative of the Arab bloc. The Sadat initiative altered 
the dynamic. Egypt was prepared to negotiate in advance of the Geneva Conference and 
was amenable to immediate proposals. The United States proceeded with the Camp 
David initiatives, the Geneva Conference was sidelined and the position of the 
Palestinian bloc, the PLO leadership and the Arab bloc had altered. 
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3.4 The configuration of the Arab bloc and nature of the Palestinian bloc 
3.4.1 The PLO 
From 1948 to 1967 the Arab states overlooked the question of Palestinian national self- 
determination. Sayigh observes, 'it was to diffuse and contain irredentism that the Arab 
heads of state approved the fonnation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1964' 
(Sayigh 1999: 666). Shortly after the first Arab Summit Conference in Cairo, the PLO 
was established at the Palestinian congress convened in Jerusalem. The congress met at 
the behest of Jordanian King Hussein, keen to cury favour with Nasser. King Hussein 
selected many of the 422 Palestinians invited to attend, nevertheless, the 'entity' or 
organization created exhibited institutional and functional autonomy (Sayigh 1999: 96). 
Adopting a Palestine National Covenant or Charter, founding documents and statutes 
created a parliamentary body in the name of the Palestinian National Council (PNC). 
Each executive committee member was allocated a 'ministerial' portfolio generating 
governing mechanisms in tandem with Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA). 
Despite strong Egyptian influence, Ahmad al-Shuqayri the Nasser appointed 
leader of Palestinian delegation at the first Arab Summit in Cairo and the first Chain-nan 
of the PNC and 'leader' of the PLO, created a national institution seeking formal Arab 
recognition as such (Sayigh 1999: 99, Yodafat and Amon-Ohanna 1981: 22). By 1968 
Shuqayri's attempts to generate an autonomous PLO independent of Egyptian or 
Jordanian state dominance (and constraint) succeeded with Fatah's ascendancy and 
leadership of the PLO. 
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As previously mentioned, by 1973 at the Arab Summit Conference in Algiers, with the 
exception of Jordan, all the Arab states committed themselves 'to restore the legitimate 
rights of the Arab people of Palestine as will be decided by the PLO'. The subsequent 
Rabat Arab Summit in 1974 with Jordanian support confirmed the commitment to restore 
the national rights of the Palestinian people, 'in accordance with the resolutions that will 
be accepted by the PLO'. 26 
At the Palestinian National Council meeting in March 1977 Anwar Sadat said: 
The Palestinian people are the sole decision-maker with respect to anything that concerns 
its destiny and its cause. No one, whoever he may be, may exercise a trusteeship over, or 
impose his will upon, the Palestinian people. For a decision which does not emanate from a 
free will is devoid of its very essence. We in Egypt insist that the Palestinian will shall 
remain sovereign and independent, free from bondage or interference. We equally insist 
that all the decisions which have emanated from that shall be fully respected - foremost 
among which is the decision to designate the Palestinian Liberation Organisation as its sole 
legitimate representative, the defender of its rights and interests. 27 
The PLO was acknowledged by the Arab state elites as the legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people. Within the Palestinian bloc, factionalism was pervasive. 
Factions had been institutionalised largely under the collective umbrella of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). The PLO prosed and initially sponsored by 
Egyptian president Nasser at the first Arab summit conference in 1964 was established 
and quickly dominated by Fateh, the largest faction (Becker 1984: 38). With the 
assistance of the 1967 war and subsequent weakening of the neighbouring Arab 
governments, Fateh rapidly achieved the largest share of the seats in the Palestinian 
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National Congress. Initially ambivalent towards the PLO, the Fateh faction recognised 
the value of Arab legitimacy afforded to it (Sayigh 2000: 206). Institutionally, the PLO 
spanned the spectrum of Palestinian nationalist and predominantly secular ideology. 
Organisational unity was based on five principal points of agreement: 
I. the liberation of Palestine; 
2. the need for armed struggle to attain this goal; 
reliance on Palestinian self-organisation; 
4. co-operation with friendly Arab states; and 
5. co-operation with international forces (Cobban 1992: 24). 
From its forination in 1958, one of Fateh's guiding principles was the importance of 
autonomy from and recognition by established (Arab) state actors in determining the 
fonn and purpose of Palestinian political institutionalisation (Sayigh 1999: 206). 
Challenges to the primacy of Fateh's elite autonomy were commonplace. Moderate 
dissent within the PLO in the early years was largely due to the geographically 
decentralised nature of the organisation. The 1960s elements of such dissent had been 
based - and often externally sponsored - intermittently in Amman, Damascus, Beirut and 
Tunis. The extent of the PLO's infrastructure in Jordan created 'a state within a state', 
leading to civil war and its subsequent expulsion from Jordan in 1970 and relocation with 
no less onerous albeit postponed consequences in Lebanon. 
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3.4.2 Elite accommodation and the nature of the support for the Palestinian bloc 
Fateh aimed to co-opt and accommodate factional and leadership challenges by absorbing 
the challenging faction when possible into the National Council. Institutional dynamics 
within the PLO centred on internally accommodating challenges in order for Fateh to 
maintain its leadership authority. 
The movement had little time, however, to re-orientate itself with the outbreak of 
the 1973 October war between Israel and the Arab states. The PLO leadership response 
involved signalling its interest as the Palestinian representative in the proposed Geneva 
Conference. Arafat tacitly acknowledged United Nations Resolution 242 as the basis for 
a comprehensive peace subject to modifications, such as the endorsement of the 
unequivocal right to Palestinian national self-determination rather than the existing 
Resolution reference to the Palestinian issue as a refugee concern. The debate concerning 
recognition of the Resolution led to internal PLO division. Opposing factions within the 
PLO established a 'rejection front' as they regarded the PLO leadership stance as an 
affront to the core principles of PLO unity. The rejectionist factions were led by the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and constituted the 'Front of 
Palestinian Force Rejecting Surrenderist Solutions' (Cobban 1984: 62). The support for 
the opposition came from the refugee camps, the traditional supporters of Fateh, and the 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). The challenge to the leadership 
deliberations over acknowledging Resolution 242, led to within-bloc violence, open 
competition and the assassinations of alternate faction members within the PLO. The 
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PLO leadership's legitimacy internationally had increased, after Arafat addressed the UN 
General Assembly in which the PLO was awarded observer status. 
As the PLO's policy of internal accommodation failed and the Fateh leadership's 
monopoly of legitimacy was undennined, the opposition factions of the leftist and 
Syrian-sponsored PFLP and later the DFLP, and the Communist (later the People's) party 
called for an end to the intra-factional fighting. The unstable situation in Lebanon and 
the beginnings of the civil war resulted in the co-operation between the factions fighting 
together under joint commands in Lebanon. The rejectionist front persisted as an open 
institutional challenge to the PLO's executive committee for the next four years and 
influenced the success of pervasive co-option of factions, shifting the nature of 
competition and the configuration of factions within the PLO. 
Encouraged by the need to maintain bloc cohesion and Fateh's need to assert its 
dominance in March 1975, the PLO representative in London called for an end to the 
state of belligerency if the PLO became a partner in the negotiating process. The PLO 
demanded the withdrawal of Israel to the borders of the 1967 agreement as part of a 
peace settlement. The establishment of a Palestinian state in the areas returned by Israel, 
and the creation of open borders between the State of Israel and the Palestinian state, 
would encourage economic and cultural ties and activities. The right of Israelis to live in 
the Palestinian state could be agreed in exchange for the right of an equivalent number of 
Palestinians to live in Israel as well as the provision of joint security guarantees for the 
Palestinian state and for the state of Israel. 28 
In 1977 the PLO leadership was located in Beirut after its expulsion from Jordan. 
The joint Egyptian-Syrian statement calling for resumption of the Geneva Peace 
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Conference reaffin-ned recognition of the PLO as the sole Palestinian representative and 
insisted that it should participate in the talks as an independent interlocutor on par with 
the other delegations, adding that the process should lead to the creation of an 
'independent Palestinian entity' (Sayigh 1999: 414). Syria's President Assad endorsed 
the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 'if that 
is what the Palestinians want'. 29 The US impetus for peace encouraged the PLO to 
initiate negotiations with Israelis interested in opening a dialogue. King Hussein of 
Jordan renewed the idea of a Palestinian-Jordanian federation and met with the speaker 
of the Palestinian National Council. PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat met with UN 
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, and the PLO opened offices in European capitals as 
Arafat asserted that the PLO was prepared to participate in the Geneva Conference. The 
basis of the Geneva dialogue was UN Resolution 242. The readiness of the PLO to 
participate meant that the PLO leadership was prepared to acquiesce and co-exist with 
Israel. The failure of the PLO Charter to recognise Israel or to accept UN Resolution 
242 and 338 as the basis for negotiation was perceived by the USA as prohibitive to the 
participation of the PLO leadership's in Geneva. The leadership had, however, taken the 
initiative to change the PLO Charter and held discussions in Egypt regarding possible 
amendments to the Charter. The imperative remained self-deten-nination for the 
Palestinian people and an independent Palestinian state. The nature of the state was 
implicitly limited to the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip and the 
PLO was prepared to negotiate. In so doing Fateh the PLO's dominant leading faction 
attempted to limit Jordanian influence and assert itself independently. 
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The Geneva initiative, however, divided the PLO. The PFLP and DFLP rejected 
the proposed changes to the Charter and the moderating initiatives of the leadership. 30 
The PFLP led by George Habash asserted that the international dialogue was intended to 
exclude and 'wipe out, finally' the PLO. The PFLP promised to take the initiative and 
attack Israel (Sayigh 1999: 416). Open and public divisions within the PLO emerged 
between groups associated with and externally sponsored by Syria. The schisms within 
the PLO were substantial and escalated the climate of distrust in the Palestinian bloc, 
increasing the polarisation and configuration of the bloc while undermining the autonomy 
of the leadership. 
The sporadic violent intra-factional Palestinian fighting in the refugee camps in 
Lebanon threatened to undermine the efforts of the PLO leadership to assert itself as a 
viable negotiating partner for the Geneva Conference. The difficulties were enhanced for 
Syria. President Assad's influence in Lebanon was unden-nined by the intra-Palestinian 
fighting. However, Syria was intent on improving relations with the PLO when it 
became clear that Egypt was realigning itself with the United States. 31 
Indirect dialogue between the PLO and the Carter administration increased 
Jordan's fears, and King Hussein sought assurances from Secretary Vance that any 
Palestinian homeland should not include the East Bank of Jordan. The PLO leadership 
was optimistic in June 1977 when the American administration stated 'the need for a 
homeland for the Palestinians whose exact nature should be negotiated between the 
parties' (Cobban 1984: 88, Quandt 1986: 73). Fateh informed the American President 
that the PLO was willing to live in peace with Israel, in return for a US commitment to an 
independent Palestinian 'state unit entity' associated or affiliated to Jordan (Quandt 1986: 
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85, Sayigh 1999: 420). US Secretary Cyrus Vance alluded to the possible US acceptance 
of a form of Palestinian state in the occupied territories after a transition period of ten 
years. The PLO's participation was conditional on the acceptance of UN resolutions 242 
and 338. The PLO leadership's concern was, however, the nature of the Palestinian issue 
as one of refugee status as opposed to a question of national self-deten-nination. The 
Palestinians shared their proposed acceptance documents with the Egyptians and 
concealed their activities from Syria after Syrian President Assad suggested an Arab 
rejection front to include Iraq and Libya (Sayigh 1999: 414). Assad proposed that the 
Palestinians be represented at Geneva by the League of Arab States. The Syrian initiative 
was disregarded as Secretary Vance told the United Nations General Assembly on 29 
September, 'we believe that the Palestinian people must be assured that they and their 
descendants can live with dignity and freedom, and have the opportunity for economic 
fulfilment and for political expression' (Sayigh 1979: 5). The US administration was 
providing the PLO leadership with the facility to represent the Palestinians at Geneva 
contrary to the Syrian proposals. 
The PLO leadership initially confirmed it would accept UN Resolution 242 if 
modified to address more than solely the Palestinian refugee problem. The head of the 
PLO political department, Qaddumi, stated that the PLO would accept both the resolution 
and the right of Israel to exist if the Jewish state recognised Palestinian rights. The aim 
of the PLO centred on establishing an independent state in the occupied territories that 
would not pose a threat to Israel (Sayigh 1999: 422 ). 32 The situation in Southern Lebanon 
between PLO factions of the PFLP, DFLP and Israel escalated as the diplomacy 
concerning Geneva advanced. The PLO leadership's conciliatory statements were 
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deemed to be too far beyond the acceptable list of phrases proposed by Brezinski, 
President Carter's national security advisor, to be credible (Rubin 2003: 8 1, Rubin 198 1). 
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union threatened to undennine the PLO leadership's 
initiative. The Soviet and Syrian sponsored factions within the Palestinian bloc and 
within the accommodatory institutional parameters of the PLO, in particular the DFLP, 
suggested that in light of the leadership's recognition of UN Resolution 242, the internal 
alignments within the PLO would change to isolate the initiative towards dialogue with 
Egypt and the USA by the 'centrist right'. 
The overt threat to the pattern of elite accommodation from the Palestinian bloc 
constrained the leadership's decision to accept UN Resolution 242. The incentive to 
accept the Resolution had diminished as the Americans informed the PLO leadership that 
acceptance of the Resolution would not necessarily provide a seat at the Geneva 
Conference although it would ensure continued American dialogue. The Fateh-based 
leadership directed a special meeting of the PLO Central Council on 26 September which 
chose not to accept the resolution (Sayigh 1999: 422). 
The initial proposals made by the USA and endorsed by Begin for the Palestinian 
representatives at Geneva to be unrecognised PLO members appealed to the PLO 
leadership. Begin initially asserted that their identities would not be too readily 
scrutinised. When this proposal was withdrawn, it was perceived to be a concession to 
the Israelis. The Fateh Central Committee in response reiterated its position that 'the 
PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people [ ... ] and will not 
accept any manoeuvre aiming at taking away or sidestepping it' (Cobban 1984: 91). The 
103 
decision ruled out the option for Arafat to nominate Palestinian delegates to Geneva and 
required that PLO represent the Palestinian people without a proxy. 
The PLO leadership had been acting under the misconception that President Sadat 
had been lobbying to gain PLO access to the Geneva Conference. It was not until Sadat's 
speech in the Egyptian Parliament in the presence of Arafat and Qaddumi head of the 
political department invited as guests, that Sadat's Egyptian initiative was accurately 
understood. Arafat and Qaddumi left the chamber in the middle of Sadat's speech in 
protest (Rabin 2003: 8 1). 
The Egyptian initiative split the Fateh Central Committee over whether or not to 
support Sadat's initiative. The Sadat rejectionists prevailed and Arafat signed a joint 
communiqu6 with Syria's President Assad condemning Sadat's visit to Israel. Relations 
between the PLO leadership and the Egyptian government deteriorated. Sadat's initiative 
resulted in a new programme of PLO partisanship in inter-state struggles when previously 
the PLO had aimed to balance its allegiances between the powerful Arab States. The 
Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in retaliation for the attack near Haifa resulted in UN 
resolution 425 and the call for an immediate withdrawal of Israel from south Lebanon. 
Arafat later accepted the overall ceasefire in South Lebanon, the first open 
acceptance of the PLO leader of a ceasefire with Israel. The UN had agreed to meet with 
Arafat to negotiate the ceasefire and in so doing legitimated him. This decision was 
influenced by the escalation of violence in south Lebanon and the inability of the Carter 
Administration to press the Israelis to allow 700 Lebanese peacekeepers into southern 
Lebanon. The Palestinian National Council remained sceptical of the United States' 
ability to convince the Israelis to leave Gaza and the West Bank and calculated the risk of 
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acquiescing to the concessions required from the United States in order to be able to 
participate in the negotiations at great risk to the leadership's autonomy (Cobban 1984: 
90). 
The PLO leadership was constrained by the changing configuration of the 
Palestinian bloc and the limitations imposed on its conventional policies of factional 
absorption or inclusive accommodation. The open challenges to the leadership from the 
externally sponsored (Syrian influenced) schismatic oriented factions and the elastic 
support it commanded from the members of the Palestinian bloc, in the refugee camps in 
particular. The PLO leadership had considered moderating the aspiration for a 
Palestinian state in all of Mandated Palestine in 1967 to national authority but decided 
that the change would not be supported; the 1974 Council declaration had moderately 
qualified the PLO's objective and signalled their desire to participate in negotiations. 
The changes instituted by the Fateh leadership at risk to its internal monopoly of bloc 
legitimacy while significant, were usurped by President Sadat's offer to represent the 
Palestinians under guidance from the Palestinians themselves. 
The competition for the position of representative Palestinian elite represented an 
old threat from a new source for the PLO leadership. Jordan was recognised as the state 
that for a time articulated Palestinian concerns internationally by virtue of its role in the 
West Bank prior to 1967 and Black September when the PLO was ousted from Jordan 
amidst violence and killing. Jordan had subsequently recognised the PLO as the 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people at the Rabat conference in 1974. 
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The new threat for PLO legitimacy was Egyptian President Sadat. The next 
section considers the actor orientation of the Egyptian government in relation to the 
Camp David Accords. 
3.4.3 The Egyptian government challenge 
President Sadat's incentives for representing Palestinian concerns were domestic, 
internal, and incumbent elite and Israeli driven. The President's decision to recognise 
Israel without eliciting concessions from the Israeli government prior to his visit, 
signalled Sadat's willingness to negotiate prior to the proposed Geneva Conference 
without endorsing the idea of a united Arab delegation (Dayan 1981: 85). Sadat initiated 
contact with Israel and a series of meetings were held in Morocco on the nature of 
negotiations. The Egyptian President insisted that any agreement reached would need to 
include a resolution of the conflict with all the other Arab states and could not be 
presented as a bilateral agreement. President Sadat was unwilling to sign an arrangement 
concerning the West Bank, Gaza and Sinai, but was receptive to one addressing Sinai 
first. The challenge for the leadership of the Palestinian bloc came from Sadat's proposal 
that if King Hussein was unwilling to sign a peace agreement between the West Bank and 
Israel, he, Sadat, would be ready to do so in the name of the Palestinians (Dayan 1981: 
163). Sadat viewed the PLO leadership as 'cabaret warriors' (Weizman 1981: 294) and a 
contributory cause of Egypt's economic malaise. Sadat, needful of the pressures for a 
prescription addressing the Palestinian problem, attempted to secure a general declaration 
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of principles, an accommodation perceived by Weizman, Sadat's close friend and 
confidante, as 'scarcely binding upon anyone' (Weizman 1981: 295). 33 
The configuration of the Arab and Palestinian bloc, the accommodation of 
external elites and external resource dependence in the Arab bloc and for Egypt in 
particular influenced Sadat's preferences for a trilateral arrangement with Israel and the 
United States rather than a multilateral conference, having cancelled a friendship treaty 
with its former sponsor, the Soviet Union. The President had been committed to 
traditional foreign policy, advocating the traditional Arab position on a comprehensive 
peace with Israel. Now, Sadat attempted to negotiate the return of Sinai, disassociate 
itself from Soviet influence, gain international supremacy over its rival Syria and mitigate 
the internal and Arab wide influence of the PLO, while paralleling the 'favoured nation' 
position of Israel in relation to the United States. Sadat's incentives were driven by Arab 
bloc and internal Egyptian considerations. 
In 1977, Sadat implemented institutional changes to the existing Nasserite single 
party corporatist state system in Egypt replacing it with a restricted pluralism (al- 
ta'addudiyya al-muqayidda) (Rosefsky Wickham 2004: 215). Sadat's modernisation 
initiative changed the complicated elite clique or shillal system (Vitalis 1995: 166) in an 
attempt to create a multi-party system from what was the Arab Socialist Union 
(Hinnebusch 1985: 67). The Shilla134 resembled tendencies in party political systems 
elsewhere. Prevalent throughout Egyptian society, usually diffuse and generalised and 
unimpaired by other loyalties, the shillals were relatively fluid associations; their 
influence - deten-nined by a shared position over particular issues, driven by individual 
goals, personal gain and career advancement - was particularly prevalent in the military 
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(Springborg 1975: 100). Sadat initiated changes to the informal shillals and more formal 
Dufaa (old boys' network) as part of his political modernisation initiative. In addition, 
Sadat encouraged the fort-nation of independent Islamic student associations (jama'at) to 
counter the socialist Nasserist organisations. The ploy succeeded and thejama'at rapidly 
overtook the left socialist students' dominance of university politics; this in turn 
expanded the ideological parameters of Egyptian domestic politics (Rosefsky Wickham 
2004: 217). 
Sadat's two political objectives involved maintaining the power needed to 
complete and sustain the changes in Egypt's global role and economic structure, and by 
virtue of his De-Nasserisation programme accommodate without jeopardising the 
growing pressure for political freedoms. Legitimacy and monopoly of authority was 
imperative for Sadat in a system best defined as a presidential monarchy or authoritarian 
presidency. The domestic crisis and 1977 food riots influenced the need for access to 
external and unobtainable resources, such as the oil wells in Sinai under Israeli control 
(Vitalis 1995). 
Sadat's imperative was not shared by his ministers in the Egyptian delegation at 
Camp David, including Foreign Minister Muhammad Ibrahim Kamel who was compelled 
to resign once the Camp David Accord was reached (Kamel 1986: 136); Minister of State 
Butros Butros Ghali (later UN Secretary General), Egypt's ambassador to the UN Abd el 
Majid; and Senior Foreign Ministry official Osama al-Baz. 
The failure of the President to consult with his advisors and his compulsion to 
reveal his reserve position to the American interlocutors, to President Carter himself and 
his close working and personal relationship with Israeli defence minister Ezer Weizman 35 
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unden-nined Egypt's position. Sadat's subsequent assassination on 6 October 1981 by 
Islamists (rather than the secular and left-leaning PLO favoured by Nasser and excluded 
by Sadat)36 has been attributed to his negotiation of the Camp David Accords as well as 
his domestic liberalisation policies (Hirst and Beeson 1981). Sadat's increasing 
dependence on external resources realigned Egypt with the United States and resulted in 
Egypt receiving the largest US donations, second only to Israel. 
Sadat's willingness to recognise Israel and to restore Egypt's territorial integrity 
influenced his decision to represent Palestinian preferences and illustrated the limits of 
Egypt's advocacy for the Palestinians. Amidst the Camp David discussions, for example, 
the Egyptian leadership negotiated the return of Sinai and made no mention of Gaza. 
Despite Egypt's role in Gaza from 1948, the Egyptians feared Israel would consider 
relinquishing Gaza (at this time free of Israeli settlements), rendering the Egyptians 
responsible for the Palestinian population (Roy 1995: 109). 37 The Israeli leadership 
unyielding in its advocacy of its claim on the West Bank (without its necessary 
integration into Israel proper) was less united in their view of maintaining Gaza (Nisan 
1978: 63). Control of Gaza was not mentioned in the negotiations, as Sadat sought to 
exclude and ultimately usurp the recognised leadership of the Palestinian people, the PLO 
(Weizman 1981: 296). 
Israeli recognition of the incumbent Egyptian government as the representative 
leadership of the Arab ethnic bloc provided the Egyptian Sadat led government the 
opportunity to diminish the influence on domestic socio-economic trials on its legitimacy. 
The Accords simultaneously endorsed the regional legitimacy of the Egyptian 
government to the exclusion of competing factional elites, such as the PLO, which 
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threatened the traditional elite accommodation of the pan-Arab ethnic-bloc. The 
Egyptian desire to sever the influence of its Soviet benefactor led the Sadat government 
to acquiesce to the preferences of the United States lured by the associated benefits from 
allying with the United States. 
3.5 The configuration and nature of the Israeli bloc 
The Israeli bloc has from its inception managed two contradictory tendencies: one has 
been to adjust the composition of the elite to conform to a rapidly changing increasingly 
heterogeneous population; the other had been to inhibit any fragmentation of the Israeli 
elite (Lenczowski 1975: 172). The Israeli election of 1977 resulted in a Menachem 
Begin led right-wing minimum winning coalition government. The Likud (fon-nerly 
Herut) the largest party with 44 seats was joined by the National Religious Party with 12 
seats, Augdat Yisrael with four seats, Ariel Sharon a Likudnik standing on a one-man list 
as was Moshe Dayan 38 with one seat each, in a 120 seats Knesset. Likud, a congressional 
type of consociational party of separate organisational entities that function as a unity 
(Bogaards 2002: 10, Lenczowski 1975: 172), being a combination of Herut and a series 
of smaller parties, captured 33.3 per cent of the votes . 
39 The election represented a 
reorientation in the Israeli electorate towards the right wing and the end of the coalition 
between the historically dominant Labour party and the National Religious Party. The 
electorate reoriented itself as coalition options shifted. Alternative groupings and party 
mergers undermined the conviction that the dominant party could not be dislodged, so 
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much so that by 1977 support for the Labour party fell to 24.6 per cent of the vote from 
46.7 per cent in 1969 (Luebbert 1986: 69). 
The division with the National Religious Party altered the Israeli elites' traditional 
mechanisms of open competition and external accommodation (oversized coalitions) as 
well as the Labour party's loss of the monopoly in the debate about Zionism. After the 
1967 war, an ideological division re-emerged in Israel. The war had reopened the pre- 
independence debate on the 'desirable boundaries of the Jewish State' (Seliktar 1988: 3 1, 
see also, Lustick 1993: 26). Zionism emerged outside a territorial base. In operational 
terms it advocated Hitnahlut - settlement, designed to secure a territorial base for the 
state. Eretz Yisrael (the Greater Israel) was perceived as a temporal geo-religious 
concept that did not coincide with international borders. The seizure of land in 1967 
divided Israelis between these two essential characteristics of Zionism. The territorial 
imperatives of Eretz Yisrael with its borders defined in biblical terms (Lustick 1993: 26, 
Nisan 1978: 133, Shindler 1995), suggested the pennanent acquisition and integration of 
the newly occupied areas of 'Judea and Samaria' (the West Bank) and Jerusalem into 
Israel. In particular, the moral and religious significance of the West Bank was 
substantial. Developed by the rational religious leader, Rabbis Abraham Isaac Kook, and 
propagated by Merkaz Herav Yeshiva and the spiritual centre of the Gush Emunim (Bloc 
of the Faithful) who advocated settling the territories as a religious imperative, Eretz 
Yisrael was seen as part of a broad process of acculturation that would bring Israeli Jews 
'to see the State of Israel as naturally and necessarily coextensive with the whole Land of 
Israel' (Lustick 1993: 35). For the new right in Israel settlement superseded strategic 
consideration. By 1977 the territorial basis of the Israeli state was more substantial than 
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ever, the 'dominant long term goal of Likud's foreign policy has been to turn the state of 
Israel into the Land of Israel' (Seliktar 1988: 3 1, Nisan 1978: 153). 
The second characteristic of Zionism refers to the inherent Jewish nature of the 
state. Demographic imperatives counselled against the incorporation of one million non- 
Jewish Palestinians into the Jewish state. The division within Israel arose from attempts 
to reconcile the imperatives of expansionism and exclusivism (Luebbert 1986: 96, Sayigh 
1979: 5, Schindler 1995). Israel's avoidance of the necessity to impose its rule over the 
million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, rather than a concession, was perceived 
to be a service that Israel 'should render to her own interest and destiny' (Eban 1978: 
351). The state building theory implied by Likud government policies emphasised 
settlement, elaboration of administrative, economic and social institutions for the Israeli 
settlers of the territories and control rather than elimination or assimilation of the 
Palestinian population (Lustick 1993: 27). 
The seizure of Sinai, required a substantial military presence better redeployed to 
the borders with Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, and all the political parties made public 
statements of willingness to negotiate with the Egyptians conceming the status of the 
Sinai occupation (Shlaim 2000: 347). The Labour government's indecision over the 
nature of the compromise to be made split the coalition and the National Religious Party 
anticipated costly territorial concessions (Kieval 1983: 121). Labour Prime Minister 
Rabin's meeting with American President Carter in March 1977 compounded these fears. 
Weakened by the domestic and oil crises and his failure to negotiate anything other than 
an interim agreement with Sadat who viewed Rabin's domestic constraints as prohibitive 
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to a more substantive arrangement, Rabin's resigned his position (Maoz and Mor 2002: 
155). 
Domestically, the Labour party was perceived to be too willing to consider 
territorial compromise. Former Foreign Minister Yigal Allon's plan of 1967 proposed 
that border adjustments were a necessary prerequisite for Israeli security and long-ten-n 
stability. Israeli control of the territories threatened a 'Jewish ... Socialist ... and 
Democratic Israel' (Nisan 1978: 77). Allon considered Israel's fundamental obligation to 
the Arab population to be the provision of a vehicle for political expression and 
development (Nisan 1978: 77, Sofer 1988.127). The adjustments needed to be linked 
with mutually efficient security arrangements. The Labour government had stated that 
'Israel would be prepared to concede all that is not absolutely essential to its security 
within the context of an overall peace settlement. It is holding most of these territories 
now only as a means to achieve its foremost goal- peace with all its neighbours. ' 
The territorial cleavage was made clear after the USA initiated Rogers Plan in 
1970 called for a large-scale Israeli withdrawal from territories captured, resulting in 
Begin's withdrawal4o as minister without portfolio from the National Unity Government 
(Seliktar 1988: 34). The aftennath of the 1973 war and the weakening of the Rabin 
government meant that by May 1977, the Israeli electorate reoriented itself towards the 
right wing and an electoral victory for the Likud (Unity) party halted the Labour party's 
historically dominant coalition party monopoly (Hazan 1999a: 126). The election of 
Begin, the fon-ner leader of the Irgun Zvai Leurni (Etzel), the Military National 
Organisation and active paramilitary wing of the revisionist movement competing with 
the socialist Hagana for supremacy in 1948, reflected popular ideological mobilisation on 
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the part of the Israeli electorate. While famed for his 'we fight therefore we are! ' 
statement (Begin 1993: 46), he agreed to join his adversary Ben-Gurion as minister 
without portfolio in the fledgling Israeli government. By 1977 Begin had also managed 
to mobilise the changing Israeli demographic, as increasing numbers of Sephardi Jews 
from North Africa, the Middle East and India supported the Likud. Conscious of the 
'high degree of consensus on the need for the existence of consensus' in Israel (Arian 
1971: 3) Begin chose his governing partners. 
He maximised the fragmentation of the Israeli parties (Laaksoand Taagepera 
1979) and further altered the mode of interaction within the Israeli bloc; his decision to 
ask the former Labour party member Moshe Dayan to be foreign minister had occurred 
only rarely. During the negotiations for the National Unity government in 1967, Begin 
proposed Moshe Dayan as candidate for defence minister in the coalition government 
(Haber 1978: 267 ). 41 In 1979 Begin's rationale for co-opting Dayan was to create an 
ideologically broad coalition. Moshe Dayan's father had been instrumental in the 
creation of Mapai and was known to be Ben-Gurion's preferred heir to the leadership of 
Labour. Dayan would, it was hoped, win support from the right of the Labour party, 
providing Begin with his much sough after and otherwise unobtainable ideologically 
broad coalition (Lustick 1993: 357). Dayan, along with his brother-in-law, Defence 
Minister Ezer Weizman, 42 provided a counterbalance to Agriculture Minister Ariel 
Sharon who had fielded his own separate list in the elections and won two seats. 43 
Begin was, however, constrained by the coalition system. The non-nally oversized 
coalition won a minimum of votes in this instance, and generated a smaller decision- 
making body or inner cabinet circle. During Begin's tenure, two such groups emerged. 
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The more forinalised 'kitchen cabinet' consisted of Begin's ministers and the less 
formalised included members of the 'fighting family', Begin's associates from the Irgun 
(Seliktar 1988: 32 ). 44 Begin was nevertheless the undisputed leader of the party as he had 
been of Herut; as Weizman suggested, 'everything revolves around [him] people vie with 
each other to guess what he's thinking and how he will react' (Haber 1978: 289). 
The government was innovative as the first right-wing religious coalition 
government in Israeli history, as were its policy proposals. In particular, the plan of 
proposals for a negotiated agreement to enhance Israeli security and Israel's proposals for 
the Geneva Conference had been drawn up by Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. They 
addressed the issue of the territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by separating the 
territorial from the political. The Palestinians would be afforded 'autonomy' or self-rule 
while the territory would remain under Israeli control. The Israeli military in the West 
Bank and Gaza would withdraw from the main Palestinian population centres. The issue 
of sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza would be postponed for five years and 
Israel's authority over the territories would remain until such time as all the parties to the 
final status discussions could agree. Palestinians would not be integrated into Israel 
'proper' and therefore have no citizenship or integration into the Israeli body politic. 
Similarly, Israel's security and territorial concerns regarding the areas were appeased 
without having to impose or relinquish power. 
Israeli Foreign Minister, Dayan, suggested the agreement be implemented in 
stages conditional on the success of the early implementation. The position paper drafted 
by Dayan asserted that it was 'probably not possible to reach a final peace agreement in 
the situation that existed' (Dayan 198 1: 11). At best, Israel desired an accord ending the 
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state of war and would not concede territory it was prepared to relinquish within the 
framework of a permanent peace treaty. Israel hoped to achieve an additional substantive 
achievement. In agreeing to consider the Geneva negotiations, it sought an American 
commitment to a long-term defence treaty. The treaty alluded to by the Carter 
Administration would substitute for the territory Israel would be asked to relinquish in 
any comprehensive settlement. During Prime Minister Begin's meeting with President 
Carter in Washington in July 1977, the Israeli proposals were detennined. The Geneva 
Conference would be in accordance with Resolutions 338 and 242 and with accredited 
representatives of Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Israel proposed a series of bilateral 
committee meetings within the framework of multilateral Geneva talks. The issue of 
Israeli borders and the question of the West Bank were addressed to President Carter 
privately. Regarding the Israel-Egyptian border, Israel was prepared to 'make significant 
withdrawal from Sinai' (Dayan 1981: 20). The Israel-Syrian border was more 
problematic. Israel proposed redeployment of its forces along agreed lines within the 
framework of a peace settlement. The third article in the Israeli position paper referred to 
the issue of the West Bank. It argued that 'based on the historic rights of our nation to 
this land' and the need for national security, 'Israel will not transfer Judea, Samaria and 
the Gaza District to any foreign sovereign authority' (Dayan 1981: 20). 
The final position represented a shift in Likud party policy. Prime Minister Begin 
while unprepared to allow the West Bank to be controlled by another sovereign power 
made no direct claim that the West Bank be integrated into Israel proper. The question of 
'withdrawal from territory' was more difficult. Resolution 242 covered all territories, 
including the West Bank and the Gaza district. The plan of self-government for West 
116 
Bank autonomy was compatible with 242, including its article on withdrawal; and that 
was Israel's proposal to fulfil the Resolution. 
Throughout the negotiations, Begin consulted with his dual inner cabinets once 
the Dayan plan had been initiated. Competition within the Likud was intense-broadly 
divisions existed between the former Herut members and the more liberal associates. 
Specifically, divisions among Herut factions were also substantive and based on 
historical or military affiliations or around personalities, like Sharon for example. The 
ideological stretching within the broader coalition was made manifest when the plan was 
initially put forward. In particular, the proposed withdrawal from settlements and 
provisional autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, rejected by Agriculture Minister Ariel 
Sharon (Sharon 1989: 400). Once assurances were given that Palestinian autonomy 
would be constrained, Mordachai Gur, the Chief of Staff, was the only remaining 
opposition to the Dayan initiative. While the forinal cabinet group tended to win 
decisions relating to the negotiations, Begin was also known to make executive decisions. 
The initiative to bypass the conventional CIA route and communicate to Sadat directly 
the intelligence Israel had of a Libyan assassination attempt on Sadat is a case in point. 
When made aware of the Libyan threat to Sadat, Begin asserted that 'there was no harrn 
in showing him [Sadat]' Israel's goodwill (Hirst and Beeson 1981: 284, Seliktar 1988: 
42). Equally significant was Begin's perseverance with the Sadat initiative despite Israeli 
intelligence reports that Egyptian popular opinion was not ready to accept Israel (Seliktar 
1988: 42). 
Furthennore, the government took the cautious step of consulting the Knesset on 
all positions. Advocating this mechanism meant that the incumbent elite accommodated 
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the opposition in all decision-making and maintained its monopoly of legitimacy. During 
the July 1977 negotiations at Leeds Castle, Israel sought Knesset approval for the 
following proposal: 'Should a proposal for a peace treaty based upon concrete territorial 
compromise be submitted, Israel, in accordance with previous statements, would be ready 
to consider it. ' The government position was approved by 64 to 32 votes in the Knesset. 
This model of decision-making, in effect by committee, attempted to render inelastic or 
fix political and subsequently popular support for any decision made. The mechanism 
employed by the government instituted collective elite decision-making and the 
absorption of the opposition in the final outcome. When the final Camp David Accords 
had to be ratified by the Knesset, the Agreements were supported by 84, with 19 against 
and 17 abstentions. The Likud-led coalition government regulated the configuration of 
the Israel bloc using parliamentary mechanisms and selective appointments to secure the 
leadership latitude in decision-making while maintaining a substantial degree of 
autonomy of the incumbent elite. The ramifications of these mechanisms further 
influenced the pattern of accommodation and support of the bloc. 
3.5.1 Elite accommodation and the support in the Israeli bloc 
Israeli Prime Minister Begin advocated transparency in an attempt to secure the support 
of the Israeli electorate for the Likud party. Begin's address to the American Jewish 
Leaders in New York on 20 September 1978 revealed that the Prime Minister had 
resisted all American and Egyptian pressure to proceed with negotiations regarding a 
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working draft referring to 'the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war'. The 
phrase, with its apparent reference to UN Resolution 242, was subsequently dropped 
45 from the draft document and the final Accord . 
The Camp David Accord provided that 'the Israeli military government and its 
civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been 
freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military 
government'. 46 Once the agreements were signed, Begin altered his policy and appointed 
Yosef Burg, the Minister of the Interior and leader of the National Religious Party, as 
head of Israel's negotiating team in the discussion of Palestinian autonomy for the Camp 
David 11 dialogue in 1979 (Silver 1984: 182). Burg's position as a staunch advocate of 
religious Zionism constituted an authentic representation of the government's position on 
Palestinian autonomy. The idea of autonomy appealed to Begin, undermining the 
Palestinian claim to sovereignty; it was also politically practicable. Palestinian autonomy 
provided a means of addressing the problematic issues associated with the question of the 
rights of a national minority and whether Israel should integrate the Palestinian territories 
further (Soffer 1998: 134). Much to the frustration of Dayan and Weizmann, the 
autonomy Begin wanted to implement bore little relation to that referred to in the Camp 
David negotiations. The appointment of Burg exacerbated the friction between Foreign 
Minister Dayan and the Prime Minister, resulting in Dayan's resignation (Slater 1991: 
428). 47 Ezer Weizman's resignation followed shortly afterwards, allowing Ariel Sharon 
and other members of the 'fighting family' to dominate Begin's inner circle. 
The Likud govemment had successfully co-opted support from Dayan to 
negotiate the withdrawal from the territory he had been instrumental in winning. The 
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Agreement necessitated a redrawing of Israel's south-west border, so transforming the 
institution of state. Dayan's appointment attempted to minimise the sense of crisis 
associated with the territorial change as well as any advantage it might provide for the 
rival Labour party (Lustick 1993: 41). However, once Sinai had been returned, Dayan's 
views on the settlements were considered too moderate and with his position no longer 
tenable, he resigned. The appointment of Burg as Minister for the Interior to lead the 
negotiations on the proposed nature of Palestinian autonomy consciously antagonised 
Dayan as Foreign Minister and Weizman as Minister for Defence. Furthennore, Begin's 
attempts to regulate Dayan's decision-making and Weizmann's autonomy contributed to 
their resignations. Israel's dependence on external resources was not so readily 
regulated. 
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3.5.2 Israeli external resource dependence 
The Nobel Peace Prize for 1978 was awarded to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and 
Menachem Begin of Israel. The external legitimacy gained by the first right-wing 
religious Israeli coalition government to negotiate territory for security successfully 
increased the international and domestic support and legitimacy of the Likud elite 
specifically and the Israeli government more specifically. Recognition was one feature of 
the incumbent Israeli elite's dependence on the United States. Carter's timely election in 
tandem with that of Begin provided much needed credibility to external involvement in 
the negotiations (Friedlander 1983: 230). Israel's reliance on the United States as a 
custodian of the Accords (Stedman 2000: 180) was more important than Begin's 
opposition to the joint US-Soviet call for the renewal of the Geneva negotiations might 
suggest (Maoz and Mor 2002: 156). The Israeli government's dependence on US support 
and Carter's tacit recognition of the Sadat initiative proposed instead provided the Israeli 
leadership with the domestic autonomy it required to initiate dialogue. 
The UN Security Resolution 242 was interpreted by the Carter administration - 
many of whom were involved in the Brookings Report of 1975 calling for a solution 
based on Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian self-determination (Aruri 2003: 56) - in such 
a way by President Carter as to oblige the parties to conclude a comprehensive peace 
agreement and not as the original text stated merely 'an end of belligerency'. The 
importance of the US position lay in its interpretation of 242 and willingness to 
accommodate differing interpretations and issues of contention in respective side letters. 
'Only Jimmy Carter had the power to bang heads together and force ... agreement' 
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(Weizinan 1981: 367). Israel was nevertheless dependent on American aid to finance the 
withdrawal from Sinai (Dayan 1981: 232). 
The USA was not, however, a benign facilitator, when difficulties and possible 
deadlocks arose in the negotiations. President Carter used information gathered by the 
CIA in order to manipulate Sadat and Begin to persist with negotiations. Carter 
intervened forcefully, telling the representatives of both blocs that if they left the 
negotiations their relationship with the USA would 'be imperilled'. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The nature of the peace established in the Camp David Accords perplexed President 
Carter as highlighted in his address before a joint session of Congress on September 18 th 
1978. Reflecting on the issues dividing the protagonists Carter focused on the 'basic 
question', namely 'the nature of the peace' outlined in the Accord. Specifically, whether 
peace 'would simply mean' the silencing of guns and ceasing of tanks, or referred instead 
to a full range of diplomatic, cultural and economic relations between neighbouring 
Middle Eastern states as 'neighbours and as equals and friends'. 
The Camp David Accords represent a minimal inter-ethnic elite bargain. The 
Accords consist of two distinct and independent documents 'nested' one within the other. 
The foundation of the Accord and the readily agreed document is the bilateral pact 
between Israel and Egypt relating to the return of the Sinai Peninsula and mutual shipping 
access. Less than a peace agreement and more than an accommodation between 
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traditional rivals, the negotiators had to choose 'between a peace agreement and the 
Israeli settlements in Sinai' (Weizmann 1981: 369). 
The Agreement met the immediate territorial and domestic 'societal' security 
concerns of both the incumbent Egyptian leadership and the Likud led Israeli 
government. Menachem Begin's desire to undermine the position of the PLO in exile 
proved the rationale for both the Egyptian withdrawal and swift invasion of Lebanon. 
Begin deftly managed an eclectic coalition government, with one man member parties 
from opposition ideological positions as influential ministers without whom Begin's 
Sinai giveaway could not have been implemented. Begin's government was the first 
Israeli government to return land and became the first to invade a neighbouring state. 
Combined the withdrawal from Egypt and subsequent invasion of Lebanon illustrates the 
degree of leadership autonomy exhibited by the Begin government. Constrained only by 
the dependence on US financial aid (Neff 1995: 120) and later US unease at the Israeli 
presence in Lebanon, Begin's leadership latitude was only curtailed by Israel's external 
dependence on the United States. 
The bilateral pact with Egypt, creating a 'land for peace legacy' for the Likud 
party fon-ned the basis of an end to overt Egyptian-Israeli rivalry - one of the most costly 
bilateral rivalries of all the dyads that have made up what is broadly descried as the 
Arab-Israeli conflict (Maoz and Mor 2002: 173). Within-bloc patterns of 
accommodation changed to accommodate the new right Likud party. The Labour party 
while still the largest opposition party, created a precendent by agreeing to go into a 
national unity government with Likud once the occupation of Lebanon proved too 
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difficult. The inherently pervasive nature of Israeli factionalism remained a feature of the 
Israeli bloc dynamic. 
The inherent asymmetry between the negotiating elites is not immediately 
transparent. For Sadat, however, the ramifications of the Camp David Accords were not 
as fortuitous. While Sadat desired to usurp the PLO leadership and re-assert Egypt's 
previous position governing the PLO in all but name, as had been its role in the 1950s 
and 60s. Sadat's willingness to recognise Israel undermined his domestic position. 
While territorial integrity over Sinai was an imperitive Sadat could not be deemed to 
relinquish, the reorientation of Sadat to the West and the United States fuelled the 
cricisms of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and ultimately cost Sadat his life and 
leadership. 
The security oriented nature of the agreement is explicit in the conventiently 
ambigious clauses in the latter of the two agreements. In the second agreement is a 
residual document that proposes a Framework for Peace in the Middle East. It was 
imperative that the second agreement be signed in order to sustain Egyptian status and 
position amid criticism from Arab states for recognising Israel. The Accords were 
accredited with heralding the beginning of a new era of Peace in the Middle East and its 
signatories were awarded the Nobel Peace prize for their efforts. The nature of the 
domestic and internal within-bloc factional influences and constraints on their efforts 
were not considered. The Accords illustrate the influence of factions within blocs on the 
preferences of the negotiating elites. The Camp David Accords illustrate inter-ethnic 
elite bargaining mediated by a mutual security threat or common foe, in this instance the 
PLO and the existence of a strong, shared dependent external resource namely the United 
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States. The inter-ethno-national bloc elites are constrained by the configuration of their 
respective blocs, the traditional pattern of elite accommodation within the blocs and the 
influence of external resources and their dependence on the sponsorship of external actors 
as well as external region and period specific Cold War variables. 
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4 Colluding to exclude Hamas: the 1993 Oslo Accord 
4.1 Introduction 
The Israel i-Palestini an Oslo Accords of 1993 exemplify an inter-ethnic elite minimal 
bargain (Horowitz 2000: 574, Nordlinger 1972: 118, Tsebelis 1990: 160), a collaborative 
security arrangement (Kupchan and Kupchan 1995: 57), in which the Israeli government 
and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) leadership aggregated their respective 
positions and political legitimacy as ethnic bloc leaders to curtail the escalating influence 
of Hamas. 
The Oslo Accords have been described as opaque (Morag 2000: 200), a product of 
twin-track diplomacy (Agha, et al 2003, Waage 2002: 597), advancing negotiation theory 
and measuring ripeness (Afeste 1991, Aggestam 1999, Zartman 1995). Game theoretical 
explanations have been supported (Hovi 1998), as have changing global dynamics, the 
end of the Cold War (Jacoby and Salsby 2002) and third-party intervention by the 
remaining superpower (Aruri 2003, Shafir 1999). While some argue the Accords 
exemplified a change in Israel's identity and cultural narrative (Barnett 1996,1999), 
others have explained them as a consequence of Palestinianisation as well as 
organisational and ideological change within the PLO (Kelman 1997, Sayigh 1999, 
Schulz 1999), or the result of attitudinal and policy changes within Israeli society (Arian 
1998, Ben-Yehuda 1997, Freedman 1995, Kimmerling 2003, Lieberfeld 1999). 
Understood as the culmination of global, regional and financial circumstances along with 
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encouraging political initiatives framed in an appropriate window of opportunity, 
explanations of the Accords also allude to the spectre of Islamic extremism as an 
explanation for the emergence of the 1987 Intifada or uprising (O'Balance 1998: 52). It 
has also been suggested that the outcome of the Oslo Agreement exemplifies situations 
where the conditions that encourage groups to initiate negotiations and sign settlements 
are insufficient to bring peace; 'combatants do not have the greatest difficulty resolving 
underlying conflicts of interest and reaching bargains' but rather in implementing the 
resulting terms (Walter 2002: 5). 
This chapter argues that the Oslo Agreement represents a shared interest of the 
Israeli and Palestinian elite made manifest in a minimal bargain comprising two features, 
recognition and security. The first is the mutual recognition of the State of Israel and the 
PLO and the second is the mutual security of the State of Israel and the PLO leadership. 
A minimal bargain is defined as a fundamental pact or limited compromise addressing 
essential concerns over which the negotiating elites can agree. The Oslo Agreement, 
however, is often mistaken for a maximal bargain defined as an inclusive comprehensive 
arrangement that addresses the core causes of the conflict. ' The Oslo Accords were 
agreed by a small caucus of Palestinians and Israelis with Norwegian facilitators in 
contrast to the simultaneous bilateral and multilateral Middle East negotiations in 
Washington held under the auspices of the US administration. The secret negotiations in 
Oslo concluded with a minimal bargain when the Washington round of talks 'failed' 
(Nawfal 1995). After 23 months of unsuccessfully negotiating core conflict concerns in 
Washington, what explains the decision of the Israeli and Palestinian bloc elites to agree 
to a minimal or partial pact negotiated secretly in Oslo? 
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The success attributed to the Oslo Pact emanates from the recognition of a shared 
security concern. The rise of Hamas (Harakat a]-Muqawama al-Islamiyya), the Islamic 
Resistance Movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, represented a shared threat to the 
incumbent Israeli and Palestinian elites. The increasing potency of the Harnas faction 
altered the configuration of actors within the Palestinian bloc, the traditional mechanisms 
of elite accommodation within the bloc and the support for the leadership within the 
Palestinian constituency. Hamas further disrupted the Palestinian leadership's 
relationship with external sponsors. Escalating violence within the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip was attributed to Hamas. The violence of the Intifada intensified Israeli security 
concerns and impacted the configuration of the Israeli bloc, the nature of elite 
accommodation as well as the external resource dependence of the incumbent Israeli bloc 
elite. As a result, the Oslo Accords were scripted to accommodate the signatories' 
common interests in order to mitigate the menace of Hamas. For the Israeli government, 
the desire to alter the composition of the ruling Palestinian elite within the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip required that it recognise and repatriate the Fateh-dominated PLO 
leadership from exile in Tunis to the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for which the PLO 
leadership would assist the Israeli government's security imperatives, by curbing the 
influence of Hamas and abating the violence of the Intifada (Shikaki 1998: 3 0) .2 
The Agreement reached in Oslo addressed the immediate needs of the leadership 
elites. It was an intricate political bargain of mutual recognition encompassing a bilateral 
security arrangement orchestrated to curtail the advancement of Hamas. The Oslo 
Agreement, defined as a minimal exclusive bargain, seeks solely to address the pressing 
concerns of the incumbent bloc leaders negotiating, and postpones the elements of the 
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maximal bargain to final status negotiations. The Agreement illustrates the 
transformative influence of factionalism within the respective Israeli and Palestinian 
ethnic blocs, the shifting nature of the constituencies of the incumbent leaders and the 
dependence of the decision-makers on external resources. All these factors shaped the 
negotiating preferences of the incumbent ethnic elites and moulded the nature of the 
bargain reached. The role of Hamas as a within-bloc faction within the Palestinian bloc 
threatened the authority and legitimacy of both Palestinian and Israeli leaderships and 
subsequently altered the respective strategies of the Oslo signatories. The minimal 
bargain reached at Oslo was premised on a collaborative security pact that served to 
secure the primacy and legitimacy of the PLO's Fateh leadership and contain the security 
concerns of the Israeli governing elite, respectively. The Oslo compromise involved the 
tacit support of both negotiating elites for each other's objectives in the guise of a 
maximal agreement. Israel would recognise the PLO leadership as the sole representative 
of the Palestinian people and facilitate the return of Fateh to the Occupied Territories of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The restoration of the exiled PLO leadership and 
containment of both the Intifada and the threat of Hamas in a collaborative security 
arrangement appealed to the Accord signatories. 
The Oslo Accord, otherwise known as the Declaration of Principles, was a device 
for mutual recognition of the incumbent Israeli and Palestinian leaders as well as a means 
of managing the mutually recognised shared threat posed by Hamas to the incumbent 
bloc leaders. 
This chapter will first consider the architecture of the Agreement. The 
institutional and functional ramifications will be compared with the bargaining positions 
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of the negotiating incumbent elites. Second, the nature of the Oslo bargain will be 
assessed with particular reference to the factional influence of Hamas within the 
Palestinian ethnic bloc and the consequences of increasing violence on the legitimacy and 
autonomy of the Israeli incumbent bloc leadership. Finally, the configuration of the 
blocs, the patterns of elite accommodation and the constraints imposed by the respective 
constituencies of the incumbent bloc leaders; as well as the dependence on external 
resources of the respective bloc elites will be considered. The influence of these factional 
features on the minimal bargain of the Oslo outcome will be assessed. 
4.2 The architecture of the Accords 
The Oslo Accords, agreed on 19 August 1993, comprise four documents, three of which 
were letters. Taken together, these letters form an agreement of mutual recognition 
between the PLO and the State of Israel. The fourth document is a Declaration of 
Principles on interim self-government signed in Washington on 13 September 1993. In 
the Declaration of Principles, the PLO was recognised as the (sole) legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people by the Labour-led Israeli government under 
Prime Minister Rabin. As an accord of mutual recognition, the Fateh leadership of the 
PLO under Yasser Arafat recognised the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and 
security .3 The Principles 
declared in the Declaration refer to the resolution of conflict by 
peaceful means, determining differences through negotiation, renouncing terrorism, 
rescinding the clauses of the Palestinian covenant that contradict the Accords, as well as 
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halting the Intifada. 4 The primacy of security is evident in that the second letter reiterates 
the PLO leadership role in regulating the Intifada, it outlines the PLO commitment to 
advocating the non-nalisation of life in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and rejecting 
violence and terrorism. 5 Addressed to the independent facilitator John Jorgen Holst, as 
opposed to the Israeli government, the letter constitutes an independent commitment by 
the PLO leadership to address the violence in the West Bank and Gaza and therefore is 
unique as there is no parallel Israeli letter or commitment to the Norwegian facilitators. 
The Accord was an incremental approach towards a settlement involving a 
'gradual transition' from occupation to self-rule. Israel would withdraw from the Gaza 
Strip and Jericho within six months of signing the Declaration, and the elections to the 
Palestinian Council were scheduled within nine months. Negotiations on the permanent 
status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be initiated within two years of Israel's 
6 
withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho and conclude within five years. Civil authority and 
limited powers would be transferred to the Palestinians first in Gaza and Jericho and 
gradually to the West Bank. The Palestinian Council would maintain jurisdiction over 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, excluding Jerusalem, with settlements and 
security issues deferred to permanent-status negotiations. The authority of the Palestinian 
Council would be extended in stages and its election held under international supervision. 
The discussion concerning the powers of the Council and the type and conditions of the 
elections and whether Jerusalem would be included were also deferred to the negotiation 
of the Interim Agreement. 
A pennanent settlement to the conflict and the establishment of a Palestinian state 
based on UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 242 and 338 would also be 
131 
7 
addressed in final-status negotiations. The core conflict concerns, including Jerusalem, 
refugees, settlements, security arrangements, border relations, interstate co-operation, and 
issues of mutual interest, were postponed. The Accords determined a time-frame for 
subsequent negotiations. With the exception of Articles pertaining to Israeli security 
objectives and the election of a Palestinian Council that provides for the return of the 
PLO leadership to participate in the elections, all other Articles defer decisive statements 
to interim or final status negotiations. 8 The intended effect of the Accord centred on 
addressing the Articles with an established date of implementation, namely, those 
Articles referring to security measures and the creation of a Palestinian interim self- 
government, the two core concerns of the ethnic bloc elites. The nature of the Agreement 
is that of a minimal bargain with a statement of intent for future negotiations. 
The Declaration of Principles, despite its title, is based on expediency rather than 
principle (Barnett 1996: 148). Conspicuously absent from the Agreement is the implicit 
understanding that the PLO leadership would return to Gaza, Jericho, and eventually the 
West Bank from its exile in Tunis. Power and self-governing authority would be 
transferred to the successful candidates in the Palestinian Council elections. As the 
recognised and 'legitimate' representatives of the Palestinian people, triumphant after 
their return from exile, Fateh would be the likely victors in the elections. The recognition 
and inclusion of the dominant Fateh faction and PLO leadership was facilitated to this 
end. The bargain required that they be recognised and return to Gaza and the West Bank 
in order to curtail and contain the Intifada and the challenge posed by Hamas. The 
security remittance of the PLO and the Palestinian Council, once elected, would cover 
only the Palestinian populated areas. The responsibility for the security of Israeli 
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citizens, settlements, and external border concerns would remain with Israel. Security 
powers relating to the West Bank and Gaza would only be incrementally transferred to a 
substantial Palestinian police force recruited locally and from abroad (in order to 
integrate the exiled PLO fighters). 9 The PLO leadership would return to the West Bank 
and Gaza in order to administer Palestinian security, its power instituted by the creation 
of an interim self-government through the Palestinian Council. All related concerns were 
deferred for future reflection. ' 0 
The array of conflict concerns deferred to subsequent negotiations endorses the 
minimal bargain definition of the Oslo Accord. The nature of the term 'accord' as 
opposed to 'agreement' highlights this fact. The Oslo Pact is most commonly referred to 
as an agreement - an accord is 'no more than a declaration of good will'. " As such, the 
Accords are imbued with great expectations that betray their minimal and incremental 
nature. 12 The 'gradualism' of the Accord made it favourable to the Israeli negotiators 
keen to proceed with addressing security concerns and postpone negotiations until 'after 
the deal was already done'. 13 The incremental nature of the Agreement was decisive for 
the Israeli government. The Israeli security apparatus would remain intact while the 
Palestinians established their own security structure. In contrast to the Camp David 
Agreement, military withdrawal would be 'seen to be' gradual., 4 Israeli authority and 
security would not be compromised as the instruments of Palestinian authority were 
introduced. 15 Once the PLO leadership accepted the 'gradualism' of Oslo the incentive 
for the Israeli government to persist with negotiations with the joint Jordanian-Palestinian 
team at Washington diminished. 
133 
The staggered nature of implementation circumvented the difficulty the Israeli 
government experienced in the ongoing Washington negotiations towards a 
comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The Israeli government's concern centred on 
the issue of authority and where the ultimate authority within the West Bank and Gaza 
would reside. This policy of incrementalism built into the Oslo Accords remedied the 
question of authority as the Israelis wanted 'to be seen to want' to 'retain as much control 
as possible for as long as possible' (Shlaim 2001: 509, Shlaim 1994: 32). 16 The PLO 
leadership's initial tacit acceptance of gradualism solved this problem. Once a degree of 
'gradualism' was accepted in principle, the secret negotiations of the Oslo track took 
precedence over Washington, where the Israeli delegation declined from committing to 
the creation of a permanent state like apparatus for the Palestinians. 17 
The issue of incrementalism was an equivocation. The objective of the Labour 
led government was primarily to minimise its responsibility for securing the West Bank 
and Gaza. When a period of transition, in keeping with gradualism was suggested the 
Israeli government opted instead to delegate responsibility to the PLO leadership as soon 
as practicable rather than initiate or supervise institutional transition and change. 18 
The PLO leadership was driven by the desire for recognition beyond the Arab 
League as the legitimate leadership of the Palestinian people. 19 As proscribed by the 
Israeli government prior to a change in the 1992 law, meeting with a PLO member was a 
criminal offence for Israelis. The offer of recognition enticed the PLO leadership, which 
had been described by Arafat as 'on the verge of liquidation at the eve of the peace 
process' . 
20 No similar offer was forthcoming in the Washington negotiations in which 
PLO members were excluded and the Palestinians representatives in attendance had been 
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selected by the PLO and subsequently authorised by the Israelis. The incentive for the 
PLO leadership was plain; complying with the Oslo Accords would revive the fortunes of 
the PLO leadership and secure its position at the expense of Hamas, the within-bloc 
challengers to PLO Palestinian leadership. By agreeing to Oslo, the PLO leadership 
assumed responsibility for security within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, appeasing 
the concerns of both inter-ethnic bloc elites. The Oslo Agreement was designed to 
address and implement these core incumbent elite concerns. 
4.3 The Intifada and the factional influence of Harnas 
The threat to the Palestinian and Israeli incumbent elites' who were party in the Oslo 
bargain began in earnest with the Intifacla. In the 1987 Palestinian uprising, the first 
Intifada initiated the emergence of Hamas (Abu Amr 1994: 5, Morris 1999: 561). The 
Intifada began amid rising tension in Gaza after a road accident led to riots against the 
Israeli occupation (Shlairn 2001: 466). The unrest persisted and almost immediately the 
religious leaders of the long-establi shed Islamic Muslim Brotherhood organisation 
published leaflets calling for a strike and demonstrations as well as an uprising against 
Israeli occupation. Increasingly, the pamphlets urging mobilisation were authored by a 
new and previously unknown group called Hamas. 
The emergence of Hamas as a new schismatic faction threatened the existing PLO 
leadership. The origins of Hamas have been attributed partially or totally to the Intifacla, 
the Israeli occupation, Israel itself, the Islamic resurgence after the Iranian Revolution, a 
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political vacuum in Gaza and the West Bank in the absence of the Fateh leadership, and 
the final interpretation sees Hamas as evidence of an internal Palestinian factional 
dispute. The factional dispute emerged over the question of Palestinian autonomy in 
relation to Islam and the nature of an Islamic Palestinian entity or state. The division 
arose over whether Palestinians would aspire to a Palestine with nation-state sovereign 
characteristics in keeping with the perceptions of the secular nationalist Fatah leadership. 
Or, whether an Islamic Palestine would form based on Shari'a law and core Islamic 
principles. The debate as to the sovereign and secular or Islamic and religious future of 
the future Palestine politicised the Islamic groups and created an anti-occupation force 
(Milton-Edwards 1996: 57) creating an ideological cleavage within the bloc that rendered 
Hamas the anti-regime and Weltanschauung model (Lipset 1959: 94) in the Palestinian 
bloc, unlikely to succumb to co-option or integration within the bloc leadership. 
Altematively, Hamas is perceived as a vehicle of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
created to mobilise support and compete with the secular nationalist groups of the PLO 
and as a counterweight to the threat posed by fringe Islamic groups like Islamic Jihad 
(Budeiri 1995: 91). Additional explanations assert that the Muslim Brotherhood's 
'original leadership ... was burdened with the stigma of de facto collaboration with Israel 
since the Moslem brothers had postponed till late the liberation of Palestine' (Rashad 
1993). Legrain observes that 'the Muslim Brotherhood had to end two decades of 
Islamic anti-Israeli inactivity' (Legrain 1997: 159). The complex relations between the 
Muslim Brotherhood and successive Israeli governments allude to initial Israeli influence 
in the creation and manipulation of Hamas. 21A relationship arrived at on the basis of 'the 
enemy of my enemy is my friend', any attempt to usurp the leadership of the PLO even 
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partially could reap mutual dividends: 'Such uncertainty allowed them to coexist and to 
manage operating separately but with a vision to their different objectives. 922 
Prior to the Intifada, the Palestinian issue languished after the PLO leadership's 
defeat and expulsion from Lebanon in 1982. The 1986 Arab Summit in Amman 
signalled a decreasing interest in the Palestinian cause in tandem with the revival of Islam 
in the Occupied Territories. 23 The mutable situation facilitated the opportunity to 
challenge the existing factional elites of the Palestinian bloc both secular and religious. 
The subsequent emergence of some new groupings was 'artificially stimulated ... part of 
an Israeli strategy to pursue a policy of divide and rule aimed at eradicating an already 
weakened national movement' (Milton-Edwards 1996: 8). Israel's co-option of the 
Muslim Brotherhood lends credence to this argument. 
Hamas arose from within the Muslim Brotherhood. The new organization was 
founded in two stages. In December 1987 prominent Muslim Brothers in Gaza formed 
The Movement of Islamic Resistance or Hamas. The initative appeared to be the work of 
Abd-al-Aziz al-Rantisi (deceased) a physician from the Islamic Ulniversity of Gaza and 
former student leaders at the University who were in respobsible for security matters in 
the Muslim Brotherhood. Traditional hostility to any political initative not associated 
with religious mobilization resulted in a clear distinction between the Islamic Resistance 
Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (Legrain 1997: 163). 
The emergence of Hamas initially marked a centrifugal shift in the support of 
Palestinians within the Gaza Strip as Hamas rapidly expanded its influence to the West 
Bank. The shift within the Palestinian bloc towards Hamas and its effort to reorient the 
Palestinian strategy towards the Israeli occupation resulted in a new dispensation in the 
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West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hamas elicited support from a generation of Palestinians 24 
unfamiliar with the 1967 war or Palestinian life prior to Israeli control and who were 
'ripe for resistance' (Litvak 1998: 148, Hroub 2000: 38). 
The new Palestinian faction advocated a national uprising against Israeli 
occupation. In contrast to the older order of the Muslim Brotherhood that formed the hub 
of Islamic opposition to the secular PLO in the West Bank and Gaza, the Hamas policy of 
active resistance to the occupation reoriented the Palestinian bloc and positioned the new 
Hamas faction between the Muslim Brotherhood and the more radical Islamic Jihad 
(Hroub 2000: 32 ). 25 The configuration of factions and the nature of elite accommodation 
within the Palestinian bloc threatened the position of the PLO leadership in terms of both 
its autonomy and its legitimacy. 
In the short time from the emergence of the Intifada to 1992,26 Hamas threatened 
the hegemony of the expelled PLO Fateh leadership and the policy of Israeli control and 
containment in the West Bank and Gaza. The 1987 Intifada and simultaneous emergence 
of Hamas as an actor within the Israeli Occupied Territories alarmed the incumbent 
Israeli elite as well as the PLO leadership (Ma'oz 1999: 400). By 1992, the continuing 
Intifada and escalation of support for Hamas had influenced the configuration of the 
factions, the perceptions of the Israeli and Palestinian bloc members and, as a result, the 
nature of elite accommodation in both blocs. The threat posed by Hamas to Israel's 
military and political control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to domestic Israeli 
support for incumbent Israeli government policy, as well as its influence on the Fateh 
leadership of the PLO, respectively, provided the incentive for both to adopt and 
advocate new tactics to curtail the activities and influence of the mutual threat of 
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'common foe'. The Oslo bargain complements the aims of both ethnic bloc leaderships 
in curtailing the influence of Hamas. 
Hamas was instrumental in increasing the financial, military, political and 
psychological cost of controlling the West Bank and Gaza for Israel. The actions of 
Hamas and the consequences of the Intifada threatened delicately balanced political 
coalitions within Israel and resulted in increasing popular support in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip against the Israeli occupation. Hamas was encroaching on the absent PLO 
leadership support within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The appeal of the new 
Palestinian faction was in no small measure due to its proximity to the conflict and its 
active response to the Israeli presence. 
The ramifications of Hamas were twofold. First, by 1990, Hamas was 
undermining Israel's containment policy of the Intifada and the Israeli government's will 
to persist with containment. The erosion of faith in the containment policy deflated 
morale throughout the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and questioned the legitimacy of the 
control regime adopted by Israel in the West Bank and Gaza. To remedy this situation, 
the Israeli government sought to change its traditional unilateral security tactics, seeking 
instead a collaborative security partner. The unlikely candidate for the partnership was 
the PLO Fateh leadership. 
Factionalism threatened the legitimacy of the PLO leadership exiled in Tunis. 
The mechanisms of patrimony that fused the Fatch leadership to its PLO supporters under 
occupation were placed under increasing financial, logistical and political strain in the 
midst of the Intifacla. Hamas unden-nined the already waning support system of the PLO 
leadership by providing services, initiatives and political activity, all of which drew 
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support and affiliation from the PLO's traditional constituency. In order to eliminate this 
threat, the PLO leadership sought to reintegrate itself into the core of the Palestinian 
polity in the Occupied Territories. This strategy required the recognition and pen-nission 
of the Israeli government. In return, the PLO's recognition of the State of Israel, which 
runs counter to the PLO Charter, would be sought from Fateh. 
These complementary objectives, combined with successive efforts to contain and 
curtail Hamas, led the Israeli government and the PLO leadership to negotiate the Oslo 
bargain. Motivated by the successive policy failures in dealing with Hamas, a shift in 
interests shaped the tactics of both participants towards the Oslo pact. A broad incentive 
for the Israeli government involved securing the legitimacy of its armed forces and the 
legitimacy of the State of Israel itself as domestic dissent regarding the handling of the 
Intifada was matched with international criticism, all of which undermined the ability of a 
quasi-consociational (Lijphart 1985: 61) consensual system to govern (Arian 1999, 
Hazan 1999b). 
The Israeli government aimed to amend its unilateral security strategy of control 
in the Occupied Territories. The change in policy required co-opting a security partner 
with a vested interest in the West Bank and Gaza. The need for an alternative 
collaborative security arrangement described as the 'Palestinian option' (Alpher 1995: 
130) formed part of the incentive for the Israeli government to negotiate the Oslo bargain 
with the exiled PLO leadership. The emergence of Hamas within five years of the 
group's founding had unified previous enemies and enduring rivals in an inter-ethnic elite 
pact orchestrated to curb the success of Hamas. 
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4.4 The configuration of factions in the Palestinian bloc 
Within the Palestinian bloc, factionalism was traditionally pervasive. The majority of 
factions have been institutionalised in large part under the collective umbrella of the 
27 Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). Institutionally, the PLO spans the spectrum 
of Palestinian nationalist and predominantly secular ideology (Cobban 1992: 24, Sayigh 
28 2000: 206). Challenges to the primacy of Fateh PLO leadership's elite autonomy were 
commonplace and moderate dissent within the factions of the PLO was largely due to the 
geographically decentralised nature of the organisation. 29 
The 1979 Camp David Accords, however, had created an internationally approved 
frame of reference for remedying the Palestinian question, and the Fateh leadership 
responded by signalling its interest as the Palestinian representative in any subsequent 
negotiations. Opposing factions established a 'rejection front' as they regarded the PLO 
leadership's stance as an affront to the core principles of PLO unity . 
30 The leadership 
advocated a policy of within-bloc accommodation to contain internal dissent by offering 
posts to factions at all levels according to quota allocation, forming a basis of power- 
sharing in the Palestinian Legislative Council in the absence of Palestinian-wide 
elections. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza after 1967 created intense 
associational activity in the Palestinian bloc. Associations were created in lieu of Israeli 
services affiliated with the PLO factions creating semi-corporatist associations (Langohr 
2004: 184). The structure of the Palestinian bloc was instituted so that open competition 
and the creation of schismatic factions challenging the leadership would be 
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accommodated and the bloc support for the leadership would remain fixed. This strategy 
was intermittently threatened, restraining the leadership while illustrating 'the difficulties 
of defining, let alone maintaining a nominal majority in a movement based in a scattered 
exile and subject to the conflicting pressures of differing Arab hosts' (Sayigh 1999: 580). 
In 1993, Hamas openly challenged the PLO leadership; its position was pivotal to 
the structure of the Palestinian bloc the configuration of factions for and against the 
leadership and the orientation of Palestinian constituency support. When the Hamas 
leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin Yassin (who was to be assassinated in 2004) issued the 
Intifada pamphlets in the name of Hamas in January 1988, the ramifications of the new 
faction were numerous. The ideological dimensions within the Palestinian bloc were 
reoriented. Hamas altered the nature of the bloc by positioning itself centrally on the 
Palestinian Islamic spectrum, between toleration of the occupation with the social 
network-based ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and the more extreme resistance and 
Islamic stance of groups like Islamic Jihad. 
The emergence of Hamas created the greatest organisational threat to the secular 
Palestinian nationalism of the PLO Fateh leadership, altering the configuration of factions 
and pattern of elite accommodation and support of the Palestinian constituency posing a 
direct challenge to the monopoly of Fateh's support by Muslim Palestinian nationalists in 
the West Bank and Gaza (Mishal and Sela 2000: 3 1). Contrary to the text of the Hamas 
Charter of August 1988, Hamas was openly challenging Fateh leadership in Gaza. 31 
The ideological pan-Arab, pan-Islamic composition of Hamas excluded the 
conventional internal accommodation policy advocated by the leadership within the PLO 
structure. When the challenge of Hamas overtly threatened the leadership a policy of 
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accommodation was initially employed to absorb Harnas into the PLO; when this policy 
failed, the PLO leadership recognised the schismatic nature of Hamas and an alternative 
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policy of open competition with Hamas was implemented . 
The PLO leadership had little opportunity to curb the threat of Hamas and limited 
ability to 'lead' from the Diaspora, resulting in an increasingly disenfranchised 
population under occupation (Khalidi 2002: 93). Local Fateh leadership in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip (constituting the next generation of Fateh 33 ) asserted itself in order 
to regain local support only to be imprisoned or detained by Israel. An Israeli policy of 
targeting the PLO groupings left a vacancy for a neutral Palestinian organisation to 
flourish. The Muslim Brotherhood was an unassuming internal Palestinian organisation 
adept at managing the dernands of occupation and able to exercise a degree of autonomy 
courtesy of tacit Israeli acceptance. This made the Muslim Brotherhood sufficiently 
different to carve a niche in the existing spectrum of the Palestinian polity in the West 
Bank and Gaza. Hamas filled a niche. 
Fateh initially overlooked the threat posed by Hamas, as it had the Muslim 
Brotherhood, at the beginning of the Intifada and then attempted to buttress its own 
position within the West Bank and Gaza, remaining at a distance both logistically and 
figuratively, while Hamas remained at the heart of the Intifada in the West Bank and 
Gaza and could create a support base. The PLO catch-all 'supen-narket of ideas' strategy 
unifon-nly succeeded in curtailing dissent and formed the PLO leadership's model policy 
response to leadership challenges. 34 The challenge posed by Hamas to the leadership of 
Fateh, however, was perceived as a threat to Fateh's secular ideology. The Hamas 
charter dispelled any perceived challenge to the PLO's advocacy of a secular Palestinian 
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state by an Islamist-nationalist Hamas advocating an Islamic Palestinian state while also 
seeking to account for the new political framework within the West Bank and Gaza 
(Schiff and Ya'an 1990: 587). 35 
Challenging Fateh's dominance was for Hamas as much a consequence of 
expediency as political ambition. The Muslim Brotherhood, and later and more critically 
Hamas, enjoyed an electoral mandate of sorts, laying claim to the Islamist constituency 
by standing Islamic candidates in PLO-dominated student unions in Gaza and the West 
Bank throughout the 1970s and emerging as a distinct political force by the end of the 
decade. 36 
The threat of Hamas to the PLO Fateh leadership was palpable and fuelled by the 
Intifacla. While PLO Chain-nan Yasser Arafat sought to impede Hamas's role in the 
Intifada, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) established the 
local branch of what became the Unified National Command (UNC). In time the Tunis 
leadership succeeded in taking control of the UNC as the flotilla of the secular-nationalist 
(PLO) Palestinian groups (Inbari 1996: 74, Mishal and Sela 2000: 43). 37 Hamas leaflets 
orchestrated Intifada directives on strikes, acts of solidarity, or dissent-replicated leaflets 
signed by the UNC .38 All were vying for the reigns of the Intifada or using the Intifada to 
notify the Fateh leadership of challenges to its authority (Mishal and Sela 2000: 62 ). 39 
The Fateh leadership was losing the support of content secularists to an Islamic 
revival politicised to personify resistance. While fragmentation of the secular- 
nationalists in the West Bank and Gaza had served Arafat's purpose of preventing the 
potential emergence of an alternative 'internal' leadership, Hamas's hold on civil 
society's infrastructure in Gaza constituted an increasing threat to Fateh's broad 
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Palestinian bloc. 40 The advocacy of Islamic Palestinian nationalism coupled with 
Hamas's institutional and organisational dominance as the largest opposition to Fateh 
hegemony threatened the leadership in Tunis. Hamas, in tandem with the release of its 
deferential Charter, overtly challenged the UNC in calling a general strike on 25 August 
1988. In asserting control and initiating strikes, Hamas was repositioning itself as the de 
facto leadership. The challenge of Hamas to the PLO leadership in Tunis intensified and 
with it the incentive for the PLO leadership to engage in negotiations to endorse its 
legitimacy and realign its support base in its favour. 
4.4.1 Elite accommodation and the nature of support in the Palestinian bloc 
The increasing isolation of the PLO leadership in exile aimed to regain support from the 
Palestinian bloc. Fateh openly competed with Hamas, accusing its Islamic competitor of 
deserting the nationalist ranks and attempting to deviate from the 'the commandments, 
the organic structure and the laws of the Palestinian family' (Hroub 2000: 92). Fateh 
condemned Hamas's actions as serving the Israeli enemy and alleged Hamas collusion 
with Israeli intelligence. The allegations resulted in the prompt prohibition and arrest of 
the Hamas leaders: Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a pivotal Hamas leader, was arrested in May 
1989 and sentenced to 15 years in prison. The structure of the Hamas was, however, 
unlike that of its secular rival Fateh and while the arrests of the Hamas leaders frustrated 
the organisation, it failed to curb its threat to the incumbent PLO leadership. 41 
145 
Hamas challenged the PLO leadership institutionally. In the Hamas decision- 
making process outlined by Sheikh Yassin, 'all decisions adopted by the majority are 
binding on everyone' (Hroub 2000: 58). Conversely, the institutional structure of the 
PLO was formulaic, and the hegemony of Fateh resulted in over-representation of the 
majority faction in every institution and council of the organisation. The influence of the 
shifting orientation of the Palestinian bloc led PLO leader Arafat to institute structural 
and institutional safeguards in order to contain the Hamas challenge. The first of these 
safeguards was a declaration of the state. 
The declaration of a Palestinian state to a closed session of the Palestinian 
National Council meeting on 15 November 1988 in Algiers created a new political 
platform. In accepting UN resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for a two-state solution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Arafat was complying with the Schultz initiative for 
peace made manifest in the Madrid conference and premised on an American 'land for 
peace' proposal: land for the Palestinians in return for peaceful coexistence with Israel. 
The US initiative attempted to curtail the Intifada while simultaneously condemning 
terrorism (Shlaim 2001: 466). The Algiers decision attempted to secure the primacy of 
the Fateh leadership by appealing to the parameters and requirements of the Schultz 
peace initiative. In the closed Algiers session, 85 per cent of PLO faction representatives 
favoured and 15 per cent opposed participation in the proposed multilateral Madrid peace 
talks. 
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Fateh's policy towards the proposed Madrid Middle East dialogue resulted from 
the increasing pressure of challenges to its leadership and constraints on its resources. 
The Algiers decision is defined as the 'historic compromise' in that it heralded a seismic 
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shift in the position of the PLO, tacit recognition of the state of Israel, alluded to in the 
statements made by the PLO in 1977 but this time with the renunciation of violence. The 
Algiers shift was simultaneously internal and external; in agreeing to recognise the 15 per 
cent Palestinian National Council division on the motion in a closed session, Arafat and 
the PLO leadership acknowledged the rejection of the Madrid proposal by the opposition 
factions of the PFLP, DFLP and by the Communist party. 43 This initiative towards 
greater transparency augmented the traditional pattern of inclusive, cohesive, centralised 
PLO decision-making and allowed for the distance between policy decisions to be made 
clear. By giving voice to pervasive factions, the leadership was providing the space for 
the creation of an internal opposition and the illusion of consensus building (Hirschman 
1970). 
The inclusive institutional structure of the PLO serves as a bulwark against 
competition and opposition whereas Arafat's concession to the opposition within the 
PLO carved a functioning opposition from the PLO rib, and in so doing, sought to 
distance Hamas further as an alternative religious-nationalist opposition. In addition, 
Arafat secured the allure of statehood in April 1989 by seeking nomination from the PLO 
executive committee and central council as president of the recently declared Palestinian 
state and successfully gained control of the PLO institutions by placing himself above 
them and Fateh when the occasion demanded. 44 The Fateh leadership (and Arafat, in 
particular) was steeling itself against leadership challenges while attempting to co-opt 
secular opposition and unden-nine Hamas support both externally and internally by 
distancing Hamas from its sole ties with the PLO's PFLP faction. The real issue of 
legitimacy rested in electoral or municipal support. 
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Electorally, PLO candidates vied with Hamas for seats in the chamber of 
commerce and professional associations; the PLO focused its attention on Hamas Gazan 
strongholds and Hamas won seats in the PLO's traditional stronghold of Ramallah. In 
1992, Hamas won 40 per cent of the popular vote in municipal elections in the West 
Bank and Gaza 45 despite efforts by the PLO candidates in Nablus to create ambiguity and 
stand on a ticket as the 'Muslim nationalist trend' (Abu Amr 1994: 86). Hamas 
nevertheless lobbied to acquire the number of seats in the PNC commensurate with its 
perceived weight in Palestinian society and politics which Hamas estimated at 40-50 per 
cent of the total number of PNC seats. Violent clashes between Hamas and Fatah 
escalated in June and July of 1992 in the midst of the Israeli election. 
It became apparent within the PNC and the bodies of the PLO that limited access 
points were available for an excluded challenger, such as Hamas, in the Palestinian polity 
to advocate its challenge to the leadership. This difficulty was illustrated in 1991 amidst 
preparations for the Washington negotiations. Hamas proposed establishing a committee 
that would strengthen the hand of the organisations opposed to the negotiations and 
minimise concessions. The ten Palestinian organistions in the resistance movement 
entertained reservations concerning the Hamas initiative. The concern centred on the 
proposals and claimed they were an encroachment on the PLO prerogative as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinians and asserted that the conditions were ripe to 
create an alternative to the PLO (Hroub 2000: 100). 46 The institutional mechanisms 
created by the PLO leadership were in this instance successful in containing the challenge 
from Hamas. 
148 
Fateh attempted to secure its institutional monopoly on the PLO leadership by 
agreeing to continue Palestinian participation in the Washington talks after Madrid. The 
Palestinian representatives in Washington were 'insiders', a select group of professional 
Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza chosen by the PLO and with Israeli agreement 
to negotiate as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian negotiation. The Palestinian 
delegation, while unofficially representing the PLO leadership, sincerely attempted to 
negotiate core conflict concerns without any decision-making authority. Unknown to the 
Palestinian negotiators, the PLO leadership by December 1993 had begun negotiating 
directly with the Israeli government for which the Washington negotiations had become a 
'smokescreen'. 47 
The Israeli policy shift towards Hamas, however, provided Arafat with an 
opportunity to redeem his support in the West Bank and Gaza. Arafat and the PLO 
leadership became increasingly conscious of their vulnerability after the PLO chairman's 
plane crash in April 1992 (Rubin And Rubin 2003: 13 1), and attempted to accommodate 
Hamas with difficulty. On 17 December 1992, as Israel expelled 413 Islamists, Hamas 
leaders, supporters and clerics to no-man's land beyond the Israeli security zone in South 
Lebanon, Hamas publicly disputed the PLO's authority to speak on behalf of the 
expellees. Nevertheless, the PLO leadership made itself indispensable as the voice of the 
expellees. 48 An accommodation was reached as senior Hamas representatives from 
Jordan held discussions with Arafat in Khartoum in January 1993. The PLO's goal 
centred on initiating its traditional policy of Hamas accommodation, with repeated 
demands for a militant political programme, and in light of their popular vote share in the 
municipal elections, a 40 per cent share of PNC seats (Sayigh 1999: 652). Once this 
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proposal was rejected by the PLO, Hamas proposed direct elections to PLO leadership 
institutions; this initiative was also rejected (Abu Amr 1994: 132). Hamas requested that 
Fateh withdraw from the Washington talks until Israel complied with UN Resolution 799 
and returned the expellees (Milton-Edwards 1999: 159). Instead, there was a delayed 
Palestinian return to the Washington talks in protest at the Israeli failure to address the 
issue of the expellees. By this time, however, the Oslo negotiations had become official- 
level talks. 
Israel's exasperation with Hamas, exhibited in its ad hoc expulsion policy, was a 
short-lived political coup for the Fateh leadership. Fateh reasserted its position as the 
conly legitimate representative of the Palestinian people' as it attempted to secure the 
expellees' release amid Hamas protests. Hamas was required to collaborate with Fateh to 
rectify the situation and was seen as co-operating with the leadership. Arafat's position 
and that of the leadership was endorsed, thus increasing its waning credibility in the West 
Bank and Gaza as well as Oslo. 
The constellation of groups forming the Palestinian bloc and the (re)orientation of 
support within the Palestinian constituency had altered with the emergence of Hamas and 
influenced the bloc elite; this in turn led Arafat to pursue contact actively with the Israelis 
and assert that the PLO would ultimately take complete charge of Palestinian authority in 
Gaza and the West Bank, policing the Occupied Territories with units from exile (Sayigh 
1999: 656). To maintain his position and the primacy of Fateh and the PLO, Arafat's 
return to the West Bank and Gaza was necessary. 
In order to sustain its leadership position and quell the challenge of Hamas as well 
as Israeli legitimacy and security, the Fateh leadership returned with its exiled Fateh 
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fighters in order to impose a new security dispensation on the Occupied Territories. The 
credibility associated with this task was afforded by the recognition of the PLO 
leadership as the (sole) representative of the Palestinian people, facilitating the necessary 
bargain for negotiating the Oslo pact. 
4.4.2 Palestinian external resource dependence 
The PLO leadership, exiled in Tunis and facing a leadership challenge that threatened to 
usurp its position, depended on donations from Arab states to maintain its system of 
patronage within the West Bank and Gaza. The leadership's support of Saddam Hussein 
in the Gulf War had onerous consequences at the end of the military conflict with the 
forcible exodus of thousands of Palestinians from Kuwait after the Iraqi defeat. The 
funds directed to the PLO leadership were halved. Twenty-eight million dollars a month 
from Saudi Arabia were redirected to Hamas. Financial decline in the PLO by September 
1990 ultimately threatened Arafat's patronage system of control, and his inability to pay 
its military increased the threat of Hamas's battalions ('Izz a]-Din al-Qassam') as its 
official military apparatus (Mishal and Sela 2000). 
The leadership position of the Fateh cadre within the PLO was increasingly 
tenuous during the 1991 Washington talks. 49 At the same time, however, the financial 
hardship of the PLO leadership increased and Arafat publicly denounced the Gulf States 
and Iran for funding Hamas. 
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The PLO leadership's loss of financial control in the West Bank and Gaza 
escalated. The situation led to public appeals both from Palestinians within the West 
Bank and Gaza for greater accountability and less corruption and from Fateh's central 
committee to establish a Palestinian provisional government in order to spare the PLO the 
need to reject its key principle, namely, non-recognition of Israel. Arafat's concentration 
of power within and among the PLO factions went unchallenged; the threat of Hamas, 
coupled with a weakened military, financial and organisational base, constrained his 
conventional policy instruments (Rubin and Rubin 2003: 130). 50 Arafat insisted that the 
Americans 'want to humiliate Yasser Arafat and eliminate him', and he repeatedly told 
the rest of the PLO leadership that 'eliminating him means eliminating the PLO and all of 
you'. Nevertheless, Arafat was not averse to dealing directly with Israel at Oslo (Sayigh 
1999: 656). The financial crisis within the PLO increased and in June and July 1993 
unprecedented requests urged Arafat to resign as chairperson of PLO amid perceived 
fears of an imminent collapse of the organisation, anticipated by Harnas preparing for its 
'moment of glory' (Milton-Edwards 1999: 161). 
The legitimacy of the PLO and Arafat as its leader, as well as the personification 
of the struggle for the Palestinian people, was weakened. The Fateh leadership was being 
usurped not by familiar challenges from secular factional opponents but rather by a well 
sponsored and supported Hamas capable of co-operation and practical agreement with the 
PFLP. This alliance-building proved Hamas was prepared and able to accommodate and 
work with the PLO factions within the West Bank and Gaza. Fateh, however, faced the 
challenge of Hamas that had successfully mobilised the Palestinian constituency of the 
Occupied Territories. As a result, the ruling Fateh elite were willing to respond to this 
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threat by engaging in policies that attempted to cement its incumbent position, incurring 
new and unforeseen costs for its constituency bloc (Gagnon 1995: 135). 
4.5 The configuration of factions and the nature of the Israeli bloc 
The configuration of the factions in the Israeli bloc consisted of a changing coalition of 
factional elites from before the inception of the Intifada in 1987 to the Oslo bargain in 
1993. Institutional, political, and contextual factors have regulated and attempted to 
subdue factional divisions within the Israeli bloc. The configuration of factions was 
naturally decentralised in structure prior to the 1967 war, a traditional politics of 
accommodation and quasi-consociational (Hazan. 1999a, Hazan 1999b). The 
consequential shift towards majoritarian. politics emerged from the ideological division 
over 'state-building and state contraction' (Lustick 1993: 26), divisions between those on 
the left willing to return occupied land for peace and those on the right advocating the 
incorporation of the land occupied in advancement of the goal of Eretz Yisrael, the 
greater Israel. The growth in support for the right-wing Likud (unity) party resulted in an 
openly competitive structure with the centrally located National Religious Party (NRP) 
obtaining the position of power broker. The conventional alliance of the National 
Religious PartY5 ' and the Labour left and its associated parties was threatened by the 
issue of land. The factor most influential in promoting or reversing the processes of 
incorporation of the territories was 'the changing level of political support within Israel 
for politicians favouring disengagement' (Lustick 1993: 30). The ideo-religious 
153 
cleavages within Israel became more pronounced and influenced the effectiveness of the 
political parties (Laakso-Taagepera, 1979, Smith 1999: 13) 
Likud's position as the largest party in 1977 with the highest number of seat share 
in the Knesset illustrated this change. The NRP gave Likud leader Menachem Begin the 
margin he required to govern (Arian 1998). The shift in factional balances was further 
tilted by the emergence of small right-wing settler movements and associated factional 
elites in response to the return of Sinai to Egypt in the Camp David Accords (Newman 
1985: 35, Nisan 1978: 163). These movements included the Jewish Underground that 
advocated a strategy of political violence against Palestinians and parties, such as Gush 
Emunim. 52 The subsequent fracturing of the NRP into nationalist religious, religious 
extremist, and ethnic religious (Shas) factions heralded the advent of coalition 
governments based on the participation of these religious parties (Lijphart et al. 1999: 
31). The factionalism within the Israeli bloc (Laakso-Taagepera 1979) initially 
concerning issues of land and religion led to a succession of national unity governments 
from 1984 to 1992. 
At the outbreak of the Intifada in 1987, the Likud-led national unity government 
failed to initiate a strategy to deal with the riots within the West Bank and Gaza. 53 
From 1967, Israel's occupation strategy differed from the West Bank to the Gaza 
Strip although the civil and military administration of the territories was combined (Van 
Creveld 1998: 338). This centralised approach ensured integration of information and 
intelligence until 1981, after which greater leeway was given to (and less information 
gleaned from) religious institutions, the main lobbying point for Hamas and the older 
Muslim Brotherhood with the installation of a civil administration (Shalev 1991: 34). 
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The administration of the occupation was unable to contain the Intifada, resulting in the 
Israeli Minister for Defence and Labour party leader Yitzhak Rabin asserting that the 
soldiers were insufficiently trained and prone to excess. 
Previous Israeli policy towards the West Bank and Gaza was governed by 
political party ideological concerns. The organisational structure and primary (though 
not only) ideological cleavage within the Israeli bloc (Sartori 1999: 25) focused on the 
issue of land and the question of Eretz YisraeL After the acquisition of the territories in 
1967, the Labour-led coalition government (that formed and implemented occupation 
strategies from 1967 to 1977) was fundamentally ambivalent about the future of the 
territories and initially employed an array of policies from detention to containment 
critically to the settlement of the West Bank. Decisive attempts to absorb or relinquish 
the territories were postponed by the imperatives of Israel's coalition politics. 
Conversely, with the exclusion of Sinai return under the Camp David Accords of 1979, 
under the Likud party leaders of Begin, Sharon and Shamir, official policy adhered to the 
idea of Eretz Yisrael, which in keeping with right-wing Likud ideology sought to ensure 
the territories' permanent absorption into Israel (Seliktar 1988: 31, Nisan 1978: 153). 
The greater Israel position was evident in the policy shift towards uniformity and 
standardisation of laws and certain policies in Gaza (Lustick 1993: 35 ). 54 The Camp 
David Accords in 1979 proposed Palestinian autonomy within the West Bank and Gaza; 
to complement this, the Israeli government allowed the registration of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (and Complex), enabling it to gain support, the objective of which was to 
'unleash it against the PLO'. 
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Israel with its overt co-option policy (Byman 2002: 81) of the Palestinian Islamic 
opposition hoped to create a strong counterweight to the PLO in order to usurp its 
leadership. However, with the advent of the Intifada, the Israeli policy objective became 
one of 'turning the uprising into a civil war' (Schiff and Ya'ari 1989). In the midst of the 
Intifada, these two considerations, Hamas and the West Bank and Gaza, threatened 
Israel's sense of security and legitimacy. 
Transparent Israeli government initiatives sought to use administrative policy to 
regulate Palestinian dissent and serve Israeli interests. Israel's initial policy of ignoring 
the Islamic organisations and subsequent tacit facilitation of the Muslim Brotherhood 
organisation enabled the Islamic complex to dominate Gaza's civil society and welfare 
provisions to the detriment of the PLO. These two policies of 'ignorance', that is, 
overlooking the Muslim Brotherhood and later co-option including the holding of 
municipal elections in the Occupied Territories, were apparent throughout the period and 
illustrate policy selection dependence on government and elite motivation. The Israeli- 
Muslim Brotherhood coexistence exemplified collective co-operation, a nest of 
converging interests, namely, the regulation of PLO leadership power. Antipathy for the 
PLO formed the basis of the relationship between the Islamic complex and the Israeli 
government, exemplary of the joint co-operation of two competing actors to defeat a third 
with mutual benefit. The configuration of factions within the Israeli bloc was transparent 
and centralised by virtue of a mechanised national unity government coalition. 
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4.5.1 Patterns of elite accommodation and the nature of support in the Israeli bloc 
The Intifada provoked a shift in the configuration of the Israeli bloc. At the outset of the 
Intifada, no unifonn policy over how best to address violence in the Occupied Territories 
existed. 55 When the violence escalated, however, the objective was outlined by Chief of 
Staff Eytan to 'make the Arabs run about like drugged bugs in a bottle' (Van Creveld 
1998: 340). The excesses exhibited by the IDF and the newly imposed policies of 
collective punishment, curfew containment (known as environmental punishment), 
'broken bones' and counter-insurgency exercised by an army previously adept at 
conventional fighting (Hunter 1991: 88) undermined the domestic political consensus 
holding Israel's coalition government together. The legitimacy of the incumbent elite 
was threatened and ultimately undermined, bloc support decreased and the government 
collapsed under the strain of domestic and international criticism (1990). The opposition, 
unable to forrn a new government relented and the Knesset approved a new Likud-led 
government in a 'Unity' coalition. The Intifada and Hamas held Israeli political will 
hostage and necessitated consensus within the bloc. 
The influence of the Intifada on the Israeli people and the crucial role played by 
Hamas undermined not only Israel's containment policy in the West Bank and Gaza but 
also the principles of the State of Israel itself. Israel's perception of societal security 
resided in the debate over the West Bank and Gaza (Barnett 1999, Buzan 1991). For 
Israel specifically the cultivation of an alternative Islamic leadership to the PLO assisted 
the administration by providing social health and welfare institutional structures and in so 
doing, absolved the Israeli administration of extending itself further. 56 
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Israel's co-option policy of Hamas is substantiated by the Rabin plan of January 
1989, in which he argued that Israeli policy could not be based singularly on the 
suppression of the uprising, but by two elements, a political and a security element, the 
objective of which involved finding a partner among the residents of the territories. 
Rabin's plan was later amended by Likud party leader and Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir 
in his plan of the same name. Israel could not, however, conduct negotiations with the 
PLO (Shalev 1991: 141 ). 57 Israel's ensuing efforts to co-opt Hamas at the expense of the 
PLO Fateh leadership attributed status to Hamas. Its leaders were filmed with top-level 
Israeli officials. In May 1989, Hamas spokesman Mahmoud Zahar met with the Israeli 
defence minister Yitzak Rabin two weeks before the escalation of Hamas violence in the 
58 Sasportas-Sadon kidnapping. Similarly, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the cleric head of the 
Islamic centre and the spiritual leader of Hamas prior to his subsequent imprisonment, 
met with Israeli government officials to discuss the uprising and its implications (Milton- 
Edwards 1996: 16 1). 
Hamas was not outlawed for another six months. 59 In contrast to the PLO, Hamas 
was afforded 'legitimacy' and recognition by Israel in a relationship dominated by a 
shared antipathy towards the PLO and the secular national movement. While the PLO 
alleged Israeli paternity of Hamas in a bid to unden-nine its own authority, it has been 
argued that, by virtue of the relationship between occupation authorities and the people 
under occupation, Hamas leaders were compelled under threat of arrest to meet Israeli 
security and political officials (Hroub 2000: 204). The Israeli government's Hamas 
strategy oscillated between ignoring, co-opting, containing or on occasion eliminating 
Hamas (by way of targeted assassinations). The policies were adopted to contain the 
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damage of the Intifacla for Israel and intensify the internal Palestinian divisions in order 
to control the West Bank and Gaza more effectively. Israeli policy initiatives escalated 
as did the Intifada. International pressure and the material cost of the Intifada and Hamas 
soared. The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza was described as a net benefit to the 
Israeli economy prior to 1987. With the emergence of the Intifada, security provision 
became a subsequent net drain. 60 By 1989 the Defence Ministry anticipated the simple 
military cost of fighting the Intifada as being approximately $1.8 billion by the end of 
1990. The cost of the Intifada was exacerbated by the failure to implement necessary 
economic reform in Israel. Frequent currency devaluations, increasing inflation and need 
to accommodate the newly aliyah of Soviet immigrants put increasing pressure of the 
government to address the Intifada (Jones and Murphy 2002: 72). 
An Israeli decision to withdraw from the territories anticipated additional Israeli 
casualties, strong external pressure and an alliance between Israeli anti-annexationists 
and Palestinians in an effort to overcome the political power of the Israeli right wing and 
make the 'irrationality' of the occupation politically decisive (Schiff and Ya'ari 1990: 
580). The orientation of the Israeli bloc realigned accordingly. In the midst of the 
Washington talks, at the 1992 general election in Israel, Prime Minister Shamir's Likud 
party lost to its Labour party rivals as Labour stressed that the Likud government's 
settlement investment programme in the West Bank and Gaza was at the expense of the 
mainly Sephardic development towns. Labour's strategy centred on preventing a tacit 
coalition between the factions of the settler movement Gush Emunim (perceived to have 
been the vanguard of the Right) and the ethnic religious party of the Sephardim Shas, 
159 
both of which had kept Likud in power. Labour also benefited from divisions between 
the Sephardi and Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox parties. 
Labour's approach was shaped by the assumption that the NRP - with the same 
number of seats as Shas - would not agree to participate in a government with 
secularising advocates of land return without obtaining substantial power in the foreign 
policy domain. The bilateral and multilateral talks in Washington had oriented Labour 
towards negotiation and agreement on the issues of foreign policy, such as 'land for 
peace' and rapprochement with Syria and Lebanon. All of this increased tensions 
between Labour and the NRP far beyond frisson at the time of their last alliance in 1977. 
The Labour party attempted to overcome difficulties with the NRP and turned its 
attentions to Shas. The Labour party ploy was assisted by Shas' requirement to 
distinguish itself from the NRP. Shas, as an orthodox ethnic party, responded to Labour 
advances and broke the isolationist political practices of the religious non-Zionists and 
joined both the Labour-led government and cabinet, providing the Labour, Meretz and 
Arab parties with a substantive coalition (Hazan 1999a: 128, Sandler 1999). 61 
The election reflected the ideological distance within the Israeli bloc at the time. 
Described as a choice between 'Greater Israel or the State of Israel', the election 
highlighted the cleavage in Israeli society regarding whether or not the West Bank and 
Gaza were necessarily an integral part of the Israeli State (Barnett 1999). The election 
was fought through national security discourse with the most important distinction 
between the parties being their positions on territorial compromise 62 and national 
security. 
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Labour's campaign platfon-n was a compromise between the goals of the leader 
Yitzak Rabin and former leader Shimon Peres. Rabin promised a settlement to the 
Palestinian problem within nine months of the election and called for immediate talks 
with non-PLO Palestinians and for withdrawal from populated areas of the West Bank 
and Gaza; rejecting Palestinian statehood (Lieberfeld 1999: 68). Shimon Peres's 
tendency within the Labour party had, however, called for a repeal of the ban on Israeli 
contacts with the PLO. The repeal was won by one vote after two private proposals, one 
a private members bill by Yossi Beilin and the other by Yael Dayan. The bill was passed 
by one vote as Uzi Baram, a Labour Knesset member, 'was late ran in and waved his 
63 hand'. The repeal of the ban allowed for Israeli officials to meet with PLO members 
and the possibility of an alternative channel of dialogue with the Palestinians. Labour 
leader Rabin, initially opposed to both the repeal of the ban and the dialogue with PLO 
members, consented to the Oslo initiative. The accommodation between Rabin and Peres 
was instrumental in the change in Labour party policy and later in the government 
initiatives towards the PLO. 
The election also intensified tensions and sparked clashes between Hamas and 
Fateh in Gaza (Sayigh 1999: 635). The reorientation of the Israeli bloc to open 
competition and schismatic factionalism facilitated the necessary shift towards the 
negotiation of the Oslo bargain with the PLO leadership. 
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4.5.2 Israeli external resource dependence 
External influences altered the perceived ideological dimension of the conflict from one 
of two conflicting nationalisms to a religious conflict-Jew versus Muslim . 
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Challenging the conventional 'clash of nationalisms' wisdom of the conflict with one 
based on religious dogma afforded greater credibility to the right-wing religious factions 
within the Israeli polity and provided a platform to the settler movement orgarnsations, in 
particular, Gush Emunim that adheres to the Eretz Yisrael principle and the continued 
control of the Occupied Territories. 
When the Shamir Likud-led Israeli government proposed elections in Gaza and 
the West Bank in 1989, it in was response to the US-initiated Reagan plan in order to 
curry favour with the USA. Internally, Israel sought to provide the religious-nationalists 
(Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood) with the opportunity to poll support and usurp the 
PLO leadership position within the territories. 
Hamas participated in municipal elections, consistently winning move than 40 per 
cent of the popular vote in the leadership-dominated West Bank. Israel's opposition co- 
option strategy, however, was sluggish and costly. Israel's burden was twofold: as the 
cost of the occupation increased, so did international pressure and US tardiness with 
issuing the promised $ 10 billion loan guarantees to Israel with the condition that the loans 
not be used in the West Bank and Gaza. 65 
Prime Minister Shamir consistently refused to follow US conditions associated 
with the loan guarantees, and the costs of augmenting the Palestinian PLO-Hamas, 
secular-religious cleavage increased (Ahmad 1994, Budeiri 1995: 90, Dolnik and 
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Bhattacharjee 2002: 109, Jensen 1998: 203). Israel attempted to curtail PLO leadership 
resources, actively halting the flow of PLO funds in support of the Intifada. Funds 
destined for Hamas were overlooked (Milton Edwards 1996: 151) whereas Saudi 
Arabia's $28 million a month destined for the PLO was re-routed to Hamas (Sayigh 
1999: 652). The sources of funding and its redistribution were problematic. Iran's 
support for Hamas, in the midst of Israel's embroiled war with the Iranian-backed 
Hizbullah in South Lebanon, contributed to Israeli concerns about the increasing power 
of Hamas. Iran was also suspected of sponsoring the older, but smaller and more radical, 
Islamic Jihad, although the two Palestinian groups were independent of each other. 
Financial support for Hamas increased, assisted by funds destined for the PLO prior to 
Arafat's ill-judged support of Saddam Hussein. 
Foreign sponsorship increased Hamas's horizons and the need for new operators, 
enabling the 'palace coup' within Hamas and the emergence of an external international 
leadership. The newly emerging Hamas leadership influenced the hierarchy within it. 
The view of the newer tier of Hamas differed from its incumbent leadership. Unknown 
to the Israeli government, extreme tactics were advocated by the new Harnas leadership 
'[un]aware of the exact understanding developed between their leaders and the Israeli 
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occupation. This situation should have heralded a warning sign to Israel'. The palace 
coup thesis suggests that the new tier of Hamas leadership had usurped the old guard, 
introducing Iranian influences and finances that militarised Hamas and strengthened the 
Al Qassam brigade. Moving Hamas closer to Islamic Jihad in operational tactics 
heralded not only the increasing Islarnisation of Hamas but the escalation of Israel's 
security fears. 
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Hamas, far from being ignored or co-opted, represented a threat to the Israeli 
government. The divide and conquer political-strategic intelligence policy failure of 
Israeli intelligence services AMAN (the Israeli Intelligence unit) meant that the Shin Bet 
belatedly realised it was mistaken and began arresting Hamas activists. The People's 
committee leaders were subsequently detained. A feature of Hamas's horizontal 
separation organisation resided in the committee leaders who were the essence of the 
Intifada. Once the Israeli counter-insurgency policy of infiltration using the Shabak 
proved unsuccessful, deporting or detaining the leaders became policy. 67 The violence 
escalated after the Al Aqsa killing of 17 Palestinians in 1990; Hamas attacks increased, 
signifying a shift towards more radical Islamic Jihad tactics, magnifying Israeli security 
fears and escalating the societal security issue as the primary concern of the Israeli 
electorate. 
Prime Minister Shamir's intransigence over the Madrid negotiations and US loan 
guarantees lost Likud the 1992 Israeli election to Labour's Yitzak Rabin. As the violence 
intensified, so too did Israel's containment policy. From 1991 onward, Israel was subject 
to increasing criticism for its use of assassinations, the replacement of rubber with plastic 
bullets, and increasing casualties in Gaza and the West Bank. The IDF's 'break bones' 
initiative formed the basis upon which the European Union (EU) used its new trade 
powers to block several trade protocols with Israel. The number of settlements in the 
West Bank increased in order to accommodate the largest emigration of people since 
1949. The Soviet Alyiah to Israel put increasing strain on Israeli housing and exposed 
Israel's vulnerability to its need for US foreign aid and US loan guarantees. Specifically, 
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Israeli security was increasingly threatened as Hamas tactics became more radical and 
Israel's counter-insurgency measures floundered under international scrutiny. 
Despite the change in the Israeli government, in response to a Hamas attack, 
Israel expelled 413 Hamas activists in breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention; using 
this initiative did little to enhance Israel in international public opinion. It did, however, 
enhance the PLO position to the detriment of Hamas (Milton-Edwards 1996). The 
deportations into South Lebanon's buffer zone enabled Hamas to create and sustain links 
with Hizbullah (Dolnik and Bhattacharjee 2002: 118). 
Prime Minister Rabin opted for reaching a settlement with the Palestinians 
'inside' the West Bank and Gaza in conjunction with Jordan. However, the Rabin plan 
was transformed to negotiate with the 'outside' Fateh leadership through the Oslo 
channel, whereby Yasser Arafat was prepared to make substantive concessions to gain 
not only recognition from the Israeli government but also relocation to the West Bank 
and Gaza as the only organisation with the military and institutional capability of 
exercising authority and curbing Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza (Ma'oz 1999: 415). 
It has been argued that the single most important benefit of the Oslo Accords was 
'the PLO pledge to prevent terrorist attacks' (Klein 1996: 1). Israeli Foreign Minister 
Shimon Peres told the Jerusalem Report: 'Why should we chase Harnas when the PLO 
can do it for US? )68 
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4.6 Negotiating the Oslo minimal bargain 
The Oslo Peace Process is a new instrument for reaching traditional [Israeli] objectives. 
Yitzhak Rabin (Savir 1998) 
The Oslo Accords were composed of an inter-ethnic elite pact, a bilateral security bargain 
to curtail the influence of a mutual threat to the signatories. The West Bank and Gaza as 
well as the problem of Hamas were recognised as a threat to Israel and the PLO 
leadership in exile, both groups of signatories to Oslo had sought unsuccessfully to 
ignore, co-opt, contain and expunge the threat Hamas posed to their legitimacy as the 
dominant elite or ethnic bloc leadership. The delegates at the Washington multilateral 
negotiations attempted to broker a maximal agreement rather than a minimal inter-ethnic 
elite pact. The objective of the Washington talks focused on creating a peace plan for the 
Middle East. However, once the Fateh leadership of Yassir Arafat was amenable to 
unofficial secret negotiations with the Israeli government (see Beilin, Savir, Rabinovich), 
the Washington talks ceased to be important. The Israeli and Palestinian incumbent elites 
attempted to curtail the multilateral talks once it became clear that their elite objectives 
could be reached in a minimal inter-ethnic elite pact. 69 
The essence of the Oslo pact emerged at the first meeting of the Israeli academics 
and PLO representatives in London. At this meeting, Abu Allah, the leader of the PLO 
group, said he would do whatever it took to come to an agreement with the Israelis. 70 At 
the subsequent third meeting of the Oslo channel in January 1993, the Israeli academic 
Yair Hirclifeld was directed by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to ascertain 'when 
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Arafat would like to travel? 57 ' This question so early in the 'non-negotiations' or 
exploratory talks illustrated the degree to which the Israelis wanted to secure a partner to 
assist in securing the Occupied Territories. Arafat's return to the West Bank and Gaza 
was first raised by Prime Minister Rabin to Hozni Mubarak and relayed to Arafat in 
November 1992. The tacit agreements reached amid this third meeting involved 
consensus over the question of Israeli security, the regulation of the Intifada, and the 
12 return of Arafat to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The fourth meeting of the two groups 
was the first in which the Israeli government was officially represented by Uri Savir. 
This fourth unofficial meeting provoked the following response from Abu Allah, the 
leader of the Palestinian delegation concerning issues of security: 'I have specific 
instructions from Arafat to accommodate you in every aspect in this matter' (Savir 1998: 
15 ). 73 Provoked by the immediate threat of Hamas to Fateh's dominance, Arafat was 
willing to provide concessions to the Israelis, relinquishing preconditions over 
settlements for example, in order to preserve Fateh's leadership position. Arafat's 
acceptance of the Oslo bargain was conditioned by his desire to return to the Occupied 
Territories (Gagnon 1995: 138). 
It was the inclusion of the PLO leadership, Fateh and Arafat in particular, along 
with the geographical return to Gaza and the West Bank that secured the signatories to 
the pact and postponed the challenge of Hamas to the PLO leadership. The Israeli 
recognition of PLO leadership secured its legitimacy and acknowledged that which had 
been omitted from the Camp David Accords. Arafat revealed his position when asked 
the reason he had not accepted the Camp David (1) Accords of 1979, 'for your 
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information, nothing was offered personally to me' (NYRB August 1993, Amoz Elon 
1996: 22-30). 
The incentive for Israel to agree in Oslo rather than Washington was evident in 
the decision to raise the level of the Oslo negotiations after the third meeting. The Israeli 
recognition of a willingness on the part of the Palestinians to agree to a bargain on the 
basis of an interim self-governing authority without instituting the moves towards 
permanent statehood that added the greater impetus to the Oslo initiative. 74 The Israeli 
desire to reach agreement advanced when the PLO leadership agreed to the exclusion of 
international guarantees and outside mediation at the third meeting. The exclusion of 
international or third-party involvement in all but the supervision of the elections to the 
Palestinian Council was raised later in July and caused friction in the 'all but signed' 
bargain. 75 The desire to return Arafat to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while not explicit 
in the Declaration of Principles, was evident from the directions received by the Israeli 
negotiators from the Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. 
In the midst of negotiations regarding the implementation of the bargain, 
proposals were made for a transition phase prior to the Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian 
Council elections. The discussions involved the implementation of a trusteeship in which 
Israel would establish the necessary institutional and structural features to create a more 
secure Palestinian environment, establishing the basis of good governance prior to the 
return of PLO leadership. The proposals were rebuked by the Israeli government. In 
allocating time to generate the necessary structures for good governance in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, the objective of Israeli withdrawal from the Territories would be 
compromised. The return of Arafat 'as soon as possible' and prior to the elections of the 
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Palestinian Council within two years of the bargain being reached facilitated earlier 
implementation. 76 
The PLO leadership's desire for recognition and legitimacy as the representatives 
of the Palestinian people as well as the return to its support base in Gaza and the West 
Bank was explicit after the written draft of the Declaration of Principles was presented to 
the Palestinians on 4 July. Crisis ensued and the Palestinians proposed changes to the 
document when it became clear that the Israelis, while wanting full responsibility for 
security, also wanted to maintain full authority over civil jurisdiction. The issues that 
caused deadlock in Washington, the issue of settlements and authority, had re-emerged. 
The collapse of the negotiations was curtailed by the Norwegian facilitators Tede Rod 
Larsen and Foreign Minister Holst. The Palestinians were unable to resolve themselves 
with the features of autonomy and the interim nature of the draft. The Israelis were 
advised to compromise and offer certain concessions. 77 Accounts regarding the nature of 
the proffered compromises differed. Parallel talks on the question of mutual recognition 
were initiated. Once Israel agreed that the PLO would be recogmsed as the legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people, 'the alternative concessions the Israeli 
negotiators were directed to provide dissipate with the appeasement of the Palestinian 
negotiators. M The desire for recognition as the legitimate leadership of the Palestinian 
people was based on the constraints imposed on the PLO leadership from the internal 
challenge of Hamas. Hamas created the leadership imperative to return to the West Bank. 
The final Oslo Agreement signed on the White House Lawn has two hastily handwritten 
amendments. Both alterations include the words 'PLO' and were conceded and agreed 
upon so late 'that there was no time to retype them' (Ross 2004: 120). The inclusion of 
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PLO in the Accords, both literally and figuratively, restored the PLO's political 
hegemony (Legrain 1997: 165). 
Arafat's leadership intact, the Oslo Accords were not ratified by the Palestinian 
National Council (PNC). Rather than convene the PNC, and in breach of PLO practice, 
Arafat sought endorsement from the PLO executive committee instead. Arafat's attempt 
to juggle with existing institutions was neither timely nor very successful. Two prominent 
members of the executive committee Mahmoud Darwish and Shafiq al-Hout resigned 
while others abstained from the vote. The resolution favouring the Declaration of 
Principles passed with one vote (Rubenberg 2003: 57). The leadership's control over the 
Palestinian institutions was not as pervasive as Arafat had hoped. 
While time and axiomatic world changes have altered the Israeli-Palestinian 
dynamic, the Oslo Accord was less about resolving differences and compromises than 
remedying a shared concern over the increasing influence of Harnas. The Oslo Accord 
was not more than the sum of its parts. Founded on the mutual recognition of the PLO 
leadership's and the Israeli government's independent failure either to correct or control 
the threat posed to each of them by Hamas. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
The Oslo Accords represent a minimal elite bargain based on the mutual recognition of 
the Israeli government and the PLO. The inter-ethnic elite pact was influenced by the 
configuration of the ethnic blocs, the (re)orientation of constituency support and the 
nature of elite accommodation as well as the external resource dependence of the 
respective blocs made manifest by factionalism and the challenge Hamas posed to the 
leadership of Fateh within the Palestinian bloc. Oslo, however, paved the way for 
Arafat's return and the establishment of Fateh dominated PLO rule within the Palestinian 
authority in the autonomous areas of the Territories. 
The Declaration of Principles agreed in August 1993 presented Hamas with a 
situation similar to that of its Fateh rival after the Camp David Agreement of 1979. 
Hamas's perceptions were revised, and the exclusion of Hamas from the negotiation 
process meant that, despite popular support, it was not privy to the Oslo arrangement. 
The agreement between Israel and the PLO led Hamas to believe it had become the 
common enemy of both camps and it viewed the new era of co-operation as a sign that 
both sides had agreed by way of exclusion to contain its imPact in Gaza and the West 
Bank. The Hamas representative in Jordan, Mohammad Nazzal, asserted that the 
movement was preparing itself for an attack in the new era of harmony between Israel 
and the PLO, believing in the real possibility of Israeli and Palestinian security forces 
combining to combat Hamas fighters. Palestinian public opinion polls after the Oslo 
Accords illustrated that Arafat and the PLO leadership had maintained its position; 
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Hamas with 23 per cent of support in 1994 had dropped to 15 per cent by 1997 (Shikaki 
1998). 
The Oslo pact to exclude Hamas exacerbated an internal-extemal leadership 
division in Hamas as its external leadership sought to distance the organisation from the 
leadership of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA established 
institutional structures to exclude Hamas, endorse Fateh and encourage recognition of the 
PLO leadership as the leadership of the PA. Six months after the return of Arafat, Hamas 
relations with the PNA were 'essentially conciliatory', however rejectionist public 
discourse' (Legain 1997: 173). The leadership of Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza 
initially sought, when appropriate, to denounce the Oslo Accords while communicating 
with the Palestinian Authority regarding related authority and security concerns. 
In the case of the Israeli governing elite, Hamas became the issue of security and 
its regulation was a necessary prerequisite to the maintenance of the legitimacy and of the 
incumbent Israeli bloc leadership. Yitzak Rabin continued to oppose direct dealings with 
the PLO and approved the Oslo Accord draft in August 1993 after concluding that the 
PLO would be amenable to Israeli conditions (Shlaim 1994: 24-30). Rabin's recognition 
of the PLO and acknowledgment of 'the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people' 
resulted from the impact of the Intifada, which had convinced the Israeli army and 
security chiefs that a fundamental reordering of political relations with the Palestinian 
inhabitants of Gaza and the West Bank was required. Allowing them some form of 
separate political and juridical status had become unavoidable not only as a political 
strategy but also for the maintenance of societal security. 
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The Oslo Pact created the political space for an Israeli withdrawal from the West 
Bank and Gaza, however short-lived (Barnett 1999). Israel also perceived the escalating 
strength of Hamas as a growing Islamist threat despite its efforts to regulate and contain 
it. For Israel, the secular leadership of the PLO became the most desirable interlocutor 
(Sayigh 1999: 659) for any bargain. Israel, initially seeing the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the Islamic opposition in Gaza and the West Bank as beneficial in the potential challenge 
it posed to the PLO leadership, soon opted for an exclusionist policy in order to contain 
Hamas. 
In the case of the PLO Fateh elite, it became an issue of legitimacy that is, 
securing its status as the unchallenged sole representative of the Palestinian people and 
excluding Hamas, which appealed to the PLO leadership. Yasser Arafat had continued to 
endorse the freezing of settlements and the inclusion of major issues, such as Jerusalem 
and the refugees, in any negotiations and approved the Oslo principles after concluding 
that the Israelis would be amenable not only to recognising the leadership but also 
allowing the leadership's return not only to Gaza but also to parts of the West Bank and 
the establishment of a Fateh-run security apparatus to contain the threat and leadership 
challenge from Hamas. For the PLO, this dilemma made the Labour-led Israeli elite the 
best interlocutor for any bargain. 
The bargaining of the Oslo pact highlights the primacy of factional concerns 
motivating the PLO leadership and the Israeli Labour government to move towards 
mutual recognition and an inter-ethnic elite pact by way of a collaborative security 
bargain. The role of Hamas, while not direct in tenns of participation in negotiations, 
was crucial in that its growth and tactics substantially altered the interests and strategy of 
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the pact participants. Thus, while the broader international agenda surrounding the Oslo 
Accords, such as the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, ripeness, third party 
intervention, Palestinianisation, and Islamisation, all had some impact on the different 
agents, it was overwhelmingly the influence of factionalism impacting upon the 
configuration of the respective blocs, the pattern of elite accommodation and whether 
within-bloc factional competition is pervasive or schismatic as well as the dependence of 
leaderships and their factional challengers on external actors which proved instrumental 
in weaving the minimal inter-ethnic elite bargain of the Oslo Accords. 
174 
5 The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement: a minimal inter-ethnic 
elite bargain 
5.1 Introduction 
The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 exemplifies a minimal exclusive inter-ethnic elite 
bargain (Horowitz 2000: 574, Nordlinger 1972: 118, Tsebelis 1990: 160). Co-operation 
between the British and Irish governments created a security policy arrangement 
(Kupchan and Kupchan 1995: 57) with institutional surrounds. While assessments of the 
Agreement are diverse (Aughey 1989, Bew, Patterson and Teague 1997, Cochrane 1993, 
Hadden and Boyle 1989, Kenny 1986, O'Leary and McGarry 1993, O'Leary 1987, Owen 
1994, Townsend 1988) most would concur that the Agreement, whether described as a 
legal or a political agreement (Hadden and Boyle 1989: 14), altered the British-Irish 
relationship and the parameters of the Northern Ireland problem. In tandem with the 
Camp David and Olso Accords the Anglo Irish Agreement was based on a shared 
security concern. Unlike these Accords the Anglo Irish Agreement did not suffer from 
great expectations. The principle of the Anglo Irish Agreement reiterated in later 
agreements being that 'those who seek to achieve political objectives by violence or the 
threat of violence much not be allowed to succeed. Democracy and the rule of law must 
be resolutely protected'. ' 
The proposition advanced here is that the Agreement was predominantly premised 
upon the convergence of the governments' compatible security 2 concerns over Northern 
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Ireland. The creation of a British-Irish intergovernmental consensus was sought in order 
to curtail both the escalating political influence of the Republican movement's Sinn Hin 
(SF) party in the Island of Ireland, and Republican (IRA) violence in Northern Ireland 
and Great Britain. These shared incentives and security concerns generated the political 
motivation for the agreement, namely, to reverse the trend within Northern Ireland's 
nationalist community towards support for SF simultaneously while instituting a way in 
which nationalist grievances could be aired. The British Government's onus on security 
thwarted the greater potential afforded to the agreement, as Garret FitzGerald observes: 
She [Thatcher] never emotionally understood, intellectually she grasped the idea of 
coping with the alienation of the [Catholic] minority, but not emotionally, as soon as the 
agreement was signed she reverted back to type and her interest was in security measures, 
so there was no will behind it. 3 
The preferences and the positions of both governing elites were otherwise shaped by both 
'exogenous and endogenous dynamics' (Arthur 2000: 161). Three major factors 
influenced the respective ethnic groups' preferred initiatives and bargaining positions. 
First, the internal structural and institutional configuration of the respective blocs 
(whether or not the bloc is segmented by political parties or political parties with 
paramilitary affiliates, or is influenced by bureaucratic dominance for example) shapes 
the way in which competing within-bloc elites were accommodated and the way 
decisions are made within the group. Secondly, the extent to which a consensus exists 
over shared preferences or 'values' among the ethnic group members and the way 
differences are accommodated are influential. Whether the respective blocs are 
predominately centralised or decentralised and whether factionalism within the bloc is 
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predominantly schismatic or pervasive influences the nature of elite accommodation 
within the bloc and illustrates the potential elasticity of support for the incumbent bloc 
elite or leadership. The third factor is the bloc leadership's dependence on external 
resources for its leadership latitude or the monopoly of autonomy within the bloc. 
Combined, these fundamental elements influenced the respective governments' 
bargaining positions, preferences and incentives, resulting in a minimal if novel 
international agreement. 
The Anglo-Irish Agreement while security oriented was nevertheless innovative. 
It afforded authority to Irish government involvement in Northern Ireland policy-making 
by establishing inter-state institutions (O'Leary 1993: 1222). The degree of British and 
Irish state cooperation facilitated by joint membership of the European Union emphasised 
a shift from absolutist concepts of national sovereignty. Its aim centred on mitigating the 
military activity and political influence of the Republican movement represented by Sinn 
Hin. Legitimising Irish governmental involvement in an international agreement was 
intended to moderate Northern Ireland's Nationalist-Republican minority and reorient it 
politically, while countering the influence of Northern Ireland's unionist majority 
dominance and the spectre of its hegemonic control from the Stormont era 1921-72 
(Lustick 1979,1987, O'Leary and McGarry 1993: 108) over Northern Irish politics. The 
Unionists had exercised their veto capacity to oppose any Irish dimension vociferously 
when required to share power with Nationalists in a consociational power sharing 
Assembly and in so doing undermined the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973. Conversely, 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) enabled the British government to exclude Northern 
Irish Unionists and in so doing moderate or 'absorb' the influence of the veto the unionist 
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lobby had exercised over Northern Ireland proposals. The ideology proximity of the 
British Conservative Party to moderate Unionism 'absorbed' (Tsebelis 2002: 12) the 
4soft' or moderate unionist position and meant that tacit agreement from the unionist 
parties, while important, was no longer necessary to change the status quo in Northern 
Ireland. In signing the Agreement, the British government sought to expedite the end of 
the traditional Northern Irish unionist veto on Northern Irish decision-making prevalent 
from the Home Rule bill of 1914, at the highest governmental level. 
The Agreement made and initiated at this intergovernmental level, however, was 
counter-intuitive. The Irish government's agreed commitment to assist in regulating the 
security dynamic in Northern Ireland gained it much in the way of duties and obligations 
and though a concordat for consultation was established, arguably little in the way of 
rights. The architecture of the final Agreement differed from the larger, all- 
encompassing maximal comprehensive bargain that set out to address core conflict 
concerns, initially sought by the negotiators (FitzGerald 1991: 453 ). 4 What led the 
British and Irish governments as the leaders of the two ethno-national blocs to converge 
on the final initiatives when they had deviated from the options considered at the outset 
of the negotiations? Why, for example, would the Irish government commit itself to 
responsibility for Northern Ireland without power? 5 
This chapter offers a consequential consideration (Tsebelis 2002) of the way in 
which the three fundamental factors outlined, shaped and constrained the preferences of 
the governments as the representative leaders of the respective ethnic blocs and led to the 
security bargain finally reached. In so doing, it seeks to examine and explain the 
rationale for the minimal and seemingly counterintuitive 'responsibility without power' 
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of the Agreement. 6 The rationale behind the Agreement has been explained by one of its 
architects in terms of national interests: 
Our [Ireland's] vital national interest lies not in Irish unity, which is not a particular 
national interest in itself it's an aspiration not a national interest, our national interest is 
maintaining our security by bringing an end to the violence in Northern Ireland... What 
the IRA have done has been to clarify for Irish people the commonality of interest of 
Ireland and Britain in regard to Northern Ireland which was totally obscured before, we 
then moved potentially to having a common interest in whatever was the best method of 
instilling stability there and a positive interaction between the North and Britain and the 
North and here [the Republic], whatever that might be; what that was to be, was 
determined by the IRA. 7 
This common interest in security resulted in an Agreement reached between two 
sovereign governments representing two ethnic blocs in Northern Ireland's divided 
society of British affiliated Unionists and Loyalists and Irish affiliated Nationalists and 
Republicans. The descriptive markers of unionist and Loyalist within the British bloc, 
and nationalist and Republican within the Irish bloc, refer to the ideological parameters 
within the respective blocs. The ideological proximity of Nationalists to Republicans has 
been broadly determined by differing views on the tactical nature of achieving the shared 
goal of the bloc. Republicans' traditional advocacy of the unification of Ireland by force 
rather than consensus contrasted with nationalist assertions of the need for an agreed 
unified Ireland including the unionist community in Northern Ireland. The factional 
actors in the Irish nationalist bloc prior to the signing of the AIA include the political 
parties in the Republic of Ireland (Fianna Fail'8 Fine Gael, the Labour Party) and the 
nationalist SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party) in Northern Ireland. Similarly, 
the term unionist and Loyalist represent the ideological distance within the British bloc 
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and represent the adherence to the Union of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
loyalty to the Union and its figurehead the Queen. Both distinctions within the respective 
blocs referred to the likelihood of factional actors within the bloc using violent tactics to 
advance the shared goal of the bloc; over time this tactical distinction became less 
pronounced as patterns of within-bloc factional accommodation oscillated between 
schismatic and pervasive competition within and between Unionism and Loyalism as 
well as within and between Nationalism and Republicanism. The same associational 
distinctions can be made in patterns of elite accommodation between Irish Nationalists 
and Republicans in the Irish ethnic-bloc. 
The territory of Northern Ireland is contested and its community divided along an 
ethnic British-Irish cleavage. A religious marker tends to be used to categorise the 
cleavage, the British unionist and Loyalist bloc members tend to be broadly Protestant 
while the Irish nationalist and Republican bloc members tend to be Catholic. 
The infori-nation cues and shortcuts provided by religious distinction (Fox 2000: 
20) convolute this conflict and the configuration of the respective blocs thwarting 
attempts to define the conflict in binary terms (Boyle and Hadden 1994: 57, Brown and 
MacGinty 2003: 95, McGarry and O'Leary 1995: 64, Tonge 2002: 110). The Republic 
of Ireland's constitutional claim to Northern Ireland, officially part of the United 
Kingdom, shaped the nature of British and unionist concerns over Irish nationalist and 
Republican aspirations to a United Ireland. Irish nationalist concerns over unionist and 
British dominance in Northern Ireland at the expense of the nationalist minority 
community formed the basis of Irish nationalist concerns. Escalating inter-ethnic conflict 
exacerbated by a combination of Republican and Loyalist paramilitarism and changes 
180 
within the configuration of the respective blocs altered not only the nature of the conflict 
within Northern Ireland but also the nature of the enduring rivalry between the British 
and Irish governments. The interactions between both governments were subsequently 
shaped by patterns of interaction framed from joint membership of the European 
Community (later Union) (Meehan 2000: 198). 9 
First, the architecture of the Agreement, its institutional features and functional 
ramifications will be assessed and compared with the initial bargaining positions adopted 
by the governments pertaining to the maximal agreement. The second and central part of 
this chapter will chart the influence of the three factors on the architects of the 
Agreement, examining the British and the Irish bargaining elites' incentives, preferences 
and the positions which precluded the signing of an all-encompassing maximal 
agreement. The final section considers whether or not the minimalist outcome reached 
contained the immediate security threat and created incentives towards future agreement. 
5.2 The architecture of the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
On 15 November 1985 at the Queen's residence at Hillsborough Castle in Northern 
Ireland, the British and Irish governments signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement. 
Unprecedented in British-Irish intergovernmental relations, the Agreement reiterated a 
consensus that any change to the status of Northern Ireland would occur solely with the 
consent of a majority of Northern Ireland. ' 0 The governments agreed to expand the active 
sphere of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) established after the first 
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Anglo-Irish talks were initiated in 1980. Its broad remit was 'concerned with Northern 
Ireland and with relations between the two parts of the island of Ireland'. " The AIA 
moulded the Conference's new policy domain to include political, security, legal and 
cross-border issues relating to Northern Ireland. To strengthen the institutional 
framework of the IGC against anticipated unionist and Republican opposition and to 
implement a co-ordinated policy, a permanent secretariat of British and Irish civil 
servants was established to assist the Conference. Based in Maryfield, Northern Ireland, 
the secretariat not only mechanised the Irish government's newly designated right to 'put 
forward views and proposals relating to Northern Ireland within the field of activity of 
the Conference' 12 in relation to how it would be ruled, but also 'embedded' the IGC and 
the Agreement. 13 The newly extended IGC and secretariat fon-nulated the institutional 
features of the Agreement but were not unyielding. 
Institutional flexibility was also built into the Agreement. The unique and 
privileged right to consultation afforded to the Irish government in its role representing 
Northern Irish nationalist minority concerns would remain, provided Northern Ireland 
was directly ruled from Westminster (Fanning 1999: 4). Were government by direct rule 
to cease and power be devolved to Northern Ireland (as was hoped), the designated role 
of the Irish government would be subject to change and the AIA would collapse 'much 
like a circus tent' (Fanning 1999: 4). This device was integral to the problem-solving 
effectiveness of the Agreement acting as a catalyst to encourage support for devolving 
control to a power-sharing Assembly. Unionists opposed to institutionalised Irish 
participation in Northern Irish affairs could alter the status quo instituted by the 
Agreement by assenting to a devolved consociational (power-sharing) arrangement as 
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opposed to wielding their veto. With or without devolution, a review of the workings and 
duties of the IGC was scheduled within three years and could be initiated earlier by either 
government if required. All of these features enabled the Agreement to guarantee the 
institutional changes necessary to manage the security problem at the highest level while 
excluding elements that threatened this objective. 
Contrary to the Sunningdale Agreement of 1974, the bilateral nature of this 
Agreement was deliberately exclusive in order to 'fireproof it from external threat. 14 The 
Irish governing elite excluded any role for Sinn Hin in the preparatory New Ireland 
Forum, forged to glean consensus from within the moderate nationalist party groupings 
within the Irish bloc. The British governing elite excluded official participation of 
Northern Irish unionist parties and politicians to circumvent a repeat of the unionist 
rejection of any arrangement as it had previously with Sunningdale proposes. The 
Agreement created intergovernmental institutions that functioned to generate policy 
initiatives and implement processes driven by the two governments' core security 
concerns: namely, the destabilising nature of Republican political and military influence. 
Crucial to the functioning of the Council was the implementation of cross-border co- 
operation on security policy. The Agreement sought to institute special measures in order 
to improve relations between the security forces and to generate a programme of 
information sharing, technical co-operation and training. Intergovernmental co-operation 
was deemed essential to secure any nationalist acceptance of the political authority of the 
security forces in Northern Ireland. Similarly, initiatives to secure public confidence in 
the administration of justice in Northern Ireland were proposed. 15 The considered 
introduction of a mixed court system within British and Irish judges in Northern Ireland 
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was not implemented. Priority, however, was given to extradition procedures in order to 
curtail Republican paramilitary cross-border activity. The socio-economic development 
of these border areas required financial investment and the Agreement also functioned to 
secure international funds to assist in this matter. 
While the Articles of the Agreement sought to institute measures to curtail 
security threats, the preamble outlined the guiding principles upon which the Agreement 
was formulated. In the preamble both governments recognised their shared interest 'in 
creating lasting peace and stability' and the rights of the 'two traditions' defined as those 
who wish to maintain the status of Northern Ireland (Unionists) and those who aspire to a 
sovereign united Ireland achieved by peaceU means through agreement (Nationalists), to 
be 'free from discrimination and intolerance' and able to 'participate fully in the 
structures and processes of government'. Article I of the Agreement asserts that any 
change in the status of Northern Ireland will be decided by consent of the majority (Hurd 
2003: 303 )16 and Article 2 states that no derogation exists from the sovereignty of either 
govemment. 
The Agreement alludes to the status of Northern Ireland because of the contested 
claims of each government. Two Agreements had to be signed as neither government 
could legitimate the same copies. (In an Irish court, NI belongs to Ireland; in a British 
court, NI belongs to Britain. ) British sovereignty over Northern Ireland and its position as 
an integral part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland conflicted 
with Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution that laid claim to Northern Ireland. The 
issue of both the constitutional guarantee that in 'no event will Northern Ireland [] 
cease to be part [ ... ] of the United 
Kingdom without the consent of a majority of the 
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people' 17 and the constitutional claim made by the Irish government that 'the national 
territory consist of the whole island of Ireland"' formed the basis for negotiating the 
maximal Anglo-Irish bargain. 
Despite intergovernmental talks, however, that initially sought to consider the 
'totality of relations in these islands' (1980) and subsequent negotiations that included 
consideration of 'constitutional and security arrangements as well as North/South 
relations', '9 a shared consensus on the constitutional or sovereign status of Northern 
Ireland was not achieved . 
20 The initial framework for the negotiations notwithstanding, 
the constitutional issue was sidelined. This attracted criticism from the Agreement's 
detractors who argued that in evading the constitutional issue, the Agreement had either 
failed to address the fundamental concerns of the conflict or conversely had 
surreptitiously undermined either the constitutional guarantee or constitutional claim of 
one or other of the two governments (O'Leary 1993: 224). 
The minimal and limited nature of the Agreement left all its critics wanting. The 
agreement was fashioned first by the institutional structure of the respective ethnic bloc 
the governing elites represented. The configuration of actors within each ethnic bloc 
influenced its representative government's bargaining positions. The leaderships' 
respective preferences were shaped by the three fundamental factors mentioned 
previously: (1) the configuration of the ethnic bloc; (2) the pattern of elite 
accommodation, whether within-bloc factionalism was pervasive or schismatic; and (3) 
dependence on external resources. The influence of intra-group structure, factionalism 
and elite accommodation as well as the role of external actors on the British and Irish 
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blocs on both the initiatives negotiated and the forination of the final Agreement will be 
assessed in turn. 
5.3 The configuration and intra-group structure of the BritishfUnionist 
bloc 
The 1979 Westminster election resulted in a new Conservative British government 
altering the configuration of factional actors within the British or unionist bloc. The 
Conservative party majority of 43 seats allowed Margaret Thatcher a strong negotiating 
hand to create 'harmony from discord' as she claimed. 21 While the Conservative party 
was predisposed towards the Northern Irish Unionists' firm desire to remain part of the 
Union, 22 it was also considered better equipped than the opposition Labour party to 
accept and implement the initiatives. Labour, while hostile to Irish Nationalism 
immediately after the Second World War, was later to support the cause of a United 
Ireland as its long-ten-n goal (Guelke 1988: 101). 23 It, however, had lost the confidence of 
Irish Nationalists sceptical of 'its ability to deliver', evidenced in the Ulster Unionist 
24 Workers Council strike against the Sunningdale Agreement in 1974 . Labour's poor 
record on Northern Ireland while in government was attributed to the close relationship 
between the Conservative party and the military. 25 Labour's Northern Ireland legacy, 
combined with its electoral defeat, meant that Labour was initially less inclined to hinder 
Conservative government policy on Northern Ireland although it jeopardised the 
bipartisan position on Northern Ireland by proposing a review of the Prevention of 
186 
Terrorism Act introduced under the previous Labour government (Cunningham 1991: 
15 1). Less influential was the Liberal party with II seats (the new Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) was established in 1981). It endorsed the improvement of human rights and 
suggested initiatives to regulate the conflict which should originate from Northern Ireland 
with assistance from the British government if required. 26 
Greater influence over Northern Ireland emanated from the unionist parties. The 
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) had won (in addition to the tacit support of a great many of 
Conservative party members) six seats to the more traditionalist Democratic Unionist 
Party's (DUP) three. The position of the secular, elitist UUP, that favoured the greater 
integration of Northern Ireland into the United Kingdom as contrasted with that of its 
rival, the more religious, mass organised, loyalist, majority rule and 'Ulster' 
independence-oriented supporters of the DUp, 27 represent the two traditions of Unionism 
(Hume 1996: 66, Todd 1987). These two distinct traditions, while unable to develop a 
consensus over core principles and objectives, successfully fused to exercise the unionist 
veto when faced with an external threat (Cochrane 1997: 39, Todd 1987). As a result, the 
new Conservative government was instituted such that the greatest political opposition to 
proposals for Northern Ireland would emanate from within the Tory party itself, its 
traditional imprimatur pervasive unionist support base, as well as from the DUP leader 
Ian Paisley and his supporters known as 'Paisleyites who were sceptical of governmental 
initiatives and believed that the country to which they pledged allegiance to was destined 
to betray them'. 28 Conversely, the position of the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(Nationalist SDLP) was more inclined to favour initiatives that included a role for the 
Irish government or executive representation for the Northern Irish nationalist minority or 
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both. The SDLP is part of the Westminster political dynamic, having won a seat at 
Westminster in 1979 was part of the open schismatic electoral competition within the 
British-Unionist bloc. However, it is simultaneously and more aptly ideologically 
proximate to the Irish ethnic bloc. This anomalous position within the British and Irish 
blocs is one it shares with the Republican movement's Sinn 176in party and will be 
considered in the assessment of the configuration of factions within the Irish and 
nationalist bloc. 
Of equal importance in the structure of the British bloc are the administrative and 
bureaucratic actors which constitute an influential and pervasive faction. Bureaucratic 
predominance in Northern Ireland gave primacy to an otherwise pervasive faction. The 
British political-administrative dimension for Northern Ireland was instituted differently 
from the rest of the UK. The implementation of direct rule from Westminster meant that 
while the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was 'in charge of policy in Northern 
Ireland, no one was responsible for Northern Ireland poliCy'. 29 Northern Ireland policy 
came under the domain of the Northern Ireland Office (NIO). Unlike the Scottish and 
Welsh offices, the NIO was immune to the introduction in 1979 of select committee 
scrutiny (Wilford 1999: 137), providing it with a monopoly over policy-making and 
creating a tendency among its bureaucrats and those charged with the role of managing 
specific institutions involved with administering Northern Ireland to adhere to the 
bureau-shaping model (Dunleavy: 1991) of bureaucratic behaviour and as such constitute 
a pervasive faction within the British-Unionist bloc. The guiding principle of the 
bureaucrats involved in Northern Ireland is best described by one influential civil servant: 
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I reflect that a collective noun for people involved with NI might be that we are all 
members of the Sisyphus club, we are concerned with rolling that stone up the hill and 
having it roll down again, but having to start rolling up again. 30 
The NIO only became involved in the Agreement negotiations in 1984 when the maximal 
bargain was moderated and the constitutional issues sidelined. Exclusion of the NIO 
exacerbated British bureaucratic tensions and existing cleavages between administrative 
units (NIO, Cabinet, Foreign and Commonwealth offices) with competing competencies 
(FitzGerald 2003: 18 1). 3 1 This division of administrative roles meant that while the 
Cabinet Office negotiated with the Irish government, the public responses to proposals or 
negotiations emanated instead from the Foreign Office and later from the NIO 
(FitzGerald 1991: 496). 
While the Anglo-Irish Agreement negotiations were initiated at the highest level 
and included the Cabinet, Foreign and Commonwealth (FCO) Offices, the NIO was 
conspicuously absent from the outset of the Agreement negotiations. It was preoccupied 
with (the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) Jim Prior's proposals for an incremental 
or 'rolling' devolution Assembly for Northern Ireland that would have a scrutinising role 
should the desired goal of devolution fail to materialise. Rolling devolution was 
unpopular with all but the unionist DUP (Cunningham 1991: 147). 
32 
The negotiating elite of the British bloc, consisting of political and administrative 
actors, included Prime Minister Thatcher, changing Secretaries of State for Northern 
Ireland (Atkins, Prior, Hurd, King), Cabinet Secretary Robert Armstrong, David Goodall 
from the Cabinet Office (seconded from FCO), the Ambassador to Ireland Alan 
Goodison and later Robert Andrew and Richard Needham from the NIO. The 
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administrative actors involved in the negotiations were Robert Annstrong and David 
Goodall. The influential decision-makers were Margaret Thatcher and by 1984, Douglas 
Hurd as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland as well as Foreign Secretary Geoffrey 
Howe; to these three decision-makers, that David Armstrong would refer (Hurd 2003: 
298). 33 While committed to the union (Bew 1997: 45, Cunningham 1991: 176), Margaret 
Thatcher's first priority was security for Northern Ireland and for 'our boys', referring to 
casualties among British soldiers. 34 Thatcher's predisposition for a security oriented 
arrangement is not retrospective. As Naughtie observes: 
"Mrs. T has not taken the opportunity since the agreement was signed to do anything much 
about it. Unionists may take this as a sign of indifference, and be right, but the difficulty is 
that the argument often proceeds to the assumption that Mrs. Thatcher is embarrassed by the 
agreement, wants out of it and wishes she had never met Garret FitzGerald. This is untrue 
and always has been untrue. " When Ian Gow was Mrs. T's eyes and ears on the backbenches, 
scurrying around the corridors like a minor but very sinister figure in Gormenghast, he was 
assuring Unionists that they need not fear: he could handle her. ... The real Mrs. Thatcher, 
however is not like that. A prominent Scottish Tory, once a high office bearer, recalls meeting 
her in the late 70s to discuss devolution difficulties in Scotland. "I'm an English nationalist 
and never you forget it", she said. ... the 
idea that Mrs. T has always an instinctive sympathy 
with Unionist was always a little misleading: there was common cause from time to time but 
never complete identification. "" 
The Prime Minister's position on Northern Ireland was influenced by her friend 
and Conservative-party spokesperson on Northern Ireland, Airey Neave, who was 
assassinated by the IRA prior to her election in 1979. Treasury Minister Ian Gow, a 
staunch unionist also assassinated by the IRA in 1990, was influential, as was Enoch 
Powell the Ulster Unionist Party MP. Thatcher was inclined towards the unionist 
perspective while objecting to the Unionism advocated by the Paisleyites. Prior to her 
first meeting with her Irish counterpart Taoiseach Charles Haughey on 21 May 1980, at 
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the well known 'teapot summit', 36 she asserted that the constitutional affairs of Northern 
Ireland were 'a matter for the people of Northern Ireland, this government and this 
Parliament and no-one else' . 
37 The outcome of these preliminary Anglo-Irish discussions 
illustrates the influential elements of British and unionist intra-group dynamics. 
The Irish Taoiseach and Fianna Fail party leader Charles Haughey had initially 
intended to discuss Anglo-Irish co-operation over defence and foreign policy at the 
'teapot' summit 'to ease British qualms about Ireland's traditional neutrality'. 38 This 
discussion, however, was problematic with Ireland's neutral status because it was 
excluded from NATO membership. 39 The potential significance of the meeting is 
illustrated in the decision of the editiors of Magill the Irish political magazine, to defer 
the publication of an expose on the 1970 arms crisis which would have been detrimental 
to Mr. Haughey and weakened his standing. 40 Defence and foreign policy were not 
considered although security concerns were acknowledged. Ireland eliminated a 
proposed membership in the Commonwealth, but proposed Anglo-Irish discussion as a 
possibility, instituting an Anglo-Irish Conference to express the unique relationship 
between the two governments without affecting national sovereignty. The discussions 
attracted intense attention as a new era in Anglo-Irish relations was heralded and 
speculation about the outcome of these talks for Northern Ireland increased. After the 
talks, the Irish Foreign Minister Brian Lenihan predicted the end of partition and the 
likelihood of Irish unity within ten years, enraging Northern Irish Unionists. The net 
effect of this comment was the total collapse of the Haughey-Thatcher relationship. At 
their next brief meeting on the fringe of the European summit in Luxembourg, Haughey 
received Thatcher's vitriol, no minutes were taken of the meeting, and relations soured 
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irretrievably (Thatcher 1995: 3 90). 4 1 The ramifications of this were evidenced at the next 
Anglo-Irish summit less than a week later. 
The 8 December Dublin summit was held in the midst of the first Republican 
prisoners' hunger strike to regain political status for paramilitary prisoners in Northern 
Ireland. The hunger strikes focused international attention on British policy in Northern 
Ireland and the need to institute change. During this time the British government 
resumed intermittent contacts with IRA representatives much to the frustrations of the 
Irish incumbent leadership . 
42 This Anglo-Irish summit set the stage for a biannual Anglo- 
Irish Conference where by joint studies would be undertaken by both governments to 
embrace new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co- 
operation, and measures to encourage mutual understanding. 43 On this occasion, 
however, relations between the two prime ministers were strained and Thatcher's 
detachment was evident in the communiqu6 after the meeting. The Irish communiqu6 
implied that this Anglo-Irish initiative would consider the 'totality of relationships 
between the two islands', alluding once again to constitutional changes, whereas the 
British sought solely to emphasise that institutional rather than constitutional 
arrangements were under consideration, and Thatcher conceded that she had not involved 
herself sufficiently with the communiqu6 (Thatcher 1995: 390). The ramifications of this 
error were long-lasting and at the height of the later Agreement negotiations, she was 
particularly cautious to avoid any repetition of this mistake (FitzGerald 1991: 520). Once 
again, the 'totality of relationships' constitutional ambiguity antagonised Unionists who 
concluded that fundamental concessions had already been made over Northern Ireland 
(Hume 1996: 67). According to the Prime Minister, 'the damage had been done, and it 
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was a red rag to the unionist bull' (Thatcher 1995: 390). What was not clear however, 
was whether Thatcher's commitment to the union was a deep intellectual commitment or 
6ý 44 a brittle thing . 
The initial talks that brokered Anglo-Irish dialogue illustrate the role undertaken 
by the respective leaders, the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister (PM). These talks, a 
prelude to the negotiations, highlight the scepticism of Unionists to any participatory role 
for Dublin in Northern Irish affairs and towards any British PM prepared to engage the 
Irish governing elite in discussions over Northern Ireland. Unionist scepticism, while not 
unique, influenced the nature of accommodation within the British bloc and particularly 
within the Conservative party. The talks also created unease among Northern Irish 
Republicans in particular, as communication between British government representatives 
and Republicans had begun. 45 The ramifications of the talks between agents of the British 
government and the configuration of the Irish bloc were significant. The Irish ethnic bloc 
elite viewed communication between the British government and the IRA as duplicitous. 
The difficulty for the Irish government involved negotiating an inter-ethnic elite bargain 
while conscious of the existence of British government talks with the IRA. The 
intennittent dialogue between the British government and the IRA altered the nature of 
the Irish bloc. 
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5.4 The configuration and intra-group structure of the Irish/ 
Nationalist bloc 
In 1979, Charles Haughey led the Fianna Fail government of two years' duration after 
Jack Lynch retired from the position. Fianna Fail's traditional Republican position made 
it less conducive for Fianna Fail to engage in inter-ethnic elite bargaining with a 
Conservative and unionist British government. All the more so when Sinn F6in emerged 
as a political threat to the share of popular Republican support monopolised by Fianna 
Fail. The main electoral opposition to Fianna Fail 'the Republican party 46 was Fine 
Gael, led by Garret FitzGerald, espousing moderate nationalism (Gallagher and Marsh 
2002). Fianna Fail, historically the dominant party in a changing party system based on a 
single transferable vote, had won a comfortable 84 seats to Fine Gael's 43 seats in the 
1977 general election. 47 The Labour party with 17 seats at this election had long been the 
third party in Irish politics. 
Prior to Irish independence, the 'national question' the ideological ordering of the 
Irish ethnic bloc, had cost Labour dearly. The party did not run candidates in the 1918 
election, in which Sinn Hin the Republican party of the time won 73 of 105 seats on a 
platform of Irish independence and the creation of an Irish Republic. Having won the 
election, Sinn Hin abstained from taking its seats in Westminster. An Anglo-Irish war 
ensued and with it the subsequent partitioning of Ireland as an outcome of the 
Government of Ireland Act 1920 . 
48 A conclusion to the Anglo-Irish war was sought with 
the signing of the 1921 Treaty. The Treaty succeeded in severing 'the moderate from the 
extreme elements' of the most unified party, 49 Sinn Hin (Mansergh 1991: 143). The 
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Treaty split the party and despite a pact between the leaders of the pro- and anti-Treaty 
factions of Sinn Hin, illustrated the reality that 'the nation was composed of different 
elements, each with its own agendas and interests' (Kissane 2002: 149). The ensuing 
civil war created the framework for Irish politics; those in favour of the Treaty later 
became Fine Gael, and after a time, those in Sinn Hin seeing the merit of political 
participation formed the dominant Fianna Fail party. The two parties for a time 
represented the legacy of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty and the subsequent civil war. 
The civil war cleavage influenced the configuration of political actors, not 
excluding independent TDs 50 Labour and Sinn Hin .51 The cleavage has been described 
as one centred on the question of national legitimacy between 'Republican moralists' 
Fianna Fdil and 'Nationalist pragmatists' Fine Gael (Garvin 1996: 146, O'Duffy and 
Githens-Mazer 2002: 132). Republican moralism and nationalist pragmatism became 
short-hand for distinguishing elements of Irish nationalism and the parameters of the 
parties' policy positions in relation to the question of Northern Ireland. 52 Indeed, the 
Constitution of 1937 drafted for the most part by Fianna Fdil leader Eamon DeValera, 
laid out Ireland's (aspirational, political, and legal) claim to Northern Ireland. 53 Under the 
subtitle of 'the Nation' Article 2 defined the national territory as the whole island and 
Article 3 envisioned the reintegration of Northern Ireland. The claim made in Article 2 
would have become a matter of contention had it not been withdrawn by Article 3 which 
makes the claim to Northern Ireland subject to the reintegration of the national territory. 
This subtle if paradoxical fon-nula combined the 'Republican moralism' expressed in 
Article 2 with the 'Nationalist pragmatism' expressed in Article 3 (Farrell 1988: 66). The 
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objective of the Articles centred fulfilling a designated task for Fianna Fail, namely, to 
4wean some IRA members into constitutional politics' (Bowman 1989: 150). 
Unlike its rival British and unionist bloc, the parameters of Irish bloc aspirations 
are codified by way of constitutional reference. The references pertaining to Northern 
Ireland included, under the subheading of 'the State', Article 15, which provided for the 
reintegration of subordinate legislatures, namely the Northern Irish Stormont Parliament 
established in 1920 (Chubb 1991: 79). 54 Nevertheless, the provocative Articles and their 
interpretation became a political party concern. In 1967, the Constitutional review 
committee considered a new provision to replace Article 3, as it was deemed to have 
undermined the relationship between Northern Ireland and the (now) Republic of Ireland, 
North/South relations 55 while at the same time the Fianna Fail Irish government sought a 
rapprochement with the Ulster unionist Northern Irish Stormont government (Kennedy 
2000: 231). A similar situation arose in the 1972 inter-party commission on the 
constitution, which considered the implications of Irish unity and proposed deleting 
Article 44 56 of the constitution that referred to the special position of the Catholic Church 
in Ireland. Article 44 was odious to Northern Irish Unionists who asserted that the Irish 
Constitution was sectarian and the Irish state beholden to Rome. Once Article 44 was 
amended, advocates of constitutional reform tended to cite 'the need to appease the 
northern Protestants as appropriate grounds on which to justify change' (Bowman 1989: 
323). 
In concert, the Fianna Fail Taoiseach argued that Irish nationalism as expressed in 
the Constitution was 'narrower and less generous' than the original nonsectarian 
principles of Republicanism had promised (Lynch 1972: 611). Fine Gael, the more 
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moderate nationalist party, proposed to proceed with other constitutional changes in order 
to allay unionist fears and create a more favourable climate for negotiation. This 
proposal conflicted with Fianna Fdil's position that any constitutional amendments to 
Articles 2 and 3 designed to meet the Unionists position should happen in the context of 
an immediate change in the status of Northern Ireland. The question of the timing of the 
changes to the constitution had become a political party issue. This intra-group division 
between the two major political parties constituted schismatic factional competition 
within the Irish bloc, constraining incumbent leaderships initiating change in the status of 
Northern Ireland until such time as there was consensus within the Irish bloc. However, 
Irish intra-group dynamics were constrained but not limited to the two dominant parties 
in the Ddil or indeed in the Republic. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 
emerged in Northern Ireland in 1970 as an amalgamation of disparate groups within the 
minority nationalist community linked by its common opposition to Unionism. This 
secular coalition of the Catholic minority was influenced by the Northern Irish Civil 
Rights Association, the emergence of a Catholic middle class and increasing 
secularisation and modernisation, all of which changed the nature and composition of the 
nationalist political elite in Northern Ireland. 
The SDLP advocated a pragmatic Irish nationalism. It promoted the cause of 
Irish unity based on the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland and was for a decade 
the sole voice of the Nationalists in Northern Ireland advocating a policy of participation 
in the representative bodies in Northern Ireland government. The SDLP's participation 
was dependent on the perceived reform of the Ston-nont regime that by 1971 was 
moribund. 57 After advocating civil disobedience and abstaining from participation prior 
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to the eventual demise of Stormont in 1972, the SDLP by 1974 was prepared to 
participate in the short lived Sunningdale Agreement (McAllister 1977: 34). The SDLP's 
monopoly position representing Northern Irish Nationalists was undennined by the 
speech made by Danny Morrison at the Sinn Hin Ard Fheis (party conference) in 198 1, 
exhibiting a tactical shift in Republican policy initiated at this time . 
58 The demise of the 
Stormont regime in Northern Ireland in 1972 and the emergence of direct rule from 
Westminster together with subsequent failed attempts at power-sharing reinforced the 
influence of the Republican movement among the minority community as inter-ethnic 
violence escalated in tandem with the British security response. Emergency British 
government legislation such as the Emergency Provisions and Prevention of Terrorism 
Acts was passed to curb spiralling violence and succeeded in further isolating the 
nationalist community and increasing support for the Republican movement and Sinn 
Hin (Donoghue 2001: 175). Public sympathy for Republican prisoners who went on 
hunger strikes in 1981 in order to reinstate their political prisoner status was apparent in 
the election of H-block candidate (as hunger strikers were known) Bobby Sands as MP 
for Ferrnanagh and South Tyrone; the SDLP did not contest this by-election and the 
Republican and nationalist voters elected Bobby Sands to the seat prior to his death in a 
hunger strike. This, in turn, changed the political debate within the Republican 
movement and initiated a policy shift. Sinn I'din , encouraged 
by the success of the 'H- 
block' candidates, initiated procedures to begin contesting elections while the IRA used 
political violence to achieve its aim of uniting Ireland by force. The joint Republican 
strategy of the well-known 'armalite and ballot box' strategy changed the political 
59 parameters of the nationalist bloc in Northern Ireland as well as in the South. While 
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some argue that the republican leadership were only 'playing to the gallery', and that the 
'ballot paper is not equal to the armalite - it is merely an addendum to it' 
60 the shift in 
Republican strategy altered the existing dynamic. By recognising that the situation had 
changed and the Republican struggle had evolved (Irvin 1999: 2) and was competing 
electorally, Sinn Hin increased support gleaned from the hunger-strike protests and 
began to encroach on the support of the moderate (SDLP), creating a centrifugal pull in 
the politics of the nationalist bloc (Mitchell 1999: 103), with associated reactive 
consequences for elite accommodation within the Irish bloc. 
The ramifications of this Republican shift were also felt in the Irish Republic as 
Sinn Hin threatened the Republican credentials and consequently the vote share of 
Fianna Fail traditionally described as 'the Republican party'. The Irish general election 
in June 1981 was influenced by the instability in Northern Ireland. Nine H-block 
candidates gained 40,000 first-preference votes and eventually won two seats (Geraghty 
1998: 98). 6 1 Fianna Fail won 78 seats but the form of the government remained uncertain. 
Fine Gael and Labour with 80 seats established a minority coalition government which 
would require the support of the six independents. The new governing elite led by Fine 
Gael's Garret FitzGerald began a constitutional crusade with a review of Articles 2 and 3 
to reduce the pressures arising from the unionist fears and 'siege mentality' and facilitate 
62 dialogue between Unionists and Nationalists. The new Irish government initiative was 
introduced amid increased conflict in Northern Ireland as the Thatcher government 
refused to grant political status to hunger strikers despite ongoing deaths in prison. The 
attack on the British embassy in Dublin in July 1981 led FitzGerald to write to Thatcher, 
impressing upon her that the Northern situation now threatened Irish security. 63 
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Domestically, FitzGerald initiated an Irish administrative review on Northern 
Ireland to be held at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in Dublin. The Taoiseach 
was more inclined to rely on the bureaucratic assistance of the DFA, the Department of 
Justice, and the Attorney General's office in contrast to his predecessor's preference for 
the Taoiseach's Office. This preference created a degree of internal dissent within the 
Taoiseach's office and a degree of pervasive bureaucratic-administrative factionalism 
within the Irish bloc that FitzGerald chose to ignore. 64 
The constitutional review and initiative proposed by the new government as well 
as alteration in the administrative actor constellation established a new agenda for the 
Anglo-Irish talks. The next Anglo-Irish summit in November 1981 convened a month 
after the hunger strikes that had resulted in the deaths of ten prisoners. At this summit, 
the governments received reports on the joint studies previously undertaken. All but the 
joint security study was published. FitzGerald and his coalition Tdnaiste 65 Labour party 
leader, Michael O'Leary, used the opportunity to inform Thatcher of the coalition's 
commitment to (and the Labour party's support for) the constitutional crusade and the 
creation of a pluralist (not secularised as Mrs Thatcher suggested) Irish state (FitzGerald 
1991: 381, Thatcher 1995: 393). The summit also reiterated the principle of consent over 
Northern Ireland, otherwise known as the constitutional guarantee that any change in the 
constitutional status of Northern Ireland would have to be sanctioned by its people. For 
the British the essential advantage of the agreement was Irish government recognition 
that consent 'was the key to the constitutional position of the [N]orth' (Hurd 2003: 303). 
The Irish government, aware of the ongoing dialogue between the British 
government and the IRA, attempted to curtail the communications by arresting 
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Republicans engaged in negotiations with agents of the British elites. It was suggested 
that the Irish attempted to 'wreck the talks' by initiating the arrests. The Irish 
government did attempt to curtail the covert and disingenuous British government-IRA 
communication: 'we were told things that were not true and each week we were told 
things that were not true, we knew what was happening [ ... ] we refused to give safe 
conducts to these fellows' . 
66 The Irish-British summit meeting endorsing the principle of 
consent and increased co-operation over extradition procedures provided for inter- 
governmental progress. However, the merits of the summit and subsequent initiatives to 
ease extradition procedures between Ireland and the UK were offset by internal structural 
constraints within the Irish bloc, exacerbated by the Irish economy. 
The coalition government announced harsh economic measures to remedy 
Ireland's budget deficit (Gallagher and Marsh 2002: 30). In January 1982, the 
government was defeated by a vote of no confidence as independent Teachta Dala (TDs) 
were unable to endorse the government's fiscal proposals. 67 At the ensuing election in 
February, Fine Gael's vote share increased yet Fianna Fail, despite lacking two seats, was 
able to establish a minority government with the support of an independent and a member 
of the small and previously uninfluential 'soft' Republican Workers party 68 (Mansergh in 
Hannon and Gallagher 1996: 95). Northern Ireland advances were constrained by the 
return of the Haughey-Thatcher dynamic as Anglo-Irish relations 'cooled to freezing' 
(Thatcher 1995: 395). The organisational structure of the Irish bloc influenced the inter- 
ethnic elite dynamic as relations changed with changes in personnel representing the Irish 
bloc. 
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5.5 Actor configuration and within-bloc dynamics 
The White Paper on Northern Ireland proposing 'rolling devolution' by Secretary of State 
Jim Prior had all references to relations with Ireland removed on the instruction of the 
Prime Minister . 
69 The exclusion of the Irish dimension, Thatcher claimed, was also an 
attempt to minimise unionist objections (Thatcher 1995: 396) . 
70 Nevertheless, the Prime 
Minister's reluctance to allow Cabinet approval for the Bill was matched with Ian Gow 
(her permanent private secretary) lobbying the parliamentary Conservative party and 
those who advocated an integrationist unionist stance on Northern Ireland against the 
devolution bill (Howe 1995: 414). Pervasive factionalism thwarted the Prime Minister's 
leadership latitude. The Bill was rejected by Ulster Unionists and backbench 
Conservative MPs, twenty of whom voted against it, arguing that the Assembly was a 
prelude to Irish reunification and as a result three junior government ministers resigned. 71 
The Labour party abstained from voting. Minimising the schismatic competition and 
illustrating the primacy of internal Conservative party and unionist division over 
Northern Ireland policy. The Bill was passed with 137 votes in favour of the government 
and 29 opposed. Thatcher's rationale for amending the Irish dimension, undermining the 
Bill, and allowing Gow to lobby Conservative Unionists - already keen to integrate 
Northern Ireland into the UK and maintain direct rule - against the success of the Bill, 
illustrates the influence of pervasive factionalism within the Tory party and the leadership 
autonomy within the British bloc. Thatcher's trust in Ian Gow contrasted with her 
appointment of Jim Prior (the main detractor of her economic policies) to Northern 
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Ireland in order to punish him for dissent and 'get him out of her hair' (Guelke 1989: 95, 
Howe 1995: 413 ). 72 Equally, the devolution White Paper also illustrated within-bloc 
dynamics on the Irish side. 
The Irish government's response to the White Paper in light of the exclusion of 
the Irish dimension was predictably negative. While the Fine Gael opposition welcomed 
the potential for an executive power-sharing dimension in the rolling devolution proposal, 
Haughey's criticism that it was unworkable was mirrored by the SDLP who wanted a 
guarantee of executive power-sharing. It was argued that the SDLP rejected the 
proposals because it 'could not afford to seem less nationalist that the Dublin 
government' (FitzGerald 1991: 408 ). 73 Centrifugal forces constrained the SDLP, 
concerned that schismatic factional threats from Sinn 176in would escalate if Sinn Mn 
could assert the SDLP were more compromising than the Irish government. 
The White Paper on Nor-them Ireland was published within days of the Falklands 
crisis, frustrating Anglo-Irish relations further. The Irish Fianna Fail government was 
initially hesitant about endorsing European sanctions against Argentina, and after the 
British sinking of the Belgrano warship, unilaterally withdrew its support for sanctions 
(although this act was not within its powers) and called for a meeting of the UN Security 
Council on which it served, eventually withdrawing its support when European sanctions 
were renewed (FitzGerald 1991: 409, Kenny 1986: 38). 74 The Irish government's policy 
stance on the Falklands renewed Thatcher's 'coolness towards Haughey' and thwarted 
any opportunity for Anglo-Irish progress in Northern Ireland (Howe 1995: 413). The 
inter-ethnic configuration of actors by this time was not conducive to dialogue and a shift 
in the leadership of the Irish bloc from Fianna Fail to the more moderately nationalist 
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Fine Gael was preferable to the British bloc leadership. The shift began with the 
Northern Ireland Assembly elections held in October 1982. 
When the elections for the Assembly (outlined in the Bill passed in the Northern 
Ireland Act) were held in October, its criticism of the proposals notwithstanding, the 
SDLP was compelled by centrifugal constraints to participate in the elections but on an 
'abstentionist' platfonn, responding to Sinn Hin's decision to its first elections also on an 
abstentionist platform. The SDLP's resulting 18 per cent share of the vote was a decrease 
in support of 4.9 per cent from the previous 1975 elections. Despite the SDLP's position 
as the third largest party after the UUP with 29.7 per cent of the vote and the DUP with a 
23 per cent vote share. Sinn Hin gleaned 10 per cent of the vote share from previous 
non-voters as well as encroaching on the traditionally Republican leaning or 'green' 
tendency among supporters of the SDLP described as a party with inherent imprimatur 
factions (Cox and Rosenbluth 1996: 268, Evans and Tonge 2000: 7 ). 75 This altered the 
configuration of actors within the Northern Irish political arena with ramifications for 
both ethnic blocs. The increased participation of Republican voters and a shift in 
Northern Ireland nationalist consensus was influential in the degree of support afforded to 
the Irish bloc elite, suggesting an elastic support base. The way this influenced elite 
accommodation mechanisms in the respective elite blocs will be considered in the next 
section. 
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5.6 Elite accommodation and the nature of support in the Irish bloc 
The multiparty nature of the Irish political system provided greater elasticity in support 
for the governing elite. After the Northern Assembly elections in November 1982, 
Fianna Hil's minority government in the Republic, suffered a vote of no confidence and 
Ireland returned a Fine Gael (achieving its highest ever vote share) and Labour (under the 
new leadership of Dick Spring) majority coalition government. 76 The shift in the 
configuration of the Irish leadership elite improved relations between the British and Irish 
governments. As Thatcher observed, the return of Garret FitzGerald as Taoiseach 
'provided us with an opportunity to improve the climate of Anglo-Irish relations with a 
view to pressing the south for more action on security' (Thatcher 1995: 395). Irish 
within-bloc tensions were exacerbated by increasing support for Sinn Hin, which had 
progressed at the expense of the 'Nationalist pragmatists' of the SDLP. The objective of 
the third Irish government in eighteen months involved re-orienting the core 
configuration of Irish actors to a consensus over Northern Ireland. Consequently, in 
January 1983, a strategy meeting between the government and Fianna Fail convened to 
consolidate nationalist opinion. 77 
The ramifications of within-bloc competition for dominance of the Irish bloc 
altered the traditional inter-bloc rivalry and the nature of the inter-ethnic conflict. The 
threat posed by Sinn 176in altered the Irish government's enduring rivalry and inter-ethnic 
bloc dynamic with the incumbent British elite. FitzGerald had initially hoped to assuage 
the fears of the Unionists and incorporate them within any negotiation. However, the 
threat of an increasingly elastic northern Irish nationalist minority supporting and 
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endorsing Sinn I'din electorally, altered the latitude of the Irish government to propose 
including Ulster Unionists in negotiations. The preferences of the incumbent Irish elite 
were firstly to maintain their primacy and regulate and 'ward off (Nordlinger 1971: 118) 
the encroaching influence of Republicanism creating centrifugal competition within the 
Irish bloc. The fear that Sinn Hin would threaten and usurp the position of the 
moderately nationalist SDLP party as the leading nationalist party in Northern Ireland 
constrained the ability of the incumbent Irish elite to initiate inclusive negotiations. The 
latitude of the Irish bloc leadership was further curtailed by the threat Sinn Hin posed no 
only to the SDLP and 'satellite' nationalist representatives in Northern Ireland but also to 
the potential it posed to cause political instability in the Republic (Moloney 2002: 267). 
The fear of Sinn Hin destabilising the politics of the Dail, the source of the leadership's 
legitimacy, was a more imminent fear than the desire to appeal to the concerns of 
Unionists. 78 
The strategy meeting between the government and the (now) leading opposition 
party Fianna Fail, led to the creation of the New Ireland Forum (NIF). The objective of 
the forum centred on generating a consensus over the nature and intent of Irish 
nationalism (Hume 1979: 309). Consequently, the forum was open to the participation of 
'all democratic parties which reject violence and which have members elected or 
appointed to either house of the Oireachtas [Dail or Seanad] or the northern Irish 
assembly'. 79 Only nationalist parties attended the Forum officially although Unionists 
made unofficial representations. Sinn F61n's endorsement of political violence excluded 
it from the Forum. The NIF took priority over any constitutional reform initiative, as 
Fianna Fail's support would not be forthcoming if the government pursued a general 
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constitutional reform without consultation (English 2003: 240, FitzGerald 1991: 380). 
The mechanism of the NIF exemplified the need to increase cohesion and 
accommodation within the bloc while consolidating the nationalist position and 
generating consensus over the guiding principles or values of the bloc. This was 
particularly significant after the previous intensely adversarial party politics. The forum 
recognised the political significance of the SDLP and northern Nationalists as an inherent 
component of Irish politics (Feeney 2002: 314). Its goal was to establish the framework 
for an agreed Irish negotiating position in Anglo-Irish discussion. 
The Irish government's objective was to be able to negotiate towards and defend 
an Anglo-Irish Agreement which, while not providing for a united Ireland, would 
nevertheless accord with the objectives upon which all Irish nationalist parties had 
agreed . 
80 The forum included the pragmatic nationalist positions of Fine Gael, Labour, 
the SDLP, and the 'Republican moralist' position advocated by Fianna Fail, which feared 
Sinn Hin would poach the Republican vote, should Fianna Fail neglect Republican 
attitudes .81 At the 1985 Fianna Fail Ard Fheis (annual party conference) a proposal was 
put forward that when in government the party render Sinn Fein illegal. 
"Republicanism is perhaps the most discussed topic within the ranks of this party. After 
all, FF is the strongest most vital Republican voice in Ireland... DeValera declared the 
IRA to be an illegal organization on June 18 1936... As history often repeats itself, I 
suggest that when Charles J. Haughey T. D. becomes Taoiseach next year he takes similar 
action against Sinn Fein'. " 
A consensus over the set of principles for the Irish bloc elite and a series of models or 
options was required. Initially, the forum began a study on the economic consequences 
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of the conflict. The economic report attempted to quantifý the human loss and economic 
costs of violence and political instability in the North. 83 The report illustrated that the 
Northern Irish situation resulted in the Irish government spending four times the amount 
of the British government on security per capita, extolling an additional strain on 
Ireland's already precarious economic situation and emphasising the need to secure a 
political solution. 84 
Three 'plus' models for a new Ireland were presented in the final New Ireland 
Forum report; a unitary state model, a model of confederation, and a joint authority 
model as well as the forum's expressed willingness to discuss alternative models 'which 
may contribute to political development'. The way in which the forum arrived at these 
forinulations is illustrative of intra-ethnic bloc mechanisms and the way in which blocs 
converge towards shared values. For example, the united Ireland model was given 
greater emphasis towards the end of the forum talks. Its inclusion, at the behest of Fianna 
Fail, delayed the publication of the forum report for four months to arrive at consensus 
over the text. 85 The aim of deferring the outcome of the Forum was a ploy by Fianna Fail 
leader Charles Haughey to unden-nine the autonomy of the incumbent Fine Gael-Labour 
coalition in their negotiations with the British government while endorsing Fianna Fail's 
own Republican credentials to intra-party assuage fears of Sinn F6in's appeal to 
traditionally Fianna Fail supporters. 
As a result of the Irish within-bloc competition over the nature of the Forum 
report, the proposal for joint British-Irish authority emerged as a model for joint 
sovereignty. Predictably, the constitutional ramifications of joint 'sovereignty' were 
onerous; the terminology was dropped after prime ministerial meetings on the fringes of 
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European summits in Stuttgart in June and November 1983 revealed that the tenn 
sovereignty antagonised the Prime Minister and was unpalatable. 86 
Charles Haughey coined the new term 'joint authority' 87 after the Taoiseach had 
suggested that sovereignty wouldn't be acceptable. The Taoiseach argues that Fine 
Gael's first preference was also joint authority though the government had to be seen not 
to endorse this option initially in order to allow Fianna Fail to possess and propose this 
option. 88 Haughey, as leader of Fianna Fail, looked for the inclusion of a unitary state 
model to counter the confederal proposals perceived to be the first preference model of 
Fine Gael. While the Taoiseach had previously proposed confederation in 1979, the first 
preference of the national pragmatists was a model based on principles best implemented 
by joint authority. The joint authority model for Northern Ireland was novel. It 
represented a shift in Irish nationalist perceptions of Northern Ireland by advocating an 
approach that included British participation in rather than demanding its exclusion from 
Northern Ireland (Arthur 2000: 198). 
The within-bloc divisions over the proposed models illustrated the different 
orientations within the Irish bloc. Prior to publication, Fianna Fail submitted an 
expanded draft to the chapter on the unitary state model (FitzGerald 1991: 490). 
Reservations also provided concerning the overtly nationalist interpretation of the 
conflict's origins as outlined in the report and an eleventh hour request by Haughey to 
insist that any changes to the status of Northern Ireland be dependent upon the majority 
consent of 'the Irish people north and south'. These examples illustrate the schismatic 
factionalism that stalled the publication of a report intended to centralise and align 
nationalist consensus in the Irish bloc. Publication of the report was ambitiously 
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anticipated to coincide with the general election in the UK in June 1983. This election 
reaffirmed the forum's objective of curbing northern Irish Republicanism as Sinn Hin 
secured 13.4 per cent of the vote, and sent Sinn I'din party leader Gerry Adams to 
Westminster. The forum debate also influenced Irish political and policy debate 
domestically by convening in the midst of a referendum on abortion; it represented a 
period of Irish national, cultural and political revisionism. Despite Fianna Fail's efforts 
to undermine the forum once its report was published, Haughey's decision as party leader 
to endorse only the unitary state model without consulting Fianna Fail colleagues 
exacerbated dissention within the party, generating open competition and the schism 
resulting in the creation of the Progressive Democratic party from the anti-Haughey 
faction within Fianna Fail (Collins 2000: 153). Haughey's attempt to play a two level 
game resulted in the division of Fianna Fail and a new configuration of the Irish bloc. 
The Irish coalition government's attempt to consolidate nationalist opinion did not in 
excluding Sinn Hin's influence. If anything it managed only to delay the inevitable 
inclusion of Sinn Hin's participation in the Irish body politic; it did, however, change the 
pervasive factionalism within Fianna Fail to an open competition changing the Irish 
ethnic bloc dynamic. 
The inter-ethnic ramifications of the forum were equally interesting. Proceeding 
to the publication of the report and amid the forum negotiations, the initiative succeeded 
in motivating the British government to consider new Northern Ireland proposals. The 
way the forum influenced the actor orientation of the British is addressed in the following 
section. 
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5.7 Elite accommodation and the nature of support in the British bloc 
The June 1983 general election secured the Conservative government's position while 
simultaneously introducing Sinn Hin into the British configuration of political actors 
89 
after the Republican party won a seat in Westminster (from which it abstained). In 
November 1983, the Taoiseach had introduced the notion of 'joint sovereignty' to the 
British Prime Minister as a means of minimising shared security concerns and mitigating 
the alienation felt by the northern nationalist community. While the notion of shared 
sovereignty was anathema to Thatcher, the meeting in the midst of the European Summit 
at Stuttgart heightened British interest in negotiations. This interest was compounded by 
escalating Republican violence, culminating in the killing of Protestant churchgoers in 
Armagh in November and the subsequent withdrawal of the UUP from the Northern 
Ireland Assembly, protesting the 'failure of the British government' to change its security 
policy (Bew and Gillespie 1993: 175). The London Harrods bombing in December 1983 
killed six, one an American tourist, and as both governments considered proscribing Sinn 
Hin, it focused increasing attention on the British need, if not for joint sovereignty, for 
greater Irish assistance to contain the security situation. 
Thatcher desired an Anglo-Irish arrangement limited to security but nevertheless 
feared that the consensus sought within Irish nationalism by way of the New Ireland 
Forum would 'attract international respectability for moves to weaken the union' 
(Thatcher 1995: 395). The forum proposals were incorporated with the initial finding of 
the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament's Haagerup Report on 
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Northern Ireland. The Haagerup Report, unlike the previous Martin Report that focused 
solely on social and economic issues, was political in nature and led Thatcher to instruct 
her officials in the Cabinet and Foreign and Commonwealth Offices to 'do something' 
prior to its publication and the impounding criticism of it by unionists and members of 
her own party (Goodman 2000: 124). 90 A series of areas for negotiation were initially 
proposed secretly to the Irish government. 91 
Four areas were considered for negotiation: (1) constitutional questions; (2) 
security arrangements with a joint-security commission, (3) North-South relationships, 
and (4) a 'security band' at the border with free access and movement for the military and 
92 police . The Irish government was agreeable to the 
first three but immediately rejected 
the fourth joint-border security zone proposal as untenable. After a series of secret talks 
between the major British and Irish officials (Annstrong and Goodhall, Nally and Lillis), 
Thatcher was prepared to seek British cabinet approval for Anglo-Irish negotiations. 
Assuaging pro-unionist cabinet members' fears, Thatcher argued that inaction was a 
greater threat than negotiating with the Irish government, on the grounds that greater 
cross-border security was needed and required a political role for the Irish government to 
secure co-operation (Howe 1995: 417). 
The cabinet and the government were pressed not only by the looming European 
elections in June but also by the pervasive unionist faction within the Conservative party 
and the broader bloc, who were keen to discuss security issues and convince the Irish 
government to commit to greater security engagement. 93 The political involvement of the 
Irish government was agreeable by way of 'institutional consultation', described broadly 
as a concordat of understanding between both governments over issues of mutual 
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concem. 94 The Irish govemment, however, proposed that for a greater political role it 
would consider calling a referendum to the amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish 
constitution. 95 Provoked by an informal discussion with the then Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland Jim Prior, the Irish proposals were well received by the Cabinet Office 
while the Foreign and Commonwealth Office considered the constitutional amendment 
with scepticism and the Northern Ireland Office was incredulous. Nevertheless, 
negotiations towards a maximal agreement in which 'joint authority', the amendment of 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution, and the commensurate British concessions 
proceeded throughout the first four months of official negotiations from March 1984 
during the Fontainebleau European Summit and the European parliamentary elections in 
June. 
The elections to the European Parliament provided Sinn Hin with the opportunity 
to buttress its support. For Unionists, the elections were seen as a means of countering 
the influence not only of Sinn Hin but also of the New Ireland Forum and the European 
Haagerup report findings. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in particular sought to 
mobilise support to counter the position of what it described as a 'weak-kneed British 
government'. The DUP viewed the election as a confrontation between 'militant 
96 Republicanism and traditional unionism'. The outcome of the elections eased fears as 
Sinn Hin gained 37 per cent of the nationalist vote share, a loss of 6 per cent on the 
general election the previous year (Moloney 2002: 240). Sinn Hin's electoral 
containment evidenced in the election results stymied the discussion over Articles 2 and 
3. After insisting that no arrangement with the political periphery could be reached 
without an amendment to Articles 2 and 3, the British by July had retreated from their 
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previous position. The Prime Minister asserted that while the proposed constitutional 
amendments were desirable it was 'clear the Irish would expect a great deal in return' and 
she doubted the ability of FitzGerald's government to deliver a favourable referendum 
result (Thatcher 1995: 399). Much to the horror of other negotiators British and Irish 
alike, the Prime Minister proposed at this time (and at regular intervals) that the border 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic be redrawn in order to ease security concerns 
more effectively (Thatcher 1995: 3 99). 97 
Of primary concern for the British negotiators was the monopolistic maintenance 
of British sovereignty over Northern Ireland. And whereas amending the Irish 
constitution would first assuage Unionists fears, it was perceived it would do so at a cost 
to British sovereignty. 98 The cost of this comprehensive bargain was deemed too great for 
the British to reciprocate Irish involvement to the degree any amendment of Articles 2 
and 3 would demanded. However, the shift in the British position was not a consequence 
of overt within-bloc tensions as the House of Commons debate on the New Ireland 
Forum report in July illustrates. 99 The first major debate on Northern Ireland since 1974 
focused on the proposals outlined in the Forum and the counter-suggestions published in 
response by the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)'00 that sought to carve a substantive role for 
the Northern Ireland Assembly (Arthur 2000: 215, Cochrane 1997: 7). The stormy 
relationship between Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Jim Prior and the Prime 
Minister while significant (Prior would communicate without authorisation with the Irish 
negotiating team see FitzGerald 1991: 494-530), 101 was terminated with his resignation 
in September and the introduction of Douglas Hurd as Secretary of State. 
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Within the British-Unionist bloc, within-bloc divisions between the unionist 
parties of the UUP and DUP were to be expected. Of substantial consequence was the 
hostility of the NIO towards any sovereignty/constitutional initiative. The NIO were 
aggravated by their early exclusion from the framing of the negotiations, and as the 
NIO's influence limited the likelihood for an all encompassing Agreement diminished. 
Irish attempts to rejuvenate the maximal constitutional arrangements in July 1984 failed 
to re-engage the British side. Between July and September, the NIO attempted to redirect 
negotiations towards a minimal security arrangement. The IRA bombing of the 
Conservative party conference on 12 October hardened the Prime Minister's resolve 
towards a minimal bargain. By November 1984, Anglo-Irish relations floundered and the 
internal divisions between the Cabinet and NIO became evident. 102 The British-Irish 
Association of parliamentarians and academics published the Kilbrandon Report, which 
proposed 'co-operative devolution' and a five-member executive committee to govern 
Northern Ireland, including three Northern Irish politicians, the secretary of state, and the 
Irish minister for foreign affairs. But all three parties in the existing Assembly rejected 
the proposal (Owen 1994: 13, Whyte 1990: 239). This position ran counter to that of the 
NIO which advocated either a power-sharing assembly in Northern Ireland or an Insh 
government role in Northern Ireland but not both (FitzGerald 1991: 515). 
The negotiations at the Chequers Anglo-Irish summit on 14 November were a 
consequence of the minimal bargain outcome. The British government's preference for 
security with political parameters gained prevalence; this reorientation was a 
consequence of the Brighton bombing after which a Cabinet vote was held regarding 
whether or not Anglo-Irish negotiations would continue at all, coupled with the greater 
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influence exerted by the NIO with the Douglas Hurd appointment as Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland. 103 Under this new dispensation, the British government, on the 
amendment of Articles 2 and 3, would concede a right to the Irish government 'to 
contribute to the consideration of the British government on a range of policy matters 
including security as a means of strengthening the confidence of the minority 
community' (FitzGerald 1991: 515). 
However, a Joint Security Commission was proposed as an alternative without 
any constitutional amendment. The British viewed the Joint Security Commission as the 
minimal means of codifying and formally instituting the existing Irish practice of 
assisting the British with security information. 104 The benefits of such an arrangement 
were the minimal compromise required. It was 'not a concession to codify and institute 
an already existing right'. Far from being a stumbling block, Articles 2 and 3 were 
deemed to be 'not of value', or if so then 'solely for the Foreign Office' or too costly to 
include in the negotiation. 105 Once Articles 2 and 3 were sidelined, a unilateral bargaining 
position was created for the British to be able to offer and withhold concessions at will 
and in such action limited the scope of any agreement to a minimal bargain. 
The ramifications of the November Chequers meeting were not to be found in the 
discussions or in the communiqu6 but rather in the press conferences afterward. The 
spectre of the New Ireland Forum arose six months after it had reported and when asked 
about the possible form of any agreement in terms of the forum's models, to each one in 
turn Thatcher responded with a forthright 'out', including joint authority. Thatcher's 
'out, out, out' response, while in the short tenn, giving solace to Ulster Unionists, the 
unionists within her own party and the NIO, unden-nined her negotiating partner, the Irish 
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government and FitzGerald personally. Thatcher's stance as leader of the British- 
Unionist ethnic bloc represented the majority opinion pervasive within the Conservative 
party, as well as the consensus opinion of the Northern Irish unionist parties. 
The effects of the statement on the orientation of the Irish bloc were substantial. 
The Taoiseach was unaware of his British counterpart's abrasive response and his 
subsequent press statement was flawed. On return to the Ddil, seizing the opportunity to 
undennine the governing coalition, the opposition Fianna Fail party and its leader Charles 
Haughey in particular criticised the Taoiseach's negotiating style, initiatives and 
proposals, all of which were unden-nined. Garret FitzGerald's position in relation to his 
co-negotiator Thatcher was ridiculed. 106 The Irish incumbent elite's position was 
marginalised, its 'leadership latitude' weakened and the options for a maximal agreement 
thwarted. The British Prime Minister content with a collaborative security arrangement 
with the Irish government resolved to maintain the broad consensus within the British 
bloc having succumbed to pressure by the NIO to avoid any schismatic faction provoking 
action 'to upset the Unionists or the security forces ... a dangerous recipe for inaction' 
(FitzGerald 2003: 181). The initiative to renew negotiations meant a reliable external 
actor or third party was required to renew the position of the incumbent Irish bloc elite. 
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5.8 Irish external resource dependence 
The external influence of the European Community had been inherent if not directly 
obvious throughout the negotiations (Meehan 2000: 207). Anglo-Irish meetings were 
dependent on European Council meetings and provided the opportunity for the Irish and 
British to meet and discuss Northern Ireland regularly. Irish perceptions of joint 
sovereignty and joint authority emanated from the European Commission, which was 
favoured by the Irish as a model for the Anglo-Irish Conference. The British preferred 
the term Anglo-Irish Conference to the tenris commission and council because of the 
European associations with the term. The associative, structural and parliamentary 
interest of the European Union in the guise of the Haagerup Report had been influential 
and beneficial for the Irish bloc. 
Ireland turned to the second major beneficial external influence, namely, the 
United States. American involvement in Anglo-Irish relations had been sporadic and, 
since independence, rare. The Carter administration and Congress in 1977 had broken 
with precedent by urging an agreement between the conflicting parties promising 
financial assistance if a resolution could be found (MacGinty 1997: 32). While the Irish 
government had failed to co-opt American assistance in the midst of the earlier 
Republican prisoners' hunger strike, ' 07 it had gained American support for the NIF 
proposals which were outlined by the Taoiseach in Haughey's address to the US 
Congress on 15 March 1983. At the time of President Reagan's visit to Ireland in June 
1984, the President fielded questions concerning whether the Irish government desired 
the British removal from Northern Ireland; Henry Kissinger was informed that if the 
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British left, American intervention would be required to maintain security and stability 
(McKittrick and McVae 2000: 113). 108 
The Anglo-US special relationship between President Reagan and Prime Minister 
Thatcher was important in assisting the Irish in the aftermath of the 'out, out, out' crisis. 
After the Chequer's Summit, President Reagan reiterated his endorsement of the NIF 
(Guelke 1989: 147). Much to Thatcher's surprise, President Reagan informally raised the 
issue of Northern Ireland and the Anglo-Irish negotiations with her at Camp David in 
December 1984 and required the Prime Minister to return to the issue on her visit to the 
America in February 1985. For the first time, Secretary of State George Schultz included 
Ireland and the status of the negotiations on the agenda of topics to be discussed at a 
British-US conference on 20 February, marking an end to the US non-interventionist 
approach to Northern Ireland. An additional incentive of financial aid by way of an 
international fund for Northern Ireland was also proposed. 109 
The Irish government sought to maximise US assistance and at the parameters of 
the European Council meeting in December renewed discussions with the British on the 
basis of a series of confidence-building measures. For example, Ireland was by now 
better able to sign the Convention on the suppression of terrorism to assist extradition in 
light of recent Irish Supreme Court decisions and considered the reintroduction of the 
Garda task force on the border. 110 The Irish negotiators proposed an agreement on a 
statement of common principles on issues, such as mixed courts, an unarmed police 
force, changes to the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) security forces, along with 
associated unilateral measures without which the nationalist minority community could 
not counter the influence of the Republicans. Amendments to the non-jury or 'Diplock' 
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court system were proposed and a mixed court system suggested (Jackson 2001: 166). 
These proposals were received negatively by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Hailsham, 
formerly Quintin Hogg) of whom Thatcher was wary. ' 11 In February 1985, the British 
proposed a package that primarily involved the expansion of the Anglo-Irish Conference 
established in 1981 and assistance by a joint secretariat. The basis for this initiative was 
a moderate security agreement with institutionalised and continued political involvement 
for the Irish government; these proposals were motivated by the Prime Minister's desire 
not to 'stand pat' 112 as she allegedly told President Reagan (FitzGerald 1991: 53 1). 
The mutual British-Irish dependence on the European Council meetings as a 
forum for discussing Anglo-Irish relations was once again made at the Milan Council in 
June 1985. Shared tensions over the ascendancy of Sinn Hin were lessened after the 
local May elections in Northern Ireland whereby the SDLP maintained a6 per cent 
advantage over their Republican rivals. Nevertheless, FitzGerald sought to secure more 
confidence-bui I ding measures in a bid to placate Nationalists' concerns. 
5.9 British external resource dependence 
British external concerns and vulnerability to external criticism were plentiful in the 
midst of the 1981 hunger strikes. The international response in favour of Republicanism 
exacerbated security fears. Irish Republicans renewed their links with Libya, an 
important external resource for them. ' 13 Libyan sponsorship strengthened the IRA's 
military supplies and capacity (Moloney 2002: 15). 1 14 The British government was 
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conscious of international perceptions of the conflict and anticipated an international 
response to the conclusion of the New Ireland Forum. This, in tandem with the 
discussions in the midst of the European Haagerup study early in 1983, provoked a 
British initiative. 
The British deemed the institutional parameters of European organisation 
beneficial with European meetings providing the opportunity to manage European and 
Anglo-Irish affairs. The same institutional parameters when proposed by the Irish as 
models for the Anglo-Irish Commission, were met with far more hesitance by the British 
government was more hesitant. The European Commission model was favoured by the 
Irish for the Anglo-Irish Conference. Indeed, as already mentioned, the term Anglo-Irish 
Conference was itself a compromise favoured over 'commission' and 'council' because 
of their association with European institutions. The associative, structural and later 
financial role of Europe in the guise of 'exceptional' European funding of ECU 100 
million for Belfast and a rural development programme had been imperative (Goodman 
2000: 125). It was the parliamentary interest of the European institutions in the forrn of 
the Haagerup Report that had been most influential in formulating a British initiative. 
American involvement from the British perspective was deemed either to be 
frustrating or unimportant. 115 Despite the influence wielded by the US in encouraging the 
British government's first secretary of State for Northern Ireland to meet with the Irish 
foreign minister in the US to initiate an Anglo-Irish dialogue, the British rejected this 
suggestion and yet had after this offer initiated the short-lived Atkins Plan' 16 to improve 
dialogue. At the same time, the US imposed a suspension on arms sales to the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the northern Irish police force; this implicit critique of 
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British government policing policy in Northern Ireland reverberated in Westminster 
(Guelke 1996, Guelke 1989: 144-7). However, American influence was greatest after 
the McBride principles established a code of conduct for American firms operating in 
Northern Ireland relating to fair employment and equal representation rules in the midst 
of the Democratic Party's Presidential platform in 1984 that the American influence was 
greatest. The British government recognised the influence of the US government in 
curbing the channel of funds from Republican sympathisers via the Irish Northern Aid 
Committee (Noraid) to Northern Ireland. The seizure of seven tons of guns and 
ammunition originating in Boston in September 1984 had focused British attention and 
security concerns on the US, which agreed to a bilateral treaty to assistance in extradition 
procedures (Guelke 1986: 134). The Anglo-American relationship while deemed 
peripheral by the British decision-makers was nevertheless influential; Margaret Thatcher 
when asked why she had signed the AIA and later disowned it, replied 'It was the 
pressure from the Americans that made me sign that agreement' (Fanning 1999: 4). The 
American role is recognised as significant; President Reagan made Anglo-Irish relations 
a feature of the Anglo-US special relationship in 1984, at a time when even a minimal 
bargain appeared unsalvageable. 
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5.10 Security, opportunity, and the making of the minimal bargain 
The coalescence of these three factors - the configuration of the ethnic blocs, the 
tradition of elite accommodation, whether factionalism is pervasive and schismatic and 
external resource dependence - influenced the ethno-national elites differently. 
The British negotiators' immediate constraints emanated from the configuration 
of the British-Unionist bloc. Institutional competition within the British administrative 
bloc shaped the changes in the British bargaining position. The role of external and 
international responses to the NIF and the Haagerup report as well as US governmental 
interests were influential in generating the initial British proposals. However, by the 
summer of 1985, Anglo-American relations were a secondary British concern to the 
emerging combined unionist lobby against the Anglo-Irish initiative. 
In August, a joint unionist working party was formed in response to mounting 
concern over the negotiations. The Unionists, on the basis of information received from 
sympathetic cabinet sources were provoked to lobby the British government against any 
agreement that failed to include the end of the Irish constitutional claim. 117 The Unionists 
refused the offer of a Privy Council briefing on the grounds that if inforination were 
received on this basis they feared it would inhibit UUP criticism of the eventual 
agreement and prompted by constituency concerns did not want to have the facility to 
contest any final agreement curbed. Molyneaux, the leader of the UUP and DUP leader 
Ian Paisley had anticipated a change in the Irish constitutional claim to Northern Ireland. 
As it became clear that the comprehensive bargain was not forthcoming and a 
more limited Agreement though one curbing the unionist veto was likely, the unionist 
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leaderships of both parties wrote to the Prime Minister stating their shared desire to 
contribute to the process of British-Irish discussions and co-operation. ' 18 At a subsequent 
meeting of the Unionists, the Prime Minister and Secretary of State Douglas Hurd, the 
Unionists impressed upon the government the need to encourage the Irish government to 
abandon its territorial claim on Northern Ireland. The unionist leaders were equally 
concerned that the British constitutional guarantee would be undermined by any Anglo- 
Irish arrangement and rejected government assurances to the contrary. The elastic 
support for the governing elite from the unionist factions of the British bloc became 
evident as a United Ulster Loyalist Front (UULF) was established and confrontations 
arose between loyalists of the Protestant Orange Order and the RUC in Northern Ireland 
in the midst of the July marching season. Rather than curtailing security fears the 
unionist street actions fuelled them. It was at the British cabinet meeting on 25 July that 
the agreement for the minimalist approach was finally established for the British 
government (Howe 2003). 1 19 
The minimalist arrangement was deemed as having the greatest likelihood of 
success because unionist opposition was considered containable. Despite unionist calls 
for an amendment to Articles 2 and 3, a request adhering to the initial maximal bargain, it 
was in British government interests simultaneously to curtail and contain unionist 
reactions with a minimal arrangement rather than opt for a maximal bargain. The 
comprehensive bargain would require a perceptual shift in British perceptions of 
sovereignty previously unmoved despite twelve years of European Community 
membership. The contrariness of this position was such that, with Articles 2 and 3 intact, 
the question of any derogation of British sovereignty was limited as the Irish government 
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would not maintain a claim to a territory over which it had any perceived joint 
sovereignty. The maximal bargain would relinquish the constitutional claim for a 
substantial Irish presence in Northern Ireland affairs while the British government sought 
to maintain autonomy over core decision-making in Northern Ireland and simultaneously 
gain security co-operation and assistance in dealing with the growing support of the 
Republican movement while creating an environment in which the unionist veto could be 
contained. British preferences were not assuaged either by the unionists' or the Irish 
government's impetus for a maximal bargain. 120 
The minimalist agreement was finalised prior to Douglas Hurd's replacement in 
September 1985, after which the British actor constellation altered as Tom King became 
Secretary of State. More hesitant than his predecessor, King postponed the final drafting 
of the Agreement at the eleventh hour. Within two weeks of his appointment, influenced 
by Ian Gow, King wrote to the Prime Minister with serious reservations regarding the 
minimal Agreement (Howe 1995: 426). The reservations expressed were premised on 
fears that the Unionists would respond by wielding their veto and jeopardise the 
vulnerable security position of Northern Ireland as evidenced by the rioting of the 
summer and Loyalist violence against police. 
Once signed, the combined unionist rejection of the Agreement by way of the 
'Ulster says no' campaign, and the march of 100,000 people in Belfast on 23 November 
illustrated the momentum behind unionist attempts to exercise its veto. In Westminster 
after a two-day debate, the Agreement was passed by 473 votes in favour and 47 
opposed. Fifteen Ulster unionist MPs resigned their seats in protest of the Agreement, 
prompting by-elections throughout Northern Ireland. The protests against the Agreement 
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lasted for over one year, with unionist calls for days of strike action, a campaign of civil 
disobedience, a rent and rate strike and the disruption of local government. Meanwhile 
threats to RUC members from loyalists escalated and a group called the 'Ulster 
Resistance' was created with an implicit warning of a repeat of the violence seen in the 
Republic of Ireland after the Sunningdale Agreement in 1974.12 1 The threat of violence 
was in a bid to counter the threat posed by the Agreement of a united Ireland. 122 
Nevertheless, the British government refused to suspend the Agreement (Owen 
1994: 89). Despite the strikes and civil protest, the strength of the Unionists was limited 
and they were unable to destroy the Agreement as they had done previously in 1974. The 
security features of the Agreement were not adopted comprehensively. Irish proposals 
for two-tier policing to reduce nationalist alienation were overlooked. The introduction 
of mixed courts was considered but not fulfilled. Republican violence persisted although 
the procedural tensions of extradition from the Republic to Northern Ireland eased and 
efforts at extradition failed. 123 The Anglo-Irish Agreement from the British perspective 
was an incremental shift described as 'an untouchable agreement in the right direction' 
(Whyte 1990: 237). 124 While the external resources were influential, the institutional 
organisation of the British bloc in tandem with the unionist factions exhibited the greatest 
influence on mediating the nature of the bargain. 
The Irish negotiators on election hoped to create a nationalist consensus within 
the immediate configuration of the Irish bloc by creating the New Ireland Forum. The 
forum attempted to create institutional cohesion while excluding Sinn Hin in an effort to 
re-adjust the actor orientation of the Irish bloc. Fianna Fail's critique of all but the united 
Ireland model in the forum's findings weakened the ability of the Irish negotiators to 
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make a compelling case for the amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the constitution. 
Despite assurances that the Irish government could succeed in passing a referendum 
(required for any constitutional change), the ambiguity of Fianna Fail's position created 
uncertainty. Once signed, Fianna Fail's rejection of the Agreement in the Ddil endorsed 
these fears and divided Fianna Fail, as some members argued the Agreement should have 
been supported. The issue split the party and resulted in the creation of the Progressive 
Democrats. Haughey's critique of the Agreement resulted in a Republican endorsement 
of him as a 'genuine Nationalist' (Moloney 2002: 268). 125 The Agreement was passed in 
the Ddil by 88 favourable votes to 75 unfavourable ones. In addition, Labour party 
senator Mary Robinson resigned due to the lack of transparency and consultation for 
Unionists during the negotiations while SDLP assembly member Pascal O'Hare resigned 
because (it was claimed) the Agreement undermined any opportunity for a united Ireland. 
The Irish negotiators' dependence on American and European support was 
substantial. The appeal of the NIF to a sympathetic Irish-American audience produced 
dividends and used the American initiative after the ill-fated summit at Chequers renewed 
the possibility of a minimal agreement. The actor orientation within the Irish bloc was of 
overriding concern to the Irish negotiators. 
Curtailing the reorientation of the nationalist bloc towards Republicanism was 
part of the Irish elite's objective. The swift escalation in Sinn Hin 's support had been 
hindered by the local elections of 1985 and the results of the by-elections created as 
Unionists resigned in protest against the Agreement helped to illustrate that Sinn Hin 's 
support was slowing with 6.6 per cent of the vote. ' 26 The success of the Irish 
government's Anglo-Irish initiative in curtailing the advance of Sinn Hin over the SDLP 
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was contested. It has been argued that the Anglo-Irish Agreement had a minimal effect 
on the decision-making of Sinn F6in or on its subsequent policy shift, to end abstention 
when contesting elections in the Republic (Feeney 2002: 330). It is agreed that the 
Republican response to the Agreement, that it 'copperfastened partition' was muted in 
comparison to the unionist street protests and strikes. Conversely, it has been argued that 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement succeeded in rejuvenating the SDLP, creating a stalemate in 
the competition between the two nationalist parties in Northern Ireland (Moloney 2002: 
241). As well as encouraging the Sinn F6in leadership to participate in the Ddil, this 
policy change created a schism within the Republican movement, a split within Sinn 176in 
, and the creation of Republican Sinn F6in which sought to maintain the policy of 
abstention. 127 The changing nature of the movement leads some to suggest the Agreement 
was influential. Indeed, prior to the finalising of the Agreement, the SDLP leader John 
Hume announced he would talk with the leaders of Sinn 176in. Criticised for this 
initiative by unionists, these discussions were instrumental over the moderation of the 
Republican movement in the long ten-n. 
The limited implementation of the Agreement in terins of the criminal justice 
review and the failure of the British government to consider the mixed courts proposed, 
however, coupled with criticism from the opposition undermined the Irish government. 
The governing coalition lost a referendum on a constitutional amendment to allow 
divorce; this vulnerability was exploited by Haughey's campaign to highlight the 
Agreement's failure, described as the 'best friend the opponents of the agreement ever 
had'. 128 Haughey's opposition to the Agreement, heightened by his fears of Sinn Fdin 's 
participation in Irish politics at the expense of Fianna Fail, contributed to Fine Gael's 
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losing the 1987 election to a minority Fianna Fail government. Poor implementation of 
Article 8 of the Agreement on the mixed courts as well as codes of conduct for the police 
had undennined the features of the Agreement that sought to limit the alienation of the 
nationalist community. However, many of the measures successfully implemented were 
not attributed to the Agreement for fear of escalating unionist responses (FitzGerald 
1992: 474). 129 Implementation of the Agreement was incremental, piecemeal and 
insufficiently tangible in the short term to sustain the electoral chances of the Irish 
government that negotiated it. This in part explains the Irish government's concession to 
responsibility without power. 
5.11 Conclusion 
They [the IRA] created a community of interest and the Irish and British policies 
therefore have had the same interest and Irish and British policy have had the same 
objective visibly and clearly from 1972 onwards. Analysis of how we reach that 
objective has diverged at times, but the purpose is the same and that is the huge 
lp achievement of the 'A130 
The configuration of the ethnic blocs and the traditional pattern of accommodation within 
each bloc, along with external actors and resources influenced the nature of the minimal 
bargain. From the Irish government's perspective the concession to duties without rights 
agreed upon in the minimal bargain was significant in that it codified Ireland's shared 
security concerns with the British government over Northern Ireland and legitimated an 
existing practice of co-operation. 131 In addition, the concession created the opportunity 
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for the Irish government to attempt curtailing the influence of the Republican movement 
while reducing the alienation of the Northern Irish nationalist minority. Moreover, the 
Irish government aimed to alter the configuration of actors within its own bloc and the 
orientation of its electorate. The government's attempt to dispense with opaque 
perceptions of Irish nationalism clarified the position of Republicanism and heralded a 
stage of revisionism. From an Irish perspective it can be argued that the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement was a crucial incremental step towards British and international recognition 
of an Irish role and Irish status in Northern Ireland (O'Duffy and Githens-Mazer 2002: 
141). 
From the British government's perspective, the Irish government's willingness to 
concede to a limited bargain enabled it to curtail the Republican movement electoral and 
military advancement. The bilateral agreement with the Irish government reined in the 
veto of the Unionists and initiated greater authority over Northern Ireland as a result. The 
Agreement renewed Britain's international persona after a decade of criticism over its 
policy in Northern Ireland. These important features forined the basic equation upon 
which the agreement was forined. The issue of consent was based in international law 
and the British government acknowledged the legitimacy of the Irish dimension on 
Northern Ireland, while the Irish government acknowledged the union in return for cross- 
border involvement and allaying the alienation of the nationalist minority. While Britain 
gained assistance with the Northern Ireland problem, Ireland acquired leverage in the 
Northern Ireland conflict in the context of an acknowledged partnership between two 
sovereign governments. 
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The minimal nature of the bargain agreed was influenced by the three crucial 
factors and in turn influenced the Northern Ireland conflict and the prospects for its 
regulation. The bargain sought to contain the Republican movement, undermine the 
unionist veto, and minimise the alienation of the nationalist minority. While the 
Agreement resolved to achieve these objectives by way of a minimal bargain, it formed 
an incremental step towards additional initiatives and agreements which were to include 
elements of the maximal bargain discussed during this negotiation. As has been argued 
in this chapter the mechanisms for manufacturing the maximal bargain were constrained 
by the three factors previously outlined. By attempting to regulate the influence of one or 
more of the actors by way of a minimal bargain, the influence of these factors helped 
shape and facilitate a more comprehensive bargain later. 
231 
6 The 1998 Good Friday Agreement: 
a comprehensive inter-ethnic elite pact 
6.1 Introduction 
The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) signed in Belfast on 10 April 1998 has as many 
names as it has possible outcomes. The Ageement is also known as the Belfast 
Agreement, the British-Irish Agreement and, officially, as the Agreement reached in the 
Multi-Party Negotiations. Equally, assessments of the Agreement have been numerous 
(Ruane and Todd 1999, Hazelton 2000, Horowitz 2002, McGarry 2001, O'Leary 2001, 
2000,1998, Wilford, 2001). 
The bargain provides two competing consequences. In recognising and 
legitimising the aspirations of the two ethnic blocs or traditions of Unionism and 
Nationalism in Northern Ireland, the long-term outcome of the Agreement is not fixed. 
Northern Ireland could integrate either into the Republic to create a united Ireland or 
secure the maintenance of its current position within the United Kingdom. The 
Agreement makes no provision for an independent Northern Ireland or for that matter for 
increasing integration. ' Crucially, the decision as to which of these potential conclusions 
is achieved resides not with the incumbent bloc elites but (by virtue of a referendum) 
with a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. In addition to addressing security 
concerns and the problem of political violence in Northern Ireland, the Agreement 
recognised the two blocs' societal security concerns and the conflicting aspirations of the 
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two traditions in Northern Ireland. These aspirations, while not realised, would be 
institutionally safeguarded. Any future decision or constitutional conclusion over the 
status of Northern Ireland would reside not with the elites but rather with the people. 
The originality of the Agreement stems from the intricate political bargain derived 
from these diametrically conflicting aspirations that nevertheless incline the factional 
bloc elites towards institutions and mechanisms of mutual dependence (O'Leary 1998: 2, 
Wilson 2001: 2). Paradoxically, this Agreement was reached despite the participants' 
contradictory end goals. Why would competing ethnic bloc elites with diverging 
ambitions agree to an inclusive maximum bargain? The Agreement addressed the 
pressing needs of the bloc elites while acknowledging the diverse aspirations of Northern 
Ireland's two traditions of Unionism and Nationalism. The Agreement appealed to the 
majority of the factional elites because it promised imminent access to power and alluded 
to the possibility of realisable aspirations in the future. 
This chapter considers the way in which the three analytic factors influenced the 
final maximal bargain. The configuration of the ethnic blocs, the innovative pattern of 
elite accommodation and the role of external resource dependence of the elites shaped, 
outlined and constrained elite factional preferences, resulting in a maximal pact. The 
maximal nature of the Agreement illustrates 'the transformative potential of inter-ethnic 
elite negotiation' (Ruane and Todd 1999: ix), and the influence of institutional innovation 
on the three ftindamental factors of ethnic bloc configuration, pattern of elite 
accommodation and external resource dependence. 
First, the architecture of the Agreement, its institutional features, and functional 
ramifications will be assessed and compared with the bargaining positions adopted by the 
233 
elites. The second part of the chapter will chart the influence of the three factors on the 
architecture of the Agreement, examining the elites' incentives, preferences, and the 
positions that ultimately led to the signing of an all-encompassing Agreement. The 
chapter addresses the way the Agreement reached provides an example of the influence 
of a series of hereditary security bargains. 
6.2 The architecture of the Agreement 
The Agreement has been described as a three-tiered arrangement with internal 
consociational or power-sharing characteristics, North-South or all Ireland features, as 
well as British-Irish and East-West elements (O'Leary 1998). The Agreement gained 
elite and later dernotic endorsement as 'people not politicians had the last word 2 by 
referenda in Northern Ireland whereby 71 per cent were in favour and in the Republic of 
Ireland 94 per cent favoured the Agreement. 
The successful approval is attributed to the appeal of the Agreement ethos, 
defined by some of its architects as the 'peace dynamic'. 3 From its inception, the 
Agreement was driven by the peace dividend. Defined as a state of security or order free 
from fear, the peace dividend provided a governmental incentive to engage the factional 
elites in exploratory discussions. 4 The first principle of the peace dynamic addresses the 
concerns of identity politics in Northern Ireland and the equality of difference. In the 
Agreement, both traditions in Northern Ireland are ascribed parity; their differences and 
rights are recognised, safeguarded, institutionally reflected and reviewed. The 
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negotiators proposed the appointment of numerous commissions to consider equality, 
policing, human rights and a review of justice and security. Similarly, the Agreement 
accommodated the pressing needs of the within-bloc elites and factions while instituting 
mechanisms to address conflicting aspirations. 
The configuration of the Agreement reflects these objectives. A composite of 
earlier minimal bargains it replicated and combined many of their 'scratched out clauses' 5 
into an all-encompassing Agreement based on three tiers or strands. 6 
The internal or Northern Ireland tier parallels features of the short-lived 1973 
Sunningdale Agreement; the subsequent all-Ireland or North-South tier inherits features 
initially outlined in the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, while the concluding British-Irish or 
East-West tier alludes to elements of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. Elements of 
intervening intergovernmental initiatives to encourage negotiations, such as the Downing 
Street Declaration of 1993 and the Framework Documents of 1995, are included in order 
to create an innovative, multi-layered, all-encompassing arrangement. 
The Agreement was led in the first instance by the British and Irish governments. 
Known as strand three of the GFA, the British-Irish tier of the Agreement reflects the 
intergovernmental relationship and features of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter. The minimal bargain reached between the 
governments as leaders of the British and Irish ethno-national blocs was manifest in the 
GFA as the governments agreed to consider 'the totality of relationships among the 
peoples of these islands. 17 In keeping with the AIA, bilateral co-operation in the British- 
Irish Intergovernmental Conference was renewed and replaced the institutions established 
by the AIA. Elements of the AIA remained, such as the constitutional statement that 
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'there would be no derogation from the sovereignty of either government. ' Some argue 
that the Good Friday Agreement is the fulfilment of the previous 1985 Anglo-Irish 
Agreement (O'Leary 1998: 2). Whereas the AIA had created a moderate but palpable 
degree of mutual dependence between the British and Irish governments, the GFA 
broadened this dynamic to create mutual exchanges and dependency between the 
governments. Intergovernmental relations are outlined in strand three of the Agreement. 
Strand three established a British-Irish Council of the two sovereign governments 
including the devolved governments (of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) with 
powers to meet, delegate functions, and consider common policies. 8 The structure of the 
British-Irish Council emulates the European Council and contains broadly similar 
features of the long-standing Scandinavian Nordic Council (Fanning 1999: 1). It provided 
a forum for increased intergovernmental co-operation and attempted to reassure Unionists 
that the end of the union was not imminent. Avid Unionists feared that the Agreement's 
repeal of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 was a 'stepping stone' towards Irish 
unification. 9 
For Unionists, the British-Irish tier forms a counterweight against the influence of 
the North-South or 'all-Ireland tier' of institutions. The North-South Ministerial Council 
of members from the Irish and Northern Irish executives was forined to address shared, 
all-Ireland, cross-border and European Union (EU) concerns with the capacity to 
implement island-wide changes. The all-Ireland tier was analogous to the Council of 
Ireland proposed in the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 and the Sunningdale 
Agreement's Council of Ireland of 1974, both anathema to Unionists. In order to ease 
Unionists' concerns and enable an all-Ireland implementation of the Council's decisions, 
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an amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution was required. The 
constitutional amendment was initially proposed in discussions held amid the 
Sunningdale negotiations in 1973 and the AIA of 1985 and was finally realised in the 
Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The primacy of the consent issue could no longer be 
contested by Unionists. 
The purpose of the North-South Ministerial Council was twofold. The all-Ireland 
element recognised Northern nationalist affinity with the Republic and hoped to improve 
unionist perceptions of a permanent all-Ireland political component. Wary of the all- 
Ireland tier, Unionists argued for the British-Irish Council to take precedence over the 
North-South Ministerial Council (Fanning 1999: 4, O'Leary 2001: 55,1999: 12). 
However, the governmental decision to maintain the two distinct strands was 
instrumental in creating innovative confederal mechanisms (O'Leary 1999: 12) in the 
second and third tiers of the Agreement (Sisk 2003: 143). 
Strand one, the internal or Northern Ireland tier of the Agreement, revisits features 
of previous power-sharing arrangements. The Sunningdale initiative of 1973 failed 
because of the strength of the unionist veto and the ensuing protests and strikes. The 
collapse of Sunningdale has haunted all subsequent power-sharing proposals and 
explains, by virtue of policy learning, the existence of the overarching institutions created 
in the intergovernmental strands or tiers. 
The features of the Northern Ireland or internal strand are consociational (Lijphart 
1969: 207, O'Leary 1998,1999). Defined as an association of communities, consociation 
is the outcome of a bargain or pact between political leaders of ethnic or religious groups 
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in deeply divided societies (Lustick 1979: 328, O'Leary 1999: 2). Based on four criteria, 
consociationalism requires: 
I. the participation of representatives of all significant groups in the government in 
order to enable cross-community executive power-sharing; 
2. the proportionality principle to serve as the basic standard of political 
representation; 
3. a high degree of community autonomy or self-government; and 
4. minority veto rights to protect their interests (Lijphart 1997: 495). 
The central factor for successful power sharing requires co-operation among elites 
capable of accommodating divergent interests and factional demands with the ability to 
transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival ethno-national 
blocs. The capacity of the elite, in turn, depends on their commitment to the system 
maintenance and recognising the 'perils of political fragmentation' (Lijphart 1969: 216). 
Unlike previous arrangements, the Good Friday Agreement engaged the spectrum 
of political actors in Northern Ireland. The Agreement includes within-bloc factional 
elites and political actors previously excluded from negotiations because of their 
Republican or Loyalist paramilitary affiliations. Sinn Hin, the Progressive unionist Party 
and the Ulster Democratic Party were allowed to participate subject to criteria outlined in 
the interim Downing Street Declaration of 1993 (O'Duffy 1995: 767). 10 The 
consociational feature of the Agreement principally required the inclusion of elite 
representatives from the majority of the competing groups. While problematic, the 
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inclusive nature of the dynamic was maintained, although at intervals factional elites 
were either excluded or left in protest only to renew their involvement later. 
The incentive for factional elites to remain involved in the negotiations was to 
seize the opportunity to participate in a Northern Irish power-sharing executive 
Assembly, with a dual premiership jointly elected by way of a parallel consent 
mechanism. A consummate example of the way in which mechanisms can be instituted 
to regulate factional elites was the parallel consent mechanism devised to encourage 
Unionists and Nationalists to nominate a candidate from their tradition or bloc acceptable 
to a majority of the other bloc's elite (O'Leary 1999: 4). The aim of parallel majority 
voting and similar devices involves creating elite co-operation and making it routine. 
Consociational features of power-sharing, proportionality, autonomy and veto necessitate 
proportional representation in electoral systems and can create procedural incentives, 
such as access to ministerial positions by virtue of the d'Hondt allocation formula, 
whereby parties have the right to nominate ministers according to their respective 
strength in seats (O'Leary 1999: 4). " All of these features create incentives to induce 
factional elites to participate in the arrangement. The same mechanisms, however, may 
not convince supporters that elite accommodation is acceptable. 
As the Sunningdale Agreement illustrates, the discretion of the elites is 
constrained by mass support and the degree of mobilisation of the bloc membership, in 
sum the elasticity of the bloc membership influenced the monopoly of autonomy of the 
leadership. Mobilisation of the bloc against the bloc leadership renders any bargain 
vulnerable to the influence of the populace (Tsebelis 1990: 159). The inclusive, 
comprehensive and multilayered nature of the Agreement was designed to minimise this 
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problem. The Agreement included not only an array of within-bloc factional elites but 
also facets of previous limited bargains, creating a tiered agreement in order not to 
succumb to previous agreement perils. The numbering of the strands reflecting their 
political magnitude, with strand three dependent upon the success of strand one. If strand 
one succeeds democratic institutions in Northern Ireland will succeed, if however strand 
one fails or stalls then strand three will resume as central to the governance of Northern 
Ireland (Fanning 1999: 5) 
The Agreement was premised upon recognising and incorporating features of the 
three crucial factors that had previously influenced the positions and negotiating 
preferences of the ethnic bloc elites as well as the minimal or maximal nature of the 
agreements reached. A pioneering feature of the Agreement is the attempt to create a 
comprehensive bargain, with its attempts to encompass, and in so doing, attempts to 
regulate, the three dynamics within its parameters. The inclusive nature of the agreement 
is influenced by the configuration of the ethnic blocs, the traditional accommodation of 
elites in each bloc and the nature of external resource dependence. 
240 
6.3 The configuration of actors and intra-group structure of the 
British bloc 
The 1997 Westminster general election altered the configuration of the British- unionist 
bloc and returned a 'new' Labour party to power after eighteen years in opposition, 
creating a new impetus for revisiting issues related to Northern Ireland. The previous 
government's initiatives had electoral consequences for the Northern Ireland parties. By 
way of an electoral pact between both parties, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) won ten 
seats and the Democratic unionist Party (DUP) won two. A further unionist seat was won 
by the United Kingdom unionist Party (UKUP); formerly members of the UUP, the 
UKUP opposed participating in negotiations involving the leadership of the Republican 
movement, Sinn Hin. 12 The nationalist won three seats. Sinn Hin retrieved a seat it had 
lost to the SDLP in 1992 and acquired a second seat previously won by the unionist DUP. 
Sinn Hin's electoral support increased despite its abstentionist policy at Westminster. 
Less than a year after winning the general election with a resounding 418 seats in 
Westminster, Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair had overseen the signing of the Good 
Friday Agreement. He later described it as 'a brave undertaking and a vast one [ ... ] Only 
in the first flush of a new Government could we have contemplated it. ' 13 The new Prime 
Minister had greater leadership autonomy and was unencumbered by the tentative 
majority of his Conservative predecessor John Major who, by the end of his tenure, was 
beholden to Unionists for parliamentary support. Consequently, as unionist influence at 
Westminster began to wane, unrestricted by centrifagal competition to which the 
Conservative party was bound, the incumbent Labour leadership used its autonomy to 
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initiate an inter-ethnic bargain with the British-Unionist bloc's enduring rival, the 
incumbent Irish bloc elite, the Irish government. 
Endowed with a parliamentary majority and an array of party advisors, the new 
Labour government altered the political and administrative features of the British bloc. 
The Prime Minister appointed Marjorie (Mo) Mowlarn as Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland. Much to the envy of her predecessors, Dr Mowlarn swiftly succeeded in winning 
favour with the media and many of people of Northern Ireland. 14 The Secretary of State, 
with Paul Murphy as junior minister, Bill Geoffreys from the Northern Ireland Office 
(NIO) and Jonathan Stephen and Jonathan Sawyer from the Cabinet Office, were 
responsible for negotiating with the Irish government. The Prime Minister also selected 
his chief of staff and political appointee Jonathan Powell to the small negotiating team, a 
position heretofore filled in British-Irish negotiations by the incumbent cabinet secretary 
(Richard Wilson). While important, these innovations in government, however, were not 
implemented in time to create the Agreement anew. The result of torturous discussion 
and negotiations, which preceded the Labour government's initiative, the Agreement was 
initially shaped under the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John 
Major in the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. 
For its part, the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) also shaped the actor configuration 
of the British bloc by regulating the influence of Unionism within the bloc. After 
rejecting and lobbying against the AIA, the unionist leadership of the UUP and DUP 
finally relented in the face of continued governmental support for the AIA and an 
increase in within-bloc schismatic factional competition between unionist factions, 
despite the maintenance of the joint electoral pact (Cochrane 1997: 174). The cost of 
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unionist intransigence became clear after the 1987 general election. The UUP lost a 
substantial share of the overall vote and two seats, one of which was Enoch Powell's, a 
friend and ally of Prime Minister Thatcher, who lost his seat to the SDLP. 
Nineteen months after the AIA was signed, the unionist party leaders met with the 
then Secretary of State Tom King for 'talks about talks' (Bew and Gillespie 1999: 209, 
Bloomfield 1997: 104). In 1988, Unionists established a joint-party policy think tank in 
order to draft alternative proposals to the AIA. The first proposed broadening the remit 
of the AIA to include the rest of the United Kingdom and rid Northern Ireland of its 
exclusivity. A subsequent proposal for a devolved Assembly elected by plurality was 
described as 'a grandiose county council without executive powers' (Cochrane 1997: 
245). 15 Tom King, however, was preoccupied with an escalation in the British 
government's tactics for curtailing Republican paramilitary activity (English 2003: 253). 
The IRA bombing in Enniskillen on Remembrance Day in 1987 heightened British 
security concerns (Geraghty 1998: 214). As well as allegations of British security force 
collusion with Loyalist paramilitaries' 6 amid the Loughall and Gibraltar operations 
(Bolton 1990), the Milltown cemetery attack, and the subsequent lynching of two soldiers 
(English 2003: 258). At the same time, two initiatives were made by Republicans: Sinn 
Hin addressed a secret letter to the British government questioning its intent and the 
reply received outlined the British government's interests in Northern Ireland. The 
second initiative involved IRA plans to assassinate Mr King. Amid these events, the 
Secretary of State was unmoved by unionist proposals to abolish the AIA (Moloney 
2002: 250). 
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Within-bloc factional divisions became evident as unionist relations with the 
Conservative government soured and by 1989, unionist Members of Parliament (MPs) 
ceased communication with junior minister Brian Mawhinney, even on constituency 
issues. 17 The open competition between the Conservative party and the unionist parties 
illustrated the lack of consensus within the British-Unionist bloc and the failure of 
traditional elite accommodatory mechanisms of inclusive co-operation among members 
of the Conservative and unionist parties. The combined unionist leadership of the UUP 
and the DUP were prepared to consider proposals made prior to the AIA, but called for 
the suspension of the AIA as a precursor to further discussions. The desire of leaders 
Molyneaux (UUP) and Paisley (DUP) to participate in discussions was plain. Both 
parties refused to participate in the three-year AIA review, but did, however, join with the 
SDLP, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland and Brian Mawhinney in a failed attempt to 
design a formula for inter-party discussions, initiated by the German lawyer Eberhard 
Spiecker at Duisburg. The unionist elite leaders were agreed on a commitment to 
negotiate an alternative to the AIA. 
The position of Unionists within the configuration of the British-Unionist bloc 
had altered as they elevated their Anti-Agreement tactic into a principle and 'marched 
into a cul de sac'. 18 The unionist proposals included a suspension of the IGC meetings 
and the secretariat at Maryfield. The unionist parties aimed to renew their leadership 
standing; it was at the British government's discretion whether to honour the unionist 
proposals. 19 Not until March 1991, when the IGC and the secretariat were suspended in 
order to allow discussions to begin, were the Unionists leaders' terms addressed and they 
were allowed to march out of their cul de sac 'with drums beating and pipes playing'. 
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Their self-respect, if not their veto preserved, they were 'allowed to come out 
honourably'. 20 The unionist elites' response to the AIA illustrates the decline of 
collective unionist influence as a regulator or constraining force on British government 
policy over Northern Ireland. 
The appointment of Peter Brooke to the position of Secretary of State in July 1989 
enabled the Unionists to reorient their position. Despite Margaret Thatcher's desire to 
manage rather than innovate in Northern Ireland, Brooke's first hundred days in office 
involved meeting with the leaders of all political parties, excluding Sinn Hin 
(Bloomfield 1997: 96). After consultation with the parties, Peter Brooke asserted that 
subject to an end to violence, negotiations with Sinn Hin could not be ruled OUt. 21 Unlike 
his predecessors, the new Secretary of State advocated consultation and consensual 
interdepartmental decision-making over Northern Ireland. Brooke was assisted by 
Richard Needham, Undersecretary of State for Northern Ireland, civil servants Ian Bums, 
Michael Lullock, Oliver Letwin and Andy Wood, as well as Ken Bloomfield in the NIO 
and Oliver Miles fon-ner ambassador to Libya, as diplomatic advisor. 22 
British-Irish intergovernmental relations improved as an inquiry was established 
to address the issue of British security collusion with loyalist paramilitaries. In January 
1990, in a speech in Bangor, Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State called for the parties 
in Northern Ireland to negotiate and proposed devolving 'some degree of political power, 
23 authority and responsibility to Northern Ireland'. Brooke also authorised the resumption 
of covert communications with Irish Republicans: Sinn Hin renewed contacts with the 
British government through British intelligence officer Michael Oakley. 24 
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The Secretary of State's pivotal speech on Northern Ireland was delivered to the 
fruit importers of Great Britain. Known as the Wbitbread speech, Peter Brooke stated 
that the British government had no 'selfish strategic or economic interest' in Northern 
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Ireland . The statement later referred to as the 'neutrality' speech represented a formal 
shift in the British government's Northern Ireland policy. The delivery of the speech 
outside Northern Ireland resulted in a delay in the unionist party leaders' response. The 
speech in effect was a public response to the questions posed in the secret exchange 
between the Sinn Hin leadership and the British Government (Moloney 2002: 276). The 
importance of the statement was endorsed shortly afterward with a shift in British actor 
constellation. Long despised by Republicans because of her response to the 1981 hunger 
strike, Margaret Thatcher's resignation altered the British government dynamic. It 
heralded a change in Conservative party leader and Prime Minister, as well as the public 
change in established British policy towards Northern Ireland as expressed in Peter 
Brooke's statement necessarily altered the configuration of the British bloc and the 
landscape of Anglo-Irish political relations. Fruitful advances were made in the brief 
period between the appointment of John Major as Prime Minister, in which British 
government leadership autonomy was greatest and the subsequent 1992 general election. 
The British government, by virtue of the Brooke statement, had changed the 
nature of its advocacy over Northern Ireland. While still the recognised and legitimate 
leader of the British bloc and guarantor of the union, the British government statement 
had altered its relationship with the Northern Irish unionist parties: ' [T]o Unionists, in 
short, Brooke represented both sponsor and betrayer, simultaneously on their side as 
British ruler and in opposition to them as partner with the enemy, a complicated view 
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exacerbated by the internal train of their attempts to present a united front to him 
(Bloomfield 1997: 104). 
The British government, while not 'neutral', now had the leadership latitude to choose 
rather than be obliged to stand as proxy representatives for unionist factional elites as the 
fear of a centrifugal shift towards unionist positions were curtailed. The government was 
no longer beholden to the unionist veto constraining its Northern Ireland policy. The 
intra-group configuration of the British bloc had altered. Equally, in the interim period 
between the AIA and the Good Friday Agreement the configuration and intra-group 
structure of the Irish bloc underwent changes, which are considered in the next section. 
The Good Friday Agreement is unlike the AIA. It is an inclusivist, 
comprehensive bargain, and it attempts to; consider core conflict concerns, attain at best a 
settlement or, at least a transition to settlement to the problem of Northern Ireland's 
divided society. The merits of this type of agreement is that it becomes the motivator and 
dynamic for implementation and it is a continual bargain, that is, a marriage-like pact, as 
the parties to the Agreement commit themselves to maintaining the arrangement for 
better or worse. 
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6.4 The configuration and intra-group structure of the Irish bloc 
Akin to its British counterpart, the Irish coalition government responsible for the Good 
Friday Agreement had not been in government a year prior to the Good Friday 
Agreement. The Fianna Fail coalition with the Progressive Democratic Party was 
reached after the 1997 election in which Sinn Fdin won its first Dail seat. The new Irish 
government had defeated a 'rainbow coalition' of Fine Gael, Labour and the Democratic 
Left, created after the collapse of the 1992 Fianna Fail-Labour government. 
The 1997 government was led by Taoiseach Bertie Ahern. Charles Haughey's 
preferred successor in 1992, Ahem waited until 1994 to become party leader and 
inherited the mantle of the 'pan-Nationalist bloc' leader. Pan-nationalism by this time 
included Sinn Fdin , as the consequences of the Ballot Box and Armalite policy had been 
instituted and Sinn Fdin were increasingly perceived as being less unequivocal 
Republicans than the hard Nationalists courtesy of a change in Sinn F6in policy in 
1987 . 
26 Unlike the political 'merry-go-round' experienced in the Republic of Ireland the 
configuration of the Northern Nationalists and Republicans remained relatively constant. 
Changes referred to policy rather than individual factional elite changes. The AIA had 
been influential in a shift in Sinn Fdin leadership policy (Moloney 2002: 267). The 
Agreement also imposed a change in Fianna Fail party policy. Prior to the 1987, election 
Charles Haughey had advocated a renegotiation of the AIA if elected. Fianna Fall 
subsequently won 81 of the 166 seats in the Dail. As a minority government under 
pressure from the Fine Gael opposition, it was reluctant to renegotiate the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement and instead resolved to recognise Ireland's international agreements and 
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participate with the British government in the IGC and the Maryfield secretariat . The 
animosity between Charles Haughey and Prime Minister Thatcher notwithstanding, the 
government 'drew a line under the Agreement and worked it' (Mansergh 1995). 28 Fianna 
Fail's Northern Ireland position was shaped and determined by Martin Mansergh, an 
appointed special advisor to the Taoiseach and all subsequent Fianna Fail Taoisigh. 
Mansergh was influential in changing the policy of 'condemnation and exclusivity' 
towards Sinn Fdin , establishing principles of self-determination and consent that would 
be amenable to Republicans (Rafter 2003). Mansergh was also responsible for co- 
ordinating the Irish government's response to a Sinn Hin leadership discussion document 
on the future of Northern Ireland . 
29 The document originated from discussions between 
Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn F6in, and Father Alex Reid, a Catholic priest and 
mediator from Belfast. The Reid-Adams discussions and subsequent document signalled 
a shift in the position of Sinn F6in leadership. Fr. Reid had previously communicated 
with Haughey while opposition leader in 1986. Fianna Fail's return to government 
allowed for the subsequent step in the Reid-Adams initiative. The document they 
formulated was endorsed by the Redemptorist religious order in Ireland and outlined 
features for discussion, a political settlement and, crucially, the Sinn F6in leadership's 
terms for a Republican ceasefire (Maloney 2002: 269). 
The Catholic Church as an influential external or third party endorsed what 
became known as the Reid-Adams proposals for an all-nationalist bloc, including Fianna 
Fail and Sinn 176in in the first instance. The proposal resembled an inclusive as opposed 
to exclusive New Ireland Forum to agree on a common policy over Northern Ireland, 
aimed at encouraging militarist Republicans to consider an 'alternative method' to armed 
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struggle (Maloney 2002: 270 ). 30 Paradoxically perceived as both an 'abandonment of the 
principles of the AIA' and a 'paralleling of the features of the AIA', the Reid-Adams 
proposals allowed supporters and decriers of the previous Agreement to claim victory. 31 
However, the new Republican initiative was potentially perilous for Gerry Adams as the 
incumbent Sinn F6in leader. Both the series of questions addressed to the then British 
Secretary of State Tom King and the Reid proposals to the Taoiseach were the enterprise 
of Gerry Adams. If revealed, they would be politically damaging to his leadership of 
Sinn 176in . 
Similarly, for the Taoiseach to communicate with Sinn F6in as the recognised 
leadership of the Republican movement was equally precarious. As a result of his 
association with the Arms Trial in 1970 (Kelly 1999), Haughey was disinclined to meet 
with Gerry Adams. 32 Instead, the SDLP leader John Hume was suggested as an 
appropriate surrogate. Hume's credibility conveyed legitimacy to the initiative later 
known as the Hume-Adams dialogue. 33 The dialogue altered the traditional schismatic 
competition between the SDLP and Sinn F6in as the leaders of both parties discussed the 
goals of Northern Irish Nationalism. 34 Unknown to the SDLP leader, he served not solely 
as a dialogue partner with Adams and Reid but also as a proxy for the Fianna Fail 
government. Previous tentative discussions between Hume and Adams had been held in 
secret whereas the new dialogue between the two leaders of Northern Irish Nationalism 
and Republicanism was deliberately public. The SDLP provided an air of 'constitutional' 
nationalist credibility to Sinn 176in. The incremental shift in Sinn 176in's policy began 
with a change of leadership in 1981 and was secured when the Sinn F6in Ard Fheis 
overturned the policy of abstention to the Dail in 1986. When the Northern Irish party 
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elites met in Duisburg in October 1988 to discuss devolution proposals, the elites were 
aware that while Sinn Hin was excluded, Father Alex Reid attended to present the view 
of its leadership (Maloney 2002: 281). 
The new Northern Nationalist-Republican dialogue temporarily raised 
expectations, which were subsequently constrained with the escalation of IRA violence. 
The weapons acquired by the militarists within the Republican movement from Libya 35 
had escalated the level of conflict and intensified the issue of security. As Sinn Hin 
began its political charm offensive, the militarists in the Republican movement began 
what was described as their 'Tet Offensive'. 36 The violence escalated with the 
Enniskillen bombing on Remembrance Day in 1987 and was followed by a substantial 
seizure of IRA weapons by the Irish police. The violence escalated in tandem with the 
'dirty war', as the question of British security collusion with loyalists was raised in the 
midst of allegations of an RUC 'shoot to kill' policy. The incidents of March 1988 
(Loughgall, Gibraltar, Milltown Cemetery), along with the first IRA bomb in Britain 
since the AIA, curtailed any notion of a pan-Nationalist initiative. With no end to 
violence in sight, the impetus for public dialogue diminished. The SDLP and the Irish 
government independently concluded public pan-Nationalist dialogue (Mansergh 1995: 
153 ). 37 Without an IRA ceasefire, the dialogue undeservedly ascribed greater political 
legitimacy to Sinn Hin. Ending the discourse publicly would, it was argued, create a 
renewed impetus for the Sinn Hin leadership to rein in Republican militarists. The 
rationale was not altruistic; the respective leaders of constitutional Nationalism and the 
SDLP, in particular, were conscious that their willingness to afford credibility to the Sinn 
Hin leadership would impact their own status. 
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The SDLP leader John Hume was subject to criticism from the party for engaging 
in dialogue with Sinn Fdin. 38 Divisions arose with members of the SDLP who were 
opposed to discussions with Sinn 176in amid ongoing Republican violence (Murray 1998: 
175). The sceptics within the SDLP feared Sinn Fdin would accrue legitimacy, status and 
votes at the expense of the SDLP (Mitchell, O'Leary and Evans 2001: 725), leaving it in 
the unenviable position of 'the prodigal son's brother'. 39 From its inception, the SDLP 
has been an amalgamation of imprimatur factions and a coalition of positions, of 'reds 
and greens' represented by members of the leadership (Tonge and Evans 2001). The 
transparency of the Hume-Adams dialogue created contradictory bloc membership 
perceptions of the party. It was viewed as simultaneously lacking unanimity when 
compared with the cohesive front presented by the joint UUP/DUP unionist leadership 
40 but nevertheless managed to 'negotiate as a monolith' . 
These internal pervasive factional dynamics of the respective Northern Irish 
parties only became evident in 1991 as the preliminary discussions for the Secretary of 
State's proposed series of inter-party talks commenced. The structure of the discussions, 
later forming the basis for the Good Friday Agreement, was divided into three areas or 
strands of negotiation: strand one was concerned with internal Northern Ireland 
governance, strand two with Northern Irish and Republic of Ireland relations, and strand 
three with the British-Irish relationship. Unionists were averse to any Irish government 
role in Northern Irish affairs and attempted to regulate its influence with preconditions. 
As the sole Northern nationalist party in the process, the SDLP successfully curtailed 
unionist preconditions which attempted to exclude the Irish government from strand one 
of the discussions. The SDLP argued that the unionist proposals to include Dublin after 
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the internal strand one features of the discussions were agreed would resuscitate the 
unionist veto and thwart progress on the second strand. The SDLP and the Dublin 
government responded by threatening to withdraw from the discussions in July of 1990. 
The Brooke talks attempted to initiate negotiations between the constitutional 
parties and review relations within Northern Ireland, relations between Northern Ireland 
and the Irish Republic and relations between the UK as a whole and the Republic of 
Ireland (Guelke 1995: 120). The Brooke initiative was, however, undermined by an Irish 
constitutional question. The Irish Supreme Court held that Article I of the AIA was not 
in conflict with Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution. Justice Barrington asserted that 
Articles 2 and 3 were not 'aspirational' but rather constitutionally imperative .4' The 
decision was made in response to a legal action taken by two members of the UUP 
(Owen 1994: 129). The subsequent refusal of the Supreme Court to extradite two 
Republicans to Northem Ireland succeeded only in antagonising existing unionist and 
British government grievances with the Irish government. Eventually, a series of 
deadlines were choreographed in order to mediate conflicting preconditions, and the 
Brooke initiative was announced in March 1991. 
The Irish government's involvement gained impetus in June 1991 in discussions 
over the North-South dimension, strand two. The Taoiseach engaged the assistance of 
Den-not Nally who had led the Irish negotiations over the AIA as well as Noel Dorr and 
Sean O'Huiginn from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). In the midst of 
deadlock, Irish Foreign Minister Gerry Collins suggested the governments threaten to 
impose an agreement on the Northern Ireland parties should they fail to resolve the 
difficulties over strand two. The proposal altered the agency of the governments 
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attributing a new role in the process. As the governments of the respective states within 
which the ethnic blocs affiliated, the role of the governments had previously been as 
representatives of the respective blocs. 
The threat to impose an agreement on the factional elite representatives of the 
blocs within Northern Ireland fashioned a new role for the governments as custodians or 
the blocs as well as guarantor of any agreement creating governmental distance from the 
blocs' representatives. The new relationship forged between the governments altered the 
nature of the enduring rivalry (Diehl and Goetz 2003: 19) previously characterised as the 
clashing of the state representatives over the shared protracted conflict. The document 
outlining the ultimatum contained the words 'after long discussion with our Irish 
colleagues'. The phrase implied a degree of intergovernmental co-operation antagonistic 
to Unionists. They responded by undennining the position of Peter Brooke and 
protesting directly to the Prime Minister. Bypassing the Secretary of State and accessing 
the Prime Minister temporarily weakened the thrust of the initiative and set a precedent 
for prime ministerial involvement in Northern Irish negotiations. 42 
In the course of efforts to restore the Brooke initiative, however, the Irish 
government received a draft summary of renewed discussions between the leaders of the 
SDLP and Sinn F6in. The document was reviewed by Irish civil servants and advisors, 
and Taoiseach Charles Haughey proposed the 'Draft 2' document to British Prime 
Minister John Major at the Anglo-Irish summit in December 1991. The document 
established the draft terrns of a joint declaration of government intent on the future of 
Northern Ireland. 
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The configuration of the Irish bloc changed in February 1992 when Charles 
Haughey resigned as Taoiseach and Fianna Fail leader amid allegations of phone tapping 
(Collins 2000: 220-5). The change in the Fianna Fail leadership was welcomed. 
Unencumbered by a history associated with Republicanism, his successor, Albert 
Reynolds, was better able to engage in dialogue with Sinn I'din. However, as the 
configuration of the Irish bloc incumbent leader changed so too did the leadership of the 
British bloc. 
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6.5 Elite accommodation and the nature of support in the British bloc 
Conservative Prime Minister Major's willingness to address personally the concerns of 
the combined unionist leadership over the wording of the Brooke and Collins ultimatum 
increased as the Conservative party's share of Westminster seats declined. In the 1992 
election, the Conservative party secured a 21-seat majority, leaving the government 
vulnerable to votes of no confidence. Consequently, the centrifugal shift on the 
Conservatives led Major's British government to reorient its position to accommodate 
unionist concerns. The election also served to reconfigure the Northern Ireland segment 
of the Nationalist-Republican bloc of Sinn Hin and the SDLP, as Sinn Hin lost the West 
Belfast seat to the SDLP. The post-election cabinet reshuffle replaced Peter Brooke with 
the security-oriented Attorney General Patrick Mayhew as Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland. The Brooke initiative was resurrected and renamed the 
Brooke/Mayhew initiative and the IGC was suspended at the behest of unionist party 
leaders in order to allow renewed talks. The British administration remained the same 
with Robin Butler the cabinet secretary responsible for dealing and negotiating with Irish 
civil servants. Patrick Mayhew relied principally on John Semple, Jonathan Stevens, 
David Hill, John Chilcot), and in particular, Northern Ireland civil servant John 
McConnell during his role as Secretary of State. 43 
Amid increasing violence in Northern Ireland, the Brooke/Mayhew initiative 
continued apace on strands two and three, despite deadlock on strand one. Meetings 
convened in London and Belfast amid the leaking of position papers and documents that 
repeatedly threatened to end the initiative. 
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In September 1992, the proposals for the draft strand one documents were leaked 
prior to the parties' scheduled meeting in Dublin. Rather than meet in Dublin to discuss 
Northern Irish concerns, the DUP withdrew from the discussions, reiterating its call for 
an Irish constitutional amendment on Articles 2 and 3. The UUP leadership conceded to 
Mayhew's requests to involve itself in the Dublin discussion, keen to curtail SDLP 
proposals to adopt an EU model for strand one. The division over the Dublin meeting 
distinguished the unionist party leadership of the UUP and the DUP emphasising the 
44 divided and open competition between the two unionist parties . The unionist pact, 
however, resumed after the Dublin conference and both parties collaborated and 
withdrew from the discussions in November, bringing the process to a halt. After the 
inter-party talks ceased, the British government addressed Republican concerns overtly 
but indirectly. 
In December of 1992, the Secretary of State gave a speech alluding to the removal 
of soldier foot patrols and the possibility of discussion with Sinn 176in if there were a 
cessation of IRA violence. The speech was regarded as 'the most significant recognition 
45 
of the case of traditional Irish nationalism' (Keatinge 1992: 84). By April 1993, the 
British government initiated contact with the IRA in a document establishing parameters 
of its position (Moloney 2002: 406). 46 The IRA response to the British government 
(mirrored in a communication to the Taoiseach) deviated from the Reid-Adams initiative 
and reiterated previous IRA Army Council claims for a definitive date for British 
withdrawal from Northern Ireland (Mallie and McKittrick 1996: 174). 47 
The two governments were wooing the Republican movement while Sinn Hin 
and the IRA Army Council were advocating conflicting positions regarding the issue of 
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British withdrawal. Conversely, the unionist elites' abilities were constrained. The 
British government's attention had been directed towards escalating violence and 
increasing schismatic competition between loyalist paramilitaries. 48 It became evident 
that mainstream unionist concerns had been marginalised. 
Unionist influence decreased after the inter-party dialogue ceased. The Secretary 
of State's assertion that the government's role on Northern Ireland's position within the 
UK was 'neutral' was, for many, a reiteration of the Brooke speech. Nevertheless, it 
exacerbated unionist fears. 49 The magnitude of the unionist role in the British bloc was 
endorsed when Prime Minister John Major, 'holding on by his fingernails' to a fractious 
Conservative party, relied on unionist support for his survival in a vote of no confidence 
over the Maastricht Treaty in July 1993.50 The Unionists buttressed the government in 
return for concessions, including a Northern Ireland select committee, and the 
government's commitment to the consent principle. The reorientation of the unionist 
party elites and its support for the government were to be short lived. British government 
communication with Republicans was revealed and later confinned by Sinn I'din in 1993 
and promptly denied by the Secretary of State. The explanation for the Republican link 
was attributed to 'an agent or official [ ... 
] making suggestions without authority'. 51 In 
September 1993, Hume and Adams revealed they had concluded their discussions and 
forwarded their proposals to the Irish government as John Hume revealed in the House of 
52 Commons. The British government was now vulnerable to backbench Conservative 
criticism from the Conservative faction and lobbyist group called Friends of the Union, 
making it increasingly susceptible to pervasive factionalism within the party and shifting 
parliamentary support. Unable to sustain a government with the support of the opposition 
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alone the Government realigned itself with its unionist supporters predominantly from the 
UUP. The centrifugal pressure on the Government had increased and the latitude of the 
government to advocate its new role as part bloc representative part custodian of the 
process curtailed. 
In the midst of preparing the final drafts of the Joint or Downing Street 
Declaration between the two governments, and immediately prior to the summit, a new 
document was presented which 'intended to change the whole thrust of the initiative'. 53 
Described as a 'Unionist document inspired by unionist susceptibilities, ' it emerged as 
the Prime Minister consulted with UUP leader James Molyneaux over proposals for the 
joint declaration . 
54 The 'Blueprint' document threatened the integrity of the 
intergovernmental initiative. This first new document as opposed to a position or 
response paper initiated by the British government and drafted by the NIO, it was 
however proposed by the Prime Minister's private secretary, Roderic Lyne. 55 The British 
perceived the document as providing a 'useful negotiating device in helping to focus the 
long and tortuous negotiations [ ... ] and move them forward towards a conclusion'. 
56 
The document enraged the Irish government negotiators, undermining the work 
of the previous six months of intensive negotiation. The Irish negotiators rejected the 
proposal outright. 57 At a subsequent meeting of the Prime Minister and Taoiseach, after a 
colourful exchange that threatened the genesis of the British-Irish initiative, the Unionist- 
58 inspired British Blueprint document was finally marginalised. The document and its 
timing were onerous; it signalled the modification of the Prime Minister's policy position 
in response to his increasing dependence on unionist support (Cochrane 1997: 3 04). 
259 
The British Blueprint document was symptomatic of the government's 
vulnerability to centrifugal forces within the Briti sh- Unionist bloc and its elastic 
parliamentary support as well as a bureaucratic administration sympathetic to unionist 
perspectives. The government did not seek to 'run a different policy from that of the NIO 
- which would have been counter-productive and out of keeping with the collegiate style 
of the Major government and the very close personal relationship between John Major 
and Paddy Mayhew'. 59 John Major's collegiate style assisted by his history as party whip, 
failed to abate the rebelling and fractured Conservative parliamentary party as 
backbenchers and others continued to threaten the government's survival by way of a 
campaign of leaking documents relating to Northern Ireland. 60 
The objective of the Declaration had been inclusive, its goal to draw the anti- 
system parties in particular Sinn Hin into the constitutional politics; Republican leaders 
were not convinced of British intentions (Adams 1997: 36, English 2003: 272). 
The governments' Joint Framework Documents of February 1995, drafted after 
the successful signing of the Downing Street Declaration (DSD), and information 
concerning the first IRA ceasefire, were also leaked. Unionist sympathisers within the 
Conservative party became increasingly proactive after the DSD was signed as few had 
anticipated the possibility of an IRA ceasefire .6' The 'tendentious' leak of the Framework 
Documents attributed to Viscount Cranborne, a member of the Cabinet subcommittee on 
Northern Ireland, further damaged the fragile status of the Major government. 62 
Additional Intergovernmental initiatives for all party negotiations were already 
complicated by the DUP boycott of any negotiations involving Sinn Hin irrespective of 
IRA and other paramilitary ceasefire activities. The failure of John Major's claim to 
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'cherish Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom' to induce the DUP to 
participate was attributed to the Framework document's appeal to 'the head rather than 
63 
the heart' . 
Following the Framework Document leak, in March the Secretary of State 
unilaterally revealed conditions for paramilitary-affiliated parties to enter into the 
proposed negotiations. 64 The conditions required a willingness to disann, an agreed 
means of disarming and the relinquishment of some weapons as a prelude to entering into 
negotiations. Mayhew's decision to disclose the issue of 'decommissioning' was a result 
of Unionist, parliamentary and Cabinet constraints; the so-called Washington conditions 
65 
were 'issued under strong instructions from [the] Cabinet' . Only two members of the 
Cabinet, however, were advocates of pursuing the Northern Ireland initiative towards 
multi-party negotiations. The ability of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State to 
act on the proposals and initiate the resumption of talks in Northern Ireland was 
constrained by the orientation of Conservative and unionist factional elites and an elastic 
support base; as a result, leadership proposals on Northern Ireland were 'gravely 
handicapped by numbers'. 66 Unlike the change in the nature of traditional elite 
accommodation within the British-Unionist bloc, which arise from a series of often subtle 
pervasive shifts, alterations in the nature of elite accommodation in the Irish bloc are 
more transparent. 
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6.6 Elite accommodation and the nature of the Irish bloc 
The 1992 Irish general election produced the first Fianna Fail-Labour party coalition 
government led by Fianna Fail's Albert Reynolds with 68 seats and Labour leader and 
Unaiste Dick Spring with 33 seats. This amounted to Labour's strongest electoral 
endorsement ever. Fianna Fail's coalition experience had been solely with the 
Progressive Democrats and it was unaccustomed to sharing power gracefully (Girvin 
1993: 4). The Labour party had negotiated the AIA in coalition with Fine Gael and was 
well versed in British-Irish intergovernmental negotiations. The strong Labour 
representation in the Ddil, as well as Dick Spring's proposition, made prior to the 
election, of rotating the position of Taoiseach, all marked changes of political parameters 
(Collins 1992: 18 0). 67 
Administratively, the introduction of party programme managers altered the 
relationship between civil servants and politicians. Fianna Fail selected fonner civil 
servants whereas Labour's programme managers were appointed from within the party. 
The new government retained Martin Mansergh, Sean O'Huiggin, Sean Donlon, Tim 
Dalton 68 and Den-not Nally. Labour introduced Fergus Finlay as programme manager for 
the DFA. The programme manager system altered relations between politicians and civil 
servants as well as improving relations inter-departmentally, negating previous animosity 
between the Taoiseach's office and the DFA . 
69 The distinguishing feature of this 
government was the versatility exhibited by the junior coalition partner. After the 
eventual collapse of the Reynolds government, the Labour party leadership countered the 
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tendency for its 'rainbow' coalition partners to reorient government policy regarding 
70 Northern Ireland . 
Once the coalition agreed in January 1993, the Taoiseach addressed the issue of 
resuming the Brooke/Mayhew initiative with Prime Minister Major. 71 The first 
complexity for the Labour coalition members arose when confronted with the 'profound 
changes in the fifteen years out of office'. 72 The renewed government dialogue with 
Republicans suggested that the central ethos behind the AIA had been a stratagem, a 
strengthening of constitutional nationalism to marginalise extreme nationalism contrived 
73 to leave 'paramilitaries to wither on the vine' . The Labour party's difficulty with the 
AIA had been its exclusion of Unionism and the subsequent fears it engendered for 
Unionists. In 1988, in New York, the Labour leader's call for a suspension and 
amendment of the AIA to include Unionists had been poorly received, although it formed 
the basis of the subsequent dialogue. 74 Having adhered to the spirit of the AIA in 
opposition, in government it was revealed that the policy advocated aimed to achieve the 
opposite of the prescribed objective of the AIA. The aim was to reorient Republicanism 
in the Irish bloc and 'place paramilitaries in the fold'. 75 
The process was orchestrated so that the separate initiatives of Hume-Adams, the 
British Government with Republicans, the Irish government and Hume-Adams, British- 
Irish discussions, and the multi-party dialogue process could all be synchromsed. In 
March 1993, Tdnaiste Dick Spring called for the resumption of the Brooke/Mayhew 
dialogue. The Hume-Adams discourse was promptly revealed after John Hume agreed 
to endorse the subsequent Hume-Adams document, hesitating on a paragraph pressing 
for a timeframe for British withdrawal. The inclusion of the Army Council inspired 
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paragraph persuaded their unofficial suspension of military actions in Britain (Moloney 
2002: 411). The Irish government delivered the proposals, vacillating over the same 
phrase on withdrawal of the British government. The British government, in turn, 
rejected it on the nature of the wording on the issue of consent and the basis of the date 
for British withdrawal. John Hume's subsequent statement in the House of Commons 
summarised elements of the proposals for the House and appealed for reconsideration by 
both governments. In so doing, Hume challenged not only the British leadership but also 
the Irish government, posing a challenge to the leader of the pan-Nationalist block and 
the SDLP partner. Both governments reverted to drafting a Joint Declaration 'weaving 
[the] logic of words around the contested area of consent'. 76 
Unionists and Loyalists, fearing a threat to their constitutional position as the 
initiatives were revealed, reacted to the Hume-Adams initiative differently. The Hume- 
Adams dialogue and revelation of British government communication channels with 
Republicans were met with an escalation in Loyalist paramilitary violence in Northern 
Ireland. The IRA retaliated and a wave of atrocities ensued amid ongoing 
intergovernmental dialogue and discussion over the best way to address the issue of 
consent and constitutional questions. 77 To allay unionist fears, the Irish government 
initiated dialogue with the unionist community through the auspices of Cardinal Robin 
Eames and Roy Magee in order to reiterate the primacy of the 'peace initiative as an end 
in itself' rather than solely a question of political accommodation. The Irish 
government's initiative appealing to and including unionist concerns contrasted with the 
government's position in relation to the AIA. The outcome of this dialogue was fruitful 
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and important elements of concern to Unionists were subsequently added 'verbatim' to 
Articles 6-8 of the DSD. 78 
Unperturbed by the introduction of the British Blueprint Document immediately 
prior to the signing of the Downing Street Declaration, the Irish government was 
preoccupied with securing Republican endorsement for the Declaration. The Republican 
movement chose to postpone and reflect on the DSD rather than to adopt a hostile 
approach to the Irish government and reveal the earlier controversial June drafting of the 
Hume-Adams document that both the Irish government and the SDLP had ascribed to 
and endorsed albeit hesitantly. Publishing the document would have undennined the 
credibility and legitimacy of the pan-Nationalist bloc. The Republican leadership 
decided, though, that both 'the carrots and sticks' alluded to by the governments were 
viable. The counter threats against Republicans, should they reject the document, were 
credible, as were promises of an end to Section 31 and the 18-year ban on Sinn 176in by 
broadcast media. Instead, the Republican movement opted for 'a period of reflection'. 79 
The ideological incentives of the DSD aimed to control the positions of Unionists 
and Republicans. It attempted to initiate a process of allowing balanced constitutional 
changes concerning Northern Ireland and provide the opportunity for a contained 
Republican strategy. The declaration was an incremental step towards achieving these 
features. 80 Once signed, the UUP and the cross-party select committee on Northern 
Ireland accepted the DSD it had lobbied for in the midst of the Maastricht vote was 
granted. The DUP rejected the DSD quietly, contrasting with their response to the AIA. 
The discrete rejection of the DSD by the DUP was attributed to the recognition and 
inclusion of core unionist concerns and susceptibilities in the DSD. In this instance 
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Unionists were openly consulted and required assurances were considered and added to 
the Joint Declaration. 81 The Irish government provided the much desired US visa for Sinn 
Mn leader Gerry Adams in order to encourage the reorientation of Republicanism and 
demonstrate to 'hard line Republicans that international battles need not necessarily be 
82 won by British diplomacy'. The visa paid dividends. In August 1994, after secret 
meetings with the Secretary of State, the IRA announced 'a complete cessation of 
83 
military activities' because the 'provos were coming in'. One week after the ceasefire 
was declared, the pan-Nationalist leaders Albert Reynolds, John Hume, and Gerry Adams 
shook hands in front of Leinster House in Dublin. The symbolism of the three leaders 
representing the core elements of Irish Nationalism and the peripheral Irish 
Republicanism represented the realignment of the Irish and nationalist ethnic bloc 
towards the centre. The Fianna Fail-Labour coalition government had succeeded in 
reorienting the Irish bloc and regulating Republicanism. 
The bloc elite consensus has altered though the issue of bloc support became 
problematic arising from disaffected Republicans. The latitude of the leadership was 
threatened from within after a series of unilateral initiatives by Fianna Fail the dominant 
partner in the governing coalition threatened the future of the government. The 
appointment of an Attorney General and the failure to extradite a paedophile priest to 
Northern Ireland resulted in the Labour party withdrawing its support from the coalition 
government and Albert Reynolds was forced to resign. For the first time a new 'rainbow' 
coalition was formed from Fine Gael, Labour, and the Democratic Left without going to 
the people. 84 
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John Bruton, the leader of Fine Gael, became Taoiseach and Dick Spring retained 
his position as Tdnaiste. This 'rainbow' coalition was oriented differently from its 
predecessor. The Northern Ireland administrative team lost Martin Mansergh who had 
identified himself with Fianna Fail, gaining Paddy Teahon in the Taoiseach's office. 
Labour retained Fergus Finlay, but his visibility in the demise of the previous government 
minimised his role. 
The change in incumbent leadership became clear in the aften-nath of the 
Framework documents. The Joint Framework documents drew on the elements of the 
Joint Declaration and previous institutional arrangements to maximise the impetus 
generated by the ceasefires and created a programme for multi-party dialogue. The 
Framework Documents in turn formed the basis for the Good Friday Agreement. 85 The 
first defined the features for democratic, accountable government in Northern Ireland 
based on a legislative Assembly elected by proportional representation and included a 
series of committees to address rights and other issues. The second intergovernmental 
document defined the objectives of both governments. The document outlined a three- 
tiered institutional mechanism paralleling the proposals outlined in the Brooke/Mayhew 
initiative as well sa incorporating mechanisms to manage Constitutional and consensus 
concerns. The proposed inter-party talks aimed to agree on the issues outlined in the 
documents being legislated in the Ddil and at Westminster. 
The difficulty in the Irish bloc arose in Washington concerning the issue of 
decommissioning outlined in the Secretary of State Patrick Mayhew's preconditions for 
parties to enter the multi-party dialogue. 86 Pressed by the divisive dynamics and heavily 
constrained influences imposed upon the British Government generally and on Prime 
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Minister Major and Northern Irish Secretary Mayhew in particular, the decommissioning 
statement was a necessary statement, designed to appease frustrated conservative 
unionists. 
I had very strong instructions from the cabinet I wasn't allowed to go to Washington and 
make it up as I went along. We said there had to be prior decommissioning; well of 
course I moved off that twice. I think because we received a lot of flack. With hindsight 
would it have been easier to recognise that from the beginning? You can never recreate 
these episodes, I would never have carried my party if we had said, "marvelous there is a 
ceasefire, they are not going to have to give up any of their weapons they are just going 
to come straight in". We would never have carried it... [without] the support of the 
labour party. But if you have a very small majority you can't govern, even if we wanted 
to, you can't remain in office with the support of the opposition. When you've got an 
inflamed and furious back bench saying you're giving it all away. But I am not saying we 
wanted to, Washington three represented what we thought was right. 
87 
The preconditions were considered arduous and troubling by Irish civil servants. 
Conversely, the Taoiseach John Bruton favoured the preconditions with 'excessive 
enthusiasm without reflecting on its implications'. 88 The delicate issue of 
decommissioning was revealed publicly and became the focal point of concern for the 
Northern Irish parties, in particular for Sinn Hin and the unionist parties; after the issue 
was revealed publicly, the process floundered . 
89 The orientation of the Irish government 
was influenced by the change in Irish coalition government and resulted in a 
temperamental and philosophical change from the pan-Nationalist leadership of Fianna 
Fail Albert Reynolds to the more hesitant traditional and 'Unionist' viewpoint of Fine 
Gael leader John Bruton. 90 The responsibility of bridging the ideological difference 
between the two governments was placed on Labour leader Dick Spring. The need to 
moderate the particular ideological stances in both governments in order to maintain a 
constant position fell to the consistent element of the Irish bloc leadership. 9' In both 
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governments, tensions arose although they were more acutely felt in the Bruton coalition 
because of additional divisions between political leadership (Bruton) and civil servants 
(Sean O'Huiggin), the resulting schism motivated the British government to wonder 'who 
to call, the Taoiseach's office or the DFA'. 92 
Ambiguity in governmental decision-making complicated the role of the Irish 
government to stand as representative and custodian for the nationalist parties in the 
process. The change of Irish government majority coalition partner from the inheritors of 
Irish Nationalism Fianna Fail to the pragmatic nationalist Fine Gael leadership anchored 
by a staunchly traditionalist John Bruton was problematic. The role of the Labour 
coalition partner to chart a course between both positions in order to maintain a 
continuity in orientation in relation to Northern Ireland was arduous and led to a greater 
Irish dependence on the collaborative influence of external actors to assist in managing 
the issue of decommissioning and driving the process forward for the remainder of the 
D 93 dil. The leadership latitude of the incumbent bloc elite altered with the change in 
government and the hindering of existing policy preferences in the midst of negotiations. 
6.7 Irish external resource dependence 
The Bruton-Spring coalition government's difficulty regarding decommissioning was 
shared by the British government and the Northern Ireland parties. Along with the 
respective Irish and Northern Irish Churches, the US government had played an 
instrumental role from the outset of the Northern Ireland initiatives. In tandem with the 
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EU, the US government provided support for economic reconstruction in Northern 
Ireland and convened a Forum for Peace and Reconciliation after the joint ceasefires. 
The Irish government's dependence on and successful engagement of the Clinton 
administration via the US Ambassador to Ireland Jean Kennedy Smith over the US visa 
for the Sinn Hin leader and a subsequent visa for IRA veteran Joe Cahill to endorse the 
IRA ceasefire had been vital for advancing the process (Coogan 1995: 372, O'Clery 
1995: 87). The Republican Movement, conscious of the benefits to be gleaned from 
American legitimacy and sponsorship of the movement's new 'totally unarmed struggle' 
or 'tactical use of armed struggle', sought to capitalise on links with the US (MacGinty 
94 1997: 34) . The creation of the fundraising group Friends of Sinn Hin assisted in 
legitimising the political elite of the Republican movement and particularly the political 
process. 
95 
The rationale behind the incumbent Irish bloc elite to encourage the recognition of 
Sinn Hin by allocation of the US visas was to commit Sinn Hin to an inclusive Irish 
bloc consensus and minimise schismatic factionalism within the Irish bloc. The benefits 
of tacit US legitimacy afforded to the Sinn F6in leadership would come at the expense of 
conforming to negotiating an end to violence. Sinn Hin's recognition as the legitimate 
representative of Irish Republicanism would require the leadership of the party to adhere 
to the constraints imposed by participatory politics including the tacit recognition of the 
state's monopoly of force. The Irish government hoped that the internal accommodation 
of Sinn Hin would minimise schismatic factionalism and regulate Republicanism 
(Duignan 1995: 147). The timing of US recognition was deemed vital. A previous offer 
of direct American diplomatic assistance in the guise of a US peace envoy to the Fianna 
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Fail-Labour coalition was declined. The utility of the external actor or peace envoy to 
reinvigorate the process, however, was recognised and realised in the person of Senator 
96 George Mitchell .A commission chaired 
by Senator Mitchell was established and 
received submissions on decommissioning from the Northern Irish parties (Mitchell 
1999). The Commission published its report, favouring parallel decommissioning. The 
proposals envisaged parties adhereing to an all encompassing schedule or map. All-party 
dialogue could begin and the decommissioning of weapons could occur in tandem with 
the negotiations. It also obliged party adherence to six principles involving the use of 
exclusively peaceful and democratic means, renouncing the use of force and agreeing to 
abide by the terms of any all-party agreement reached. The advocacy of George Mitchell 
detracted from decommissioning and facilitated a multi-party talks process and was an 
important element in maintaining the legitimacy and credibility of the Irish bloc elite. 9' 
Subsequent pressure to elect parties to a Northern Ireland Forum delayed 
progress. After the forum elections, Senator Mitchell agreed to preside over the Northern 
Ireland Talks process. Mitchell's chairing role was an attempt to dissuade sceptical 
Republicans that the initiative was solely a means of achieving an IRA ceasefire without 
addressing the core concerns of the conflict. The US envoy added an additional failsafe, 
guaranteeing a degree of impartiality elusive to governments constrained by having to 
deliver their respective bloc parties to the negotiations. The US peace envoy provision, 
however, was unable to redeem the process from procedural delays or end the IRA 
ceasefire. The Canary Wharf bomb ended the IRA ceasefire and excluded Sinn Hin 
from the talks forum scheduled for June 1996. Despite US assistance, disarrayed the 
Irish bloc elite limped towards a 1997 election. 98 
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6.8 British external resource dependence 
While the British government's internal dependencies on unionist parliamentary support 
took priority and were seconded by the Major government's constraints, some of which 
were external, influenced by the EU, the influence of the Clinton administration altered 
British government perceptions of the special Anglo-US relationship-99 The British 
government, however, had gained from a change in popular American perceptions of the 
British role in the conflict after signing the Joint Declaration (O'Clery 1995: 189). The 
Mitchell Commission assisted the British government in overcoming its own internal 
constraints concerning the issue of decommissioning and provided the basis for a future 
benign American involvement in the process. Far from the trilateral relationship between 
the British-Irish and American governments most desired by the British government, 100 
the collective involvement of the British-Irish-US relationship became increasingly 
significant. The resumption of IRA violence and the domestic weakening of Major's 
government meant that the role of Senator Mitchell and the American government role 
became more influential over time. 
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6.9 The making of the Agreement 
The maximal bargaining for the agreement was enabled by the existence of the previous 
incremental bargains inching towards an overall Agreement. The security bargain of the 
AIA addressed the core security concerns of the governments and allowed greater 
intergovernmental involvement while containing the influence of Sinn F6in and the 
Unionists. Core concerns regarding the issue of consent and constitution were addressed 
in the Joint Declaration while the institutional constructs in the Brooke/Mayhew initiative 
became the framework for the Good Friday Agreement. 
The landslide victory of the Labour party in the UK and the return of Fianna Fail 
and the Progressive Democrats to government in Ireland reoriented the British and Irish 
blocs. The elections increased the autonomy of the respective government bloc 
leaderships and with it an increased willingness to innovate the process unencumbered by 
factional elite determinants. Equally significant was the increasing desire of the within- 
bloc factional elites to participate in all-party negotiations. The UUP led by David 
Trimble was prepared to engage with and restrain the march of Sinn Hin as the 
leadership and elite decision-making changes within had reinvigorated the party and its 
supporters. ' 01 The introduction of 'a tactical period of quiet' by Republicans in the month 
leading up to the elections created the expectation of a second IRA ceasefire. As a result 
of alluding to the likelihood of a reduction in paramiliarism, Sinn Hin made increasing 
electoral gains in Northern Ireland and the general election in the Republic. Critically, 
Sinn Hin became the 'the only all-Ireland party'. 102 The implicit threat posed to the 
parties within the Irish National bloc north and south was now explicit. The political rise 
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of Sinn Hin created sufficient enticement to Republicans to persist with the alternative to 
armed struggle. The SDLP sought the renewal of all-party dialogue and perceived its 
role as 'saving parties from themselves and the consequences of their own positions'. 103 
The DUP's goal was to exclude Sinn Hin from negotiations and failing that, refrained 
from any potential discussions concerning Northern Ireland's future. The anomalous role 
of the Alliance party, defined as belonging to neither ethnic bloc in Northern Ireland 
though commonly associated with the unionist bloc, wanted to broker a Northern Ireland 
without reference or preference to sectarian politics or an arrangement to share power 
between the respective ethnic blocs, 104 perceived by many to be little more than 
institutionalised sectarianism prohibiting social transformation away from ethnic markers 
(Taylor 2001: 46). 
The two new governments were predisposed to initiating a process of multi-party 
negotiations under the auspices and with the assistance of the Clinton administration. 105 
The governments first issued proposals on decommissioning, reiterating the Mitchell 
principles and announcing the introduction of an Independent Commission on 
Decommissioning. After a joint SDLP-Sinn Hin statement reiterating the need for a 
negotiated process, the IRA declared a renewed ceasefire, easing the process towards 
negotiation. 106 Subsequent joint government documents to facilitate negotiations, 
however, were only warmly received by the parties (Mitchell 1999: 109). The 
'negotiations became more difficult once the violence had stopped'. ' 07 The ideological 
proximity within the respective ethnic blocs altered the room for negotiation and 
compromise as the factional elites attempted to carve out niches within ever-decreasing 
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ideological distinctions and centripetal tendencies, however, temporary, defined the new 
direction of competition within blocs. 
The Republican murder of Loyalist paramilitary leader Bill Wright in prison led 
Loyalist prisoners to withdraw their support for the negotiations, constraining the 
leadership latitude of their political representatives, namely, the PUP and the UDP to 
negotiate. 108 Secretary of State Marjorie Mowlam visited the prisoners in order to gain 
their support amid reprisal attacks between Republicans and Loyalists. 109 Sinn Hin was 
subsequently suspended from the talks as a consequence of IRA violence. Its suspension 
allowed the DUP to end its boycott of the talks. The end of Sinn Hin's short suspension 
was marked by George Mitchell's imposition of a negotiation deadline for the parties to 
end the 'Swan Lake like maneuverings of the talks'. " 0 
In creating a deadline and a multiparty requirement, the onus of decision-making 
shifted from the sole preserve of the governments to include the Northern Irish parties. 
The governments' negotiations concerning strands two and three were partly driven by 
the readiness of the Irish government to 'over-negotiate' on the all-Ireland features of 
strand two. '" Concessions were made in some measure to placate unionist concerns 
regarding the nature of the cross-border bodies under negotiation. The Irish government 
accommodated the all-Ireland features of the Agreement. ' 12 The two sections in strand 
three relating to the transfon-nation of British-Irish relations are disparate as a result of the 
unionist pressure (Fanning 1999: 1). Rather than viewing the moderation of the Irish 
dynamic as appeasement to unionist concerns, the Irish government viewed the all- 
Ireland features of the Agreement as a tacit recognition of existing and inevitable facts, as 
unofficial concordats of association already existed. ' 13 
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The parameters of the intergovernmental bargain had been broadly achieved in 
previous agreements and the role of the governments in the first strand of negotiations 
shifted from leading their respective British and Irish blocs to assisting the factional elites 
to negotiate for themselves. Like Virgil guiding Dante through the inferno, on Good 
Friday the governments facilitated and no longer overtly (though often covertly) drove 
decision-making in the internal strand one Northern Ireland focused negotiations. 1' 4 The 
parties negotiated between themselves but were provoked by government position papers 
inherited from individual party proposals. ' 15 The final institutional features of the strand 
one track were agreed upon by the parties with able assistance by George Mitchell. 
Not all parties contributed, however. Of the ten par-ties in the negotiations, the 
core of the framing of the internal institutional mechanisms came from the parties 
occupying the political middle ground, namely, the SDLP, UUP, the Alliance party and 
the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition party in particular responsible for the equality 
elements of the Agreement. ' 16 Sinn Hin was conspicuously absent and abstained from 
actively negotiating on an Assembly they were prepared to accept but not prepared to 
contribute to creating. 117 The DUP excluded itself from the negotiations as it refused to 
participate in negotiations with Sinn Hin. The smaller parties initiated policy papers on 
the broader confidence-building features of the Agreement, issues of restorative justice, 
the question of 'the missing', conflict survivors and ViCtiMS. 118 The Loyalist parties of the 
PUP and the UDP were concerned with and assisted with the question of 
decommissioning and prisoner release. 
The institutional features of the internal strand were agreed upon between the 
leadership of the two majority parties in their respective nationalist and unionist 
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groupings. Fears of factional splits and scepticism resulted in the SDLP initiating 
proposals and document drafts and f6warding them to the UUP for scrutiny. The 
procedure is described as follows: 'David [Trimble] declined to take the paper in case 
accepting it gave it currency. He complained that the language was all function and 
responsibility and not enough power. But for us that was great it meant he was interested 
and wasn't saying no'. '' 9 
The creation of a joint office for the dual premiership of one leader from each 
ethno-national bloc arose after the SDLP deputy leader and the UUP leader arrived 
together at the funerals of the cross-community victims of paramilitary violence. 
The idea of joint office came about with the funerals in Pointzpass when Seamus 
[Mallon] and David [Trimble] went together and real image of leadership emerged. 
Especially when Seamus introduced David and gave his arm, it internally bound the 
wounds of the community and begged the question, 'why not joint officeT 120 
The joint leadership exhibited by the SDLP and the UUP as well as the popular support 
received as a result, changed the nature of the First and Deputy First Minister office from 
one with distinct roles (of executive and co-ordination for the First Minister and External 
Relations for the Deputy First Minister) to a jointly shared office with shared 
responsibilities. The joint office initiative illustrates the efforts made to match and mould 
institutional mechanisms to the specificities of the Northern Ireland conflict (Sisk 2003: 
147). 
As with the governments negotiating the minimal security oriented bargains 
before them, the parties were constrained by within-bloc factional elite challengers. The 
nature of the arrangements reached illustrates the constraints imposed on their autonomy 
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by an elastic bloc membership subject to shifting its support and realignment fears or 
factional challengers 'outbidding' incumbent bloc elite representatives. The procedural 
mechanisms of parallel consent and weighted majority voting and the nature of the 
threshold were negotiated with intra- as opposed to inter-group considerations in mind. 
The negotiating parties were preoccupied with the ramifications of specific quota and 
voting procedures for their particular party rather than their ethnic group, as factional 
competition and intra-group dynamics dominated concerns. 121 
Once the governments had addressed the consent and constitutional concerns that 
had plagued previous agreements, the points of division altered. The two critical features 
of the Agreement were anns decommissioning and early release of paramilitary 
prisoners. 122 The leadership elites of the parties participating in the negotiations were 
increasingly vulnerable to internal dissent and division. The UUP's collegiate leadership 
arrangement attempted to minimise internal division (Cochrane 1997). It was, 
nonetheless, the most potentially fractious party in the negotiations with imprimatur 
factions. Prior to agreeing on the final draft of the Good Friday Agreement a member of 
the UUP team, Jeffrey Donaldson walked out of the negotiations. 123 This episode 
illustrated the division within the UUP, and the centrifugal tendency within the party 
membership. Although open competition and schismatic factionalism did not divide the 
party, the schism within the party made the leadership latitude of the party leadership 
increasingly fragile. Still, the UUP leader and the Agreement were endorsed by a 72 per 
cent majority of the ruling and institutionally decisive Ulster Unionist Council. 
The issue of decommissioning threatened the cohesion of the Republican 
movement prior to the Agreement. The issue arose as Sinn Hin responded to the 
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Mitchell Principles; the decommissioning proposal document issued jointly by the 
governments in 1997 led to open competition within the Republican movement and a 
division within Sinn Hin. Those opposed to the Mitchell principles and advocates of 
militarism reorganised in opposition to the Sinn Hin leadership and, while small, 
threatened to attract disaffected Republicans displeased with the Good Friday 
Agreement. 124 The proposal to release paramilitary prisoners as a feature of the dividend 
for Republicans prepared to adhere to the Agreement insured against dissent for Sinn 
Hin and the loyalist PUP and UDP parties. At the subsequent Sinn Hin special Ard 
Fheis in May 1998, convened to endorse the Agreement, the presence of four released 
Republican prisoners as a show of their support for the Agreement endorsed the peace 
dividend and the Agreement was carried by 94.6 per cent majority (Moloney 2002: 481). 
The issue of policing reform pressed by the nationalist bloc was divisive for the SDLP 
initially and subsequently a lingering concern for Sinn Hin (McGarry and O'Leary 
1999). 125 
The factional elites were also influenced by the external actors, in particular, the 
roles of US President Clinton and Senator Mitchell (Mitchell 1999: 178). The 
accessibility of the President to the party leaders and the two governments' increased the 
legitimacy of the process and the respective ethnic bloc elites within and beyond their 
own parties created a degree of kudos 'on a very small stage with a very limited cast' 
(MacGinty 1997: 41 ). 126 Third party 'engagement' in the process was consistent and 
intimate, illustrated in the account of the final hours of the negotiation provided by 
George Mitchell: 
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At 8.15 on Friday Morning (3.15am in Washington), I received a telephone call from 
President Clinton. "What are you doing up so late? " I asked. I can't sleep I want to 
know what's happening. I want to help". 127 
In tandem with the international, inten-nediate broker position adopted by the United 
States government, the effect of parallel processes elsewhere was influential. President 
Clinton's role as facilitator the Oslo process in Israel-Palestine (Beilin 22004: 37) and 
the role of US Congress passing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act to assist in the 
South African process (Guelke 1999: 138), helped set the atmosphere for the party elites, 
the aspirations for external recognition, and the lure of Nobel Peace Prizes. ' 28 
6.10 Conclusion 
The counter-intuitive outcome of the GFA institutional arrangements and co-operation 
despite conflicting overall concerns can be explained by the incremental nature of the 
maximal bargain attempting to address core conflict concerns. The Agreement set the 
parameters for future discussions, borrowing from previous Agreements and modifying 
previously unsuccessful elements. The Agreement is a product of a series of 
arrangements, understandings and agreements reached prior to the signing of the 
multiparty talks. The GFA unlike the previous Agreements considered, seeks to embed 
the three fundamental dynamics - the configuration of the respective ethnic blocs, the 
tradition of elite accommodation and external resource dependence - into the functioning 
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of the GFA in order to constrain or regulate more effectively the effect these dynamics 
have on factional elites and the regulation of the conflict. 
The Good Friday Agreement is formed and functions differently from the 
previous AIA as an inclusive, maximal agreement. Its aim is not solely a security 
arrangement but more an effort to address the essential features of the conflict. As such, 
it is not a minimal outcome. In addition, the configuration of the ethnic blocs is similar 
but sufficiently different to warrant greater examination. The AIA was an 
intergovernmental bargain. The Good Friday Agreement is also an intergovernmental 
agreement with multilevel tiers of negotiations and arrangements. To add to the 
complexity, the British and Irish governments are proxy representatives and custodians 
for their within-bloc factional elites. The role of factional elite competition is implicit in 
the nature of the exclusive and limited AIA and becomes explicit or transparent in the 
GFA; the inclusive nature of this agreement is such that factional elites are included and 
participate in the negotiations specifically but not only in the first tier or strand, and as 
such are active factional elites of their respective blocs within Northern Ireland. 
The inclusive nature of this agreement highlights the importance of the way in 
which ethnic blocs are configured and the way incumbent bloc elites accommodate 
challengers. These within-bloc elites are made transparent and required to engage in a 
consensus of sorts, obliging them to negotiate and represent their distinct factional 
interests within their own institutional tier. This situation arises by virtue of the previous 
minimal bargain arranged between the governments. 
The proposition may be made that an inclusive, comprehensive maximal bargain 
can seek to integrate mechanisms to manage the influence of the configuration of the 
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blocs on incumbent elites' monopoly of autonomy within their respective blocs, and the 
way in which schismatic factionalism is accommodated. It can be argued that in this 
instance the fundamental problem of the within-bloc elite accommodation is modified by 
the overt participation on a distinct and separate track of negotiation. 
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7 Conclusion 
7.1 The significance of within-bloc factionalism 
This thesis argues that ethnic groups function as oligopolistic markets. Existing and 
anticipated within-bloc factional elite competition influences inter-ethnic bargaining and 
shapes the minimal or comprehensive nature of the bargain reached. This classification 
challenges conventional descriptions of inter-ethnic blocs as unitary actors. It counters 
traditional elite-driven conflict regulation perspectives of fixed and functioning ethnic- 
bloc elites and argues that ethnic blocs are not monoliths but rather more complex 
configurations. Rather than cohesive unitary actors, ethnic blocs are instead described as 
amalgams, clusters of associations that possess their own interests (Barak 2002, 
McAllister 1983). These 'ethnic entrepreneurs' or factional elites compete to gain the 
monopoly of legitimacy within the ethnic bloc in order to promote and realise their own 
preferences (Kasfir 1979: 372). It has been argued that the perils of political 
fragmentation and unleashing within-bloc dynamics into the field of negotiated peace 
agreements are necessary evils. The residual hope is that viewing negotiated peace 
agreements as a process of intra- as well as inter-ethnic bargaining provides for a better 
understanding of what motivates incumbent factional leaders to arrive at particular 
agreements and what prescriptive recommendations follow for conflict regulation 
theorists and practitioners. The study of within-bloc factional competition addressing the 
configuration of ethnic blocs, the pattern of elite accommodation, and external resource 
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dependence, stoops not to folly but to conquer the understanding of what influences 
ethnic elite incentives in negotiating inter-ethnic agreements (Goldsmith 1911: 11,219). ' 
Following Lake and Rothchild: 
In formulating political strategies, ethnic leaders anticipate the consequences of their 
within group-choices for relations with other groups and, in turn, incorporate the effects 
of their between group-choices into plans for dealing with their ethnic kin. These 
intergroup and intragroup interactions are intimately and necessarily integrated. 
Together, the choices made in these two arenas can combine to create a vicious circle that 
threatens to pull multiethnic societies into violence. (Lake and Rothchild 1998: 7) 
The course of inter-ethnic negotiations never did run smooth (Gellner 1983: 58). 
Acknowledging intra-ethnic competition and the fractious and dynamic nature of ethnic 
blocs creates greater transparency. This, in turn, provides for the recognition of ethnic 
blocs as institutional ised social relationships. At the behest of Horowitz (1985,2000: 
574) a greater consideration of the factional constraints imposed on bloc elite autonomy 
and the nature of within-bloc accommodations (Lijphart et al. 1999) illustrates the 
importance of elite-based mechanisms employed to maintain the leadership latitude or 
autonomy of an incumbent bloc elite. Within-bloc considerations reveal how elites 
compete for the monopoly of ideology, legitimacy and mobilisation of the bloc in a 
divided society where ethnic cleavages create vertical conflict and under-mine any 
centralised notion of a state monopoly of violence (Gellner 1981: 753). Divided societies 
in divided territories with pervasive ethnic conflict tend to be weakly institutionalised 
political systems, where political legitimacy is low and an incumbent leader's ability to 
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preside over a bloc 'depends on how well he wields patron-client networks' (Bienen and 
Van De Walle 1991: 7, Snyder 1998: 64). The elites' quest for identification and often 
explicit recognition as the bloc leadership is inextricably linked to legitimacy (Horowitz 
2002: 195). Legitimacy, in turn, is used to secure latitude or autonomy (Horowitz 2000: 
574). Legitimation occurs 'first within blocs and only secondly between them', 
suggesting that legitimation is a 'private game' (Barker 2001: 31,68). The desire of 
elites to maintain the monopoly of legitimacy within their respective blocs provides a 
greater understanding of why it is that 'the conditions that encourage groups to initiate 
negotiations and sign settlements do not appear sufficient to bring peace' (Walter 1997: 
336). The orientation of legitimacy sought, whether elites seek the means to better 
represent 'the general will of the people' or the 'tyranny of the majority' shapes the 
nature of the agreement reached. The legitimacy preference of the elite is shaped in turn 
by within-bloc detenninants. The prescriptive consequences of legitimacy preferences in 
shaping the nature of agreements are considered below. In sum, the failure to examine 
the ceaseless competition, bargaining and coercion within an ethnic bloc and the 
influence of within-bloc dynamics limits and constrains conflict regulation theories 
(Barak 2002: 62 1). 
285 
7.2 Argument 
Analysis of (1) the configuration of the ethnic bloc, (2) traditional mechanisms of within- 
bloc competition and (3) external resource dependence predisposes protagonists, analysts 
and policy-makers to consider the ways in which intra-ethnic bargaining, like coalition 
bargaining between political parties, tends to occur 'in the shadow of the future' (Lupia 
and Strom 2003). The incentive for an incumbent bloc elite to reach a minimal security 
bargain with an enduring inter-ethnic rival shapes inter- and intra-ethnic bloc dynamics. 
The importance of external resources and third parties as custodians, guarantors or 
occasional spoilers of bargains (MacGinty and Darby 2002: 106, Stedman 2003: 104), 
once recognised, can assist in creating viable expectations as to whether negotiated 
agreements are signed as a means of addressing core conflict concerns and eliciting inter- 
ethnic peace, or rather inter-ethnic accommodations and co-operative containment 
(O'Duffy 1996: 285) mechanisms that seek to address a 'common foe' or mutual threat. 
These attempts to curtail schismatic and open within-bloc competition, or pervasive and 
closed factionalism that threatens to undermine the incumbent bloc leadership's 
legitimacy, are readily confused with comprehensive, credible peace agreements in 
tandem with associated peace dividend expectations. Recognising the influence of these 
factional dynamics on elite incentives in negotiating inter-ethnic bloc accommodations 
contributes to the literature on elite-driven conflict regulation perspectives. The cases 
considered in this study illustrate the role of intra-factional dynamics on elite incentives, 
and the way in which negotiated agreements are framed. 
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7.3 Empirical cases considered 
The four cases selected have produced a 'high volume of research and commentary' 
usually as single case studies (Darby and MacGinty 2003: 2). This research charts the 
role of within-bloc competition in both the Northern Ireland and Israel 1-Palestinian cases 
over two consecutive and decisive negotiated Agreements with the latter Agreements 
forming the basis of simultaneous peace processes. 
First the Camp David Accords and later the Oslo Accords allude to 
comprehensive peace but go no further than establishing bilateral security regimes 
consciously excluding a shared threat. In the Camp David Accords, the shared Egyptian 
and Israeli threat was the PLO. Attempts at a comprehensive peace arrangement 
addressing the problem of peace in the Middle East were initiated at the Geneva 
Conference. Preferring to exclude grand, inclusive negotiations, the signatories opted 
instead to contain the parameters of the negotiations to minimal security oriented 
concems. 
The 'cold peace' that followed from Camp David between Egypt and Israel 
reflected the functional nature of the bilateral security bargain between the two states and 
the limitations imposed on the prospects or potential for a comprehensive inclusive 
peace. The PLO had strengthened its position between the 1973 war and the Camp David 
bargain. Increasing recognition of the PLO was perceived to have aggravated deadlock 
in the political process (Yodfat and Arnon-Ohanna 1981). Egyptian president Sadat 
referred to 'the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people', in his speech to the Israeli 
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Knesset, excluding any reference to the PLO. The Arab states' joint recognition of the 
PLO was undermined by the signing of the Camp David Accords, which 'addressed' the 
Palestinian problem without any reference to the PLO. The PLO responded by adopting 
a dual approach: a military strategy aimed at undermining the Geneva and Camp David 
process and deterring potential participants and a political strategy of moderation and 
readiness to participate in future negotiations. 
The PLO imposed a symbolic political boycott on the Sadat regime, and began 
assassinating PLO members prepared to communicate or 'collaborate' in peace talks or 
2 
negotiations. PLO military activities were directed first against Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza, later against Egypt and Israel, the goal being to reassert the legitimacy of 
the incumbent leadership and curtail challenges to its position weakened by the 
Egyptian-Israeli bargain. Once the Accords were signed, the PLO leadership maintained 
its office in Cairo, escalating PLO opposition fears that Arafat was playing a double 
game. Attempting to initiate a role for the leadership, Arafat met a US representative and 
stated that the PLO were ready to end the anned struggle and recognise Israel de facto if 
an independent Palestinian state with a corridor between the West Bank and Gaza would 
be established (Sayigh 1997: 441). Egypt's claim to represent the Palestinians, yet, in the 
bargaining omitted any mention of Gaza for fear the Israelis might acquiesce and return 
Gaza, with its substantive Palestinian refugee population and problems to Egyptian 
control. 3 Both states were happy to equivocate over core Palestinian concerns in favour of 
their core security preferences. As custodian to the Agreement, the US, inclined to 
advocate an Israeli preference competed, with the USSR which was sympathetic to the 
Arab states, to facilitate broker an accommodation. Unrelenting in its initial commitment 
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to create an inclusive agreement, the US appeased PLO concerns with the Vienna talks 
where Arafat was engaged in sterile negotiations with the Austrian chancellor and Willy 
Brandt (Yodfat and Arnon-Ohanna 198 1: 10). The only part of the Camp David Accords 
implemented was the Egyptian-Israeli bilateral agreement. Efforts to address the core 
conflict concerns of the Palestinian question were overlooked. However, Arafat rejected 
the Camp David (1) Accords of 1979, not because of the failure to address the Palestinian 
question but rather because 'nothing was offered personally to me' (Amoz Elon 1996: 
22-30). 
The later Oslo Accords were also formulated on the basis of co-operative 
containment of a shared threat. In this instance, the PLO and the Israeli government 
shared the common foe, with the emergence of the Islamic Hamas movement in the 
Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza. The escalating violence of the Intifada 
had repercussions for factional competition within and between the Israeli and Palestinian 
blocs. The initiative for thorough, comprehensive peace negotiations in Washington, 
under the auspices of the United States government, was curtailed as the incumbent 
elites' preference for a bilateral secret arrangement became increasingly tangible. 
Hamas, as the common foe of both the PLO and the Labour-led Israeli government, was 
the motivation behind the Oslo negotiations. The PLO representatives consoled 
themselves with the thought that the Israeli incentive to negotiate was not solely security: 
'I am sure you won't decide that the entire West Bank is a security area' (Savir 1998: 
33 ). 4 The PLO leadership was losing its legitimacy among Palestinians, for civil society 
leaders and notables within the West Bank and Gaza, known as 'insiders', as well as for 
the Islamic Hamas movement. The Palestinian bloc within the Occupied Territories was 
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mobilised behind either the 'insiders', the secular Palestinian elite, or behind Hamas, the 
religious organisation that gleaned substantial support at universities in the Occupied 
Territories; the Hamas appeal was that 'whereas the PLO fill their pockets, the Islamists 
fill their brains and hearts'. 5 
Factionalism dominated PLO leadership preferences during the twin-track secret 
negotiations in Oslo. After months of deliberation and tacit agreement on the return of 
the PLO leader Yasser Arafat to the West Bank and the creation of a Palestinian 
Authority, the Palestinian negotiators had a list of 25 recognition guidelines for Israel: 
I don't know what they [the recommendations] were, but basically we [Israelis] should 
acknowledge that everything that we had done has been a crime, these were 25 points to 
really get them [Israelis] at their throats, they [the recommendations] were all kinds of 
bullshit, [formulated] in a way to antagonise. 6 
The bargaining over the Palestinian recognition points threatened to put the negotiations 
all but at an end. When it was feared and threatened that Israel would withdraw from the 
negotiations, the Palestinians moved on 23 of the 25 points. The two final outstanding 
issues were deemed to be irresolvable. The Israeli negotiators anticipated an end to the 
negotiations without achieving an agreement: 
Then something very peculiar happened and that was when we [Israeli party to 
the negotiations] had marching orders [from Israel] over where to give in and 
where not. The Palestinians made difficulties. We didn't move too much ahead 
and then suddenly they [the Nor-weigan facilitators] tell us 'Abu Allah is writing 
his ceremonial speech! ' There was silence. That was the end of our [Israeli] 
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concessions we never gave in [on] what we could have... because we were 
angry, really angry. 7 
The PLO leadership's desire to return to its support base before it found its power 
usurped is symptomatic of the excluded position of the PLO and its preparedness to 
negotiate with the 'enemy'. In addition, the lure of Israeli recognition and associated 
external sponsorship, along with the dividends of external recognition influencing the 
PLO leadership's need for greater 'latitude' and legitimacy took primacy over core 
conflict concerns. Declining external resources as well as internal legitimacy problems 
influenced the PLO leadership's choice. Increasingly schismatic factionalism rendered 
the Israeli government the dominant bargaining partner and maintenance of the core 
conflict considerations were if anything a secondary initiative for the negotiating parties. 
Yossi Beilin's account of the initial plans for the signing of the Joint Declaration 
of Principles provides an insight into the way in which a minimal pact morphed into more 
than the sum of its parts. Originally, plans were made for the agreement to be signed in 
Washington with Shimon Peres of Israel and Faisal Husseini the leader of the Palestinian 
delegation at the Washington talks that had ended abruptly and in failure. It was initially 
believed that 'it was too much for Rabin and the Israeli public to have an event with 
Arafat... Israel was not ready to see Arafat celebrated at the White House' (Ross 2004: 
119). As Beilin observes, '[t]he signature of Peres and Abu Mazen on a five-year 
interim agreement with many question marks would definitely have been interesting and 
unusual, but it would not have amazed the world' (Beilin 2004: 37). The Oslo Accord 
much like its predecessor the Camp David Accord was not more than the sum of its parts. 
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In both instances, letters of mutual recognition formed the basis of these Accords, 
upon which the tentative assertions toward peace were added as something of an 
afterthought without a fixed schedule or implementation guidelines. In both the Camp 
David and Oslo Accords, prescriptive peace proposals are postponed. Conversely, in 
comprehensive peace agreements that attempt to address core conflict concerns, detailed, 
comprehensive and thorough documents, with (provisional) dates for implementation are 
negotiated and signed (de Varennes 2003: 15 1). 8 
The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was far from an 'all-singing, all-dancing final 
constitutional settlement'. 9 Instead, it established a bilateral security regime consciously 
excluding a shared threat, while also addressing pervasive factionalism within the 
respective British and Irish blocs. In addition, intergovernmental co-operation was 
institutional ised at Maryfield providing a mechanism hitherto unworkable: 'Rather than 
working towards changing the status quo, the imperative was to make the status quo work 
with new structures North and South. '10 The Agreement was framed by a recurrent 
British 'argument of what the hell will happen if we don't do something"' and an Irish 
position of 'something must be done', ' 2 as well as a feeling that 'it doesn't really matter 
what you agree about as long as you agree on something'. 13 Combined, these concerns 
resulted in limited inter-ethnic elite accommodation of core British security concerns and 
specific Irish constitutional changes with an eye toward future within-bloc competition. 
The Irish bloc's proposal for a New Ireland Forum originated as a 'Nationalist 
Council' initiated by SDLP leader John Hume. 14 The Taoiseach stole the clothes of the 
SDLP-proposed Council and created an inclusive forum to include all the Irish political 
parties, providing a vehicle for the inclusion of unionist parties, however unlikely, while 
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successfully excluding Sinn Hin from the Forum. The Irish government's objective in 
agreeing to the bargain was to illustrate that 'it was possible to get results from politics 
rather than violence, the objective was to get them [Sinn Hin] to realise that they had to 
think in terms of ballot box and not the armalite'. 15 The British government's preference 
for greater security was accompanied by the need to contain the influence of Ulster 
Unionism. Even some Unionists felt that they would be forced by the British government 
to thole 16 some unpalatable consequences (Aughey 1989: 5 1). 17 The exclusive and 
partial nature of the Agreement suffered, however, in implementation. The creation of a 
new security regime in tandem with extensive Irish government commitments to co- 
ordination and co-operation with the British government over cross-border issues created 
a bilateral security regime with institutional (Maryfield) surrounds, and enabled by 
British government deference towards the US and gentle American massaging of the 
British Prime Minister. " The core purpose of the agreement - namely to encourage the 
Republican movement to rethink its armalite and ballot box strategy - paid dividends. 
While the intergovernmental and exclusive nature of the Agreement negated any illusion 
of an inter-ethnic comprehensive peace, the path dependent concordat elements of inter 
government collaboration instituted links, which would later prove instrumental in the 
creation of a comprehensive bargain. 
The Good Friday or Belfast Agreement attempted 'conflict transforination' by 
addressing core conflict concerns (Ledarach 1997). The 'remarkably comprehensive' 
(MacGinty and Darby 2002: 1) double annexation of two agreements, one addressing the 
multi-party concord dealing with constitutional issues, the second with British-Irish 
interstate dimensions (Hadfield 2001: 84), sets the Agreement apart from the other cases 
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considered. '9 Much like a wedding cake, the three-tiered feature of the inclusive overall 
agreement provides a tier for all protagonists and participants to share in prompt and 
practical peace incentives readily and immediately available. A penultimate, bridging 
tier addresses pending peace issues and associated concerns. Finally, a top tier associated 
with permanent peace, its consumption delayed until peace could be prescribed (or 
christened). 
The distinctive nature of the agreement reached, while not without its hurdles, 
represents the most thorough attempt at conflict regulation of all the cases studied. 
Rather than address security, law and order policing or control the Good Friday 
Agreement addressed profound issues which had been 'lumbering and slumbering on for 
seventy years'. 20 The Good Friday Agreement adopted institutional mechanisms from the 
EU (Guelke 2001: 258, Walker 2001: 133), to improve the 'socialising effect' of the 
agreement on the elites and their constituents (Taylor 1996: 76). Guarantees, defined as 
the hallmark of the agreement, were made with the leaders of states as well as with ethnic 
or religious communities; the Agreement increased the perceived value of collaboration 
(Horowitz 2002: 196, O'Leary 2001: 49). The role of state custodians and guarantors 
mitigates the conventional dynamics of horizontal communication among elites rather 
than vertical accommodation between elites and bloc membership in power-sharing 
agreements (Fisher and Keashley 1991, Tsebelis 1990: 159). Initiating the Agreement 
and framing it in this way circumvented the tendency for consociations to lead to inaction 
over controversial issues when ruling elites lack the 'political will', capacity or leadership 
latitude to remedy problems (Lijphart 1969: 215). The Good Friday Agreement 
mobilised bloc memberships as well as elites with plebiscites on the Agreement in 
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Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland attempting to create 'sufficient 
consensus' and making implementation failure costly for political party leaders 
(MacGinty and Darby 2001: 167, Mitchell 2001: 30). Neither wholly domestic nor solely 
international, the agreement is constructed to address the challenges ethnic conflict poses 
for conventional perceptions of state sovereignty (Ruane and Todd 1999: 63). 
7.4 Prescriptive potential 
The Good Friday Agreement reflects many of the features of modem divided societies, 
and the accommodations required to address them. Like the Good Friday settlement, 
modem conflict regulation agreements tend to be multi-party rather than bilateral with 
associated veto consequences regulated by 'sufficient consensus' within institutions 
modelled to facilitate transition and long-term peace objectives (Darby 2003: 25 1). 21 
Replicating all the facets of the Good Friday Agreement in order to regulate other 
conflicts is unlikely. The configuration of actors, proposals and preferences in the 
Northern Ireland case, combined with the hidden hand of previous historical 
accommodations and inter-ethnic bargains (Lijphart 1977) conducive to the Good Friday 
Agreement suggests the nature of the bargain, or terms of settlement are tailored to match 
the particular problems of Northern Ireland (Rothchild 2002: 117, Sisk 2003: 148). Other 
elements flatter the form of the Belfast Agreement, for example the absence of 'winner- 
takes-all mentality' among the majority ethnic bloc (Lijphart 2002: 108) elsewhere allude 
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to some of the specific, non-transferable elements of the Northern Ireland bargain as a 
cure-all for divided societies elsewhere (Horowitz 2002: 220). 
Despite the specificies of the Northern Ireland case, and ongoing implementation 
problems with the Agreement, resulting in a protracted peace process, the Good Friday 
Agreement has nevertheless been promoted as a promising blueprint for conflict 
regulation. 22 In the same vein the South African National Peace Accord of 1991 and the 
subsequent Agreement for Reconcilation and Peace of 1994 heralded the transition from 
Apartheid toward a new South Africa (Harvey 2001). In this case transfon-nation 
required the weaving together of existing ethnic cleavages while instituting cross cutting 
cleavages to benefit issue based political parties. The sectarian nature of the Apartheid 
system negated a power-sharing arrangement based on ethnic bloc representation in 
tandem with that adopted in Northern Ireland. The 1993 interim constitution rejected a 
post-apartheid ethnically based power-sharing system, opting instead for the building 
blocs of the political system to be built anew. Consequenetly, integrative power-sharing 
mechanisms to sustain the transition toward a united non racial democratic South Africa 
were adopted (Sisk 2003: 139) to accommodate the core conflict concerns central to the 
South African case. 
The Good Friday Agreement has altered Northern Ireland's divided society with 
credible attempts to address core conflict concerns. The Northern Ireland conflict is 
transformed, the change manifest in a marked reduction in violence, with (some) 
protagonists resolved to 'take the war to the classroom'. 23 Advocating politics as the 
continuation of war by other means suggests substantive conflict transformation, the 
problems of faithful implementation not withstanding (Scharpf 1997: 116). The 
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persistent problems associated with the Good Friday Agreement, foremost the issue of 
paramilitary weapons 24 amplify the role of political actors and the way in which they 
interpret their situation (Ruane and Todd 2001: 923). The Belfast initiative also suggests 
that sustainable political institutions be forged to contain conflict and sustain elite 
commitment. 
Critically, the Good Friday Agreement's institutional arrangements, rules and 
principles are associated with a concept of sovereignty tailored to address the most 
pressing issues in the Northern Ireland conflict. The novelty of this bargain is the way in 
which it addresses some of the conventional constraints sovereignty imposes on the 
management of ethnic conflict. Regulating longstanding 'sons of the soil' wars typically 
involving conflict over land (Fearon 2004: 275) is often hindered by competing 
sovereignty claims over (divided) territories and (contested) borders. The comprehensive 
nature of the Good Friday Agreement provides a modem and previously multilateral 
intergovernmental regime solution to the sovereignty issue. 
The Solomon's baby like sovereignty dilemma was created by the international 
nation-state norm. The traditional Westphalian view of sovereignty forms the locus of 
the realist view of the international system and is based on the principles of territoriality 
and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures. In the Northern 
Ireland case these core elements of sovereignty are mediated by the institutional and 
procedural feaures of the Good Friday Agreement. Rather than view sovereignty as an 
absolute, the Agreement creates mechanisms for the mediation of the conflict created out 
of the necessity for sovereignty. 
Following Krasner: 
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The term sovereignty has been commonly used in at least four different ways: domestic 
sovereignty, referring to the organization of public authority within a state and to the 
level of effective control exercised by those holding authority; interedependence 
sovereignty, referring to the ability of public authorities to control transborder 
movements; international legal sovereignty, referring to the mutual recognition of states 
or other entities; and Westphalian sovereignty, referring to the exclusion of external 
actors from domestic authority configurations. These four meanings of sovereignty are 
not logically coupled, nor have they covaried in practice (Krasner 1999: 9) 
Westphalian and international legal sovereignty exclusively refer to issues of authority, 
while interdependence and domestic sovereignty refer to uses of control. These 
distinctions parallel the different types of legitimacy sought by elites. The novelty of the 
Good Friday Agreement lies in its re-writing of the absolutist notion of sovereignty. The 
Agreement recognised that a political entity's control over transborder movements, its 
domestic authority and control, international recognition and the autonomy of domestic 
structures do not always go hand in hand, and that the rules of sovereignty can be 'traded' 
(O'Duffy and Githens Mazer 2002: 125). While formal British and Irish co-sovereignty 
has not been established through the Agreement (O'Leary 1998: 3) it sets in place a 
double protection for the Nationalist and Unionist communities. The Agreement 
establishes credible governmental guarantees by way of a consensual concordat, to 
institute an intergovernmental policy network over Northern Ireland. 25 The Good Friday 
Agreement recognises that much like nation-states and ethnic blocs the notion of 
sovereignty is not a black box. 
Consequently, the broader application of the Good Friday Agreement findings for 
the regulation of similar cases and contemporary peace agreements 26 (Darby and 
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MacGinty 2003: 245) lies in a greater understanding of the utility of within-bloc 
dynamics or what Madison describes as 'the evils of factions', addressed in this study. 
7.5 Implications 
The three variables of ethnic-bloc configuration, patterns of elite accommodation, 
and external resource dependence, explain bloc elites' incentives to reach minimal or 
comprehensive agreements. Suggesting that bargaining in the shadow of the future 
combines two elements of legitimacy, input and output-oriented legitimacy. Scharpf 
observes; 
Trust in institutional arrangements that are thought to ensure that governing processes are 
generally responsive to the manifest preferences of the governed (input legitimacy, 
'government by the people') and/or that the policies adopted will generally represent 
effective solutions to common problems of the governed 'output legitimacy' government 
for the people. Taken together these two types of arguments constitute the core notions of 
democratic legitimacy (Scharpf 2003: 5). 
Borrowing from Scharpf this suggests that agreements vary not only in the relative 
emphasis they place on structures and procedures supporting input-oriented and output- 
oriented legitimacy arguments, but within the context of output-oriented considerations, 
they also vary in the relative emphasis placed on power constraining versus action- 
enabling features (Scharpf 2003: 3). It follows, that the nature of the agreement reached 
or the 'modality of compromise' is dependent upon legitimacy (Krasner 1999: 26). The 
degree of elite compliance reflects bargaining preferences and incentives shaped by the 
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factors determining their legitimacy. Scharpf argues that input and output oriented 
legitimacy arguments can be assessed at three levels: specific policy processes, 
characteristics of government and characteristics of the regime. Similarly, inter-ethnic 
elite bargains can be assessed by examining the configuration of the respective ethnic 
blocs, the pattern of elite accommodation and the dependence on external resources. The 
nature of factional bargaining relates to input oriented legitimacy common in all the cases 
considered. In the Camp David and Oslo Accords mutual recognition was desirous for 
the signatories in securing greater within-bloc leadership latitude. Output-oriented 
legitimacy tends to relate to the notion of good governance associated in this instance 
with the post bargain and agreement implementation environment. It refers to 'the future 
present', the incumbent bloc elites consider when bargaining (Lupia and Strom 2003). 
Inclusive comprehensive and credible Agreement models require incumbent elite and 
bloc endorsement, where the bloc memberships are often formally mobilised by referenda 
or plebiscite. In inclusive agreements a sufficient consensus between ethnic blocs is 
sought for collective output-oriented legitimacy, and is more readily applicable to 
bargains that require implementation to address core conflict concerns than minimal and 
limited security pacts. 
In structural tenns the minimal security oriented or maximal comprehensive 
nature of the inter-ethnic bargain reached needs to be understood as a joint-decision 
process, with negotiations an example of an extreme form of the multiple-veto 
constellation (Tsebelis 2002 ). 27 From this perspective classifying an agreement as a 
minimal or security oriented pact in which incumbent bloc elites 'collude to exclude' a 
common foe, the syle of the negotiation and the nature of the bargain would be 'bloody- 
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minded' and as Scharpf observes; 'one should expect a low capacity for effective action 
and frequent blockages' (Sharpf 2003: 12,1997). Alternatively, when inter-ethnic bloc 
elite interactions are characterized by considerable commitment of negotiators to address 
core conflict concerns, mediation by meddling is limited, and credible guarantees are 
instituted to create an inclusive bargain. 
Acknowledging the complex nature of sovereignty, legitimacy and ethnic blocs 
allows for: the delegation or pooling of sovereignty, the differing functions of input and 
output oriented legitimacy and the deten-nining influences of factional within bloc 
dynamics on ethnic bloc elites. Between-bloc mobilisation and consensus is notoriously 
difficult to achieve when assumed that ethnic blocs are homogenous, all the more so 
when fractious ethnic blocs are recognised. In order to succeed, the outcome of the 
bargain and its implementation should be better, the transaction costs fewer, than would 
have been the case had the negotiations failed. Disaffection among ethnic-bloc elites 
once a comprehensive agreement has been signed and prior to implementation is reflected 
in the within-bloc controversies, ideological or otherwise as to whether better outcomes 
could have been achieved (Lindholm- Schulz, 1999, Maclntyre 2001: 202, Scharpf 1997: 
189). The ramifications for the implementation of any comprehensive collaborative 
between-bloc agreement while protected by the authority structure provided by the 
guarantors or external guardians are once again dependent on the internal bloc dynamics 
of political accountability and conditions of elite accommodation and external resource 
dependence. Divisions within the Republican movement and the Ulster Unionist Party 28 
since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement reflect not only the pervasiveness of 
factionalism but also the comprehensive nature of the bargain reached. The Good Friday 
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Agreement is complex and exhaustive in character, with symmetry and parity of esteem 
afforded to the bargaining elite and devilish in detail. Conversely the Oslo Accords 
highlight a disparity of power, a lack of credible guarantees and textual ambiguity over 
all but security-oriented facets of the agreement. The Camp David Accords and Oslo 
Accords along with the Anglo-Irish Agreement are examples of security-oriented 
bargains with increasingly complex institutional surrounds; the Good Friday Agreement 
has transformed the Northern Ireland conflict and created a protracted peace. This thesis 
argues that within bloc factional induced incentives can assist with viable expectations as 
to whether the nature of inter-ethnic elite compromises are made to achieve a 
comprehensive, inclusive and credible maximal bargain or a co-operative containment 
arrangement that may over time result in a more credible peace arrived at piecemeal. The 
incremental nature of some bargains, in this case the Anglo-Irish Agreement illustrates 
that the nature of the Agreement reached is dependent upon within bloc factional 
dynamics. In attempting to address Walter's question as to why it is that the conditions 
that encourage groups to initiate negotiations are not always conducive to implementing 
peace, this study examined the impact within bloc factional dynamics have on shaping 
elite incentives and the nature of the agreement reached whether security oriented and 
minimal or comprehensive and addressing core conflict concerns. The convenient 
ambiguity of security pacts saciate the incumbent elites need to maintain their monopoly 
of control or address schismatic factionalism within their ethnic blocs, allowing them 
sufficient means to address a mutual threat with their enduring inter-ethnic bloc. 
Returning to Horowitz's assertion 'a principle limitation on interethnic cooperation is the 
configuration of intraethnic competition', power prescribes the pursuit of peace. 
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Interviews 
Name Title/Organization Date 
Tbdul Shafi, Hadr Chair, Palestinian Negotiator, Madrid talks Saturday 4 September 1999 
Gaza City 
Tbdel Hadi, Mahdi Palestinian NGO PASSIA Tuesday 17 August 1999 
East Jerusalem Tuesday 24 September 2002 
Wilton Park 
Al-Khatib, Ghassan Minster for Labour, Palestinian Authority Wednesday 8 September 1999 
East Jerusalem 
a] Qaq, Zakaria Palestinian IPCRI Academic and NGO Sunday 29 August 1999 
leader East Jerusalem 
Amyreh, Khalid Palestinian Journalist, MEI Durah West Tuesday 13 July 1999 
Bank 
Andrews, David Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs Monday 31 July 1995 
Dublin Saturday 30 May 1998 
Asalam, Dalah and Fateh Palestinian Legislative Council Tuesday 20 July 1999 
women members representative Ramallah, 
Fatah Women's group meeting, Ramallah 
Aughey, Arthur Academic Belfast Tuesday 9 March 1999 
Avivi, Pinchas Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, West Monday 2 August 1999 
Jerusalem 
Awadiah, Nabil Palestinian Authority, Orient House Wednesday 4 August 1999 
Jerusalem 
Baram, Haim Journalist ME1 Labour party, Israel Wednesday 21 July 1999 
West Jerusalem 
Barghouti, Marwan Palestinian Fateh Tamzirn leader, Ramallah Monday 2 August 1999 
Wednesday 4 August 1999 
Bassett, Ray Dept Foreign Affairs Anglo-Irish division WednesdaylO November 1998 
- 
Civil Servant, Dublin 
BTMie, Esmond UUP Assembly party, Stormont Wednesday 24 February 1999 
303 
and Tuesday 9 November 1999 
B Israeli civil servant Friday 20 September 2002 
Brooke, Peter Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Friday II June 1999 
Westminster 
Tulous, ýJawal Legal representative for Palestinians, Orient Wednesday I September 1999 
House, East Jerusalem 
Chilcot, John Permanent Undersecretary of State for Thursday 20 July 1995 
Northern Ireland NIO London 
Clarke, John UUP, Belfast Wednesday 10 March 1999 
Daly, Cathal Catholic Cardinal, Belfast Ffiday 24 March 2000 
Dalton, Tim Senior Civil Servant Department of Justice, Friday 29 January 1999, 
Dublin Wednesday 10 November 1999, 
Wednesday 24 May 2000 
Dempsey, Judy Financial Times Middle East correspondent Wednesday 8 September 1999 
West Jerusalem 
Durkan, Mark SDLP Leader, Deputy First Minister, NI Wednesday 17 May 2000 
Stormont 
Ervine, David PUP Leader, Stormont Wednesday 8 March 2000 
Esmeir, Samara Adalah Safar'arn Palestinian Human Rights Tuesday 10 August 1999 
Organisation Israel Afula Israel 
Finlay, Fergus Advisor to Irish Labour party, Programme Wednesday 18 November 1998 
Manager Department of Foreign Affairs 
Dublin 
Fitzgerald, Garret Fon-ner Taoiseach, leader of Fine Gael, Wednesday 26 July 1995 
Dublin Wednesday II November 1998 
Gallagher, Dermot Civil Servant Head Dept of Taoiseach Wednesday 24 May 2000 
Dublin 
Garret, Brian Unionist perceptions on Unionism and Tuesday 23 February 1999 
European integration Belfast 
Gunning, Paul Irish Civil Servant Department of Foreign Wed-iesday 14 July 1999 
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Affairs, Tel Aviv 
Gur, Shlomo Israeli Dept. Foreign Affairs West 
Jerusalem 
Sunday 14 September 1999 
G Member of the Israeli Military establishment 
Boston 
Thursday 12 February 2004 
Hanna, Cannel SDLP MLA for South Belfast Belfast Thursday 2 October 2003 
Hirclifeld, Yair Prof Haifa University, Israeli Oslo 
Negotiator Haifa 
Friday 3 September 1999 
Hoffman Sabine Professor Humbolt University, Berlin Thursday 16 July 1998 
Horowitz, David The Jerusalem Report West Jerusalem Wednesday 14 July 1999 
Holmes, Erskin Northern Ireland in Europe, Belfast Monday I March 1999 
Hurd, Douglas Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
London 
Tuesday 19 August 2003 
Inbari, Pinchas Author Palestinians between Terrorism and 
Statehood, NGO leader and analyst Tel Aviv 
Wednesday II August 1999 
Karim Qais Abdul Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine DFLP-PB Ramallah 
Saturday I August 1999 
Khamash, Amer Jordanian Senator, Advisor to King Hussein, 
London 
Monday 7 June 1999 
Kennedy Denis Queens University, Belfast Thursday 25 February 1999 
Kennedy, John Belfast, NICE Belfast Wednesday 10 March 1999 
Kramer, Martin Israeli Negotiator, Professor Moshe Dayan 
Centre, Haifa 
Sunday 5 September 1999 
King, Stephen UUP advisor Trimble Europa Hotel Belfast Monday 31 July 2000 
Lenihan, Brian Fianna Fail TD Leinster House Thursday 23 March 2000 
Lyne, Roderic British Ambassador to Russia, former No. 10 
Advisor to John Major, electronic 
communication, London-Moscow 
Friday 10 October 2003 
Malki, Riad Palestinian negotiator and NGO president 
Halki Greece and London 
Saturday 8 September 2001 
Saturday 15 December 2001 
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Mansergh, Martin Advisor Taoiseach's Office, Research Mo day 10 November 1999 
Fianna Fail Dublin 
Mayhew, Patric ecretary o tate or ort ern re an e es ay une 
Westminster London 
McAlister St Clair DUP Communications Officer, Stormont Tuesday 23 February 1999 
Maginnis, Ken UUP, Glengall St Belfast Friday, 12 November 1999 
McIntyre, Anthony & Alex Academic, and foriner IRA prisoners Tuesday 9 November 1999 
Ballymurphy Belfast 
McKittrick, David The Independent, Journalist and author Thursday II March 1999 
Belfast 
Moloney, Ed The Sunday Tribune Journalist and author Sunday 23 March 2003 
Boston College 
Morrison Danny Republican and author, Belfast Wednesday I October 2003 
Moylan Isolde Consul General of Ireland for Palestinian Thursday 24 July 2003 
Territories Boston 
Nally, Dermot Civil Servant Head Department of Foreign Tuesday 9 November 1998 
Affairs, Dublin 
Nevo, Yossi Israeli Academic, Haifa University Sunday 5 September 1999 
O'Bradaigh, Ruairi Leader Republican Sinn Fein, Dublin and Monday 8 November 1998 
Roscommon Tuesday 17 November 1998 
O'Ceallaigh, Daithi Civil Servant Head Dept of Foreign Affairs Wednesday 24 May 2000 
Dublin current Ambassador to UK 
O'Reilly, Emily Sunday Business Post Journalist Dublin Friday 12 November 1998 
Pundac, Ron Tel Aviv, Negotiator Oslo, Israel NGO Monday 6 September 1999 
leader People to People programme Tel 
Aviv 
Qais, Abdul Karim DFLP PC Leader Ramallah Sunday I August 1999 
Rabah, Jamil Jerusalem, Palestinian NGO JMCC East Thursday 15 July 1999 
Jerusalem 
Reynolds, Albert Former Taoiseach Leinster House Dublin Thursday 27 July 1995 
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sen, David Foriner Chief Rabbi of Ireland Israeli peace Tuesday 17 August 1999 
NGO West Jerusalem 
Seale, Patrick Author, Syrian specialist, Halki, Greece Sunday 9 September 2001 
Teidemann, ýDaniel Peace Now lawyer, West Jerusalem Tuesday 31 August 1999 
Shaikaki, Kahlil PCPRS- Palestinian Negotiator and Tuesday 3 August 1999 
academic. Palestinian Centre for Policy and Tuesday 24 September 2002 
Survey Research, Nablus, Wilton Park and 
Dartmouth College Wednesday 21 January 2004 
Shavit Elinoar Foriner Israeli political activist Boston and Tuesday 16 September 2003 
London 
Sherman, Martin Israeli negotiator, Academic and Tsomet Sunday 5 September 1999 
party member 
Spring, Dick Leinster House Tdiniste, Labour party Thursday 19 November 1998 
Leader 
Steinberg, Gerald Academic, former Israeli Ambassador to Wednesday 25 September 2002 
UK, Wilton Park UK, and Halki Greece Wednesday 5 September 2001 
Tamari, Salim Negotiator, Director US East Jerusalem Thursday 14 September 1999 
Teahon, Paddy Head of the Taoiseach's Office, Dublin Wednesday 3 February 1999 
Tsiddon-Chatto, Yoav Likud and Tsomet Israeli negotiator Madrid Friday 15 September 1999 
talks, Tel Aviv 
Usher, Graham Economist, Middle East Editor and MEI, Thursday 15 July 1999 
East Jerusalem 
Zoghbia, Hanan Second Secretary Libyan Foreign Liaison Friday 7 September 2001 
Committee, Halki Greece 
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Notes 
I Introduction 
'See Aggestam 1999, Afeste 1991, Hovi 1998, Montvi I le 1991, Walter 2002, Zartman 1995,2000a, 2000b, 2001. 
2 See Fearon 1996, Lupia and Strom 2003 for more on 'bargaining in the shadow of the future'. 
3 Information corroborated by interviews with Ray Bassett, Garret FitzGerald, Dermot Nally, November 1998, Douglas 
Hurd, 19 August 2003. 
4 See Connor 1994 and Conversi 2003 for the definition of ethrionational. 
5 Barry criticises Lijphart's advocacy of solidary actor position. 
6 The term 'divided societies' refers to an ethnic cleavage within a given political entity, the existence of divided 
territories in tandem with divided societies illustrates the contested nature of the territory within which the (often) 
numerous societies reside. I thank Brendan O'Leary for drawing my attention to this point. 
7 See Barry 1975, Lijphart 1999, Tsebelis 1990. 
8 See Bogaards 2002, Boucek 2003, De Swaan 1973, Laver and Shepsle 1996, Lehmbruch 1975, Leiserson 1968, 
Leubbert 1986, Lupia and Strom 2003, Maor 1998, Michell 2001,1995, Olzak 1992, Riker 1962, Sartori 1999,1976, 
Tirnmermans 2003, Ware 1996 
9See Belloni and Bellerl 976, Gillespie et al. 1995, Luther and Deschouwer 1999, Rose 1967, Siegel and Beals 1960. 
1() See Dahl 1958, Higley and Burton 1998, Kelman 1970, Leczowski 1975. 
11 See Bloomfield 1997, Buzan 1991, Diehl and Goertz 2000, Moaz and Mor 2002, Wagner 2000. 
12 See Horowitz 2000, Hovi 1998, Montville 1991, Walter 2003,1997, Zartman 1995. 
13 The Sinn Fein leadership were aware of the PLO chairman's address to the UN General Assembly though whether or 
not the similarity between the two speeches was conscious or merely a case of significant coincidence (see Jung 1960, 
1968) is unclear. Interview 1 October 2004. 
14 The governments are described in this bargaining instance as the incumbent ethnic bloc elite representatives. The 
British government asserted itself as representing the interests of the unionist bloc. In much the same way as the 
Egyptian government asserted itself as representing the interests of the Palestnian bloc in the Camp David agreements. 
While controversial in light of the subsequent 'Ulster says no' campaign, neverritheless the British government has 
sufficient autonomy to assert its legitimacy in this manner. 
15 Interviews, Dermot Nally 9 November, Ray Bassett 10 November, 1998. 
16 The Political Programme adopted at the 12"' session of the Palestinian National Council on 8 June 1974 in Cairo 
came in the midst of the Helsinki Conference on East-West security relations and during the Geneva process to address 
the concerns of actors involved in the Middle East. For the full Palestinian programme see Abudl Hadi 1997: Vol. 1, 
1). 225. 
2 Elite incentives and the role of factions 
' Ruane and Todd (2003) argue otherwise, suggesting that ethnic blocs are relatively fixed and not so easily subject to 
change. 
3 See Adams (1986) The Politics of Irish Freedom Dublin: Brandon Press. 
' Institutional mechanisms for managing within bloc conflict extend beyond the political parameters to securing the 
autonomy of the elite by administering 'civil administration'. Civil administration refers to a broad array of sanctions 
available to one elite and tacitly accepted by the elite of the opposing ethnic bloc. The sanctions are available to the 
leadership by virtue of their status and their monopoly of violence and allow for militarised elites to assert their 
leadership against internal challenge to maintain their monopoly. 
5 Within bloc cleavages between Gaza and the West Bank in the Isareli-Palestinian case are clear. Equally significant 
is the religious cleavage between Northern and Southern West Bank. The southern region is more religious with 
political ramifications than the West Bank north of Al Quds (Jerusalem). 
6 See Boucek 2003, De Swaan 1973, Laver and Shepsle 1996, Leiserson 1968, Lijphart et al. 1999, Lupia and Strom 
2003, Luther and Deschouwer 1999, Maor 1998, Mayhew 1974, Mitchell 1995,2001, Riker 1962, Sartori 1999,1976, 
Ware 1996 for parallels in the literature on party politics and coalition building. 
7 The rivalry between mainstream and non-mainstream factions reached its peak in 1979 when the LDP failed to co- 
ordinate on a candidate for the prime ministership. The PM Ohira retained sufficient support and eventually won but 
several months later the non-mainstream factions absented themselves during a vote of no confidence, bringing down 
the government. Ohira decided to dissolve the Diet rather than relinquish his position to a non-mainstream opponent 
and called an election in June 1980. 
8 The threshold does not apply to racist parties such as the Kach party excluded from the Israeli Knesset parliament and 
associated with the extreme right organisation Eyal to which the assassin of Yitzak Rabin, Yigal Amin, was associated. 
91 am grateful to Paul Mitchell for pointing out that ethnic blocs are only 'sometimes coalitions'. 
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'0 Leadership phenomena can be distinguished from other power phenomena where power relations occur among 
members of the same bloc and these relations are based on bloc members' perceptions that the elite may, with reference 
to the bloc's activities, 'legitimately' prescribe behaviour patterns for them to follow (see Paige 1972: 7). 
" See Tsebelis (I 990a: chapter 6), for a summary of the elite theorists and pluralist school approaches to the interaction 
between elite and mass relations in political decision-making. 
12 Interview, Garret FitzGerald 26 July 1995. 
13 Interview, Garret FitzGerald, 10 November 1998. 
14 interviews, Ruairi O'Bhadaigh 8 and 17 November 1998. 
15 Interview, Den-not Nally, 9 November 1998. 
16 'Follow me I'm right behind you'; unpublished paper by Anthony McIntyre, NIPC, Linenhall Library, Belfast. 
17 See for example Arian 1998, Bogaards 2002, Lijphart 1977,1999 et al. 
18 Affecting their so-called koalitionsfdhigkeit, their ability and perceived acceptability to act as coalition partners. 
19 Eric Hobsawm asserts that 'national consciousness' develops unevenly among social groupings and regions of a 
country; he argues that regional diversity and its reasons have been overlooked. 
20 The theory of timing in negotiating inter-ethnic conflict resolution is analysed in theories of 'ripeness' and the nature 
of opportunities for negotiation and agreement see Zartman 1994,1995,2000,2001. 
3 The 1978 Camp David Accords: a minimal elite bargain 
1 Preamble to the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, 17 September 1978. 
2 Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Abigniew Brezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor, both former 
Poles, played passionately competitive chess for the duration of their stay. Accounts reveal that President Carter 
referred to Prime Minister Begin as a psycho to his wife. Decision-making tensions between Israeli foreign minister 
Moshe Dayan and his prime minister were issue and personality related. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's distaste for 
consultation undermined his advisors' ability to contribute and resulted in numerous resignations. 
3 While Jordan and Israel conducted informal communication for some time this was the first instance of public overt 
dialogue with Israel. See Avi Shlaim's Collusion Across the Jordan (1988), for a detailed account of Israeli-Jordanian 
dialogue. 
4 Advocates of the Accords cited Benjamin Franklin's retort, 'I have never known a peace made, even the most 
advantageous, that was not censured as inadequate, and the makers thereof condemned as injudicious or 
corrupt. ' See Eban 1979: 343' 
5 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Jimmy Carter 1978 11, United States Government Printing Office Washington 
1979: 1533. 
6 The evacuation of Sinai posed an economic problem for Israel. It required that Israel relinquish oil fields in Sinai that supplied 
Israel with a third of its oil needs, the cost of normalisation with Egypt (Dayan 1981: 180). 
7 See The Camp David Summit September 1978 Department of State publication 8954, Near and South East Asian Series 88 T. 
Released September 1978 Washington DC page 4. 
8 El-Arish is a former Roman garrison town on the north-east coast of Sinai and close to the Israeli Rafah settlement. 
9 Exchange of letters in connection with 'The Framework for Peace in the Middle East' from President Anwar Sadat of 
Egypt to President Carter of the United States, 17 September 1978. The letter pertains to the second part of 
the Accords and as such is often omitted from the list of letters produced on this date. Priority is given to 
the letters pertaining to the Israel-Egypt features of the Accords. 
10 Resolutions of the Algiers Arab Summit Conference, 26-28 November 1973 and the Rabat Summit 
resolution 28 October 1974. 
11 Exchange of letters on Jerusalem, 17-22 September 1978. 
12 Letter from Prime Minister Begin to American President Carter at 4 pm, Sunday, 17 September 1978. 
3 Newspaper interview with Prime Minister Begin in Maariv, 20 September 1978. 
4 Interest in Gaza surged when explorations revealed a limited amount of natural gas of its coastline; interview, 4 
September 1999. 
15 President Anwar Sadat's Statement to the Israeli Knesset, 20 November 1977. 
6 Political programme adopted at the Twelfth Session of the Palestine National Council Cairo, 8 June 1974, section 2. 
7 The newly declared PLO position was shaped by the involvement of third party intermediaries (Quakers) assisting 
the American administration. 
18 Joint US-Soviet Statement on the Middle East, I October 1977. 
19 Interview, Confidential Source 12 February 2004. 
20 The proposals were drafted by Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. 
21 Interview, Martin Sherman, 5 September 1999. 
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22 On 13 September the US department of state explained officially that the status of the Palestinians must be settled in 
a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement. 'The issue cannot be ignored if others are to be solved ... to be lasting, 
a peace agreement must be supported by all of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinians. This means that 
the Palestinians must be involved in the peacemaking process. Their representatives will have to be at Geneva for the 
Palestinian question to be solved. ' See Quandt 1986: 102. 
23 Interview, Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999. 
24 Egypt's association with the Soviet Union began in earnest in 1955 after the Israel's Gaza incursion and after the 
1956 collusion of Israel, France and Britain over Suez. 
25 Interview, Confidential Source, 12 February 2004. 
26 Resolutions of the Algiers Arab Summit Conference 26-28 November 1973 and the Rabat Summit resolution 28 
October 1974. 
27 President Sadat to the PNC meeting March 1977 in AI-Ahram, 13 March 1977. Translated and referenced by F. 
Sayigh 1979: 39. 
28 Said Hammami, PLO representative in London, views on the Palestinian question expressed at the National- 
Liberation Club in London on 20 March 1975. 
29 Time magazine interview with Assad, 24 January 1977. 
30 Interview, Abdul Karim Qais, I August 1999. 
31 The outbreak of a brief border war between Egypt and Libya, 21-24 July 1977 increased Syria's concern over the 
shift in Egyptian foreign policy. 
32 Interview, Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999. 
33 Interview, Confidential Source, 12 February 2004. 
34 The term Shillal is often referred to as Shilla. 
35 Weizman had a close personal relationship with Sadat and Vice President Mubarak. Weizman forged such a strong 
working relationship with the Egyptian negotiators that after Sadat's assassination he was a conduit during the Israeli- 
Egyptian 'cold peace' even in a non-political capacity during his time as President. 
36 Sadat's negotiation with Israel had already resulted in the assassination of his close friend Youssef El 
Sibai in Nicosia, Cyprus in February 1978. The assassination resulted in an international incident when 
Egyptian Special Forces landed in Larnaka Cyprus to thwart the escape of the assassins. See Kamel 1986: 
124. 
37 The settlers from Yamit were relocated in Gaza and formed the basis of the current settlements. Interview, 12 
February 2004. 
38 Moshe Dayan hoped to redeem his position after the 1974 inquiry into the conduct of the Israeli government during 
the 1973 war. Dayan and Meir's resignation resulted in the resignation of the 1974 government after one month and 
one day. 
39 In 1961 the Herut party won 14 per cent of the vote (Luebbert 1986: 79). 
40 Begin had been part of the National Unity Government representing the Herut faction of the Gahal party. Gahal was 
renamed Likud. 
41 Begin advocated Dayan as minister in 1967: 'We ourselves have some good candidates for this post. But we prefer a 
man from another party, as we want a national coalition, one that can lead the nation to war. And apart from that, 
Dayan is the right man in the right place. ' See Haber (1978: 267). 
42 Interview, Boston, Thursday, 12 February 2004. 
43 The Israeli electoral system adheres to a closed list system providing a modicum of control for the party leader (see 
Lijphart 1999). Sharon's creation of a separate list created open competition and a challenge to the party leadership at 
this time. 
44 Interview, Confidential Source, 12 February 2004. 
45 Interview, Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999. 
46 See the Framework West Bank and Gaza, section A, I (a) of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, 17 
September 1978. 
47 Interview, Confidential Source, 12 February 2004. 
4 Hamas, elite necessity and the Oslo bargain: the 1993 Oslo Accord as an inter-ethnic elite pact 
' The Accord defers discussion concerning core conflict issues to a series of interim agreements and final-status 
negotiations. 
2 Interview, Khalil Shikaki, 3 August 1999. 
3 The Declaration of Principles on interim self-government provided a Palestinian interim self-governing authority, 
including an elected Council for the Palestinian people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a transitional period not to 
exceed five years. 
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4 Immediately after his return from the White House signing of the Accords Arafat declared, 'the Intifada 
continues', a call was made simultaneously for a strike in East Jerusalem. 
5 Letter 2 of the PLO and Israel Letters of Mutual Recognition signed 9 September 1993. 
6 The withdrawal began on 4 May 1994 and the permanent status talks began 4 May 1996. 
7 UNSCR 242 of 22 November 1967 has been repeatedly referred to as the principal agreed basis for the solution to the 
Middle East conflict. Declared after the 1967 war, it calls for 'withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories 
occupied in the recent conflict to clear and recognised boundaries'. UNSCR 338 of 22 October 1973 ended the 1973 
Yom Kippur war and called upon the parties to ceasefire and implement UNSCR 242. 
8 The Articles pertaining to issues of Security and the creation of the interim self governing authority are Articles 3,4, 
5,8,13,14 and Annex I and 11 of the Accords. 
9 The creation of a police force of Palestinians from 'inside' the West Bank and Gaza and 'outside', namely expelled 
PLO fighters returning from Tunis, was an important regulatory device. See Gordon Peake, Policing Peace: Learning 
ftom Experiences in the Palestinian Authority and Kosovo, MESA paper, 24 November 2002, Tucson, Arizona. 
10 Interview, Pinchas Avivi, 2 August 1999; Hadr Abdul Shafi 4 September 1999; Shlomo Gur, 14 September 1999. 
11 Interview, Pinchas Avivi, 2 August 1999. 
12 Interview, Hadr Abdul Shafi 4 September 1999. 
13 Interview, Yossi Nevo, 5 September 1999. 
14 Interviews Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September and Yosi Nevo, 5 September 1999. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Interview, Daniel Seidemann 31 August 1999; Yossi Nevo 5 September 1999. 
17 Interview, Yoav Tsiddon-Chatto, 15 September 1999. 
18 1 thank Pinhas Inbari for reminding me and interviewees. 
19 The 1974 Arab League summit at Rabat recognised the PLO as the 'sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people'. 
'oArafat's comment in conversation with interviewee. Interview, Ghassan Al-Khatib, 8 September 1999. 
" Interview, Confidential Source 
22 Interview, Confidential Source 
23 The disarray and internal conflict within the Palestinian national movement led to the amalgamation and 
modification of new and existing groups (including Majd or Glory the security apparatus founded in 1983) within the 
rubric of Hamas (Hroub 2000: 40). 
24 The younger generation of Palestinians born after the 1967 war and referred to as the Takbir. 
25 Islamic Jihad translates as the marriage of Islam and the gun; a splinter group from the Muslim Brotherhood prior to 
Hamas Islamic Jihad was more radical and militaristic than Hamas purported to be. 
26 The influence of Hamas escalated in tandem with the victory of the Islamic list in the January 1992 
Algerian elections. See Inbari 1996: 45. 
27 The PLO was established in 1964 and was quickly dominated by Fateh, the largest faction which, with the assistance 
of the 1967 war and subsequent weakening of the neighbouring Arab governments, rapidly achieved the largest share 
of the seats in the Palestinian National Congress. Initially ambivalent towards the PLO, Fateh recognised the value of 
Arab legitimacy afforded to it. 
2"The Muslim Brotherhood represented the Pan-Islamic dimension of the Palestinian bloc; it became a weaker counter 
to the pan-Arab secular nationalism monopolised by the PLO, and as such was excluded from the PLO umbrella and 
often disregarded. The secular nature of the PLO from its formation in 1958 became one of Fateh's guiding principles; 
that and autonomy from and recognition by established (Arab) state actors in determining the form and purpose of 
Palestinian political institutional isation (Sayigh 2000: 206). 
29 From the 1960s elements of such dissent had been based - and often externally sponsored - intermittently in 
Amman, Damascus, Beirut and Tunis. 
30 The ensuing conflict led to within bloc fighting and the adoption of a dual policy for dealing with dissent. PLO 
departments were increasingly staffed with Fateh members, establishing Fateh's dominance in PLO institutions. 
31 However, Article 25 of the Hamas charter states the following: 'Harnas reassures its [the nationalist movement's] 
members and victors that [it] is a moral and j ihadic movement ... hates opportunism and does ... not go after material 
gain nor personal fame, nor reward of people'. Article 27 continues, '[T]he Palestinian Liberation Organisation is 
closest of the close to the Islamic Resistance movement, in that it is the father, the brother, the relative, or friend ... Our 
nation is one, plight is one, destiny is one, and our enemy is the same ... See Maqdsi 1993: 130. 32 Interview, 13 July 1999. 
33 The Fateh Tam-7in or youth movement led by Marwan Barghoutti until his arrest in 2001, 
34 Interview, Khalid Amyreh, 13 July 1999. 
35 Ibid. Despite its Islamic origins, Hamas sought to minimise ideological distance between itself and the PLO factions. 
Hamas shared an ideological proximity to Fateh (excluding its secular stance). Affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Harnas formed the hub of civic life in Gaza, filling the vacuum created amid Israeli suppression of the 
PLO and large-scale detentions of PLO affiliated Palestinians. 
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36 The Israeli policy of excluding the PLO was bolstered by the 1979 Israeli decision at Camp David and prompted by 
the search for alternatives to the PLO (Sayigh 1999: 629), to allow official registration of the Islamic complex while 
refusing permission for a secular university (MER 1993: 181). The Muslim Brotherhood established an Israeli 
authorised Islamic University founded with PLO assistance. In 1985-86, the PLO leadership attempted to gain control 
of the university by blocking payments from the higher education council which it dominated, and when that policy 
failed, established a branch of al-Azhar University. 
37 Inbari argues that the DFLP established the UNC, Mishal and Sela omit the pervasive factional control of 
the DFLP and attribute the creation of the UNC to Fateh directly. 
38 In a worrying development for the Tunis leadership often by the UNC 'inside' the West Bank and Gaza and in 
defiance of the leadership in Tunis. Alternatively, pamphlets were signed by the UNC with the PLO signature first 
signalling a Tunis led directive. 
39 The leaflet war escalated the degree to which pamphlets morphed into one another and secular Tunis leadership 
pamphlets cited Koranic verses with the same frequency of Hamas, as Fateh sought to retain its monopoly over 
ideology. Namely, the ability to manipulate the image of one's own organisation and that of the challenger not only in 
the minds of the other Arab elites (Walt 1990: 149) but also to the occupants of the West Bank and Gaza and was 
deemed a crucial source of power. 
40 Interview, Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999 
41 Unlike the PLO factions within the West Bank and Gaza (known as those 'inside'), removing the leaders did not 
decapitate Harnas (Khalidi 2002: 93). When more than 250 Hamas leaders were interned, a complete leadership 
replacement was established (Sayigh 1999). In contrast to the centralised structure of the bureaucratised PLO, when 
the initial Hamas leadership of Sheikh Yassin and six others increased, the overall leadership of Hamas was entrusted 
to a decentralised majlis shura or consultative council from both inside the West Bank and Gaza and from Amman and 
Damascus (Abu-Amr 1993: 14). 
42 Interview, Nabil Awaid, 4 August 1999. 
43 Interview, Karim Qais Abdul, I August 1999 
44 In August 1989, Arafat established two new posts, Fateh commander in chief and chairperson of the central 
committee, the votes for which were conducted separately from the election of the new central committee. Arafat was 
duly recorded as having been selected with a unanimous ovation to hold both posts (Sayigh 1999: 632-3). 
45 Interview, Khalid Amyreh, 13 July 1999. 
46 See AI Hadaf 17 May 1992. 
47 Interview, Hadr, Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999. 
48 The leadership attempted to endorse the perception domestically and internationally that it was indispensable to the 
resolution of this and every crisis; see Guelke (1999: 38). 
49 Arafat pleaded with the US via the local Palestinian negotiators in Washington to curtail the funding of Hamas but to 
no avail. 
50 Interview, Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999. 
51 The National Religious Party contained the land of Israel movement and advocated the maintenance of occupied 
land. 
52 Gush Emunim is 'the bloc of the faithful'. 
53 In the initial year of the uprising, the Israeli Defence Force's (IDF) response was characterised by confusion, 
bewilderment and an inability to act decisively (Hroub 2000: 201). 
54 Interview Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999; Interview Yoav Tsiddon-Chatto 15 September 1999. 
55 When the conflict escalated, Israel initially initiated legal proceedings against shopowners who adhered to strikes 
initiated by the Intifada's United National Command (UNQ of Palestinian groups. 
56 Interview, Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999. 
5' For an analysis of changing Israeli initiatives prior to Camp David, see also Ryan 1983. 
58 The kidnapping involved two Hamas operatives wearing skullcaps and offering two hitchhiking IDF soldiers a lift 
when they were subsequently killed and buried. It was the first example of a tactical shift for Hamas and the first 
armed assault of which Hamas was accused Interview Graham Usher 15 July 1999. 
59 The document arrived at was the 'Outline for Advancement of Negotiations between Likud and the PLO'. 
60 In 1986, $35 million was collected in permits and fees and travel taxes at the Jordan River bridges. The Bank of 
Israel reported that in the first year the Intifada cost Israel $650 million in export losses, reduced business sector 
production by 1.5 per cent, reduced Israel's trade surplus with the territories, and produced $180 million in 'nationally 
motivated' arson Sayigh 1999. 
61 Labour won 44 of the 120 parliamentary seats in the elections, Meretz with 12 seats and Shas with 6 seats. The 2- 
seat majority of the coalition was strengthened by the co-operation of the two Arab parties with a total of 5 
parliamentary seats. 
62 The territorial question in Israeli politics accounts in part for the uncodified nature of the Israeli constitution. 
Territoriality and the issue of how best to refer to God euphemistically referred to as 'the Rock' in Israeli 
documentation and the persistence of Israel's basic laws as the legal template of the state exemplify this division. 
63 Interview, Salim Tamari, 14 September 1999. 
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6' This clash of religious approach to the Israel i-Palestinian conflict overlooks the large Christian Palestinian 
population. 
65 The loan guarantees were required to assist in the accommodation of the newly arriving Soviet Jewish Alyiah. 
66 Interview, Martin Sherman, 5 September 1999. 
67 Instead, a network of collaborators was established Hamas countered with lynching and public executions of 
collaborators. 
68 Immediately prior to the signing of the Oslo 11 Accords, September 1995. 
69 Interview, Martin Sherman, 5 September 1999. 
70 Interview, Hadr Abdul Shafi 4 September and Martin Sherman, 5 September 1999. 
71 Interview, Martin Sherman, 5 September 1999. 
72 Abu Allah, the leader of the Palestinian Oslo 'delegation' said, 'I see you have placed great emphasis on security, 
that is acceptable to the chairman [Arafat]. ' See Savir 1998: 37. 
73 Interview, Yair Hirchfeld 3 September 1999. 
74 Interview, Yari Hirchfeld, 3 September, Hadr Abdul Shafi, 4 September 1999 Yosi Nevo 5 September 1999. 
75 Interview, Martin Sherman 5 September 1999; see also Savir 1998: 38. 
76 Interview, Martin Kramer 5 September 1999. 
77 Interview, Ron Pundac, 6 September 1999. 
78 Interview, Martin Kramer 5 September 1999 
5 The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement: a minimal inter-ethnic elite bargain 
1 See Tom Hadden and Kevin Boyle's Principles for a Lasting Peace, address to the Irish Association 
Annual Conference, Dun Laoghaire 14-16 October 1994, LHL P5973. 
2 The term security includes the military and political security situation within Northern Ireland as well as the political 
security or maintenance of the ethnic group elites positions. 
3 Interview, Garret FitzGerald, II November 1998. 
4 All interviews, Ray Bassett, Dermot Nally, Garret FitzGerald, November 9-11 1998. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Interview, Garret FitzGerald, II November 1998. 
7 Interview, Garret FitzGerald, II November 1998. 
' The Progressive Democratic Party emerged from the Fianna Fail party after the signing of the AIA when Charles 
Haughey the incumbent leaders of Fianna Fail was rivalled for the party leadership by Des O'Malley. 
9 Interview, II November 1998 
10 The principle of consent had been agreed upon by both governments in the Sunningdale Agreement of 1974. This 
was the first time the issue of consent had been agreed upon in an international intergovernmental agreement as 
opposed to ajoint communiqu6. 
II Article 2, Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985, Cmnd. paper no 9657. 
12 Article 2 (b) Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1985. 
13 Interview, Ray Bassett, 10 November 1998. 
14 Interviews, Ray Bassett 10, November, Garret FitzGerald II November, and Fergus Finlay 18 November 1998. 
15 Institute of Contemporary British History Witness Seminar archive of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, II June 1997. 
16 The wording 'a majority of the people' as opposed to 'the majority of the people' was crucial. Interview November 
1998. 
17 Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973. 
18 Article 2 Bunreacht na htireann, 1937 prior to amendment. 
19 Interview, Dermot Nally, 9 November 1998. 
20 The options were either power-sharing or an Irish government role in Northern Ireland but not both, see FitzGerald 
1992: 516. 
21 Mrs Thatcher quoted St Francis of Assisi on her election. See Ddil debates Vol. 23, Column 1063,29 May 1980. 
22 The Conservative party's stance on the Union was such that it had officially been called the Conservative and 
unionist party until 1974, after which time the unionist element of the party had the whip withdrawn. 
23 British Policy in Northern Ireland 1964-70, Witness Seminar, Institute of Contemporary British History Archive, 14 
January 1992 European Commission Offices 8 Storey's Gate, London. 
24 Interviews, Ray Bassett 9 and 10 November 1998; and Peter Brooke and Patrick Mayhew interviews II and 9 June 
1999. 
25 Interview, confidential source.. 
26 Liberal Party, 1979, election manifesto: 'The real fight is for Britain'. 
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27 See Fionnuala O'Connor, Argument Alarms Loyalists, Irish Times 13 March 1980, Loyalist members of 
the UDA believed that their existence would be used to bolster the contention that the Northern Ireland 
majority no longer determined to remain in the UK. 
28 The unionist fear of deception emanated from Unionists experience of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1938 which 
attempted to remedy among other outstanding 1921 Treaty issues the question of Irish deep water ports for use by the 
British navy. Interview Douglas Hurd, 19 August 2003. 
29 All interviews, November 1998. 
30 Institute for Contemporary British History archive, Witness Seminar, British Policy in Northern Ireland 1970-74,11 
February 1993, Kings College, London. 
31 Institutional divisions between bureaucratic offices being common, for Northern Irish Officials the claim that files 
could be 'for English eyes only' reinforced the cleavage. Interview, 20 July 1995. 
32 Interview, Peter Brooke II June 1999. 
33 Interview, Douglas Hurd 19 August 2003. 
34 Institute for Contemporary British History, Witness Seminar discussion, II June 1997, confirmed using Institute's 
documents on discussion, Northern Irish series, ICBH, Senate House, London, October 2003. 
35 See James Naughtie, 'The View from the Other End of the Telescope: Westminster Attitudes to the 
Agreement', Fortnight No. 245 November 1986 pp. 4-5. 
36 The summit was described as the teapot summit as Haughey presented Thatcher with a gift of a Georgian silver 
teapot, which exceeded the value for official gifts and so remained atNo. 10. 
37 Hansard V series, vol. 985, col. 250. 
38 See Haughey may offer Thatcher deal on North, Irish Times 19 May 1980 
39 Haughey was concerned about initiating dialogue on these issues and attempted to speak to the leader of the 
opposition Garret FitzGerald about it prior to the summit, hesitated and refrained at the last minute. See FitzGerald 
1991: 350. Interview, Garret FitzGerald, II November 1999. 
40 See Gibbons delays magazine account of the Arms Crisis Irish Times 23 May 1980 
41 Interview, Dermot Nally 9 November 1998. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Dail Debates, II December 1980, Vol. 325, col. 988. 
44 See David McKittrick Curious Silence has befallen the NIO Irish Times 24 May 1980 
45 Interviews, Dublin, November 1998-99 and Institute for Contemporary British History archive Witness Seminar, 
British Policy in Northern Ireland 1970-74,11 February 1993, Kings College, London. 
46 Fianna Fail's origins with Sinn Fein, the Easter Rising of 1916, the rejection of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, the 
subsequent civil war and the emergence of Fianna Fail in 1926 prepared to participate in the Free State government. 
The party's success is evident in its dominance of Irish party politics since. 
47 The election results awarded 84 seats to Fianna Fail, 43 to Fine Gael, 17 seats to the Labour party and independents 4 
of the 148 seat Ddil. 
48 The passing of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, also known as the fourth Home Rule Act or Better 
Government of Ireland Act or 'Partition Act', was facilitated by Sinn Fein's policy of abstention from Westminster. 
49 H. A. L. Fisher in a letter to Lloyd George, 19 May 1920 in Mansergh (1991: 143). 
50 TD is the abbreviation of Teachta Ddla and describes a member of the Ddil. 
51 Sinn Fein remained an abstentionist party only occasionally (1954) participating in elections. 
52 When asked to distinguish between Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, Barry Desmond TD replied, 'Them that know don't 
need to ask, and them that don't know don't need to know. ' 
53 Interview, David Andrews, 30 May 1998. 
54 In addition, Article 29 recognised the principles of international law and rules of conduct, advocating a more 
pragmatic nationalist reading of the Constitution. 
5 Preliminary draft of 1967 Constitutional committee's report, omitted from the final report, the suggested amendment 
to Article 3 was 'The Irish nation hereby proclaims its firm will that its territory be re-united in harmony and brotherly 
affection between all Irishmen. ' See Bowman (1989: 325). 
56 The Constitution read as follows: Article 44.1.2 The state recognises the special position of the Holy Catholic 
postolic and Roman Church as the guardian of thefaith professed by the great majority of the citizens. A 
5 The failure of the Stormont government to hold an inquiry into deaths caused by the security forces amidst violence 
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